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Marie-Eve Morin, In Memoriam: Jean-Luc Nancy (1940-2021)

Jean-Luc Nancy, Epekeina

Allegra de Laurentiis, An Early Translation of Aristotle's
De Anima by G.W.F. Hegel

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Aristoteles, *De Anima* III.4-5 /
Translation of *De Anima* III.4-5

Francisco J. Gonzalez, Introduction to Heidegger's 1921
Summer Semester Seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima*

Martin Heidegger, Übungen über Aristoteles, *De Anima* /
Seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima* (Summer Semester 1921)

Alejandro G. Vigo, Heidegger – *De Anima* SS 1921:
Presentation

Mark Shiffman, Comments on Heidegger's 1921 *De Anima*
Seminar

Diego De Brasi, Heidegger's 1921 Seminar on Aristotle's
De Anima: A Classicist's Point of View

Erick Raphael Jiménez, Commentary on Helene Weiss's Notes
on Heidegger's 1921 Summer Seminar on Aristotle

Abraham P. Bos, Aristotle's *Eudemus* as the Comprehensive
Framework of His *De Anima*

Gilbert Gérard, Hegel: Translator and Reader of Aristotle's
De Anima

John Sallis, Heidegger as Translator

Andrzej Serafin, Editorial Introduction 3

IN MEMORIAM

Marie-Eve Morin, In Memoriam: Jean-Luc Nancy (1940-2021). 5

Jean-Luc Nancy, Epekeina 8

PRESENTATIONS

Allegra de Laurentiis, An Early Translation of Aristotle's *De Anima* by G. W. F. Hegel 11

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Aristoteles, *De Anima* III.4-5 (429b22-430a25) 20

Translation of *De Anima* III.4-5 (429b22-430a25). 21

[Randbemerkungen] 28

[Remarks and Annotations]. 29

Translator's Remarks 32

Francisco J. Gonzalez, Introduction to Heidegger's 1921 Summer Semester Seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima* as Recorded in the Handwritten Notes of Helene Weiss and Oskar Becker 34

Martin Heidegger, Übungen über Aristoteles, *De Anima* (Sommersemester 1921). 38

Nachschriften von Helene Weiss 38

Nachschriften von Oskar Becker 39

Seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima* (Summer Semester 1921) 70

Notes by Helene Weiss. 70

Notes by Oskar Becker. 71

Editorial Notes

Editor's Notes to the Notes by Helene Weiss 104

Editors' and Translator's Notes to the Notes by Oskar Becker 105

ESSAYS

Alejandro G. Vigo, Heidegger – *De Anima* SS 1921: Presentation. 119

Mark Shiffman, Comments on Heidegger's 1921 *De Anima* Seminar 122

Diego De Brasi, Heidegger's 1921 Seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima*: A Classicist's Point of View 136

Erick Raphael Jiménez, Commentary on Helene Weiss's Notes on Heidegger's 1921 Summer Seminar on Aristotle 150

Abraham P. Bos , Aristotle's <i>Eudemus</i> as the Comprehensive Framework of His <i>De Anima</i> . . .	172
Gilbert Gérard , Hegel: Translator and Reader of Aristotle's <i>De Anima</i>	190
John Sallis , Heidegger as Translator.	205
Claudia Baracchi , Images, Offspring, and Hiding Places: Traces of the Good in Plato's Thought	210
Kevin Corrigan , Is the Idea of the Good beyond Being?	224

REVIEWS

Magdalena Mateja-Furmanik , Return of Nature: Return of Plato	234
Mieszko Wandowicz , Existence and Appearance: Two Aspects of Being	241
Justyna Horbowska , Ernst Bloch's Retrieval of Aristotelianism from Oriental Philosophy. . . .	245
Gabriel Pihás , The Political Philosophy of Images	249

ABOUT THE AUTHORS	255
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SUMMARY	258
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EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION



Universal history is the history of a few metaphors. One of them is “substance,” a term of ancient origin, now well assimilated in modern languages, transformed to the extent that one can hear of “substance abuse” and “substance-related disorders.” A long way separates us from the Latin meaning of the term, concocted to denote something underlying, standing below (*sub-stare*) all that exists, not yet specialized and narrowed by the materialist paradigm into a chemical, mind-altering drug that can be misused. Spinoza, to whom we owe the quaint identification “*Deus sive substantia*,”

defined it as “*id quod in se est*,” both “*causa sui*” and “*causa immanens*,” indwelling (*in-manere*) in all things, not merely underlying them. All these metaphors were initially neologisms, fresh, astounding ways of speaking that only with the passing of time became worn, faded, and lapsed, alienated by means of cross-linguistic mediations. This initial, founding moment of a metaphor, still susceptible to the conceptualized phenomenon, is mutilated or even entirely lost in the stabilized traditional forms, distant relatives of the primordial progenitor. Who nowadays can hear the echo of the original Greek οὐσία in the Latin substance? Why all the quarrels about the proper way of translating οὐσία, not as substance, but rather as *Beingness* or *Seiendheit*? Why does Heidegger need to stress in his 1921 *De Anima* seminar that “οὐσία is not substance” and that “one must especially guard oneself against translating οὐσία as substance” if not for the sake of disclosing its original meaning, occluded by the worn-out, traditional conceptuality? Perhaps one should not even blame Thomist realism for this, since the Greeks were already in perplexity regarding the meaning of οὐσία. Whence otherwise the γιγαντομαχία περὶ τῆς οὐσίας?

How to avoid this *aporia*? On the one hand, we have the tradition of trust in words, in their ability to disclose, to reveal things by naming their essence, thus co-creating it or even establishing it from scratch, as though things were merely means for the creative power of language to come about in its glory. This leads us, though, to an overconfidence in language, to its misuse and abuse, hence ultimately to the desperate call: *zurück zu den Sachen selbst!* This is the fate of Hofmannsthal’s Lord Chandos, who in his fictional letter admits to losing faith in language, having experienced “an inexplicable distaste for so much as uttering the words *spirit*, *soul*, or *body*” or any “abstract terms of which the tongue must avail itself as a matter of course in order to voice a judgment,” being able to name only concrete, material objects. But all words initially were metaphors rooted in everyday experience, even the most abstract concepts, and only for the sake of abstraction did they have to lose the primordial concreteness of a metaphorical image. On the other hand, we have the tradition of the Platonic criticism of writing, first developed in the *Phaedrus* and the *Seventh Letter*, emphasizing the limits of discourse, that which is beyond words, the unspoken, ἄρητον, although

not necessarily unspeakable, or “the unsaid in that which is said,” to use Heidegger’s phrase, pointing to the incipient, creative, poetic moment of words as metaphors. Perhaps this is what Hofmannsthal’s Chandos is facing when “something entirely unnamed, even barely nameable” reveals itself to him, and any particular object “can become the vessel of this revelation,” thus reaching the non-discursive goal of Platonic dialectics.

Still, there is another possibility, the most interesting for the purposes of discursive philosophizing: phenomenology understood as a philosophical method of *Wesensschau*, of an intuition, a glance (*Anschauung*) into the essence of things, mediated through language, of letting things speak; phenomenology both as a philosophical method and as a hermeneutics of interpreting ancient texts, of treating them as a kind of proto-phenomenology, perhaps even more radical than Husserl’s. This is how Heidegger conceived phenomenology: “as the self-manifestation of phenomena,” “thought more originally by Aristotle.” According to one of his students, W. R. Boyce Gibson, Heidegger claimed that “Aristotle [is] really in *De Anima* phenomenological (without the explicit reduction).” This claim is even more interesting when one realizes that *Dasein* is nothing but a phenomenological equivalent of the Greek ψυχή and that *Sein* (which, according to Heidegger, is the most proper translation of οὐσία) is only given as *Dasein*, as being-here, that is, ψυχή. *De Anima* is the crucial phenomenological treatise of the Aristotelian *Corpus* if we want to understand οὐσία not as an abstract term that has been defined in multifarious ways over the centuries but as that which is given to us as the being that we ourselves are. This is why, in the *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, Heidegger underscores that *De Anima* is “no psychology in the modern sense, but instead deals with the being of a human being (or of living beings in general) in the world.” It is an ontological treatise on being as being-here and being-such, that is, being alive, embodied, perceiving, thinking, and wanting: a treatise on *Sein* as *Dasein*. Or, to quote Hegel, a treatise on ψυχή, dealing “not with its Being” *in abstracto* but with “the particular manner of its *Wirksamkeit* (ἐνέργεια),” of its being-at-work (ἔργον), of being enacted as the physical organic body capable of life, as the self-determining universality in its facticity, in factual human life.

We would like to present for the first time the entire transcript of Heidegger’s 1921 *De Anima* seminar, one hundred years after it took place in Freiburg, his only systematic interpretation of this text, as recorded by Helene Weiss and Oskar Becker, both the German original and the English translation of Francisco Gonzalez. We have decided to supplement it by Hegel’s early translation of *De Anima* III.4-5, rendered into English by Allegra de Laurentiis. In a remarkable series of coincidences, all these texts have remained preserved in the form of unpublished manuscripts or in student’s notebooks not destined for publication, just like the original text, perhaps a draft of a lecture, several thoughts on the nature of the ψυχή jotted down by Aristotle in an obscure way, “just as in the temples, where curtains are used for the purpose of preventing everyone, and especially the impure, from encountering things they are not worthy of meeting [...] obscure as a veil, so that good people may for that reason stretch their minds even more, whereas empty minds that are lost through carelessness will be put to flight by the obscurity” (Ammonius). Published many centuries later, they became the subject of sublime debates, or even caused some to reach for extraordinary aid (Hermolaus Barbarus, as Heidegger remarks in his last Marburg lecture course, “compelled by his perplexity over the philosophical meaning of the term ἐντελέχεια, invoked the Devil to provide him with instruction”). Hopefully, these source texts and the accompanying studies will contribute to answering the perplexing question: τίς ἡ οὐσία?

Marie-Eve Morin

IN MEMORIAM: JEAN-LUC NANCY (1940-2021)

Jean-Luc Nancy passed away on August 23, 2021, at the age of 81. It is not an exaggeration to say that Nancy was one of the most formidable philosophers of our time. The breadth of his work and the profound impact of his thought on generations of philosophers cannot be captured in any short tribute. His work spans almost four decades and includes more than fifty authored or co-authored books in French and hundreds of contributions to journals, collected works, and art catalogues. Yet the sweep of Nancy's work is not best captured by the sheer number of books he penned but by the range of figures and topics he engaged with. He wrote on figures such as Descartes, Kant, and Schelling, as well as Hegel, Nietzsche, Marx, and Heidegger. He engaged contemporary French thinkers such as Lacan, Bataille, Blanchot, and of course Derrida. He wrote on topics as diverse as psychoanalysis, globalization, hermeneutics, community, Nazism, resurrection, Christian painting, German Romanticism, techno music, modern dance, and film.¹

Sifting through the numerous tributes that have appeared since his passing, we find Nancy being hailed as the thinker of freedom, of community, of politics, of sexuality, of religion, of the body, of touch, and of art. While Nancy certainly was all of this, he was first and foremost the thinker of the world, and of *our* world in all its complexity and volatility. This became even more obvious during the pandemic. Lockdowns and restrictions did not affect him as much as others: he had for a long time been forced to limit his travels and public appearances. In a sense, he became more present as all of us lived virtually,

¹ For a more detailed intellectual biography of Nancy, see the Introduction to my *Jean-Luc Nancy* (Cambridge: Polity, 2012).

and he was also one of the most perspicacious voices for those of us who were – and still are – trying to understand how this world could have been upended by this “all too human virus,” as he described it in one of his final essays.²

Despite its breadth and diversity, there is a core axiom that traverses all of Nancy’s thinking, that of being is essentially “being-with” or “being singular plural.” Being singular plural, which Nancy insisted must be written in one stroke without any punctuation, implies both that there is a plurality of singularities and that each singularity is itself plural so that its identity or selfhood can only be found in its “relations” to itself and to other singularities. A being only makes sense, only *means* something, through its exposure to an outside, where it senses itself as being. This means that nothing exists or makes sense in isolation and that sense always happens between singularities.

Nancy’s own philosophical practice embodied this understanding of sense as the sharing of voices. Even when he was teaching, he never professed truths *ex cathedra* but always acted as a conduit for the propagation of sense between himself and the text, and between himself and us, in the differences of voices. He spoke to professors, artists, students, children with the same respect and the same excitement. He could engage in careful academic discussions of Heidegger or Hegel but also walk on a stage and initiate a dialogue with children about God, love, or obedience. He wrote essays on the essence of art and also on specific art forms such as poetry, music, painting, and drawing, yet he could also engage actively with the artistic process itself. Among the most unconventional of his writings are those written in direct collaboration with artists to accompany a dance performance, an installation, or a series of lithographies. Here Nancy can hardly be said to take the work of art as an *object* of study or interpretation. Much more, we witness a thinking-in-common: the thinker thinks with the artist who creates with the thinker so that the thought is a response to the work as much as the work is a response to thought. In these texts, Nancy’s voice is often more poetic than didactic, not unlike what we find in the short philosophical fiction “Epekeina,” published in this issue.

Being singular plural also means that there is no such thing as a singularity that would only start making sense when it enters into a relation with others. At the heart of each singularity there is a *rift*, a spacing, an opening that essentially turns it inside out and exposes it to an outside so that this singularity feels itself – feels its interiority, so to speak – only from the outside. This thought, which Nancy developed in his major ontological works from the 1990s – first and foremost *Être singulier pluriel* (1996) but also *Une pensée finie* (1990) and *Le sens du monde* (1993) – was for Nancy more than an abstract philosophical premise. It was also a most intimate lived experience. Indeed, in the early 1990s, after suffering major health issues, Nancy was forced to receive a heart transplant, which was followed by a long-term fight with cancer and many other health issues. In *L’intrus*,³ Nancy offers a touching personal account of this ordeal, intertwined with philosophical reflections on selfhood, the integrity of the body, and the originary exposition of any self to what is foreign and heterogeneous. While these reflections can

² Jean-Luc Nancy, *Un trop humain virus* (Paris: Bayard, 2020).

³ Jean-Luc Nancy, *L’intrus* (Paris: Galilée, 2000) translated into English by R. Rand as “The Intruder,” in *Corpus* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008), 161-70.

certainly remind us of the fragility of human existence, they should not lead us to deplore the frailty of a body that puts the powerful mind of the philosopher at risk. Such dualistic thinking is quite foreign to Nancy's. Unlike so many other intellectuals, for Nancy it was not a brain or a head that thinks but a body – first and foremost a heart, always the heart of another. While one can get acquainted with Nancy's thinking by reading his more "serious" academic works, another, no less valuable entry point is the 2003 documentary, *Le corps du philosophe*,⁴ where we see Nancy swim in the sea, work in the garden, cut wood, visit his doctor.

Despite the essentially embodied nature of Nancy's thinking, it is still true that anyone who heard Nancy speak in the last few years of his life would have been struck by the incongruity between his frail stature and the robust vitality of his thinking. It was almost as though Nancy, who with his artificial heart, was, as he himself said, a cyborg, a zombie, had transcended bodily finitude. This is why, even though he was well aware – as were we – that he was living on borrowed time, his death came as a shock, an absolute surprise.

In October 2020, less than a year before his own death, Nancy wrote a short text titled "*Mort scandaleuse*."⁵ There, he speaks of some of his departed friends' attitudes toward death – Derrida, Lacoue-Labarthe, Lyotard, Hamacher. He reminds us that philosophy is not an antidote to death and that if "to philosophize is to learn to die" (*Phaedo*, 64a), this has nothing to do with knowledge or rational mastery. Death always remains surprising, shattering, aberrant. And he tells us, "All the consolations that memories, testimonies, and homages can procure ... do not ever change anything about the bite of definitive absence."

A few days after Derrida's death, in a short address to his departed friend published in *Libération*, Nancy reminded us that the time of mourning is not a time for analysis or discussion, and also not for what he called "affected tributes."⁶ It can, however, or rather it "must be, with you, *avec toi*, the time of a greeting: *salut*, farewell!" So let's bid this great thinker and generous man farewell in the way in which he would have wished:

Salut à toi, Jean-Luc!

⁴ Marc Grün, director, *Le corps du philosophe* [documentary], Le Meilleur des Mondes Productions, France 3 Alsace, TV 10 Angers (2003); <https://www.capuseen.com/films/582-jean-luc-nancy>.

⁵ Forthcoming in English translation in *Angelaki* 27, no. 1 (2022).

⁶ Jean-Luc Nancy, "Salut à toi, salut aux aveugles que nous devenons!" *Libération*, 11 October 2004; https://www.liberation.fr/evenement/2004/10/11/salut-a-toi-salut-aux-aveugles-que-nous-devenons_495374/.

EPEKEINA

I

On this summer day, old Ousia sits on her bench by the roadside. The shade of the plane tree cools the air around her. Behind her, the chickens and goats go about their ordinary little ways, and Socrates, the dog, sleeps. Ousia does not sleep, but she is groggy; she stares sightlessly at the olive grove across the road. Uncertain thoughts cross her mind and pass through without stopping. There was the very ancient past when she had arrived from a foreign land whose name, language, and color she had forgotten. There were wars, columns of men on the road covered in sweat, leather and bronze, and the injured one who had fallen before her. She never could recall his Barbarian name; he had left after a month. After nine, she had had her daughter.

So it is that today the dust rises on the road from the direction of Kifissia. But it is not a great cloud, only two men, carrying neither bags nor walking sticks. Yet they must already have covered a long distance, judging by the dust on their sandals and on their legs. From the moment she can make out their features, Ousia knows that she does not know them. They are not from here. Where might they have come from?

“Hello, grandmother,” says the taller of the two men, also the older.

“Hello,” repeats the boy who accompanies him.

“Are you seeking your way?” asks Ousia.

“No, we are seeking someone, a young girl who is supposed to live around here. Her name is Epekeina. Do you know her, by chance?”

“Do I know her! She is my daughter, my good sir. What do you want with her?”

“We were told that she holds secrets – hidden science from Egypt, magic from Persia ...”

“And above all,” adds the boy, “the secret of traveling very far, of seeing very far, further than the stars.”

“My boy,” says Ousia, “there is nothing out there. And besides, why would you want to go very far?”

“To get to the end.”

“This is the end: you see, I am living out my last days on my bench, under my plane tree.”

“But your daughter?” continues the old man. “Your Epekeina?”

“She is not here.”

“When will she return?”

“I do not know. She does not return often, and when she does, she leaves at once. She is always elsewhere. Sometimes a messenger brings me a tessera bearing an E for her name or else a broken ring, and I know that she will arrive within a few months. But oftentimes I know nothing. I do not worry. She is very resourceful. But she has neither secrets nor magic – that much I can tell you.”

“We will see,” says the man. And they resume their journey as the sun begins to set.

II

When the sun disappeared, Ousia went back to her house. In the growing twilight, there glowed the dying embers of a stove where a kettle of beans and onions simmered. Ousia rekindled the fire and placed her dinner plate on the table. She was about to pour her vegetable stew when she heard the door creaking. She was not surprised; she knew at once that only her daughter could come in like that, unannounced and without knocking. Besides, Epekeina often returned at dusk.

“My daughter! I was about to eat; there is some for you.”

“Good thing, Mother; I am a bit hungry.”

“Have you come from far? Have you walked much?”

“A little, yes ...”

In truth, Epekeina had not come a great distance. She left her mother in the dark; in fact, she never went further than the little mountain nearby. She did not have to go anywhere else to find the distant countries whose unusual customs she relayed to her mother and whose forests, cities, and temples she described: there, indeed, in a discreet cave on the mountainside, Epekeina could contemplate their images, animated and projected on a shimmering screen as she pleased. It was the lair of a magician named Diotima, who was said to have come from Egypt with the science of spells and images. Diotima had disappeared long ago – perhaps she had always been a mere legend – but the screen was still there, and in the obscurity of the cave, uninterrupted, it received the sights, the figures and movements, the likenesses of all lands and of all peoples. On it were even projected the dizzying expanses of the spheres that surrounded the earth, bathed in the pure music of their eternal silence. Right here, in this place, Epekeina traveled to the ends of worlds and multiverses.

For some time now, she had also been visited by a young man there. His name was Eros; he was young – he had just turned eighteen. Eros, too, had discovered the entrance to the cave hidden beneath the bushes. He was clever and had devised ways of influencing the procession of images, suspending it, reversing its course, and producing upon it new forms whose shapes and colors he thought up. Sometimes he appeared on the screen himself in the form of a phoenix or of a traveling acrobat.¹ Epekeina was amused, surprised, enchanted by it all.

¹ Translators’ note: Nancy’s word here is “*saltimbanque*,” which is difficult to render into English. The term has been recorded in the French language since the seventeenth century. It derives from the Italian “*saltare in banco*,” which means “to jump on a bench/on a platform.”

She knew that Ousia could not understand the appeal of this beautiful world, hidden from the world at the heart of the nearest hill. She knew that it was better to let her rest peacefully in her old age. She used to say to Eros, “From here, we go everywhere, anywhere.”

“And what is even better,” replied the young man, “is that we go nowhere else but here.”

Translated by Philippe-Antoine Hoyeck and Antoine Pageau-St-Hilaire

Allegra de Laurentiis

AN EARLY TRANSLATION OF ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA* BY G. W. F. HEGEL

INTRODUCTION

The following is the first translation into English of a very early Hegelian translation of the second half of *De Anima*'s chapter 4 and the whole of chapter 5 in Book III (*DA* 429b22-430a25). The translation offered here is based on the transcription of Hegel's manuscript edited by Klaus Grotzsch.¹

Hegel's translation is in all probability based on the so-called *Basileensis tertia* edition of Aristotle's work (Basel, 1550). As Karl Ludwig Michelet, first editor of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, commented in 1833, Hegel "used to say that others had had an easier time in the study of Aristotle; he had let it become a bitter pill, having had to gather the deeper sense of Aristotle from the illegible Basel edition, without Latin translation."²

Hegel's translation has the character of an unfinished, somewhat unpolished, even rushed yet never crude template for the kind of expansive lecturing for which he is famous. When in doubt, Hegel clings to a hyperliteral rendition of the Greek – an

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke* [GW], vol. 10, 2: *Nürnberger Gymnasialkurse und Gymnasialreden 1808-1816*, Nordrhein-Westphälische Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: Meiner, 2006), 517-21. My thanks go to Dr. Grotzsch for his invaluable help in deciphering and interpreting passages of this manuscript.

² G. W. F. Hegel's *Werke: Vollständige Ausgabe durch einen Verein von Freunden des Verewigten*, vol. 13 (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1832-45), xiv-xv.

occasionally felicitous choice in German, an almost invariably disastrous one in English. As shown by the accompanying remarks in Hegel's hand (here translated following the main text), he probably prepared this translation for use in high-school classes taught at the Nürnberg Gymnasium (today's Melanchthon-Gymnasium Nürnberg) between 1808 and 1816, although one cannot exclude, as Grottsch explains,³ a later time of origination in Berlin. For stylistic and other reasons, Walter Kern, first to publish an in-depth analysis of this manuscript in 1961, dated it to the beginning of Hegel's Jena period, preferably around 1805. More recent research shows this to be mistaken.⁴ A strong indication of the scholastic-didactic purpose of this text is that Hegel's glosses, aside from a few concise elaborations of conceptual issues, mostly consist of exemplifications and notes on Greek conjugations, suffixes, and declensions – that is, of materials that are only grammatically connected to Aristotle's text and unlikely to have been relevant or useful in a university lecture.

There exist other partial translations of *De Anima* by Hegel, notably those from the Aristotle section of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* held in Heidelberg (academic years 1816/17 and 1817/18) and then seven more times in Berlin (between 1819 and 1831). With the exception of an introduction to the Heidelberg lectures ("Heidelberger Niederschrift," 1816) and another introduction written for the Berlin lectures ("Berliner Niederschrift," 1820), all of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* available to us are transcriptions in students' hands. The only extant manuscripts on the history of philosophy in Hegel's hand are those contained in a notebook from the Jena period ("Jena Heft," 1805-6) and an abridgment he used for lecturing in Heidelberg ("Heidelberger Abriss," 1816-18) and then in Berlin until his death on November 14, 1831.

Hegel's paraphrases and translations of *De Anima* passages in these lectures have the expressed purpose of informing his audience, illustrating a conceptual point, or corroborating the interpretation provided. They are linguistically far more polished than the translations of the same Greek passages presented here. They are already known to Anglophone scholars through two available translations. The oldest one by Haldane and Simson is based on Michelet's 1833-36 edition in the *Werke*.⁵ Michelet's text was a somewhat questionably assembled compilation of transcriptions by several students, including Michelet himself. The more recent and scholarly English edition is Brown's, and it is based on the Berlin cycle of lectures of the year 1825-26.⁶

By reason of the intrinsic interest of Hegel's reliance on ancient Greek thought in general (Platonic, Aristotelian, Stoic), of his affinity with (and partiality to) Aristotle's work in particular, of his explicit modeling of *Geist* on the Aristotelian *voûç*, and of the modifications that his *De Anima* renditions underwent over time, the early manuscript of uncertain date presented here is not insignificant for Hegel scholarship. Those interested in the development

³ GW 10, 2: 1002.

⁴ See W. Kern, "Eine Übersetzung Hegels zu *De Anima* III, 4-5," in *Hegel-Studien* 1 (1961): 49-88; and Walter Grottsch, GW 10, 2: 1002.

⁵ Elizabeth S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, *Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, 3 vols. (London: Kegan Paul, 1892-96).

⁶ *G. W. F. Hegel: Lectures on the History of Philosophy 1825-6*, ed. Robert F. Brown, trans. R. F. Brown and J. M. Stewart with the assistance of H. S. Harris, 3 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2009).

of Hegel's grasp and interpretation of Aristotelian psychology and metaphysics may now compare the manuscript translation offered here with the Haldane/Simpson or, preferably, the Brown translations of corresponding passages in the Aristotle lectures.

In all, Hegel's interpretation of pivotal concepts such as φύσις, νοῦς, νόησις, ψυχή, and ἐντελέχεια, as well as of conceptual pairs such as potency and actuality, matter and form, does not seem to undergo radical changes over time, though one will find plenty of differences in terminology and, on occasion, in conceptuality: the translated *De Anima* passages from the lectures are not identical twins of those from the manuscript presented here. Certainly, Hegel's understanding of Aristotle's text becomes more refined as time passes – or it becomes perhaps more Hegelian, as critics would argue. Be this as it may, Hegel's appraisal of the groundbreaking role of *De Anima* in the history of philosophy becomes if anything more enthusiastic as time passes, an enthusiasm best summarized in this opening passage from the *Encyclopaedia's* "Introduction to the Philosophy of Spirit" (1830): "Aristotle's books on the soul with his treatments of its particular aspects and conditions are ... still the prime or sole work of speculative interest about this subject matter" (sec. 378). The justification for this almost rhapsodic assessment follows immediately in the same passage: "The essential end of a philosophy of spirit can only be the re-introduction of the Concept in the knowledge of spirit, hence also a new unlocking of the sense of those Aristotelian books." Not a decade later, a twenty-two year old Karl Marx would insert an equally ardent comment in his own excerpts and translation of the *De Anima* (1840): "Aristotle's profoundness stirs up in a stunning way the most speculative questions. He is a kind of treasure seeker. Wherever in brushwood and chasms there springs a living fount, that is where his divining rod points to without fail."⁷

To various degrees, Hegel's translations of the Greek text, even partial ones like the following, exemplify his endeavor to detect the wellspring of spirit in the self-moving, self-reproducing, perceiving, and imagining soul of nature precisely by unlatching and releasing the meaning of "thinking," or νοῦς, from Aristotle's treatise. Some would say that the endeavor is a very successful one; others, that it is mainly self-interested. Unprejudiced and close readers of both philosophers will probably conclude that it is both things at once.

NOTES

(i) Hegel's manuscript consists of a two-leaved, four-sided paper in folio form, folded vertically to form two columns on each leaf. The translation of *De Anima* 429b22-430a25 (i.e., the second half of chapter 4 and the whole of chapter 5 in Book III) is on the right-hand column of the manuscript. On the left-hand column, often intruding into the right half and wherever else there is space on the page, one finds Hegel's notes and remarks (translated here as well).

(ii) Hegel's substantivation of the verb "denken" into "das Denken," which he uses as a synonym for intellect or νοῦς, has been rendered throughout with lowercase "thinking" because in this particular text the word appears in verb form only once and then in the untranslatable impersonal passive form: "... [daß] nicht immer gedacht wird...."

⁷ Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe (MEGA), vol. 4 (Berlin: Dietz, 1976), 1, 163.

which, despite changing the active Greek verb (μὴ ἄει νοεῖν) into a passive form, has the advantage of avoiding any reference to a subject of this activity, mirroring Aristotle's a-subjective, impersonal formulation. The English "it is not being thought always" would be far too awkward, not to mention misleading. Hence even in this case I have opted for "thinking": "thinking does not always happen."

(iii) In keeping with the customary translation of "*Bestimmung*" and its cognates in Hegel's works, this is translated here throughout with "determination" and cognates. Of course, Hegel's use here is mostly restricted to the connotation of "determination" most appropriate to the text in question – namely, "affection." (In one instance, Hegel himself writes "*Bestimmt*" in parenthesis as a synonym for "*Afficirt*.")

(iv) Hegel's use of "*N.*" has been replaced by Grotzsch throughout the GW edition with "*Nus*" (Hegel's usual orthography). To enhance clarity for the English reader, all instances of *Nus* have been replaced with νοῦς.

(v) Words and expressions in parentheses are Hegel's; those in square brackets are mine. In many cases, these additions are rendered necessary by the ubiquitous neutral gender "it" in English. Hegel need not repeat "*Geist*" (nor *Nus* or *N.*) in passages where the masculine singular pronoun "*er*" suffices for German readers to unambiguously identify the referent. Readers of an English text do not have this luxury when the referent of "it" may apply to a number of preceding substantives.

(vi) The occasionally haphazard punctuation in the manuscript, typical of a lively but hurried jotting down of notes for use in oral delivery, has been retained as far as possible; in a few cases, it has been adapted to normal (German and English) use.

(vii) At many junctures, Hegel's manuscript ignores German capitalization rules. For example: "*das denkbare [sic] ist nur eines seinem Begriffe (Gattung, allgemeinen [sic]) nach*" (first leaf, side 1). The decision to translate certain terms as nouns or adjectives has been made based on context and on comparison with the Greek text.

(viii) Hegel's employment of Latin expressions (*actu*, *potentia*) has been retained. His Greek misspellings have been faithfully reproduced.

Hegel's Nachlass 15, VII, 1, no. 6: Translation of Aristotle, *De Anima* III 4-5
2 negative copies on document paper in quarto (four pages) cut in 5.5 cm wide stripes

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ARISTOTELES, *DE ANIMA* III.4-5 (429B22-430A25)

^aI.

^bAristoteles de Anima III

4. Απορησείτε – 5.

DA III.4 429b22: ἀπορήσεται δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθές καὶ μηθεὶς μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστὶν (ἢ γὰρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν), ἔτι δ' εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός;

Man möchte aber fragen, wenn 'der Nus einfach ist, von aussen nicht bestimmt, und nicht mit irgend etwas in Gemeinschaft^d steht, nach Anax[agoras], wie^e ist das Denken möglich, da das Denken, ein Afficirt- (Bestimmt-) 'werden ist^f. Denn insofern Etwas ^bein gemeinsames von beyden (von zweyen) ist, so ist es nach einer Seite passiv, nach der andern activ. – ⁱÜber dem aber, da der Nus selbst ein denkbare Object ist; wie das Denken möglich!?

DA III.4 429b27: ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητὸς, ἐν δὲ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἶδει, ἢ μεμιγμένον τι ἔξει, ὃ ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τᾶλλα.

^jInsofern muß *entweder* der Nus auch dem Andern (aussern Gegenständen) inhäriren; – wenn er nicht auf eine andere ^kWeise ein denkbare ist; aber das denkbare ist nur eines s[einem] Begriffe (Gattung, allgemeinen) nach. Oder wird er etwas Vermischtes haben, was ihn zu einem Denkbaren Gegenstande macht, wie die andern ^lDinge².

¹ G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke*, Bd. 19, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie* II (Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp 1972), 214 [= *VGP* II]: „»Wenn das Denken einfach, nicht passiv ist und nichts Gemeinschaftliches mit Anderem hat« (sondern nur für sich ist, indem es Anderes zum Seinigen macht; das Andere ist nur Schein), »wie soll dann gedacht werden, da etwas denken selbst auch Passivität ist«, [...] »Denn insofern etwas Zweien gemeinschaftlich, so scheint das eine zu tun, das andere passiv sich zu verhalten.«”

² *VGP* II, 214: „»Ferner schon, wenn er selbst gedacht, denkbar ist, so gehört er anderen Dingen an, ist außer ihm selbst oder wird etwas Gemischtes an ihm haben, das ihn zu einem Gedachten (Objekte) macht wie die anderen Dinge«, – er erscheint als Gegenstand, als Anderes.“

TRANSLATION OF *DE ANIMA* III.4-5 (429B22-430A25)

^aI.

^bAristotle, *De Anima* III

4. Απορησείτε – 5.

DA III.4 429b22: ἀπορήσεται δ' ἂν τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἀπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθὲν μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν Ἀναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσεται, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί ἐστὶν (ἢ γὰρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν), ἔτι δ' εἰ νοητὸς καὶ αὐτός;

One might ask, however, if ‘νοῦς is simple, not determined from the outside, and having nothing in common^d with anything, according to Anaxagoras, *how*^e is thinking possible, as thinking is a ^f‘becoming affected (determined)^g. For insofar as something ^his common to both (to two), it is on the one hand passive, on the other active. – ⁱBut in addition, since νοῦς itself is a thinkable object; how [is] thinking possible?¹

DA III.4 429b27: ἢ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις νοῦς ὑπάρξει, εἰ μὴ κατ' ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητὸς, ἐν δὲ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἶδει, ἢ μεμιγμένον τι ἔξει, ὃ ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ τᾶλλα.

^jAccordingly, *either* νοῦς must also inhere in the other (in external objects); – unless it is a thinkable in another ^kway; and yet the thinkable is such only according to its concept (genus, universal) – or it will have an admixture, which renders it a thinkable object like [all] the other ^lthings.²

¹ “Aristotle, raising difficulties, goes on to ask, ‘If reason is simple and unaffected by impressions, and has nothing in common with other objects, how can it think, since thinking is certainly a state of receptivity?’ [...] ‘For it is when two objects have something in common that the one appears to produce and the other to receive an impression,’” trans. E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson (henceforth all translations in footnotes by these two authors unless noted otherwise).

² “[...] There is a further difficulty, whether understanding can itself be the object of thought. In that case understanding would either be inherent in other things – unless it is the object of thought in a different sense from that in which other things are so, but there is only one sense in which things can be objects of thought – or, on the other hand, it would have something compounded with it, making it an object of thought as other things are [...]”

DA III.4 429b29: ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς ἔστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεῖα οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῆῃ

Oder ist er *rein* so findet *nun* die Passivität Statt nach der Gemeinschaftlichkeit, Allgemeinheit. Deßwegen ist vorhin ^mbestimmt worden, daß der Nus der Möglichkeit (Potenz)^l nach dasⁿ denkbare Object ist, ^oaber in der Wirklichkeit ist er nichts, eh er denkt³.

DA III.4 429b31: δυνάμει δ' οὕτως ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μὴ ἐνυπάρχει ἐντελεχεῖα γεγραμμένον· ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ.

Es muß daher nichts darauf seyn, wie ^pauf einer Schreibtafel, auf der nichts der Wirklichkeit nach eingeschrieben ist; diß ist aber der Fall beym Nus⁴. –

DA III.4 430a2: καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὰ νοητὰ.

Er selbst ist ferner auch ein denkbare Object, wie die denkbaren Objecte überhaupt⁵;

DA III.4 430a3: ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοοούμενον·

denn im Immateriellen, ist das Denken und das Gedachte dasselbe⁶;

DA III.4 430a4: ἢ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἢ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν

wie denn die theoretische Wissenschaft und das Gewußte ein und dasselbe ist⁷. –

DA III.4 430a5: τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον·

Die Ursache aber daß nicht immer ^qgedacht wird, ist zu untersuchen (betrachten).

DA III.4 430a6: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστον ἔστι τῶν νοητῶν.

In dem Materiellen ist jedes nur der Möglichkeit nach eines ^rder denkbaren, Gedachten⁸;

³ VGP II, 214: „»Deswegen ist vorhin unterschieden worden: daß das Denken der Möglichkeit nach alles Gedachte (νοητὰ, Seiende) ist«, [...] »Aber zugleich ist er der Wirklichkeit nach nichts, ehe gedacht worden.«”

⁴ VGP II, 214: „»Der νοῦς ist wie ein Buch (ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ), auf dessen Blätter nichts wirklich geschrieben ist.«”

⁵ VGP II, 215: „[...] »der νοῦς selbst ist auch denkbar (νοητός), Gedachtwerdendes [...]«”

⁶ VGP II, 215: „[...] »Denn in dem, was ohne Materie ist« (im Geiste), »ist das Denkende« (das Subjektive) »und das Gedachtwerdende« (Objektive) »dasselbe [...]«”

⁷ VGP II, 215: „[...] die theoretische Wissenschaft und das Gewußtwerdende ist dasselbe [...]«”

⁸ VGP II, 215: „[...] »In dem, was materiell ist, ist das Denken nur der Möglichkeit nach [...]«”

DA III.4 429b29: ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πῶς ἐστὶ τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς, ἀλλ' ἐντελεχεία οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῆι·

Or it is in the *now* so that the passivity takes place *now* on account of communality, universality. This is why it has been previously ^mestablished that νοῦς is theⁿ thinkable object according to possibility (potency),¹ ^obut in actuality it is nothing before it thinks.³

DA III.4 429b31: δυνάμει δ' οὕτως ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματεῖῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ἐνυπάρχει ἐντελεχεία γεγραμμένον· ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ.

Therefore there must be nothing on it [just] as ^pupon a writing tablet on which nothing is actually inscribed; this, however, is the case with νοῦς. –⁴

DA III.4 430a2: καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά.

Furthermore, it is itself also a thinkable object, like thinkable objects in general;⁵

DA III.4 430a3: ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ νοοῦμενον·

for in things immaterial, thinking and what is thought is the same;⁶

DA III.4 430a4: ἢ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἢ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶν

just as also theoretical knowledge and what is known is one and the same.⁷ –

DA III.4 430a5: τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον·

Yet one has to inquire (consider) the reason why ^othinking does not always take place.

DA III.4 430a6: ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστον ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν.

In things material it is only according to possibility that each is one ^of the thinkables, thoughts;⁸

³ “[...] Now it has been already said that passivity is so determined that understanding is in potentiality all that thought is exercised on; but at the same time it is in actuality nothing before the exercise of thought.”

⁴ “[...] Reason is like a book upon whose pages nothing is actually written [...]”

⁵ “Understanding itself can enter thought, like the objects of thought in general [...]”

⁶ “[...] For in that which is without matter (in mind), the thinker (the subjective) and the thought (the objective) are the same [...]”

⁷ “[...] theoretical knowledge and that which comes to be known are the same [...]”

⁸ “[...] In that which is material, thinking is only in potentiality [...]”

DA III.4 430a7: ὥστ' ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρξει.

so daß der Nus ihnen nicht zukommt; denn der Nus ist die Möglichkeit derselben, aber ohne Materie. Ihm aber kommt es zu, ein denkbarer Gegenstand zu seyn⁹.

DA III.5 430a10: Ἐπεὶ δ' [ὥσπερ] ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ [τι] τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἢ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς·

⁹Da aber Wie in aller Natur, etwas ist, theils die Materie jedes Geschlechts; (diese ist das, was potentia jenes alles ist) theils aber das Ursachliche und Thätige, (was der Activität nach Alles ist) so etwas wie 'die Kunst sich zur Materie verhält, so müssen auch in der Seele diese Unterschiede Statt finden¹⁰.

DA III.5 430a14: καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα.

So nun ist der Nus beschaffen einerseits "dadurch, daß er alles wird, andererseits daß er alles macht, als ein thätiges 'Wesen; wie das Licht; denn auf eine gewisse Weise macht auch das Licht "die nur der Potenz nach seyende Farben zu actu Farben¹¹; –

DA III.5 430a17: καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστός καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὦν ἐνέργεια·

Und diß ist der Nus, nemlich der abstracte¹¹ und unvermischte und nicht von anderem bestimmbare, der seiner Substanz nach actu ist¹². –

DA III.5 430a18: ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης.

denn das Active ist "durchaus vortrefflicher als das Passive, und das Princip als die Materie¹³.

⁹ VGP II, 215: „» [...] so daß ihm die Vernunft nicht selbst zukommt; denn der νοῦς ist eine Möglichkeit ohne Materie.«”

¹⁰ VGP II, 216: „»Weil aber in aller Natur eine Seite ist, die Materie in jedem Geschlecht, weil alles der Möglichkeit nach ist, was es ist, – ein anderes die Ursache und das Tätige, was alles tut, wie die Kunst sich zur Materie verhält, so ist nötig, daß auch in der Seele dieser Unterschied [...]«”

¹¹ VGP II, 216: „» [...] Es ist also ein solcher Verstand (νοῦς) fähig, alles zu werden, ein anderer aber, alles zu machen (ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν), wie eine wirksame Kraft (ἕξις)« (ἕξις ist nicht ein einzelnes Tun) »wie das Licht; denn auf gewisse Weise macht das Licht die der Möglichkeit nach seienden Farben so erst zu wirklichen Farben [...]«”

¹² VGP II, 216: „» [...] Dieser« (tätige) »νοῦς ist an und für sich (χωριστός), unvermischt, und nicht passiv, da er der Substanz nach die Tätigkeit ist [...]«”

¹³ VGP II, 216: „» [...] Denn das Tuende ist immer geehrter als das Leidende, – das Prinzip [geehrter] als die Materie [...]«”

DA III.4 430a7: ὥστ' ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης δύναμις ὁ νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ νοητὸν ὑπάρξει.

so that νοῦς does not belong to them; for νοῦς is their possibility, but without matter. To it, however, it properly belongs to be a thinkable object.⁹

DA III.5 430a10: Ἐπει δ' [ὥσπερ] ἐν ἀπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστὶ [τι] τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἐκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὁ πάντα δυνάμει ἐκείνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν, τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἢ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας τὰς διαφοράς·

⁹But since in all of nature each something is [*etwas ist*] in part the matter of each kind (this matter being what it all is *potentia*) but in part the causal principle and agent (which in terms of its activity is everything), about in the way in which 'art relates to matter, these differences must also obtain in the soul this way.¹⁰

DA III.5 430a14: καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς· τρόπον γὰρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργεῖα χρώματα.

Hence νοῦς consists, ⁹on the one hand, in becoming everything, and on the other hand, in making everything, as an active ⁹entity; like light; for in a certain way even light makes ⁹only potentially existing colors into colors *actu*;¹¹ –

DA III.5 430a17: καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγής, τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὦν ἐνεργεῖα·

And this is νοῦς, namely the abstract¹¹ and unmixed and undeterminable by another, [one] which in terms of its substance is *actu*. –¹²

DA III.5 430a18: ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης.

for the active is ⁹entirely superior to the passive, and the principle [is superior] to the matter.¹³

⁹ “[...] so that understanding itself does not belong to it; for understanding is a potentiality without matter [...]”

¹⁰ “In nature as a whole there is present in every species of things, on the one hand, matter, which in potentiality is the whole of this species, and, on the other hand, cause and energy, operative in all things, in the same way that art is related to matter. It therefore necessarily follows that in the soul also these different elements should be present [...]”

¹¹ “[...] The faculty of understanding is thus, in one view of it, the capacity of becoming all things; but in another view it is the capacity of creating all things, as is done by an efficient power (ἕξις), light, for instance, which first causes the colours which exist in potentiality to exist in reality [...]”

¹² “[...] This understanding is absolute (χωριστός), uncompounded, and not influenced from without, as it is essentially activity [...]”

¹³ “[...] For the active is always more in honour than the passive, and the principle more in honour than the matter that it forms [...]”

DA III.5 430a19: τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἢ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι ἢ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλωσ δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ.

Das Wissen, das actu Wissen ist, ist dasselbe mit der Sache; das Wissen, das aber nur potentia ist, ist der Zeit nach früher in dem Einen^v; überhaupt aber auch nicht der Zeit nach; man kann nicht von ihm absolut betrachtet sagen, daß er das einmal denke, das andermal nicht¹⁴.

DA III.5 430a22: χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδιδόν (οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός)· καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

Aber nur abstract^{IV} ist er das, was er ist; und nur dieses ist unsterblich und ewig wir haben aber kein Bewußtseyn, daß^v dieser von anderem unbestimmbar ist, der bestimmbare Nus aber ist vergänglich und denkt ohne diesen nichts^{15, VI}.

¹⁴ *VGP* II, 216: „» [...] Die Wissenschaft der Wirksamkeit nach ist dasselbe, was die Sache selbst (πρᾶγμα); die aber der Möglichkeit nach« (äußerer Verstand, Vorstellung, Empfindung) »ist wohl der Zeit nach früher in dem absolut Einen, an sich (ὅλωσ) aber auch nicht der Zeit nach: es ist nicht so, daß es bald denkt, bald nicht [...]«^v»

¹⁵ *VGP* II, 216: „» [...] Wenn der (tätige) νοῦς an und für sich ist (χωρισθεὶς), ist er allein das, was ist; und dies allein ist ewig und unsterblich. Wir erinnern uns aber nicht, weil dies nicht passiv ist; der passive Verstand ist vergänglich, und ohne diesen denkt er nichts.«^v»

DA III.5 430a19: τὸ δ' αὐτὸ ἐστὶν ἡ κατ' ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγματι ἢ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ ἐνί, ὅλωσ δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅτε μὲν νοεῖ ὅτε δ' οὐ νοεῖ.

Knowing which is knowing *actu* is the same as the thing [known]; but knowing which is only *potentia* is temporally prior in the one;^{y, III} but in general [it is] not even temporally [prior]; one cannot say of it [νοῦς], considered absolutely, that it thinks at one time and not at another.¹⁴

DA III.5 430a22: χωρισθεὶς δ' ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ' ὅπερ ἐστὶ, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ αἰδίδιον (οὐ μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός)· καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ.

Rather, only when abstract^{IV} is it, what it is; and only this is immortal and eternal [.] We however are not aware that^V this is undeterminable by another, while the determinable νοῦς is perishable, and thinks nothing without this.^{15, VI}

¹⁴ “[...] Knowledge, when in active exercise, is identical with the thing (πρᾶγμα) known; but what is in potentiality (that is, external reason, imagination, sense-perception) is certainly prior in respect of time in one and the same individual, but in the universal (ὅλωσ) it is not even so in respect of time. Active understanding is not such that it sometimes thinks and sometimes does not [...]”

¹⁵ “[...] When it [active understanding – Ed.] is absolute, it is the one and only existence; and this alone is eternal and immortal. We, however, do not remember this process, because this understanding is unaffected from without; but the passive understanding is transitory, and without the former it is incapable of thought.”

IRANDBEMERKUNGEN

- a. ἀπορησειεν (regelmäßig ἀπορησαιμι, αις, αι) kein Augment, weil Optativ.
 sing sec. ειας
 – 2 ειε
 pl. 3 ειαν
 πασχω aus πηθω, επαθον; von πενθω fut. πεισομαι statt πενσομαι, ν vor Consonant
 in ει (wie σπενδω fut. σπεισω)

- b. I. Wie bestimmt sich das Denken, da es einfach, unafficirt, ungemeinschaftlich ist,
 und doch Passivität in sich schließt (Passivität aber kommt dem Gemeinschaftlichen
 zu), da es sogar selbst denkbare Object ist.
 Aristoteles fragt wie muß das Andersseyn, die Passivität des Nus gefaßt werden.
 Wie bestimmt sich das Denken, da es einfach und unafficirt und ungemeinschaftlich
 ist; und doch Passivität in sich schließt, so gar da es selbst denkbare Object ist.

- c. ἐνδεδελεχεια, Fortdauer. ἐντελεχεος ἐχω vollkommen
 Princip der Bewegung;

- d. nicht verbunden ist,

- e. wie ist das Denken näher zu bestimmen

- f. Passivität in sich schließt.

- g. weil Passivität statt finden, so findet auch Gemeinschaftlichkeit Statt.

- h. ἀμφοιν weg; denn nichts vorhergegangen: – oder zwey.

- i. ἀμφοιν Gen. und Dat.
 αμφο Acc.

- j. νοητον, ein Denkbare, oder Gedachtes (gleichgültig, hier Object) νοητος Medium

- k. II. Diß, daß Nus gegenständlich ist, kann auf verschiedene Weise genommen werden
 1) daß Nuß Prädicat von anderem ist oder 2) die Bestimmung *vermisch*t in sich enthält,
 wodurch er νοητος ist, oder 3) und diß ist das recht hat er das πασχειν (νοητον ειναι)
 nach der Gemeinsamkeit oder Allgemeinheit. ἢ zum vorhergehenden το μεν zum
 folgenden. Diß wird fortgesetzt.

- l. was ihn zu einem solchen macht, als die andern sind.

REMARKS AND ANNOTATIONS

[MS leaf 1, side 1, mostly left-hand column; the second half of remarks (marked '[2]') is on MS leaf 4]

- a. ἀπορησειεν (regular ἀπορησαιμι, αις, αι) no augment, because optative mood.
 sing.[ularis persona] sec.[unda] ειας
 – 2 ειε
 pl. 3 ειαν
 πασχω from πηθω, aor. ἐπαθον; from πενθω fut. πεισομαι rather than πενσομαι, ν before consonant in ει (like σπενδω fut. σπεισω)
- b. I. How does thinking determine itself, as it is simple, unaffected, not shared, and yet includes in itself passivity (but passivity belongs to communality), as it is indeed itself [a] thinkable object.
 [from leaf 4:]
 Aristotle is asking how must the being-other – the passivity of νοῦς – be grasped.
 How does thinking determine itself, as it is simple, and unaffected, and unshared; and yet it includes passivity in itself, as it is indeed itself [a] thinkable object.
- c. ἐνδεδλεχεια, permanence. ἐντελεχευ εἶχω, complete[ly]
 Principle of movement;
- d. is not joined,
- e. how is thinking to be determined further
- f. includes passivity in itself.
- g. since passivity takes place, also communality takes place.
- h. ἀμφοιν off; since nothing preceded: – or two.
- i. ἀμφοιν gen. and dat.
 αμφοω acc.
- j. νοητον, a thinkable, or thought (indifferent[ly], here object) νοητος, medium
- k. II. This [idea], that νοῦς has objectivity [*gegenständlich ist*], can be taken in various ways: (1) that νοῦς is predicate of another; or (2) [that it] contains mixed in itself the determination through which it is νοητος; or (3), and this is the right [way], it has the πασχειν (νοητον εἶναι) in virtue of the communality or universality. ἡ to the preceding το μεν to the following. This is being continued.
- l. which makes it into such a one as the others are.

- m. leere Möglichkeit zu wenig; δυναμις wie Ey Saamen Möglichkeit des Thiers. gänzliche Albernheit und Trivialität; es wäre möglich daß hier ein Baum stände, wo ein Haus war; äusserste Zufälligkeit.
- n. die alles
- o. πριν ἂν με νοη̄ plutot que je n'ai pas pensé plus grand qu'il n'a été, il y a une année
- p. γραμματειον, Schule wo γραμματα gelehrt werden, Schreibtafel
- q. Geld: im materiellen ist jedes der Gedachten nur der Möglichkeit nach vorhanden)
- r. ἄει nicht bloß Zeit
überall, oft so nicht räumlich
insofern sie nur der νοϋς der Möglichkeit nach sind,
sie sind wohl νοητα, diß ist wohl das νοειν δυναμει, der νοϋς aber als solcher ist die
δυναμις aber ohne ὕλη, sie aber sind νοεισθαι mit ὕλη.
επισκεπτομαι
εψομαι,
ἐσκεφα, ἐσκεμμαι
- s. τι το μεν ὕλη
theils als
- t. (πεποιθεν pf. 2, πειθω, πεπεικα pf. 1 πεπεισμαι)
λειπω λελοιπα
πεπονθεν, sich verhält; nichts näheres von πασχω, da ἡ τεχνη gerade vom
ποιητικον Beyspiel ist.
ἐν τη ψυχη ὑπαρχειν, verschieden von τη ψυχη ὑπαρχειν.
- u. ὁ μεν – ὁ δε einerseits, andererseits
- v. ἐξις, Gewohnheit aber an und für sich; Gewohnheit ein Thun bewußtlos (*Wesen*,
Postwesen Examinationswesen)
- w. *Gewissermaßen*, kan hier beym Beyspiel gelten, sonst zu verbannen.
- x. ἄει nicht bloß der Zeit nach.
- y. andere lesen: ἀνθρωπω^{vii}

- m. empty possibility too weak; δυναμις like egg sperm possibility of the animal complete puerility and triviality; it could be possible for a tree to stand here, where there was a house; extreme randomness.
- n. that all [MS leaf 1, side 2, left-hand column]
- o. πριν ἂν μη νοη plutôt que je n'ai pas pensé plus grand qu'il n'a été, il y a une année
- p. γραμματειον, school where γραμματα are being taught, writing tablet
- q. Money: in what is material, every one of the things thought is present only according to possibility)
- r. ἄει not just time
 everywhere, often so non-spatially
 insofar as they are the νοῦς according to possibility,
 they are certainly νοητα, this is certainly the νοειν δυναμει, the νοῦς as such is the δυναμις but without ὄλη, they however are νοεισθαι with ὄλη.
 επισκεπτομαι
 εψομαι,
 ἐσκεφα, ἐσκεμμαι
- s. τι το μεν ὄλε
 in part *as* [MS leaf 2, side 1, left-hand column]
- t. (πεποιθεν p[er]f[ect] 2., πειθω, πεπεικα pf. 1 πεπεισμαι)
 λειπω λελοιπα
 πεπονθεν, is the case; nothing more about πασχω, given that ἡ τεχνη is precisely an example of the ποιητικον.
 ἐν τη ψυχη ὑπαρχειν, different from τη ψυχη ὑπαρχειν.
- u. ὁ μεν – ὁ δε on the one hand, on the other
- v. ἐξις, habit but in and for itself; habit an unconscious doing (entity [*Wesen*], postal system [*Postwesen*] examination system [*Examinationswesen*])
- w. in a certain sense, it may apply here with the example; otherwise to be banished.
- x. ἄει not just according to time.
- y. others read: ἀνθρωπων^{vii}

Translated by Allegra de Laurentiis

TRANSLATOR'S REMARKS

I. Kern (“Eine Übersetzung Hegels...”) reads “Oder ist er *rein* so findet nun die Passivität Statt nach der Gemeinschaftlichkeit, Allgemeinheit. Deßwegen ist vorhin bestimmt worden, dass... [Or it is *pure* so that passivity *now* takes place according to communality, universality. This is why it has been previously established that...].” However, “*rein*” cannot be detected in the manuscript. Grotsch (GW 10, 2) reads instead: “Oder ist er *nun* so findet *nun* die Passivität Statt nach der Gemeinschaftlichkeit, Allgemeinheit [Or it is *now* so that passivity takes place *now* according to communality, universality.].” A comparison with the manuscript shows that the latter is the more plausible reading. There remain several issues, of both content and form. First, the meaning of Hegel’s sentence with the double “*nun*” is elusive. The New High German “*nun*” is one of the most protean expressions of the German language: like the Greek *νῦν*, it may be used as a temporal adverb for the present (“now”); for logical, temporal, or even causal connectivity (“then”); and more. Second, even Grotsch’s accurate transcription shows Hegel straying starkly from the Greek text: in the latter, the third alternative Aristotle offers to conceiving *νοῦς* as (a) inherent in the objects or (b) itself having an admixture, is (c) *τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διήρηται πρότερον*, i.e., “being-passive according to something common as formerly distinguished.” He is referring to a previous distinction made in Book II.5, according to which being a passive receiver in virtue of a common element with the agent can be said in two ways, namely, as potency and as actualization. The young Marx’s translation (1840; MEGA IV.1:163) of this third alternative is more meaningful, though equally deviating from the actual text: “Oder das *πάσχειν* ist nach einem Allgemeinen zu unterscheiden. Deswegen ist früher gesagt worden, dass...” Marx translates from a different *De Anima* edition than Hegel’s *Basileensis*, namely, the Greek and Latin edition by Casaubon (1605). He is therefore among those who, as Hegel laments (see this Introduction), have had the advantage of consulting a legible Latin translation when faced with the hardships of a barely legible Greek text.

II. See Hegel’s remarks, note k.

III. See Hegel’s remarks, note m.

IV. Hegel’s rendering of *χωριστός* as “abstract” and *χωρισθείς* as “when abstract” instead of “separate” and “when separated” has raised eyebrows, most famously in the trenchant criticism by Horst Seidl (“Bemerkungen zu G.W.F. Hegels Interpretation von Aristoteles’ *De Anima* III 4-5 und *Metaphysica* XII 7 und 9,” in *Perspektiven der Philosophie* 12, no. 1 [1986]: 209-36). Walter Kern has no objections to Hegel’s rendering of *χωριστός* as “abstract,” perhaps because he is more familiar with Hegel’s technical use of the term for something free from limitations or burdens, i.e., existing in a state “separate” from hindrances to the full realization of its essence. One example among many is in the *Encyclopaedia’s Anthropology*, where Hegel describes the attainment of egoity in the human individual as the culmination of a process of abstraction of the soul from its own body: “This being-for-self ... is the higher awakening of the soul to the ‘I,’ to the abstract

universality, insofar as it is for the abstract universality, which in this way is thinking and subject for itself” (sec. 412).

V. Two remarks are needed on Hegel’s rendition of οὐ μνημονεύομεν δε, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθέξ as “*wir haben aber kein Bewußtseyn, daß...*”. First, Aristotle speaks neither of epistemic consciousness nor of psychological awareness (the two meanings of Hegel’s “*Bewußtseyn*”) but of remembrance or recollection. This leads some (like Seidl in “*Bemerkungen zu G.W.F. Hegels Interpretation...*” and Giancarlo Movia, editor and translator of *Aristotele. L’anima*, Florence: Giunti, 2018) to imply that the Stagirite is talking about a temporal separation of the active from the passive intellect, or of eternity from temporality, in mortal creatures. This reading leads to insurmountable logical difficulties and metaphysical *aporiae*; in addition, it contradicts Aristotle’s own rejection of the afterlife and reincarnation theories of his predecessors (in particular, the Pythagoreans: see, e.g., *DA* I.2). In choosing “*wir haben aber kein Bewußtseyn*” instead of “*wir erinnern uns aber nicht*,” Hegel avoids the implication of a temporal before and after; admittedly, he attains this result by bending the original text to his however well considered intentions. (A most helpful discussion of this use of οὐ μνημονεύομεν is in R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle, De Anima* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907], 507-8.) Second, the “ὅτι” in this phrase does not mean “that” (Hegel’s “*daß*”) but “because”: ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθέξ translates literally as “because it is impassive.” A charitable interpretation is that in sketching these notes Hegel’s pen may have slipped, as “*da*” without “*ß*” means precisely “because.”

VI. Kern reads, “and without this nothing thinks” (W. Kern, “*Eine Übersetzung Hegels...*,” 65), suggesting that no passive νοῦς may think without the active. Seidl reads (and elucidates), “and without this [= the passive νοῦς] it [= the active] thinks nothing” (Seidl, “*Bemerkungen...*,” 224), suggesting the inverse. The referent of the pronoun in Aristotle’s καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν νοεῖ is grammatically undecidable. This ambiguity underlies a controversy (going back to the first centuries of the Christian era) on whether the uninterrupted activity of the divine νοῦς is a condition for our own intermittent thinking, or whether our human thinking is a condition for the ever-active divine thought. (Once again, Hicks is most helpful in unraveling some of the conundrums sparked by Aristotle’s fantastic succinctness in the treatment of colossal subject matter: see R.D. Hicks, *Aristotle, De Anima*, 509-10).

VII. By “others,” Hegel refers to a variant of the Greek text given in the *Basileensis tertia* edition at his disposal. On the margin of this page in that edition it is noted, “ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ THEMIST.” The reference is to the *De Anima* paraphrases of the Greek-Roman writer Themistios (317-c. 388 CE).

INTRODUCTION TO HEIDEGGER'S 1921 SUMMER SEMESTER SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA* AS RECORDED IN THE HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF HELENE WEISS¹ AND OSKAR BECKER²

While the importance of the study of Aristotle for Heidegger's thought during the 1920s has been known for some time, several of Heidegger's seminars on Aristotle from this period remain unpublished and therefore unstudied. Among these is the very first one delivered in the summer of 1921. Apart from its importance as the beginning of a long pedagogical engagement with Aristotle's texts, continuing not only up to the publication of *Being and Time* but well beyond, this seminar also fills an important lacuna in the published material. While the later prospectus of 1922 for a planned book on Aristotle does not include a study of *De Anima* and instead focuses on the texts that will become the focus of the later seminars on Aristotle, that is, the *Physics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics*,³ the first text to which Heidegger turned in his teaching of Aristotle was *De Anima*. The reason is not hard to find: *De Anima* is the Aristotelian text devoted to the phenomenon of life (the translation of the title as "On the Soul" obscures for the modern reader the fact that it is indeed a study of the principle of all life, including plants), and what Heidegger sought in Aristotle at the beginning of the 1920s was precisely an *ontology of life*. This also explains why the 1921 seminar studies *De Anima* alongside a reading of the central books

¹ M06131, Box 3, Folder 5, Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries.

² Published in *Heidegger und Aristoteles: Heidegger-Jarhbuch 3*, ed. A. Denker, G. Figal, F. Volpi, and H. Zaborowski (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2007), 9-22.

³ *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)*, in *Gesamtausgabe* 62 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005), 340-99. While *De Anima* is completely absent from the prospectus, a turn to the central books of the *Metaphysics* is envisioned in the second and final part after the study of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Physics*, along with the first two chapters of *Metaphysics A* in the first part.

of the *Metaphysics* on οὐσία. Indeed, in this reading of the *Metaphysics* along with *De Anima*, we can see an anticipation of the very methodology of *Being and Time*: to address the question of being by way of an analysis of the being, not of life in general, but of human life (Dasein). As I have attempted to show elsewhere,⁴ there are other significant ways in which the 1921 reading of *De Anima* anticipates both the project and the argument of *Being and Time*. Yet Heidegger's reading of *De Anima* is to be found only in this unpublished seminar of 1921 and in a follow-up seminar of 1922/23 that also remains unpublished.⁵

If we include the unpublished seminars starting with that of SS 1921, we can see a clear trajectory in Heidegger's study of Aristotle that raises important questions: after the beginning of the 1920s and as we approach the writing of *Being and Time*, the *Physics* replaces the *Metaphysics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* replaces *De Anima* in Heidegger's interests. There is indeed an evident explanation that itself, however, raises important and difficult questions: on the one hand, Heidegger turns from a conception of being as presence that he finds in the notion of οὐσία to a conception of being as motion that he finds in the analysis of κίνησις in the *Physics*; at the same time, the particular way of being he seeks to interrogate shifts from life in general to human life in particular or, more accurately, to human being as distinguished from mere life.⁶ Reconstructing the early seminars on *De Anima* enables us to address the question of what is possibly lost in both of these moves. What, in other words, was lost in the move away from *De Anima* and the being of life as such? Without the 1921 seminar and other unpublished seminars, not only finding the answer but even raising the question would not be possible since this shift in Heidegger's reading of Aristotle would not even be evident.

I do not want to suggest, however, that the only thing to be gained from the study of the 1921 seminar is a better understanding and critical appraisal of Heidegger's thought. Precisely because his goal is not a historically accurate reading of Aristotle's text but the development of an ontology of life, Heidegger can help us discover, as he helped his students discover, certain philosophical possibilities in the text that a less philosophically motivated reading might miss. We see already in the seminar of 1921 what his students in this period remarked on: his ability to make Aristotle speak to us as a contemporary. This does not mean that Heidegger exhibits a cavalier attitude toward the text and makes it say whatever he wants it to say. On the contrary, this seminar, like other small seminars for advanced students that remain unpublished, is entirely focused on the Greek text and treats it with a care and fidelity that would not shame any philologist. There is no so-called "hermeneutical violence" here. On the contrary, one can see instances in the present seminar where a self-correction in Heidegger's understanding of the Aristotelian text leads his thought in an unexpected direction. We do not see Heidegger imposing

⁴ "The Birth of *Being and Time*: Heidegger's Pivotal 1921 Reading of Aristotle's *On the Soul*," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 56, no. 2 (2018): 1-24.

⁵ On this later seminar, see my "Movement versus Activity: Heidegger's 1922/23 seminar on Aristotle's ontology of life," *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 27, no. 3 (2019): 615-34.

⁶ See the claim in the WS1929/30 course on the *Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* that "a dog does not exist but only lives" (ein Hund nicht existiert, sondern nur lebt), with the complementary claim that "we do not live with animals if living means: *being* in the manner of an animal [Aber wir leben nicht mit ihnen, wenn Leben besagt: *Sein* in der Weise des Tieres]" (*Gesamtausgabe* 29/30, 2nd ed. [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992], 308).

on the text a preestablished ontology of life; on the contrary, we see an ontology of life emerging from Heidegger's dialogue with the text, a dialogue in which Aristotle's voice is always heard and respected.

If the seminar of 1921 is therefore worthy of study, it must also be reconstructed. This is because we do not have for the seminar either Heidegger's own notes or the detailed, polished protocols that exist for later courses and seminars. We have instead only some student notes that are indeed nothing but *notes* of the kind any student would take in a class. It is of course not the case that the seminar of 1921 is completely unpublished, since the notes of one student, Oskar Becker, were published in 2007 and have therefore been available for some time, though they are translated here into English for the first time. Yet if the Becker notes have not spurred much study of Heidegger's reading of *De Anima*, this is because of the major gaps in these notes revealed by a comparison with the notes of another student, Helene Weiss, which are published here for the first time. In reading the two sets of notes side by side, as they are presented below, we can see that they often precisely parallel and thus confirm each other, giving us confidence that they accurately reproduce the seminar's content. But we also see that while Becker's notes are generally more detailed than those of Weiss when it comes to the earlier parts of the seminar devoted to the *Metaphysics*, they barely cover the later classes dealing with *De Anima*. As shown by all the blank spaces below, Becker, whether out of a lack of interest or for more circumstantial reasons, preserves little of what the seminar had to say about *De Anima* as conveyed by the Weiss notes. This means that it is only in supplementing the Becker notes with the Weiss notes that we can recover Heidegger's reading of *De Anima*. The other major advantage of the Weiss notes is that they preserve the dates of the classes and tell us what in particular was discussed in each class. Indeed, it is only with the help of the Weiss notes that we can see that Becker missed an entire class as well as determine which sections of his notes correspond to which of the other classes.

If we read the Becker and Weiss notes in parallel, then, thereby combining their different relative strengths, we can arrive at a good understanding of what was covered and argued throughout the course of the entire seminar, class by class, despite whatever obscurities and lacunae will doubtless still remain. For reasons only indicated here, the effort will be greatly rewarded.

ÜBUNGEN ÜBER ARISTOTELES, *DE ANIMA* (SOMMERSEMESTER 1921)

NACHSCHRIFTEN VON HELENE WEISS

wi Heidegger Seminar: Aristoteles, *De Anima* SS 1921

Metaphysik und Physik mit heranzuziehen, um ein Verständnis der Aristotelischen Philosophie zu gewinnen.

- | | | |
|--------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------|
| 1) <i>Metaph.</i> 7. Buch Z als Referat nach Pfingsten | 24 Mai | Lichtenstein ¹ |
| 2) <i>Metaph.</i> 5. Buch Δ | Mitte Juni | |
| 3) <i>Metaph.</i> 3. B[uch] | | |
| <i>Metaph.</i> 13. Buch M | Anfang Juli | |
| 4.) <i>De Anima</i> 2. Buch | 7 Juni | |
| 5.) <i>De Anima</i> 3. Buch | 21 Juni ² | |
| 6.) <i>Physik</i> 5., 6., und 8. Buch über Bewegung | (Dr. Beck) ³ | |

Alle die Kategorienlehre aus dem *Organon* lesen, vielleicht unecht.
Anima 1. Buch Ch. 1., 2., 3. Auf Problem der Methode achten.

Womit hängt es zusammen, daß Psychologie in der Philosophie vorkommt? Wie ist die Psychologie in die Philosophie des Aristoteles hineingebaut? Man unterscheidet Methode der Darstellung und Methode der Forschung. Es ist die Weise der Begründung der Erkenntnis.

402a6 ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων⁴ enthält Begründung für beides: Behandlung des Gegenstandes und Strenge der Methode. Denn indem die Seele ἀρχή ist, also die anderen Wissenschaften auf ihn berufen, muß sie auch methodisch besonders streng sein.

Von 23 an dieselbe Frage wie gerade vorher, nur in schärfer Zuspitzung⁵.

SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA* (SUMMER SEMESTER 1921)

NACHSCHRIFTEN VON OSKAR BECKER¹

Übungen über Aristoteles, *De Anima* (Sommersemester 1921)

INHALT

1. Einleitende Bemerkung zu <i>De Anima</i> 402 a, b.	[B1]
2. Zu <i>Metaphysik Z</i>	[B3]
Analyse von Z 17	[B6]
Systematische Betrachtung dazu.	[B10]
Ὀὐσία und ὁρίσμιός	[B12]
Einzelinterpretation von Z, c. 1–4.	[B14]
Einzelinterpretation von Z, c. 7–9.	[B24]
3. Zu <i>de anima</i> B.	[B27]

1. [Einleitende Bemerkung zu *De Anima* 402 a, b]

B1

Es ist zu fragen, ob *Aristoteles* die Psychologie als Einzelwissenschaft oder als Philosophie auffaßt. Faßt er sie als *Wissenschaft* auf, so kann man ihm nicht den Gebrauch bestimmter methodischer Mittel verbieten, besonders wo diese prinzipiell (in der *Metaphysik*) fundiert sind. Anders ist es, wenn man nur die Beschäftigung mit dem Physischen auf ihre philosophische Bedeutung hin untersucht.

2 Cap. des I. Buches und 1 Cap. des 2. Buches.

w2 **24.V.**

Wichtig Unterscheidung Physiker, Mathematiker und erstem Philosophen (Dialektiker)⁶ φυσικός (403a)⁷ e.g. biologisch gemeint. Das Biologische ist bei ihm das Grundansatz des Wissens.

[Ergänzungen (aus Nachschrift Bondi) zum *De Anima Seminar*⁸

403a29ff

Aussagend über 3 theoretische Einstellungsweisen:

- 1.) Der φυσικός. Der biologische Grundansatz bedingt hier das Naturkennen. Der wahre φυσικός nimmt den Stoff als Unterlage stofflicher Art für eine bestimmte Funktion.
- 2.) Der Mathematiker behandelt das Haus, abgesehen davon, daß es Haus ist. (Der Grieche sieht das Gerade immer als Grenze – als Form von etwas – aber in dieser Indifferenz.)
- 3.) Der erste Philosoph behandelt das Seiende als Seiende: ὄν ἢ ὄν. Den Sinn jedes Gegenstandes, sofern es ist. Die Was-Bestimmtheiten fallen aus.

Radikale Behandlung des Seinsproblems.

Seine Grundvorstellung der Einheit von Form und Materie ist gehoben vom Schaffen – gestalthaft gesehen.]

πάθη⁹ 1.) = Zustände 2.) allgemeine Gegenstandsbestimmung.

Betrachtung des Biologen auch Formbetrachtung: Materie für bestimmte Form für bestimmte Funktion.

403b *so beschaffen* wichtig¹⁰.

Mathematiker sieht ab vom Haus, aber nicht von der ὄλη, es hat Winkel etc. bei einer allgemeinen ὄλη.

402a4	ἱστορία ¹	„Geschichte“.
402a11	πίστιν	Grundüberzeugung.
402b	Allgemeine Aussagen über die Sache sind zweifelhaft.	
4012b12	μορία	verschiedene Fähigkeiten („Vermögen“) der Leistung, d. h. Fähigkeiten zu verschiedenen Leistungen.
402b15	τὰ ἀντικείμενα (<i>Plotin</i> : ἡ ἀντίληψις).	das Gegenüberliegende.

[24.V.]

B2

Aristoteles' „Physik“ (φυσικός) ist von der Biologie aus zu verstehen. Die Physik ist auch eine Formbetrachtung, das Physische ist Stoff *für* eine Form.

Aristoteles hat in seiner Metaphysik die Tendenz auf die Befreiung von einer bestimmten Seinsregion; er strebt nach einer wirklich universalen Betrachtung (ὄν ὡς ὄν). Tendenz auf die Betrachtung des *Sinnes* von Sein.

Doch auch diese Tendenz ist vom Konkreten aus bestimmt; d. h. dem „Biologischen“; „Gestalteten“. Einheit von Form und Inhalt. Grundeinstellung des τεχνίτης (ἐντελέχεια).

Seinsproblem bei Aristoteles radikaler als sonst jemals, auch universaler als bei Kant. Grundstellung bei ihm: er sieht alles gestalthaft.

Bei Plato Seele mit Ideen in Zusammenhang: *Phaidros* 249e4¹¹, 247d3¹². Gerichtetsein auf das Sein ist der Grundcharakter der Seele. Sie lebt nur, sofern sie nach den wahren Ideen gestaltet. Daher auch Schöpfer des Uranos (*Timaios*, vglch. *De Anima* 404b16)¹³.

Referat Lichtenstein: *Buch Z der Metaphysik*:

1-3¹⁴: einleitend.

4-6, 10-14: behandeln εἶδος von der Seite des Erkennens her.

7-9: εἶδος als reellen Faktor des Werdens.

17: überleitet zu dieser anderen Behandlung¹⁵.

15-16: müssen dann auf 9 folgen (Natorps Vorschlag)¹⁶.

w³ 4-6, 10-14 εἶδος koinzidiert mit dem τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι¹⁷.

Heidegger hält Natorps Einteilung zweifellos für richtig. ^{Nein!}¹⁸

Frage nach dem methodischen Zugang zu dem Gegenstand Seele für uns {ein Mittelpunkt} der Behandlung. Also Problem der Definition. Heute dies meist vernachlässigt. Nur *Rickert* hat es in seiner Dissertation¹⁹ behandelt, mißt ihm aber auch keine bestimmte Bedeutung zu. Erscheint fälschlich immer als interner Problem der formalen Logik.

Problem der Leistung der Definition. Und woher kommt die Definition. Welche Lage in der Struktur des Gegenständlichen.

[*Ergänzungen* (aus Nachschrift Bondi) zum *De Anima Seminar*

Met. Z.:

Unsere Frage nach dem begrifflichen Wesen der Seele. Welchen Sinn die Definition hat. (Angefaßt nur durch *Rickert*, wenn auch anfechtbar in jeder Hinsicht.)

Man hat sich das Verständnis des Aristoteles durch den Begriff des Realisten verbaut, besser muß man sich hüten οὐσία mit Substanz zu übersetzen.

2. Cap.: Am meisten zum Durchbruch, zur Erscheinung, scheint die οὐσία zu kommen bei den Körpern. ---]

2. Zu Aristoteles, *Metaphysik*, VII. Buch (Z)

B3

Wir betrachten das VII. Buch im Zusammenhang unseres Problems des Zugangs zur Seele. Definition der Seele. Welchen Sinn hat bei Aristoteles die Definition?

In der modernen Literatur das Problem der Definition selten und nur als logische Spezialität behandelt. Nur Rickert, *Zur Lehre von der Definition*², Zusammenhang mit der Frage der philosophischen Begriffsbildung.

Wir fragen, wie man Zugang gewinnt zu der „Seele“ des Aristoteles, dem „Bewußtsein“ der Neueren. Dafür ist die Frage nach der Leistung der Definition wichtig. Hat der Begriff der Definition eine sinngenetische Ableitung aus der Struktur des Erkennens?

Ganz verkehrt, Aristoteles als Vertreter des Realismus gegen Idealismus anzusehen. Es kommt ihm auf ganz Anderes an. Οὐσία ist *nicht* Substanz. Gibt im 1. Cap. eine Überlegung von οὐσία.

Methode in der Philosophie viel größere Rolle als in anderen Wissenschaften. Die Behandlung des Problems der οὐσία und der Definition nennt Aristoteles λογικῶς²⁰. Das hat bei ihm den spezifischen Sinn von *Aussagen*, betrachtet also Phänomen im Hinblick auf Gesamtzusammenhang des Aussagens, von etwas durch etwas, das ist Grundzusammenhang. Verklammerung des Aussagens (λέγειν) mit der {wahrer} faktischen Kenntnis. Auch für platonische Philosophie motivgebend.

^{w4} **Das λέγειν ist das Grundphänomen, von dem aus Aristoteles zur οὐσία kommt.** Von hier aus expliziert Aristoteles Sinn von οὐσία und von ὁρτισμός. Das Aussagen des Einen von Anderen in ganz bestimmtem Sinn. **Das was definiert werden soll, ist in einem bestimmten Sinn intendiert.** Kap. 17. Was heißt überhaupt Fragen, Bestimmen? Ich muß das Sein haben, damit ich überhaupt bestimmen kann. ἔχον τὸ εἶναι δεῖ²¹; es muß ein Etwas da sein, damit nach etwas gefragt werden kann. **Eine Frage entspricht immer erst einer Erfahrung.** Ein anderes in Bezug auf ein Anderes, das ist das Gefragte: Im Gegensatz zu einer anderen Gegenständlichkeit bei der nicht gefragt werden kann. Die wissenschaftliche Frage geht nach dem διὰ τί, nach dem αἴτιον. **Wodurch, weshalb, aus welchem Grunde, dieses andere dem anderen zukommt.** Das Bestimmende, das ein Anderes bestimmt, ist das τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι! Dieses muß also primär verstanden werden {als} nach der Funktion des Antwortens im Fragen. Cap. 17 für Sinn des τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι besonders wichtig. **Es gibt zwei Grundbestimmungen von αἴτιον: das Weswegen und das Bewegende. Dann ist das Fragen offenbar.**

[Ergänzungen (aus Nachschrift Bondi) zum *De Anima Seminar*

1041a32: am meisten: (λανθάνει δὲ μάλιστα...) ²² Am meisten liegt verborgen das Gefragte in dem was im Aussagen steht, was gefragt wird, was es selbst ist (καὶ αὐτό).

Aristoteles ist hier tiefer eingedrungen, als man im allgemeinen meint. Man darf ihn nicht unter dem Aspekt der Alternative: Idealismus-Realismus betrachten. Damit verbaut man sich sein Verständnis. Man darf sich auch nicht so sehr an *Aristoteles'* Beispiele halten. Diese sind nur illustrativ. Es ist ihm um anderes zu tun.

B4

Die Frage der οὐσία ist sehr schwierig. Die Übersetzung mit „Substanz“ ist irreführend. Im lib. VII cap. 1 gibt *Aristoteles* eine formale, sinnmäßige Deduktion von οὐσία. Er sagt nun, die Körper (σώματα) sind φανερότατα μὲν (am offenbarsten) Beispiele für die οὐσία (c. 2, 1 [1028b8 sq.]). Sie erfüllen aber nicht deren eigentlichen Sinn.

Die Frage der Methode hat in der Philosophie eine andere Bedeutung als in den Einzelwissenschaften. Sie ist in der Philosophie nichts Sekundäres.

Aristoteles sagt (c. [4, 1029b13]), die Frage nach der οὐσία und der Definition sei „λογικῶς“, dies kommt von λέγειν (λόγος). Das heißt „Aussage“ in bezug auf Etwas. Die Bestimmung von Etwas durch Etwas in der Aussage ist *Aristoteles'* Grundphänomen, von wo aus er alles entwickelt.

B5

Aristoteles sieht (s.o.) die Umwelt in einer bestimmten Art, in der Struktur des *Gestaltens*. Dies ist für ihn die eigentliche Grunderfahrung beim Erkennen, d.h. schon beim vorwissenschaftlichen Kenntnisnehmen, die sich dementsprechend in einer bestimmten Form expliziert. Die Aussage ist verklammert mit dieser Art der Kenntnisnahme. (Ähnlich ist es auch in der Platonischen Philosophie.)

Das λέγειν, die Aussage, ist das Grundphänomen, aus dem der Sinn von οὐσία und ὁρισμός expliziert wird. Der ὁρισμός ist eine bestimmte Weise der Aussage. Der Sinn dieser Aussage ist derart, daß das, wovon ausgesagt wird, für sich selbst (καθ' αὐτό) intendiert ist. Das, was definiert werden soll, ist in einer bestimmten Tendenz erfaßt, nämlich καθ' αὐτό, nicht καθ' ἀλλήλων (c. [4, 1029b16 sq.]). Der Sinn der Definition ist also abhängig vom λέγειν.

B6

Analyse von lib. VII, c. 17 (die Paragraphen nach *Schweglers* Ausgabe³):

Neue Untersuchung über die οὐσία, auch von unsinnlichen Gegenständen (§1). Von der οὐσία als δόξα und αἰτία ist auszugehen (§2).

Frage nach dem Wesen der „Frage“ (ζήτησις). Das Weswegen (διὰ τί) wird immer so gefragt, weshalb etwas anderes dem einen zukommt (διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλῳ τινὶ ὑπάρχει [1041a11]) (§3).

Man kann nicht fragen, weshalb etwas es selbst ist (διὰ τί αὐτό ἐστιν αὐτό, 1041a14). Denn das Daß und das Sein muß feststehen (δεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχειν δῆλα ὄντα, 1041a15) (§4), d. h. die Frage hängt nicht in der Luft, sie sucht die Bestimmung des Einen durch das Andere (vgl. §3).

[ähnlich §8–9].

(§9) Τὸ αἴτιον wird gefragt: das „Weswegen“ oder in welchem Sinn etwas ist (τὸ αἴτιον). Dies ist (§10) nach einigen das Weswegen (τίνοσ ἐνεκα [1041a29]), nach anderen das zuerst Bewegende (τί ἐκίνησε πρῶτον [1041a30]). „Logisch“ (ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς [1041a28]) gesagt, ist es aber das „τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι“ (§ 10). – „Λογικῶς“: nach dem Sinn in der Aussage, in der Funktion des Bestimmens.

B7

Wenn gefragt wird, was der Mensch ist – durch das einfache Aussagen (ohne ein inhaltlich Anderes) zur Bestimmung aus ihm selbst. Aber es ist notwendig, daß man auch das Was zergliedert. (Für die Frage ist es notwendig, daß ich loskomme aus den bloßen Vergegenwärtigung[]).

Im Fragen wird gefragt nach dem zu Bestimmenden, nach der ὄλη, was das zu Bestimmende nach seinem Was bestimmt. – – –]

Im 6 und 4 Cap. Frage des Zusammenhanges des τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι und des ἕκαστον. Das λέγειν auf eine οὐσία. Das Erkennen geht auf ein ἕκαστον. Natorp fasst das falsch als Einzelwesen auf, es ist vielmehr (6. Cap.) ein Jegliches, ein Etliches. Etwas bestimmt Etwas: d.h. das Etliche wird bestimmt durch ein Etwas. **Was im formalen Sinne ist die οὐσία.**

[Ergänzungen (aus Nachschrift Bondi) zum *De Anima Seminar*

Z17 1041b9²³

Bei dem ganz einfachen gibt es kein Fragen, keine Lehre, keine Gedanken. Ganz andere Weise des Fragens, wie ich diesem *Was* beikomme. Das Sein muß da sein (gegeben). – – – –

Im Aussagen muß etwas anschaulich gegeben sein. – – –

In der Philosophie wird gefragt, wie das Anschauliche selbst gegeben wird und in welchem Sinne. Es wird nicht gelebt im Haben, sondern gewußt (leer formale Bestimmung.) – –]

Wir können unterscheiden Erkenntnis-Fragen im wissenschaftlichen und im philosophischen Erkennen. Wie verhält sich der Satz = „Das Sein muß gehabt werden“ zu diesen beiden. Die Phänomenologie hat diesen Satz in der Philosophie gebracht. Eines ihrer Hauptverdienste. Im Aussagen ist immer etwas gemeint, das zu Bestimmende muß gegeben sein. Man bezeichnet das als Anschauen. So das Anschauen in der Phänomenologie zu verstehen. Das, was ich expliziere, muß mir anschaulich gegeben sein. Dabei aber, wie auch bei Aristoteles, ist große Gefahr. Das Anschauen allein führt nicht weiter. Der Grundprinzip, zunächst zwar formal, gibt noch nichts für großes System.

Welche Rolle spielt der Prinzip, daß das Sein gehabt wird, in den Wissenschaften? Ist es leitend und wie ist es leitend? Man bestimmt, was man nicht hat von dem her, was man hat. Aber das Haben und das Wie-Haben sind gar nicht Probleme. Man lebt im Haben

Das τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ist zu verstehen aus dem Sinn von Erkenntnis (Aussage). Was heißt τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι? Dieses Problem ist seit langem eine crux der Aristoteles-Erklärung. –

(§12) Am meisten ist das ζητούμενον verborgen (λανθάνει μάλιστα), wenn etwas an sich selbst gemeint ist, nicht wo ein Anderes es bestimmt (ἐν τοῖς μὴ καταλλήλως ζητούμενοις)⁴ (1041a32 sqq.). Schematisch: Wenn man fragt „Ist A b?“, so ist das b offenbar das Gefragte. Im anderen Fall ist das Gefragte aber verborgen.

Diesen anderen Fall nennt *Aristoteles* „ἀπλῶς“, im Gegensatz zu ἀλλήλως.

οἶον (εἰ) ἄνθρωπος τί ἐστι ζητεῖται διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι⁵, ἀλλὰ μὴ διορίζειν ὅτι τάδε ἦ⁶ τόδε. ἀλλὰ δεῖ διαρθρώσαντας⁷ ζητεῖν² (1041b1 sq.).

(§14) ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ (ταδι)⁸ διὰ τί ἐστὶν οἶον οἰκία³ (1041b4 sq.).

Es wird nicht gefragt nach der ὕλη, was sie ist; es handelt sich [um] eine Wie-Bestimmtheit der ὕλη. Der eigentliche Sinn der ὕλη entspringt aus dem λέγειν.

B8

Im IV. und VI. Buch⁴ der *Metaphysik* finden wir einen Zusammenhang zwischen dem τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι und dem ἕκαστον. Beim Aussagen wird Etwas von Etwas ausgesagt. Ἐκαστον ist nicht das Einzelwesen (wie *Natorp*⁹ meint). Ἐκαστον heißt „Etlisches“ oder „das Etlische“¹⁵ (dies soll hier nicht den Nebensinn „Einige“ haben, sondern an „Etwas“ anklingen, ohne das „was“ – Ausdruck von Heidegger). Das Etwas (Etlische, ἕκαστον) wird bestimmt durch das Etwas (Was, οὐσία). Das ἕκαστον wird als ein Etlisches καθ’ αὐτό bestimmt.

B9

(§16) φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν οὐκ ἔστι ζήτησις [...], ἀλλ’ ἕτερος τρόπος τῆς ζητήσεως [1041b9 sq.]⁶.

τῶν ἀπλῶν: Gegensatz: καθ’ ἀλλήλων.

Ich bleibe bei dem Was, das ich habe. In diesem einfachen Verhältnis gibt es keine Frage und keine Lehre; kein Entwickeln des Gedankens.

B10

(§17) Vielmehr gibt es hier eine ganz andere Erkenntnisweise.

Systematische Betrachtungen zum Vorigen

Wir beschränken uns auf die Erkenntnisfrage. Dabei ist zu unterscheiden 1) die Frage im wissenschaftlichen 2) im philosophischen Erkennen. Was heißt: das Sein muß gehabt werden im Sinne der Phänomenologie? Die Phänomenologie zeigt: Wenn es möglich sein soll, etwas zu erkennen, so muß mir das, worüber ich rede, *gegeben* sein – „anschaulich“ gegeben sein. Dies ist eine Grunderkenntnis der Phänomenologie, aber es ist nur *ein* Schritt und birgt eine Gefahr in sich, solange dieses Prinzip nicht selbst zur Frage wird. Man muß sich klarmachen, daß die verschiedenen Gegenstände ihrem Sinn nach einen bestimmten verschiedenen Zugangsweg haben müssen. Der Sinn des Habens und daß und wie man es hat, spiele in einer Einzelwissenschaft nur eine geringe Rolle. Doch ist das vorwissenschaftliche „Haben“ der Gegenstände in der Naturwissenschaft ein anderes als¹⁰ in der Geisteswissenschaft.

B11

wie auch das faktische Leben. Aber auch bei der Einzelwissenschaft sehr verschiedene Weisen des Habens. Und eine ganz andere Weise des Habens bei den Natur- als bei den Geisteswissenschaften.

Durch das Haben ist nicht nur Rahmen des Fragens sondern auch Wie des Fragens bestimmt.

Analog ist es in der Philosophie {?} wir sehen es bei der Frage nach dem Substanz. Wir wissen nicht, ob diese Analogie berechtigt ist.

w6 **7.VI.**

Buch Z der *Metaphysik*: Problem: *Sinn des Seins*; nicht Substanzproblem noch Problem der Definition in logischen Sinne. Ὀρισμός nicht gleichbedeutend mit heutiger „Definition“. Die Frage ob man mit *genus proximus* und *differentia specifica* definiert, ist ganz sekundär bei Aristoteles.

Wichtig: wie wird das Problem des Seelischen erfaßt, und was hat es mit der Philosophie zu tun? – –

Wichtig bei Aristoteles.: Das, was erfaßt wird und das Erfassende selbst ist identisch; gilt aber bei I.) {uns} für bestimmte Gegenständlichkeit. II.) dieses dasselbe von Begriff und Gegenstand gibt es nur in einer ganz bestimmten Weise des Seins und des Lebens. Für Aristoteles hat es gar bestimmte Orientierung nach der Seite des Objektiven der Ontologie.

Wie kommt Aristoteles bei den Versuch den Sinn des Seienden herauszustellen, plötzlich auf die Definition?

Diltheys und Aristoteles' {Fassung} des Seelischen beide im Grundzusammenhang des Lebens.

λόγος bei Aristoteles {erst} sekundär als Begriff; der Ὀρισμός ist ein λόγος, zu verstehen als Aussagen.

τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται = Der Sinn des Seins hat im Aussagen jedesmal eine andere Funktion.

Die Copula „ist“ ist das Wichtigste; von her erhält Subjekt und Prädikat erst seinen Sinn. Die οὐσία ist ein bestimmter Ist-Sinn. Das 1. Cap. hat die Aufgabe, den formalen Sinn der οὐσία herauszustellen, aus dem λέγειν herausheben. 2. Cap. mehr historische Orientierung. Im 3 zählt er die 4 überlieferten Begriffe auf: 1) τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; darin steckt das Aussagen; es ist der eigentliche Sinn von οὐσία und der Sinn von οὐσία, das im Ὀρισμός erfaßt wird.

w7

Im formalen Sinn der οὐσία ist schon der Sinn des Ὀρισμός vorgezeichnet. Es liegt für das ganze Problem des Erfassens die natürliche Einstellung des Etwas zur Kenntnis Nennens zu Grunde. Das erste worauf alle Kenntnisnahme geht ist ein Was, eine οὐσία (ganz

Dagegen soll in der Philosophie gerade der *Sinn* des Habens eines Gegenstands behandelt werden. Der Sinn des Habens wird selbst bewußt; nicht nur wird darin gelebt. Aber diese formale Bestimmung ist solange leer, als nicht bestimmt ist, was gehabt werden soll.

Analog ist es beim Problem der Frage (ζήτησις). Die Frage wächst aus dem Haben einer Erfahrungswelt (einer „Grunderfahrung“) heraus.

Das Wie des Fragens ist schon bestimmt durch den Sinn des Habens.

Diese Gegenüberstellung von Philosophie und Wissenschaft ist nur vorläufig. Die Analogie von Philosophie und Wissenschaft ist problematisch und für die Philosophie eine Gefahr. Es könnte sein, daß die Philosophie noch einen ganz anderen Sinn hat.

B12

17.VI.]

Οὐσία und ὁρισμός bei Aristoteles (zum VII. Buch der *Metaphysik*)

Die Art der Definition nach genus proximum und differentia specifica ist sekundär für *Aristoteles* (obwohl man sich heute darauf beschränkt, vgl. z. B. Rickert, *Zur Lehre von der Definition*¹¹). Sie kommt von einer bestimmten Auffassung der Gegenständlichkeit. Der primäre Sinn des ὁρισμός (definitio) ist davon unabhängig.

Bei *Aristoteles* finden sich Stellen (so im VIII. Buch, Kap. 3 über die „Silbe“ und die „Schwelle“), wo er das, was erfaßt wird, von der Art des Erfassens abhängig macht. Das ist wichtig für das Problem des ὁρισμός der Seele. Doch läßt sich dieser Gedanke nur fruchtbar machen, wenn man sich beschränkt auf eine bestimmte Weise des Seins und des Lebens. Bei *Aristoteles* ist die ganze Problemstellung schließlich orientiert auf eine objektive Wissenschaft und Ontologie hin. In diesem Falle fällt aber gerade der Bezug auf die Art des Erfassens aus.

B13

Problem: Woraus entwickelt Aristoteles den Sinn von οὐσία? – Wie kommt er dabei auf den ὁρισμός?

„Λόγος“ bedeutet bei *Aristoteles* nicht „Begriff“; sondern der Zusammenhang mit dem Verbum λέγειν ist durchaus lebendig. Λόγος heißt „Aussage“, im formalen, unbestimmten Sinn der Aussage, in der „etwas von etwas ausgesagt wird“.

Nun sagt *Aristoteles*: Der ὁρισμός ist ein λόγος, d. h. die „Definition“ ist eine Weise des Aussagens.

„Τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς“ (VII, c. 1, §1 [1028a10]) heißt nicht: „Das Seiende hat verschiedene Bedeutungen“, sondern „das ὄν wird in verschiedener Weise ausgesagt“. Wichtig für die „Weise“ des Aussagens ist die *Copula*, das „ist“ der Aussage „A ist b“. *Aristoteles* meint: Der Sinn des Seins ist orientiert an dem jeweilig verschiedenen „ist“ der Aussage.

In der modernen Logik wird die Copula zumeist vernachlässigt. Aber von dem „ist“ der Aussage her erhalten Subjekt und Prädikat erst eigentlich ihren Sinn. Das hängt mit der fundamentalen Rolle des Aussagevollzugs zusammen.

Somit ergibt sich: οὐσία ist ein bestimmter „ist“-Sinn.

formal); das „Ist“ hat eine Beziehung auf ein Was; dieses Was ist auch ein τὸδε τι, ein bloßes Dieses-da. Das liegt in dem ursprünglichen, was das λέγειν intendiert. Dieses Was in der Kenntnisnahme ist ein πρῶτον, nicht nur als fundierendes das erste ({das etwas} ist das fundierende jeder Aussage), also das worauf alles andere geht, dem gegenüber die Mannigfaltigkeit ein zweites ist, sondern auch als erstes bezüglich des Erkennens, schließlich auch der Zeit nach das Erste, d. h. was immer und überall im Vordergrund steht. Dieses Etwas ist das, was χωριστόν ist, was *für sich* ist (an und für sich). Οὐσία also weder Substanz noch begriffliches Wesen etc. Einfach seinen Sinn im Aussagen.

Einzelinterpretation der ersten Kapitel des VII. Buches der *Metaphysik*

B14

VII, Kap. 1. Der Sinn der οὐσία wird *formal* aus dem Aussagen entwickelt.

Kap. 2 gibt eine historische Orientierung.

Kap. 3 setzt sich mit einem historisch vorliegenden Begriff der οὐσία auseinander und prüft sie [ihn?] nach den formalen Bestimmungen des 1. Kapitels.

Kap. 3: Was besagt der Ausdruck „τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι“? Zu beachten ist die Verbform „εἶναι“. Durch diese *Verbform* ist die οὐσία, die als τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι charakterisiert wird, bezogen auf das λέγειν, auf die Dynamik der Aussage.

Als eigentlicher Sinn dieser οὐσία erscheint: „das, was in dem ὁρισμός erfaßt wird“. Der ὁρισμός ist ein bestimmter λόγος, eine bestimmte Art des λέγειν des Erfassens, und als das „Was“ dieser bestimmten Art des Erfassens erscheint eben das τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

Die nächsten sechs Kapitel des VII. Buches befassen sich mit der formalen Betrachtung der οὐσία. Hier entscheidet sich, durch einen eigentümlichen Abweg, auf den *Aristoteles* gerät, das Schicksal der gesamten abendländischen Logik bis heute!

Aristoteles geht sehr *radikal* vor.

Vor allem im 3. Kap.: die ὄλη, die scheinbar dem (formalen) Begriff der οὐσία viel radikaler genügt, ist doch nicht wirklich die οὐσία, sondern das τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

B15

Im formalen Sinn der οὐσία ist schon die Form des ὁρισμός „angezeigt“. Wie geschieht die formale Bestimmung der οὐσία?

Zugrunde liegt die natürliche Einstellung der *Kenntnisnahme*. In diesem zur Kenntnis Nehmen liegt schon ohne weiteres ein λέγειν. In jedem Kenntnisnehmen liegt schon ein Was, das zur Kenntnis genommen wird. (So radikal wie bei *Aristoteles* wurde das nie wieder gefaßt.) Jedes Erfasste ist ein Was. Dieses ursprüngliche Was ist aber auch ein τόδε τι.

Das τόδε τι ist nicht ein zeit-räumlich oder „historisch“ bestimmtes Individuum, sondern es ist einfach ein „Dies-da“, ein mir vorliegendes „Etwas“. (Es kann auch ein Abstraktum, ein theoretischer Satz oder sonstwas sein.) Genauer: Es ist das „Et-“ im „Et-was“, es ist das „Et-liche“; – sofern im λέγειν ein Was gefaßt wird als ein Seiendes, als etwas, das „ist“ (*nicht existiert!*).

Dieses Was im Meinen ist das „Erste“: πρῶτον. Wenn ich weiter bestimme, so ist das ἄλλο (das „Andere“), was von dem ersten „Was“ (πρῶτον) ausgesagt wird, ein Zweites (deswegen „ἄλλο“ genannt).

B16

Der „Ist-Sinn“ liegt zunächst im πρῶτον. (c. 1, §8¹²)

Cap. 2²⁴:

Die 4 {verschiedene} Begriffe: 1.) τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι 2.) καθόλου 3.) γένος 4.) ὑποκείμενον.
Sein Problem nun: wo in diesen 4 ist der eigentliche Sinn von οὐσία (Aussage) gefaßt?
Dabei fallen eigentlich 2.) und 3.) aus.

^{ws} Auch die formale Betrachtung („Ist“) nicht absolut; wir betrachten sie nur als formal angezeigt²⁵.

Aristoteles beginnt mit dem ὑποκείμενον, weil es dem „Aussage“ am meisten entspricht. Denn es ist das, wovon ausgesagt wird, also der eigentliche Sinn der οὐσία. Aber das eigentliche ὑποκείμενον für das Erkennen ist die ὄλη an sich, das seinem Sinne nach nicht Bestimmte. Aber die ὄλη genügt dem vollen Sinn der οὐσία nicht; denn sie ist *nicht* an sich ἀπλῶς, sondern sie hat als ὄλη schon ihre Beziehung auf das εἶδος, ist nichts Selbstständiges.

Also genügt vielleicht das τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι dem eigentlichen Sinn der οὐσία. – Das λέγειν eigentlich eine ποιήσις.

14.VI.

Heidegger hält nicht mehr an Natorps Einteilung des Buches Z fest²⁶. 10 Cap. kann nicht auf 6 folgen. 7-9 bildet gerade den Kern für Begriffszusammenhang der οὐσία.

Er ist das „erste“: *erstens* „λόγῳ“, d. h. bezogen auf den Sinn des Aussagens. D. h. in jedem Aussage-Ansatz ist ein Was schon gemeint.

Zweitens: „γνώσει“, d. h. bezüglich des Erkennens. D. h. als Wissenschaft und Forschung, als das, was interessiert.

Drittens: „χρόνῳ“, d. h. der Zeit nach: was immer und überall zuerst erkannt wird. – Vgl.: cap. 1, §7 (1028a30 sq.) ὥστε τὸ πρῶτως ὄν καὶ οὐ τὶ ὄν ἀλλ' ὄν ἀπλῶς ἢ οὐσία ἄν εἴη⁷.

cap. 2 und 3.

Welche konkreten Gegenstände der in Kap. 1 formal charakterisierten οὐσία? Vier Begriffe sind dafür überliefert (cap. 3):

- | | |
|-------------------|------------------------|
| 1) τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι | der „Ist-Sinn“ |
| 2) τὸ καθόλου | das Allgemeine |
| 3) τὸ γένος | die Gattung |
| 4) τὸ ὑποκείμενον | das Subjekt (Substrat) |

Von hier ab ist es das Problem des ganzen Buches VII: Inwiefern kommt in diesen vier Begriffen der formale Sinn von οὐσία, der aus dem λέγειν entspringt, zur Erfüllung? B17

Es zeigt sich, daß τὸ γένος und τὸ καθόλου strenggenommen ausfallen. Das ist von größter Wichtigkeit: Die Gattung, das Allgemeine sind sekundär.

Damit kommt aber die konkrete Auffassung des Erkennens in die formale hinein.

Aber auch die formale Betrachtung können wir nur als „(formal) angezeigt“ übernehmen.

Vielleicht ist schon das „Etwas ist Etwas“ nicht ursprünglich, sondern es liegt schon hier eine ganz bestimmte Auffassung (Vorgriff) vor.

Aristoteles beginnt mit der Betrachtung des „ὑποκείμενον“, d. i. das, was im λέγειν zugrunde liegt; oder das, *wovon* ich aussage.

Das eigentliche ὑποκείμενον ist die ὕλη (materia, Material, Stoff), sofern das Erkennen Bestimmen ist, d. h. ein Form-Geben. Die ὕλη ist daher das an sich Unbestimmte, das

ἔσχατον ὑποκείμενον ist die ὕλη an sich. Daher müßte die ὕλη die eigentliche οὐσία sein. Ist sie das wirklich? *Aristoteles* antwortet: das genügt nicht (οὐ γὰρ ἰκανόν, c. 3, §7 B18

[1029a9]). Denn die ὕλη ist nichts Selbständiges; sie ist schon mit Bezug auf die Form (μορφή) gefaßt. Vgl. §10 und 11.

114.VI.]

Bei der *Aristoteles*-Erklärung sind zwei Wege zu vermeiden: 1) *Aristoteles* von der durch ihn selbst bestimmten Philosophie (im Mittelalter, Thomas von Aquin etc.) zu verstehen. Diese ist in einer geistesgeschichtlich anderen Situation als er. 2) *Aristoteles* vom Standpunkt des Kantischen transzendentalen Idealismus zu kritisieren (*Natorp* u.a.).

Man muß *Aristoteles* durch den Rückzug durch die Geschichte zurückgewinnen.

Natorps Meinung über die Zusammensetzung des VII. Buches (Philosophische Monatshefte 24 [1888]¹³, 561 ff.), nämlich: daß zwei Untersuchungen durcheinandergingen:

1) Die Form in logischer Hinsicht: c. 4–6 und 10–14 mit c. 16 Schluß. 2) Die Form in physischer Hinsicht, im Hinblick auf das Werden: c. 7–9, 15, 16. 3) Übergang von (1)

Die οὐσία ist ein τόδε τι, ein χωριστόν, ein πρώτον, und ein ἀπλῶς. (Das ἀπλῶς determiniert das χωριστόν, es ist das {letzthin} Einfache.)

Mit dem formalen Begriff der οὐσία ist auch der formale Begriff des ὀρισμός schon gegeben.

Nun aus der Geschichte die 4 Bedeutungen.

w9 Zunächst nun: Inwiefern erfüllt das ὑποκείμενον den Sinn der οὐσία; inwiefern ist es eine οὐσία?

Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ist jegliches Was, das gesagt wird in Bezug auf sich selbst.

1029b7-8²⁷ *Nicht jedes Was-Bestimmen ist schon ein Sinnbestimmen, sondern das Sinnbestimmen ist ein besonders charakterisiertes Wasbestimmen und das ist der ὀρισμός.*

(οὐ γάρ — — — τούτου ὀρισμὸν εἶναι ὃ ἂν λόγῳ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ τινὶ λόγῳ²⁸.)

Der τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι im Hinblick auf das Werden wird ein εἶδος, im Hinblick auf das Gewordene ein καθόλου.

Nur dasjenige Wasbestimmen ist ein {Dasbestimmen} in dem das bestimmende und das bestimmte Was identisch sind²⁹.

Zur 5-6. Cap mit Hinblick auf Plato. Marburger werfen Aristoteles vor, er habe Plato mißverstanden, weil nicht nach Art der Naturwissenschaft der 17 Jahrhundert³⁰. Sie vermißt bei Aristoteles Wesen der Idee als Prozeß des Denkens, Zusammenhang des Bestimmens. Bei Aristoteles ist tatsächlich das Problem: wie kann das ἕκαστον ein τόδε τι sein und zugleich ein πρώτον und ἀπλῶς. Die Marburger hören das so, daß (Cassirer: *Substanz und Funktion*; Natorp: Kritik von Bauchs Kantbuch. *Kantstudien*³¹) zwischen letztem Individuellen und allgemein Logischem kein Unterschied. Aber ist *das* Individuelle wirklich dasselbe, wie das was Aristoteles meint und ist es dasselbe Individuelle, das in der Geschichte ist? Die Geisteswissenschaften keinen Platz in der Marburger Schule. Sie kommen mit Theorie am Einzelnen heran, während Aristoteles radikaler ist und fragt: wie erfahre ich das Einzelne. Das ist seine Kernfrage; das Problem der *Bewegung* der Ideen interessiert ihn nicht. Gelöst hat Aristoteles aber die Frage, das Einzelne zu fassen, auch nicht.

zu (2) und c. 17. – Ist zunächst bestechend, aber nicht zu halten. (Vgl. Natorp: *Platos Ideenlehre*¹⁴, 388–399).

Die Kapitel 7–9 sind keine Digression¹⁵ aus der Logik in die „Physik“, sondern eine ursprüngliche Erfahrungsexplikation, von der man erst zum Urteil kommt.

B19

Die οὐσία kommt *vor* der „Existenz“. Der „Ist-Sinn“ (Copula) ist ursprünglicher als die Existenz. Der formale Sinn des λέγειν ist ein „ist was“, „etwas“ = τὸδε τι (s. u.).

Die Plato-Kritik des Aristoteles wird von den Marburgern (Natorp) mißverstanden. *Natorp*¹⁶ wirft dem Aristoteles ein Mißverstehen Platos vor. Denn Aristoteles hat natürlich nicht Plato nach der Naturwissenschaft des 17. Jahrhunderts interpretieren können. Aristoteles sei (so sagt Natorp) nicht darauf eingegangen, daß Plato einen Zusammenhang der Ideen unter sich statuiert hat; und zwar ein dynamischer Prozeß, eine κίνησις, ein Fiat [?] der Erkenntnis. Das Wesen der Ideen sei ein Bestimmungszusammenhang. Dadurch können die Ideen auch das Individuelle fassen. (Vgl. *Natorps* eigene systematische Ausführungen über die „Apeiomorphie“ des Individuellen in seiner Kritik an *Bauchs* „Immanuel Kant“ in „Kantstudien“ Bd. 22, Heft 4¹⁷). Das ist aber gerade für Aristoteles ein Problem. Wie kann man von einem ἕκαστον (τὸδε τι), dies da, eine Wesensaussage machen?

Für Natorp gibt es im Kosmos alle logische Möglichkeiten, kein [...] des letzten Individuellen vom Logischen.

Es fragt sich aber, ob: 1) das so gemeinte Individuelle (das unendlichfach logisch bestimmte) das ist, was Aristoteles mit dem τὸδε τι meint?

B20

2) Ob mit jenem „logischen“ Individuellen z. B. das historische Individuum zu fassen ist? Aristoteles ist so radikal, zu fragen: wie *erfahre* ich das Einzelne? Er versucht, das gestalthaft einzelne Ding frei von Theorie zu fassen.

Fraglich ist dann wieder, ob auch damit das historische Individuelle zu fassen ist.

6. Cap.: 7., 8., 9., das Genesisproblem

Im 7., 8., 9. Cap. Ausgangspunkt der Aristotelischen Begriffsbildung aufgezeigt. Unsere bisherige formale Fassung erhält hier ihre konkrete Bedeutung.

[*Ergänzungen* (aus Nachschrift Bondi) zum *De Anima Seminar*

Im Vollzug des Was-Bestimmens zu verharren; der λόγος muß in einer bestimmte Weise vollzogen werden, daß ich im Was-Aussagen beim Was bleibe. Inwiefern ermöglichen die Gegenstandsbereiche, daß ich zu ihrem Was komme? Alle unsere Begriffsbestimmungen sind hier verkehrt orientiert. Ist der Sinn des ἕκαστον denn immer derselbe?

Das Grundcharakteristikum der Dinge in der γένεσις; daß sie eine *Form* haben. Wenn die Form geworden ist, ist sie allgemeine. (καθόλου und γένος kommen so erst herein.) Das eigentliche Problem ist das Problem des philosophischen Erkennens.]

Zu VII, cap. 1–4

c. 1. Οὐσία ist ursprünglicher als „Existenz“. Der formale Gehalts-Sinn des λέγειν ist ein „dies-da“, τόδε τι. Dieses τόδε τι ist χωριστόν, d.h. es bedarf in der Aussage keiner Stütze, wie das, was von einem anderen ausgesagt wird. In diesem Sinn ist es πρώτως und ἀπλῶς. Die οὐσία muß also sein:

- 1) τόδε τι, bzw. χωριστῶς.
- 2) πρώτως.
- 3) ἀπλῶς.

c. 3. Die ὕλη ist Zwar πρώτως und in gewissem Sinn auch ἀπλῶς, aber *nicht* χωριστῶς, d. h. *kein* τόδε τι.

Sie ist abstrakt, daher kein τόδε τι (c. 3, §14).

B21

c. 3. Ὑλη, μορφή, σύνολον erfüllen alle die formale Bedingung des ὑποκείμενον. Von der μορφή kommt Aristoteles auf das τί ἦν εἶναι. (Das σύνολον ist offenbar sekundär und die ὕλη im Obigen abgewiesen.)

c. 4. Genügt das τί ἦν εἶναι dem formalen Ansatz der οὐσία?

Was ist das τί ἦν εἶναι? „Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι“ ist jegliches Was, das gesagt wird in Bezug auf sich selbst.

c. 4. §5 [1029b13 sq.] „ὅτι ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστου ὃ λέγεται καθ’ αὐτό.“ Entscheidend ist hier das „ἕκαστον“.

Das „εἶναι“ darf nicht unterschlagen werden; es ist in einem bestimmten λέγειν gehabt.

c. 4, §6: in den Beispielen zum τί ἦν εἶναι:

τὸ σοὶ εἶναι τὸ μουσικῶ εἶναι⁸ [1029b14 sq.]. Was besagen die *Dative*? Sie sind eine Verkürzung des καθ’ αὐτό. Sie heißen: „in Bezug auf das da“, „auf das gerichtet hin“. Das καθ’ αὐτό liegt im Aussagevollzug selbst.

„τὸ σοὶ εἶναι“ heißt aber: „das *dir* zukommende Sein“.

B22

„οὐ γάρ ἐστὶ τὸ σοὶ εἶναι τὸ μουσικῶ εἶναι“ [1029b14 sq.] heißt: „der Grundsinn, der dich selbst ausmacht, ist nicht der, der das Gebildetsein ausmacht“. Es handelt sich nicht um eine inhaltliche Verschiedenheit; der Sinn des Aussagens ist ein anderer.

Das eigentliche Was = Sinn. Nicht jedes Was-Bestimmen bestimmt schon ein eigentliches Was oder einen „Sinn“, sondern nur den ὀρισμός. Denn der ὀρισμός ist ein solcher λόγος, daß das Was nicht von woanders her, sondern nur durch sich bestimmt wird. Im ὀρισμός verharre ich bei dem Vollzug des Was-Bestimmens und halte so das Was fest (wie das möglich ist, das erörtert Aristoteles nicht). (Vgl. c. 17.)

Der formale Begriff der οὐσία und des τί ἦν εἶναι darf nicht unterschiedslos auf alles angewandt werden. Unsere Begriffsbestimmungen sind verkehrt, wenn wir von vornherein den Begriff des ἕκαστον bestimmen wollten. Ist denn das ἕκαστον dasselbe in der Geometrie, in der Biologie, in der Geschichte?

Aristoteles faßt das ἕκαστον nicht als logisches Individuum, sondern als irgendwie gestaltet (s. den Begriff der γένεσις im 6. und 7. cap.). Sein Grundcharakteristikum ist, daß es ein εἶδος hat.

B23

^{w10} 4. Cap. 1030a3-17 entscheidend für die Auffassung der Aristotelischen Begriffsbildung.

7 Cap. Werden = 3 Arten: φύσει, τέχνη und Zufall ^{τύχη}. Ausgangspunkt ist das Machen, die ποιήσις, die immer auf einen, der macht, bezogen ist; also selbstliche³² Leistung. Dagegen φύσει macht sich von selbst, objektive Leistung. Drei also die *Arten* des Werdens.

Nun 3 Momente des Werdens; was jedem Werden zukommt: *aus*, *durch* und *zu* etwas.
Warum ist εἶδος eine οὐσία? Cf. *De Anima* II. Buch.

Wir haben also folgenden Gedankengang:

οὐσία → ὑποκείμενον → ὕλη → τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: bezogen auf das Werden (γένεσις). Das ἕκαστον als das werdende. Das τί ἦν εἶναι = εἶδος.

Trotzdem geht der ὀρισμός bei Aristoteles dann schließlich auf das καθόλου; aber nur im abgeleiteten Sinn, von der γένεσις aus. Denn vom Werden aus wird das εἶδος entwickelt (c. 6). Der Gegensatz von μορφή und ὕλη steht innerhalb des Problemzusammenhangs der οὐσία bezogen auf die γένεσις.

Beim ὀρισμός kommt es nicht auf das Was, sondern auf das Wie des λέγειν an. (Das Wie des Vollzugs!). Der ὀρισμός λόγος schöpft aus einem Gegenstand etwas, das zu ihm selbst gehört, aber nicht als Eigenschaft, sondern als... [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι?]¹⁹

Diese Auffassung des ὀρισμός ist nur möglich, wenn das Wesen der οὐσία ein εἶδος (ein gestaltetes Ding) ist. Dies setzt er als Grundstruktur an; darauf ist auch „Gattung und Art“ bei ihm zugeschnitten.

(Wichtig: 1030a3–17)

[Einzelinterpretation von] Buch VII, Kapitel 7–9

B24

In diesen Kapiteln wird der Ausgangspunkt der Aristotelischen Begriffsbildung gezeigt. Man sieht die konkrete Bedeutung des abstrakt Erworbenen im 1.–4. Kapitel. Das am Anfang Stehende erscheint dann als logische Fassung des Konkreten. Es wird auch klar, warum die οὐσία das ἕκαστον ist.

Man kann eine damalige Begriffsbildung, wie sie bei Aristoteles erscheint, die noch eine starke Nähe zur unmittelbaren Kenntnisnahme hat, die gar nicht auf einer hohen Stufe der Theoretisierung liegt, nur verstehen, wenn man sieht, in bezug worauf das Theoretische naiv ist. Man muß es im guten Sinn nur sehen!

Natorp hält die Kapitel 7–9 für eine Einschlebung, mit Unrecht, er scheint den Zusammenhang zu verkennen (vgl. *Platos Ideenlehre*, S. 388–399²⁰).

Kap. 7 beginnt mit den „Arten“ des Werdens (φύσει, τέχνη, ἀπ' αὐτομάτου) und seiner „Momente“ (ὑπό τινος, ἕκ τινος, τί).

Φύσις und ποιήσις wird gegenübergestellt.

Ποιήσις ist eine selbstliche⁹ Leistung, φύσις nicht.

Cap. 7, §9 (1032a32 sq.)

B25

ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίνεταί ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ¹⁰. Das Bild des gestalteten Dings ist in der Seele, nach welchem Vorbild die Gestaltung „gemacht“ wird (ποιεῖν).

§9 – §20.

Das Beispiel vom Gesundwerden:

Bemerkenswert: (§14) [1032b13]: ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ [τέχνη] [...] τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὑγιείας [...]!¹¹

Die Kunst des Heilens besteht darin, das (richtige) Bild der Gesundheit vor Augen zu haben. Von diesem Bild (Endzweck) kommt der Arzt durch Denken (νοεῖν, d.h. durch ein λέγειν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) rückwärts zu dem Heilmittel.

§15/16. λέγω δ' οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. [1032b14] – τῶν δὲ γενέσεων καὶ κινήσεων ἢ μὲν νόησις καλεῖται ἢ δὲ ποιήσις, ἢ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἶδους νόησις ἢ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς νοήσεως ποιήσις¹². (1032b15–17)

5.VII.

Anschließend daran weitere Probleme. Wie kommt {er ans} Seelische {heran} Wie weit kann man Gegenstand als solchen erfassen? Ohne Voraussetzungen, aber welcher Art diese? *De Anima* II 1 Frage nach dem Was = Frage nach der οὐσία. Und zwar auf ganz bestimmten οὐσία-Begriff. εἶδος bezieht die οὐσία auf eine γένεσις, diese eine ποίησις und κίνησις φύσις. Die γένεσις in der φύσις hat in sich selbst ein bestimmtes εἶδος. Also drängt er schon auf bestimmten Bereich der Seienden hin, nämlich auf Natur. – Der εἶδος ist *Entelechie*. Diese doppelt zu fassen: ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖν. Analog dem Schlafen und Wachen³³. – – – –

Das eigentliche Sein ist das Werden und das Wirken. Also Begriff bezogen auf das Wirkliche als werdendes.

^{w11} Das Sein hier selbständig, {nicht} in Bezug auf Aussage. – Die Entelechie macht das Sein selbst aus; die Seele selbst wird als Entelechie bezeichnet.

412b11 τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι parallelisiert mit der οὐσία³⁴.

– –

Er † den οὐσία, {sieht} dabei {hin} auf bestimmten Bereich: φυσικά und ἀρχαί.

In 1. Cap. vom Lebendigen {aus}.

In 2. Cap. umgekehrt vom Seienden (Beseeltes, Unbeseeltes) durch Leben geschieden³⁵.

Seele hier als ἀρχή bestimmt³⁶.

αἰτία = das {Inwiefern}; inwiefern ist diese Frage auch {eine Frage} nach dem Was?

1-6., bis 5 und 6.

Met. VII 17. αἰτία nicht nur auf die Dinge {bezieht}, sondern {auch} {eine} αἰτία von dem *was* ist. Das αἰτίον = Weswegen. *Das εἶδος in der ποίησις gesehen, so ist es ein αἰτίον.*

Das τί ἦν εἶναι wird klar, wenn man bedenkt, daß es die ἀρχή einer γένεσις ist. (Zunächst: §15 (1032b14). λέγω δ' οὐσίαν ἀνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.)

Vgl. §18. τὸ δὴ ποιῶν καὶ ὅθεν ἀρχεται ἡ κίνησις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἂν μὲν ἀπὸ τέχνης, τὸ εἶδος ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ¹³ (1032b21–23).

Kap. 8, §6. φανερόν ἄρα ὅτι οὐδὲ τὸ εἶδος, ἢ ὅτιδήποτε χρὴ καλεῖν τὴν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ μορφῆν, οὐ γίνεταί, οὐδ' ἔστιν αὐτοῦ γένεσις, οὐδὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι· τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὃ ἐν ἄλλῳ γίνεταί ἢ ὑπὸ τέχνης ἢ ὑπὸ φύσεως ἢ δυνάμεως. (1033b5–8)

Kap. 8, §10. φανερόν δὴ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος ἢ οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίνεταί, ἢ δὲ σύνολος ἢ κατὰ ταύτην λεγομένη γίνεταί, καὶ ὅτι ἐν παντὶ τῷ γεννωμένῳ ὕλη ἔνεστι, καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν τόδε τὸ δὲ τόδε¹⁴. [1033b16–19]

Zur Bedeutung von γένος:

Kap. 8, §15. [...] ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ, ἐὰν μὴ τι παρὰ φύσιν γένηται, οἷον ἵππος ἡμίονον. καὶ ταῦτα δὲ ὁμοίως: ὃ γὰρ ἂν κοινὸν εἴη ἐφ' ἵππου καὶ ὄνου οὐκ ὠνόμασται, τὸ ἐγγύτατα γένος, εἴη δ' ἂν ἄμφω ἴσως, οἷον ἡμίονος¹⁵. (1033b32–1034b42)

B26

Anima II 1 und 2. Frage nach dem κοινότατος λόγος³⁷ (allgemeinstes Sagen) vom Was der Seele. (Τύπω εἴρηται³⁸ cf. auch 416b30 ist bei ihm immer Vordeutung, Andeutung) In 1. formale allgemeine οὐσία-Betrachtung, dann kommt es zum σώμα. Wie aber? cf. *Met. Z*
Der σώμα ist ἀπλους, {dann} ist es οὐσία³⁹

In 2. geht er anderen Weg.

w12 ἄσαφές (Ungeklärtes) ist Ausgangspunkt, es springt in die Augen⁴⁰. Was in die Augen springt ist das Unterschied der lebendigen von der unlebendigen Natur. Pflanzen wachsen nach *verschiedenen Richtungen*⁴¹. (Hier Grundsinn alles Biologischen, wenn auch ganz primitiv.) Diese scheinen nun in sich selbst die ἀρχή zu haben; was in ihnen ist nennen wir ζωή.

Weisen des Lebens: νοῦς, *Bewegung* κίνησις, *Ernährung*, αἴσθησις; {alle} die anderen 3 sind auch eine κίνησις und γένεσις⁴².

Cf. 415b13 Das Leben ist ein Sein, und die ἀρχή dieses Seins die Seele⁴³.

Cf. 413b12, 13 ff⁴⁴. – –

Nun zunächst: θρεπτικόν. Es ist ein Wie des Ζῆν. Wo Leben ist, ist Ernährung; insofern also der grundlegendste seelische Vermögen; ohne das ist Leben nirgends zu finden.

(Bergson der einziger der Neueren⁴⁵ der das αἰσθάνεσθαι **als volles Leben erkannte und merkte, daß der Ausdruck Wahrnehmung ganz unzureichend ist.**) Die Pflanze hat ihr eigentliches Leben in Ernähren; das *Eigentliche* was das Tier ausmacht ist die αἴσθησις. 417b also πρώτως nicht = beginnt, sondern = *eigentlich*⁴⁶.

Es handelt sich im 2. Cap. um die Seele als ἀρχή. Auch schon Vorblick über den Sinn, den die αἴσθησις selbst hat. Cf. 3 Cap., wo wieder die Frage ist nach dem λόγος ψυχῆς, dem eigentlichen Was der Seele. Vergleich mit Figur. Es handelt sich hier um das λέγειν, nicht um Platos Fragestellung. Es gibt eine Mannigfaltigkeit von ἰδίαι, denen auch der allgemeine Sinn {anmißt}, ἐφαρμόσει (anharmonisiert)⁴⁷. Was das ist was sich {anmißt} dafür fehlt uns der Terminus; an ihm bekommt der κοινός λόγος seinen Sinn. Aristoteles geht nicht von der Gattung aus. Inwiefern εἶδος zum Begriff Art?

w13 Resultat dieser Betrachtung: Man kann nicht in allgemeine Weise über Seele spekulieren, sondern was jeglichem das Eigentlichste ist sein Logos; sein οικεῖον.

In 4 Cap. – Wenn einer den οικεῖος λόγος herausstellen will, wie muß es vorgehen, da allgemeines Reden keinen Sinn hat (man muß diese Cap. auf die erste zurückbeziehen)⁴⁸?

Es muß im *Vollziehen* gefaßt werden. (Von αἰσθητικόν das αἰσθάνεσθαι etc.) Früher als die *Leistungen* δύναμις ^{Möglichkeit} die ἐνέργεια das Vollziehen, Wirken, das aktuelle Leisten. Noch früher aber das Gegenüberliegende (ἀντικείμενα); das ist bei der αἴσθησις etwas Anderes als bei der τροφή, vielmehr das Wie des Gegenüberliegens jedesmal ein anderes. Zusammenhang der ἰδίαι mit dem κοινότατον.

Verschiedene Weise des Lebens.

III Buch {zu Grunde} – III 1.2.

19.VII.

II 3 sagt Aristoteles, es wäre lächerlich, nach dem κοινότατος λόγος zu fragen, also die Frage von II 1; sie wäre eher lächerlich ohne II 2: Grundvorstellung des Sich-Bewegens muß festgehalten werden; sie ist überall da bei Phänomenen des Lebens.

[19.VII.]

[3. Zu] *De Anima*, lib. II

B27

Bei der konkreten Betrachtung mußten die einzelnen *Weisen* der Seele möglichst weit gefaßt werden.

Es wurde oft als eigentümlich bezeichnet daß das „Ich“ der heutigen Psychologie bei Aristoteles nicht ist. Bei schärferem Zusehen aber ist es überall da, nur aber in der Verkleidung der δύναμις = das Ich-Kann und Es Kann, eine Gegenständlichkeit also, die als Grundbestimmung hat, daß sie kann. Damit Vorweisung auf Gegenständlichkeit aller *Weisen* des Lebens. Von hier aus muß δύναμις – ἐντελέχεια und Wirken – Leiden verstanden werden; alles vom Ich-kann des νοῦς; wie weit die konkreten übrigen Bestimmungen des Lebens hineinspielen (außer dem menschlichen νοῦς) mußte *einzelne* näher untersucht werden.

W14 Gibt es nun unter den einzelnen *Weisen* des Lebens noch einen allgemeinen Begriff? 414b19⁴⁹. Wie verhält sich der κοινότητας λόγος zu der ἰδία? Zweiheit und Einheit! Hier ein Problem das bis heute nicht entschieden in der Philosophie(!) Überhaupt die Frage, ob man das Problem so ansetzen darf, wie es Aristoteles von der platonische Philosophie tat. λόγος hier *nicht* = Begriff, sondern die Aussage. Aristoteles meint, es gibt keine Aussagen über Seele *neben* den Einzelseelen. Λόγος nicht neben den ἰδία; sie sind in bestimmter Ordnung und Aufeinanderfolge (τὰ ἐφεξῆς). Dadurch bekommt das ἐφαρμόσε πάσιν seinen Sinn. Die bestimmte Ordnung ist folgende: Das αἰσθητικόν ist ein *Mehr* als das θρησκευτικόν und ist nicht ohne dieses. Diese Weise des Lebens vollzieht sich nicht ohne die andere. Also bestimmte Weise der Fundierung. Die vorangehende immer die Bedingung der Möglichkeit der folgenden. (Möglichkeit = das mögliche Sich-Auswirken.) Im Viereck ist das Dreieck *mitenhalten*. Diese formale Mitenhalten ermöglicht Aristoteles Figur mit Seele zusammen zunehmen. Für unsere Betrachtung ein ganz anderes Verhältnis zu Figuren als bei der Seele. Aber diese Unterschiede stören Aristoteles nicht; es kommt ihm nur auf das In- und Nacheinander an. Was ihm eigentlich vorschwebt, ist der Mensch in dem alle Vermögen in sich konkret da sind.

Die γένεσις (als objektives *Tun* gedacht) ist das Eigentlichste, das Natürlichste der Natur. Der εἶδος in der γένεσις ist das οἶον ^{wie beschaffen}, von ihm der Begriff *Art*; εἶδος ist der Sinn von οὐσία, der auf die γένεσις bezogen ist; und zwar in der Natur.

Cf. 415b17⁵⁰.

Von hier aus auch Verständnis der ἐντελέχεια.

W15 II 4 verschiedene Begriffe

{Beziehungsweise} das αἴτιον, zugleich οὐσία (cf. *Met.* Z 17 inwiefern οὐσία αἴτιον ist. Cf. 415b13: Das eigentliche Sein liegt in der οὐσία. εἶναι hier *gleich* = beschaffen sein, ein solches sein, nicht aber bloß Dasein, Existieren. Vielmehr ein *Sodasein*. Jede Weise des Daseins hat ein So, und dieses So liegt im „Was es ist“. Im Was liegt das Wie des Seins. Daher ist die οὐσία αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι.

ἐτι τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἢ ἐντελέχεια⁵¹.

Δύναμις heißt: „es kann“.

Das Ich faßt Aristoteles als δύναμις: „ich kann“ (wobei das „es“ und „ich“ nicht grundsätzlich geschieden ist).

λόγος τῆς ψυχῆς. Frage: ob das *ein* λόγος oder mehrere λόγοι sind; ob es einen allgemeinen λόγος gibt (414b20 sqq.).

Γένεσις als Tun.

φυσικώτατον, in dem die Natur am eigensten Natur ist (415a26): Das ist das: τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό¹⁶ [415a28] (Reproduktionskraft).

οἶον εἶδος: Ursprung des Begriffes der Art.

Εἶδος ist *der* Sinn von οὐσία (Ist-Sinn), der auf die γένεσις (φύσις) bezogen ist.

416b15 sqq.: καὶ γενέσεως ποιητικόν, οὐ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ' οἶον τὸ τρεφόμενον· ἦδη γὰρ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, γεννᾷ δ' οὐθὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, ἀλλὰ σώζει¹⁷.

Dreifacher Sinn von αἴτιον (das „Inwiefern“).

415b10 sq.: ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς ἡ οὐσία.

415b12 sq.: τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἡ οὐσία.

In dem Was liegt das Wie des Existierens (des Daseins).

415b14 sq.: τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἡ ἐντελέχεια. Das Wie des Daseins der δύναμις ist die ἐντελέχεια.

B28

Der λόγος ist hier ὀρισμός, ist das Aussagen, das sich auf die οὐσία bezieht. Es handelt sich um das Leben als bestimmte Weise des Seins, und zwar um die lebenden Dinge. Das eigentliche Was (und Wie des Seins) der Dinge ist die ἐντελέχεια. Das Leben ist Leben im eigentlichen Sinne als ἐντελέχεια. Ἐνέργεια ist das in Aktion-Sein, ἐντελέχεια aber In-Aktion-Sein mit einem Ziel und dieses Ziel schon Haben.

II 5: 3 verschiedene Gruppen von Begriffen, um die es sich hier dreht: 1) δυνάμει, 2) πάσχειν, 3) ἀλλοίωσις.

Wie kommt es im Zusammenhang der αἴσθησις auf das πάσχειν? (Beachtenswert Ende des 5 Kapitels!⁵²) Tritt immer auf mit dem ποιεῖν. Was heißt πάσχειν? Es liegt darin, daß einem etwas anderes begegnet. Insofern das eine von dem anderen etwas erfahren hat, ist es ein ὅμοιον.

πάσχειν = 1.) φθορά † τις und 2.) σωτηρία⁵³.

Zu 1.) Wenn auf eines ein Anderes wirkt, ist es *nicht mehr*, was es war.

2) Es ist zugleich⁵⁴ etwas was erlitten hat und erlebt hat; das ὅμοιον bleibt.

Die ἀλλοίωσις.

Das ποιεῖν bringt das ὅμοιον mit sich, und ein δυνάμει ὄν.

W16 Δυνάμει ὄν im doppelten Sinn / Lernen Wissen {und zwar} γραμματική

1.) nur zur Gattung der Wissenden.

2.) Er hat elementare Kenntnisse, ist schon in dem Stand gesetzt zu wissen.

Also hier schon der konkrete Einzelne.

Gegensatz Schlaf – Wachen wieder eine andere Dimension von δύναμις und ἐνέργεια.

417b29⁵⁵.

Wichtig 6. Cap. {Noch und} 5. Cap., 12, III 1. und 2.

26.VII.

Problem der αἴσθησις; sie ist eine bestimmte Weise des ζῆν, dieses eine bestimmte Weise des Seins; jede hat ihre ἀρχή. (Also handelt es sich hier gar nicht um Erkenntnistheorie etc.) Sie wird bestimmt als πάσχειν und κινεῖσθαι. Eigentliche Bestimmungen ^{der αἴσθησις}:

1.) δυνάμει ὄν 2.) ein δέχεσθαι, bezeichnet als ein λόγος. (424a20ff, 30)⁵⁶. Λόγος hier = Verhältnis. Wie gehört das zur δύναμις. Λέγειν = ein anderes in Bezug auf ein anderes sagen. Also das λέγειν ein Sagen von einem Verhältnis.

Diese 3 Bestimmungen nun schärfer zu fassen:

Das δυνάμει ὄν = „Es kann“: charakterisiert ganz spezifisch die αἴσθησις. Es ist bezogen weist auf die ἐνέργεια, die Auswirkung des „Es kann“, also Vorweisung auf die κίνησις.

Zu 5 Cap.: Explikation des δυνάμει ὄν im Zusammenhang der κίνησις. 417a14 πάσχειν und κινεῖσθαι hängen mit der κίνησις zusammen, diese selbst eine bestimmte ἐνέργεια⁵⁷.

πάσχειν = erleiden = *geschehen mit*⁵⁸.

κίνησις = *Geschehen*.

ἐνεργεῖν = wirken = *geschehen von*.

Ἐντελέχεια: Das In-Aktion-Sein auf ein bestimmtes Ziel hin, das schon am Ziel ist. (ἐνέργεια die Tätigkeit). Die ἐντελέχεια ist in ihrem Sein bei sich selbst.

[26.VII.1

B29

De Anima, lib II, c. 5 sq.: „αἴσθησις“

Die αἴσθησις ist eine Weise des ζῆν (m[it] ἀρχή). Leben (ζῆν) ist eine bestimmte Weise des Seins, für jede solche Seinsweise gibt es eine ἀρχή. Die αἴσθησις ist genuin eine ἀρχή des Lebens. Sie ist weiterhin ein δυνάμει ὄν (ein Etwas, das kann).

(Dies alles ist im modernen Begriff der Sinnesempfindung verlorengegangen!).

Die αἴσθησις ist ferner ein δέχεσθαι [vgl. *De Anima* B 12, 424a17 sqq., 424b24]. Sie ist endlich ein λόγος (424a27–28):

οὐδ' ἡ αἴσθησις μέγεθος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου¹⁸.

Was heißt hier λόγος? Λόγος heißt das Besprechen von Etwas, die Aussage von Etwas; im Sinn von: Etwas von Etwas aussagen. (Λόγος heißt in der Mathematik auch „Verhältnis“, *Euklid* u. a.)

In der δύναμις, dem „es kann“, liegt die Verweisung auf die ἐνέργεια.

W17 Aristoteles spricht zuerst allgemein vom Geschehen, dann näher vom *πάσχειν*. ὁμοιον und ἀνόμοιον. Bezug mit dem 2 {Vorgehen}. Sie sind gar gleich, {eher sie} ungleich in Bezug auf das Aufeinanderwirken: die eine bewegt, die andere unbewegt; *nach* dem Geschehen auch die unbewegte bewegt. Das liegt alles im *πάσχειν*. Das Geschehen *mit* und Geschehen *von* sind im Geschehen in einem ungleichen *Was*, nachher aber im gleichen *Was*.

Ferner *πάσχειν* bestimmt als φθορά und σωτηρία. Diese Bestimmungen gelten nicht wie die ersten von jedem *πάσχειν*, sondern kennzeichnen zwei verschiedene Weise des *πάσχειν*⁵⁹.

Ὅμοιον und ἀνόμοιον muß bei beiden da sein. Σωτηρία: das Geschehen mit muß ein Eigentümliches sein und das womit geschieht muß so sein, daß es erst zu sich selbst kommt.

Die αἴσθησις ist ein *πάσχειν*, in dem es auf die σωτηρία ankommt. Anfang des 5. Cap.: δόκει γάρ ἀλλοίωσις εἶναι⁶⁰; diese bezeichnet er sonst in seiner Bewegungslehre als bestimmte Weise der κίνησις und zwar eine, die sich auf das *Was* bezieht; sie ist eine γένεσις. Dabei eine μεταβολή = ein Umschlag zu Zuständen des Beraubtseins, und ἐπὶ τὰς ἔξεις (=Haben), also ein Anderswerden, in dem womit etwas geschieht zu sich selbst kommt (417b15ff.)⁶¹.

Das *πάσχειν* ist keine ἀλλοίωσις ({Denkendes denkt}). Die ἀλλοίωσις ist kein *πάσχειν*. (Einer der lernt wird anders, aber kein *πάσχειν*.) Also Aporie. Darum verschiedene Weisen der ἀλλοίωσις zu unterscheiden.

W18 Im Zusammenhang mit Scheidungen des *πάσχειν* auch Scheidungen der δύναμις. Zur näherer Bestimmung der δύναμις kommt man, indem man fragt: in welchem Sinne ist die αἴσθησις δύναμις. Dem δυνάμει ὄν steht das ποιητικόν gegenüber. Scheinbare {Zunahmestellung}: αἴσθητον bewahrt die Wahrnehmung, also ein eigentümliches ποιητικόν, nämlich was wahrgenommen wird (das ἀντικείμενον).

Cap. 6 { Er unterscheidet 1.) αἴσθητον καθ' αὐτόν,
2.) κατά συμβεβηκός.
Bei 1.) ἰδίᾳ und κοινά zu unterscheiden⁶².

417b20 außen; in der Seele⁶³.

12 Cap: Das Einzelne nicht als Einzelne, sondern als wie Beschaffenes, nicht auf die οὐσία, sondern auf ein οἶον τί.

Noch Ergänzung zur αἴσθησις als *πάσχειν*. Cap. 12: Sie ist ein λόγος, und zwar ein Verhältnis, in dem das was kann aufnehmen kann, besser: annehmen, etwas begegnen, λαμβάνειν. Das *πάσχειν* als solches ist noch keine Wahrnehmung ({Vglch.} Pflanze). Ende des 5.: als wenn es eigentliche Ausdrücke wären⁶⁴. Nicht jedes Körper ist ein παθητικόν, nicht auf jedes können Klang, Farbe etc. wirken. Z. B. *Luft*, sie riecht in objektiven Sinne. Bei der αἴσθησις aber anders *nicht* unbegrenzt, und es bleibt. Das δέχεσθαι ist nicht⁶⁵

Transcribed by Francisco J. Gonzalez from the handwritten notes preserved among the papers of Helene Weiss, M06131 Box 3, Folder 5, Department of Special Collections, Stanford University Libraries

ἀνόμοτον ungleiches Was. (417a19–20).

B30

Vor dem Geschehen sind beide ungleich, *im* Geschehen reißt Eines das Andere mit, *nach* dem Geschehen sind sie beide *gleich*.

(Z. B. eine Kugel A bewegt sich auf eine ruhende Kugel B zu, stößt sie an, und nun sind beide bewegt.)

417a16 sq.: κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελής μέντοι¹⁹. Ein Geschehen, das noch nicht am Ziel ist.

417b2–4:

πάσχειν	
/	\
φθορά	σωτηρία
(durch das Geschehen kommt es zu sich selbst – Anstoß zur Entwicklung)	
So auch die αἴσθησις, und zwar eine ἀλλοίωσις.	

Das αἰσθητόν ist ein ποιητικόν, ein ἀντικείμενον.

Vgl. 1) 417 b20 sqq.

2) 424 a22 sqq.

B31

Zu Kap. 12. δέχεσθαι hier nicht *Aufnehmen*, sondern eher *Annehmen* (λαμβάνειν), auch im Sinne der φθορά (kein Aufnehmen im obigen Sinn und Behalten!)

Based on the editon by Günther Neumann, Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski (*Heideggers Aristoteles-Seminare im Sommersemester 1921 und Wintersemester 1922/23*, in: *Heidegger und Aristoteles: Heidegger-Jahrbuch 3* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2007), 9-22)

SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA* (SUMMER SEMESTER 1921)

NOTES BY HELENE WEISS

w1 Heidegger Seminar: Aristotle *De Anima* SS 1921

Metaphysics and physics to be drawn upon in order to gain an understanding of Aristotelian philosophy.

- (1) *Metaphysics* Book 7 (Z) – as a report after Pentecost, May 24, Lichtenstein¹
- (2) *Metaphysics* Book 5 (Δ) – middle of June
- (3) *Metaphysics* Book 3 (B) – beginning of July
- Metaphysics* Book 13 (M)
- (4) *De Anima* Book 2 – June 7
- (5) *De Anima* Book 3 – June 21²
- (6) *Physics* Books 5, 6, and 8 – on motion (Dr. Beck)³

Read all the doctrine of categories from the *Organon*, perhaps inauthentic. *Anima*, Book 1, ch. 1, 2, and 3. Pay attention to the problem of method.

What connection is there such that psychology should arise in philosophy? How is psychology built into the philosophy of Aristotle?

One distinguishes between method of presentation and method of investigation. It is the way in which knowledge is grounded.

402a6: ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων⁴ contains the grounding for both: treatment of the subject and strictness of method. For since the soul is ἀρχή so that the other sciences refer to it, it must also be especially strict in terms of method.

From 23 onward, the same question as immediately before but in a sharper formulation.⁵

Chapter 2 of Book 1; chapter 1 of Book 2

NOTES BY OSKAR BECKER^a

Seminar on Aristotle, *De Anima* (Summer Semester 1921)

CONTENTS

1. Introductory Remark on <i>De Anima</i> 402 a, b.	[B1]
2. On <i>Metaphysics Z</i>	[B3]
Analysis of <i>Z</i> 17	[B6]
Systematic observation [concerning the above].	[B10]
Οὐσία and ὁρισμός.	[B12]
Detailed interpretation of <i>Z</i> , chapters 1-4	[B14]
Detailed interpretation of <i>Z</i> , chapters 7-9	[B24]
3. On <i>De Anima B</i>	[B27]

1. Introductory Remark on *De Anima* 402 a, b

B1

It is to be asked whether *Aristotle* comprehends psychology as an individual science or as philosophy. If he comprehends it as *science*, one cannot deny him the use of certain methodological means, especially where these are principally grounded (in metaphysics). Matters are different when one investigates the occupation with the psychical only with regard to its philosophical significance.

w2 **MAY 24, 1921**

Important distinction between physicist, mathematician, and first philosopher (dialectician)⁶ φυσικός (403a),⁷ e.g., meant biologically. The biological is for him (Aristotle) the fundamental beginning of knowledge.

[Supplement from Bondi transcript:⁸

403a29ff

Speaking of 3 ways of theoretical positioning:

(1) The φυσικός

The fundamental biological starting point here determines the knowledge of nature. The true φυσικός takes the material as a material basis for a determinate function.

(2) The mathematician deals with the house in abstraction from the fact that it is a house. (The Greeks see the straight line always as a limit – as the form of something – but in this indifference.)

(3) The first philosopher deals with beings as beings: ὄν ἢ ὄν. The meaning of every object insofar as it is. The determinate properties that determine what it is are left out. Radical treatment of the problem of being.

His guiding representation of the unity of form and matter is taken from creating – seen in terms of forming.]

παθη⁹ 1.) = conditions 2.) general determination of the object.

The biologist's examination also examination of form: matter for a determinate form for a determinate function.

402a4	ἱστορία ¹	“History”.
402a11	πίστιν	Fundamental conviction.
402b8	General assertions about the subject are dubious.	
402b12	μόρια	different capabilities (“powers”) of action, i.e., capabilities for different actions
402b15	τὰ ἀντικείμενα, (<i>Plotinus</i> : ἡ ἀντίληψις).	that which lies against.

[MAY 24, 1921]

B2

Aristotle's “physics” (φυσικός) is to be understood from the perspective of biology. Physics is also an examination of form, the physical is stuff *for* a form.

Aristotle in his metaphysics tends toward the liberation from a determinate region of being; he strives for a truly universal examination (ὄν ὡς ὄν). Tendency toward the consideration of the *meaning* of being.

However, even this tendency is determined from the perspective of the concrete – i.e., the “biological,” “formed.” Unity of form and content. Fundamental position of the τεχνίτης [craftsman] (ἐντελέχεια).

403b *of such a kind* important!¹⁰

The mathematician looks away from the house but not from the ὕλη [matter]; there are corners, etc., in a general ὕλη [matter].

The problem of being is in Aristotle more radical than at any time since, also more universal than in the case of Kant. His fundamental orientation: he sees everything in terms of form.

In the case of Plato, the soul is in relation to the Ideas. *Phaedrus* 249e4,¹¹ 247d3¹². Being directed toward being is the fundamental character of the soul. It lives insofar as it is formed according to the true Ideas. Thus the creator of the universe (*Timaeus*, compare *De Anima* 404b16).¹³

Report Lichtenstein: Book Z of the *Metaphysics*

1-3¹⁴ – introductory

4-6, 10-14 – deal with εἶδος from the perspective of knowing

7-9 – εἶδος as a real factor of becoming

17 – transitions to this other treatment¹⁵

15-16 – must then follow 9 (Natorp's proposal)¹⁶

w3 4-6, 10-14 – εἶδος coincides with the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι¹⁷

Heidegger holds Natorp's division to be doubtlessly correct. No!¹⁸

The question regarding the methodological access to the object soul is for us {a central point} of the treatise. Thus the problem of definition. Today this is mostly neglected. Only *Rickert* dealt with it in his dissertation,¹⁹ but he also does not assign it any determinate significance. It always appears falsely as a problem internal to formal logic.

The problem of what definition accomplishes. And where does the definition come from? What position in the structure of the object in its objecthood [*des Gegenständliches*]?

[Supplement from Bondi transcript:

Metaphysics Z

Our question concerning the conceptual essence of the soul. What meaning definition has. (Tackled only by Rickert, even if open to criticism in every respect.)

One has obstructed the understanding of Aristotle through the concept of "Realist"; one must especially guard oneself against translating οὐσία as "substance."

2. Chapter [i.e., of Book Z]: οὐσία appears to come through, to come to appearance, most in bodies. – – –]

2. On Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book VII (Z)

B3

We examine Book VII in the context of our problem of access to the soul. Definition of the soul. What meaning does definition have in Aristotle?

The problem of definition is seldom dealt with in modern literature and only as a logical specialty. Only *Rickert, Zur Lehre von der Definition*,^b in relation to the question of philosophical concept formation.

We ask how one wins access to what is for Aristotle the “soul” and for the Moderns “consciousness.” For this the question of what definition accomplishes is important. Does the concept of definition derive its meaning genetically from out of the structure of knowing?

Completely wrong to see Aristotle as a defender of Realism against Idealism. He is concerned with something completely different. Οὐσία is *not* substance. Provides in chapter 1 [i.e., of *Metaphysics Z*] a reflection on οὐσία.

Method a much greater role in philosophy than in other sciences. Aristotle calls λογικῶς²⁰ the treatment of the problem of οὐσία and of definition. This has in his case the special meaning of *asserting*, thus considers the phenomenon with an eye to the general context of asserting, of something through something, that is the fundamental context. Joining of asserting (λέγειν) with {true} factual knowledge. Also providing the motive for Platonic philosophy.

^{w4} **Λέγειν is the fundamental phenomenon from which Aristotle arrives at οὐσία.**

From here Aristotle explains the meaning of οὐσία and of ὁρισμός. The asserting of one thing of another in a completely determinate sense. **That which is to be defined is intended in a determinate sense.**

Chapter 17. What does it generally mean to question, to determine? I must have being [*das Sein*] in order to be at all able to determine. ἔχον τὸ εἶναι δεῖ²¹: a something must be there in order that something can be asked about. **A question corresponds always first to an experience.** One thing in relation to another, that is what is questioned: in contrast to another kind of object [*Gegenständlichkeit*] with regard to which questioning is not possible. The scientific question pursues the δια τι, the αἴτιον. **By means of what, on account of what, and for what reason this one thing belongs to the other.** The determining factor that determines something else is the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι! This must therefore be understood first according to the function of answering in questioning. Chapter 17 especially important for the meaning of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

There are two fundamental determinations of αἴτιον: the for-the-sake-of-which and the cause of motion. Then is the questioning manifest.

[Supplement from Bondi transcript:

1041a32 – most: (λανθάνει δὲ μάλιστα ...) ²² What is questioned lies most hidden in that which is said in the asserting, what is questioned, what it itself is (κατ'αὐτό).

When what man is is questioned – through a simple asserting (without something substantially different) – determination through it itself. But it is necessary that one also

Aristotle has penetrated deeper here than one generally believes. One should not consider him under the aspect of the alternative: Idealism – Realism. By doing so one blocks oneself from understanding him. One should also not hold so firmly onto *Aristotle's* examples. These are only illustrative. His concern is something else.

B4

The question of οὐσία is very difficult. The translation “substance” is misleading. In Book VII, chapter 1, *Aristotle* provides a formal, semantic deduction of οὐσία. He now says that bodies (σώματα) are φανερώτατα μὲν (most evidently) examples for οὐσία (ch. 2, 1 [1028b8 and following]). They do not realize, however, its genuine meaning.

The question of method has a different meaning in philosophy than in the individual sciences. In philosophy, it is nothing secondary.

Aristotle says (ch. [4, 1029b13]) that the question concerning οὐσία and definition is “λογικῶς”; this comes from λέγειν (λόγος). This means “assertion” in relation to something. The determination of something through something in the assertion is the fundamental phenomenon from which Aristotle develops everything. Aristotle sees (see above) the surrounding world in a determinate way, in the structure of *forming*. This is for him the genuine fundamental experience in the case of knowing, i.e., even in the case of prescientific taking-cognizance, which accordingly explicates itself in a determinate form. The assertion is tied up with this type of taking-cognizance.

B5

(Something similar is to be found in Platonic philosophy.)

The λέγειν, the assertion, is the fundamental phenomenon from which the meaning of οὐσία and ὁρισμός is explicated. The ὁρισμός is a determinate form of assertion. The meaning of this assertion is such that that about which the assertion is made is intended in itself (καθ'αὐτό). That which is to be defined is grasped in a determinate tendency, namely, καθ'αὐτό, not κατ'ἀλλήλων (ch. [4, 1029b16 and following]). The meaning of definition is also dependent on λέγειν.

B6

Analysis of Book VII, chapter 17 (the paragraphs according to *Schwegler's* edition):^c

New inquiry into οὐσία, also of nonsensible objects (sec. 1). We are to start from οὐσία as ἀρχή and αἰτία (sec. 2).

Question concerning the essence of the “question” (ζήτησις). The “for the sake of which” (διὰ τί) is always asked in this way: why something different attaches to the one thing (διὰ τί ἄλλο ἄλλω τινὶ ὑπάρχει [1041a11]) (sec. 3).

One cannot ask why something is itself (διὰ τί αὐτό ἐστὶν αὐτό, 1041a14). For the That and the being must be fixed (δεῖ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι καὶ τὸ εἶναι ὑπάρχειν δῆλα ὄντα, 1041a15) (sec. 4), i.e., the question does not hang in the air but seeks the determination of the one through the other (cf. sec. 3).

[similarly, sec. 8-9]

(sec. 9) Τὸ αἴτιον is questioned: the “for the sake of what” or in what sense something is (τὸ αἴτιον). This is (sec.10) according to some the for-the-sake-of-which (τίνος ἔνεκα [1041a29]), according to others the first mover (τί ἐκίνησε πρῶτον [1041a30]). “Logically” spoken (ὡς εἰπεῖν λογικῶς [1041a28]), however, it is the “τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι” (sec. 10). – “Λογικῶς”: according to the meaning in the assertion, in the function of determining.

B7

take the “what” apart. (The question requires that I free myself from the mere making-present [*Vergegenwärtigung*][]).

In questioning we ask about that which is to be determined, about the ὄλη, what determines that which is to be determined according to what it is.]

In chapters 6 and 4, the question of the relation between the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and the ἕκαστον. The λέγειν directed toward an οὐσία. Knowing directed toward an ἕκαστον. Natorp falsely understands this as the individual; it is much more (chapter 6) an “any each” [*ein Jegliches*], a “some-it” [*ein Etliches*]. Something determines something: i.e., the some-it [*das Etliche*] is determined through something. **What in the formal sense is the οὐσία.**

[Supplement from Bondi transcript:

Z17, 1041b9²³

In the case of what is completely simple there can be no questioning, no teaching, no thought. A completely different way of questioning how I arrive at this *What*. Being [*das Sein*] must be there. (given) — — —

In asserting, something must be intuitively given. — — —

In philosophy we ask how the intuited is itself given and in what sense. It is not lived in having but known (an empty formal determination) — —]

We can distinguish between knowledge-questions in scientific and philosophical knowing.

^{ws} How is the proposition “Being [*das Sein*] must be had” related to these two. Phenomenology introduced this proposition into philosophy. Which is one of its major services. In asserting, something is always intended that must be given to be determined. One characterizes this as intuition. Thus is intuition to be understood in phenomenology. That which I explain must be given to me in intuition. But here, as also in the case of Aristotle, lies a great

The τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is to be understood from the meaning of knowledge (assertion). What does τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι mean? This problem has been a crux of Aristotle interpretation for a long time.

(sec. 12) The ζητούμενον is most hidden (λανθάνει μάλιστα) when something is meant in itself, not where something different determines it (ἐν τοῖς μὴ καταλλήλως ζητούμενοις)^d (1041a32 and following). Schematically: when one asks, “Is A b?” the b is evidently what is in question. In the other case, however, what is in question is hidden.

Aristotle names this other case “ἀπλῶς,” in contrast to ἀλλήλως.

Οἶον (εἰ) ἄνθρωπος τί ἐστι ζητεῖται διὰ τὸ ἀπλῶς λέγεσθαι^e, ἀλλὰ μὴ διορίζειν ὅτι τάδε ἦ^f τόδε, ἀλλὰ δεῖ διαρθρώσαντας^g ζητεῖν² (1041b1 and following).

(sec. 14) ἐπεὶ δὲ δεῖ ἔχειν τε καὶ ὑπάρχειν τὸ εἶναι, δῆλον δὴ ὅτι τὴν ὕλην ζητεῖ (ταδι)^h διὰ τί ἔστιν οἶον οἰκία³ (1041b4 and following).

The ὕλη, what it is, is not being inquired into; what is at issue is how the ὕλη is determined. The genuine meaning of ὕλη emerges from λέγειν.

In Books IV and VI⁴ of the *Metaphysics*, we find a connection between the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι and the ἕκαστον. In asserting, something is asserted of something. “Ἐκαστον is not the individual being (as *Natorp*ⁱ believes). “Ἐκαστον means “some-it-ness” [*Etliches*] or “the some-it” [*das Etliche*]⁵ (this should not have the secondary sense of “few” but should sound like “something” without the definite what-thing [*Was*] – Heidegger’s expression). The something (*Etliche*, ἕκαστον) is determined through something (*Was*, οὐσία). The ἕκαστον as a some-it is determined καθ’ αὐτό.

(sec. 16) φανερόν τοίνυν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν οὐκ ἔστι ζήτησις [...], ἀλλ’ ἕτερος τρόπος τῆς ζητήσεως [1041b9 sq].⁶

τῶν ἀπλῶν [the simple]: opposite κατ’ ἀλλήλων [according to each other].

I remain with the “what” that I have. In this simple relation there is no question and no teaching; no development of a thought.

(sec. 17) There is rather a completely different way of knowing here.

Systematic observations concerning the above

We limit ourselves to the knowledge question. Here we must distinguish between the question (1) in scientific and (2) in philosophical knowing. What does it mean to say: being must be had in the sense of phenomenology? Phenomenology shows: if it is to be possible to know something, so must that about which I speak be *given* – “intuitively” given. This is the fundamental knowledge of phenomenology, but it is only *one* step and conceals a danger insofar as this principle does not itself become a question.

danger. Intuition by itself leads no further. The fundamental principle, at first indeed formal, does not yet provide anything for a grand system.

What role is played in the sciences by the principle that being must be had? Is it directing, and how is it directing? One determines what one does not have from that which one has. But having and how-having are not at all problems. One lives in having as also factual life. But one finds very different ways of having also in the case of the individual sciences. And in the natural sciences a way of having completely different from that in the human sciences.

Not only the framework of questioning but also the way of questioning is determined through having.

Is this analogously the case in philosophy {?} we see it in the question concerning substance. We do not know if this analogy is justified.

W6 **JUNE 7, 1921**

Book Z of the *Metaphysics*: problem: *the meaning of being*; not the problem of substance nor the problem of definition in a logical sense. Ὄρισμος does not mean the same as today's "definition." The question of whether one defines with genus proximus and differentia specifica is of completely secondary importance in Aristotle.

Important: How is the problem of the soul grasped, and what does it have to do with philosophy? – –

Important in Aristotle: that which is grasped and the thing itself that grasps are identical; this holds true with (I) [us] for a determinate type of object; (II) this sameness of concept and object is found only in a completely determinate way of being and of living. For Aristotle there is indeed a determinate orientation from the side of the objective in ontology.

How does Aristotle, in the attempt to work out the meaning of beings, suddenly light upon the definition?

Both Dilthey's and Aristotle's {interpretation} of the psychical [*des Seelischen*] in the fundamental context of life.

Λόγος in Aristotle {initially} secondary as concept; the ὄρισμός is a λόγος; to be understood as asserting.

Τὸ ὄν πολλαχῶς λέγεται = the meaning of being always has a different function in asserting. The copula "is" is the most important; from here the subject and the predicate first derive their meaning. Οὐσία is a determinate meaning of "is."

One must make it clear to oneself that different objects according to their very meaning must have a determinate and different mode of access. The meaning of having and that and how one has it plays only a minor role in the individual sciences. However, the prescientific “having” of the objects is different in the case of the natural sciences from what it is^j in the human sciences.

In contrast, in philosophy it is precisely the *meaning* of the having of an object that must be dealt with. The meaning of having becomes itself conscious; one does not only live in it. But this formal determination remains empty as long as what should be had remains undetermined.

This is analogously the case with the problem of the question (ζήτησις). The question grows out of the having of a world of experience (a “fundamental experience”).

The how of questioning is already determined through the meaning of having.

B12

This contrast between philosophy and science is only preliminary. The analogy of philosophy and science is problematic and a danger for philosophy. It could be the case that philosophy has a completely different meaning.

1 JUNE 7, 1921

Οὐσία and ὁρισμός in Aristotle (on Book VII of the *Metaphysics*)

The kind of definition according to proximate genus and differentia is secondary for Aristotle (even though today one confines oneself to this, cf., e.g., Rickert, *Zur Lehre von der Definition*).^k It derives from a determinate conception of objecthood. The primary meaning of ὁρισμός (definitio) depends on it.

In Aristotle we find passages (thus in Book VIII, ch. 3, on the “syllable” and the “threshold”) where he makes that which is grasped dependent on the kind of grasping. This is important for the problem of the ὁρισμός of the soul. But this thought cannot be made fruitful when one confines oneself to a determinate mode of being and living. In Aristotle the whole problematic is in the end oriented toward an objective science and ontology. In this case what is missing is precisely the relation to the kind of grasping.

B13

Problem: From where does Aristotle develop the meaning of οὐσία? – How does he arrive at the ὁρισμός in this context?

“Λόγος” in Aristotle does not signify “concept”; rather, the connection with the verb λέγειν remains alive throughout. Λόγος means “assertion,” in the formal, indeterminate sense of assertion in which “something is asserted of something.”

Now Aristotle says: the ὁρισμός is a λόγος, i.e., the “definition” is a mode of asserting. “Τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς” (VII, ch. 1, sec. 1 [1028a10]) does not mean: “being [*das Seiende*] has different meanings,” but rather “the ὄν is asserted in different ways.” Important for the “way” of asserting is the *copula*, the “is” of the assertion “A is b.” Aristotle means: the meaning of being is oriented toward the “is” of the assertion, which is different in each case.

w7 The first chapter [of Book Z] has the task of working out the formal meaning of οὐσία, to be lifted out of λέγειν. Chapter 2 has a more historical orientation. In [chapter] 3, he enumerates the 4 traditional concepts: (1) τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; therein is contained the assertion; it is the genuine meaning of οὐσία and the meaning of οὐσία that is grasped in the ὀρισμός. The meaning of ὀρισμός is already anticipated in the formal meaning of οὐσία. What lies at the basis of the whole problem of grasping is how a thing is naturally situated in relation to our taking cognizance of it. This first thing toward which a taking-cognizance is directed is a “what,” an οὐσία (completely formal); the “is” has a relation to a “what”; this “what” also a τόδε τι, a mere this-there. This lies in what the λέγειν originally intends. This “what” in taking-cognizance is a πρότον, the first not only as foundational ([the something] is foundational for every assertion), therefore as that toward which everything else is directed, that against which the multiplicity is secondary, but also as first in relation to knowing; finally, as first also in time, i.e., what always and everywhere stands in the foreground. This “something” is that which is χωριστόν, what is *for itself* (in and for itself). οὐσία therefore neither substance nor a conceptual essence, etc. Its meaning simply in asserting.

In modern logic the copula is mostly neglected. However, it is from the “is” of the assertion that subject and predicate first actually receive their meaning. This goes with the fundamental role played by the carrying out of the assertion. Thus we have the result: οὐσία is a determinate meaning of “is.”

Detailed interpretation of the first chapter of Book VII of the *Metaphysics*

B14

VII, ch. 1. The meaning of οὐσία is developed formally from asserting.

Ch. 2 provides a historical orientation.

Ch. 3 critically examines the concept of οὐσία available historically and tests it according to the formal determinations of chapter 1.

Ch. 3: What is the meaning of the expression “τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι”? Note the *verbal form* “εἶναι.” Through this verbal form οὐσία, characterized as τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι, is related to λέγειν, to the dynamic of the assertion.

What appears as the genuine meaning of this οὐσία: “that which is grasped in the ὁρισμός.” The ὁρισμός is a determinate λόγος, a determinate type of λέγειν, of grasping, and what appears as the “what” of this determinate type of grasping is precisely the τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι. The next six chapters of Book VII are concerned with the formal consideration of οὐσία. Here, through a peculiar detour that *Aristotle* falls into, the fate of the whole of Western logic up to the present day is decided!

Aristotle proceeds very *radically*. Especially in ch. 3: ὅλη, that apparently satisfies much more radically the (formal) concept of οὐσία, is nevertheless not really οὐσία but the τὸ τὶ ἦν εἶναι.

B15

In the formal sense of οὐσία, the form of the ὁρισμός is already “indicated.” How does the formal determination of οὐσία occur?

At the basis lies the natural attitude of *taking-cognizance*. A λέγειν lies already and without further conditions in this taking-cognizance. There is in every taking-cognizance already a “what” that is taken cognizance of. (This was never again grasped as radically as with Aristotle.) Everything grasped is a “what.” But this original “what” is also a τὸδε τι.

This τὸδε τι is not a temporally-spatially or “historically” determined individual; rather, it is simply a “this-here,” a “something” lying before me. (It can also be something abstract, a theoretical proposition or whatever else.) More precisely: it is the “some”

Chapter 3²⁴ – The 4 {different} concepts: (1) τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι; (2) καθόλου; (3) γένος; (4) ὑποκείμενον.

His problem now: where in these 4 is the genuine meaning of οὐσία (assertion) grasped? Thereby (2) and (3) {actually} drop away.

w8 Even the formal consideration (“is”) not absolute; we consider it only as a formal indication.²⁵

Aristotle begins with the ὑποκείμενον because it most corresponds to the “assertion.” This is because it is that about which an assertion is made, thus the genuine meaning of οὐσία. However, the genuine ὑποκείμενον from the perspective of knowing is the ὄλη in itself, that which according to its very meaning is undetermined.

But ὄλη does not satisfy the full meaning of οὐσία; for it is *not* in itself ἀπλῶς, but rather it as ὄλη is already related to εἶδος, is nothing independent.

Therefore, it is perhaps the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι that satisfies the genuine meaning of οὐσία. – The λέγειν is actually a ποίησις.

[*Et-*] in “some-thing” [*Et-was*], it is the “some-it” [*Et-liche*]; insofar as in λέγειν a “what” is grasped as a being, as something that “is” (*not exists!*).

This “what” in intending is the “first”: πρῶτον.

When I determine further, so is the ἄλλο (the “other”), what is asserted of the first “what” (πρῶτον), a second (therefore called “ἄλλο”).

B16

The “is-meaning” lies most immediately in the πρῶτον (ch. 1, sec. 8¹).

It is the “first”: *in the first place* “λόγῳ,” i.e., in relation to the meaning of asserting. That is, in each making of an assertion a “what” is intended.

In the second place: “γνώσει,” i.e., in relation to knowing. That is, as science and investigation, as that which is of interest.

In the third place: “χρόνῳ,” i.e., according to time: what always and overall is known first. – Cf.: ch. 1, sec. 7 (1028a30ff.) ὥστε τὸ πρῶτως ὄν καὶ οὐ τὶ ὄν ἀλλ’ ὄν ἀπλῶς ἢ οὐσία ἂν εἴη.⁷

Ch. 2 and 3

Which concrete objects for the formally characterized οὐσία of ch. 1? Four concepts in this regard have come down to us (ch. 3):

- (1) τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι – the “is-meaning”
- (2) τὸ καθόλου – the universal
- (3) τὸ γένος – the genus
- (4) τὸ ὑποκείμενον – the subject (substrate)

From here we have the problem of the whole of Book VII:

To what extent does the formal meaning of οὐσία, which arises from λέγειν, come to fulfillment in these four concepts?

B17

We see that τὸ γένος and τὸ καθόλου strictly taken fall out. This is of the greatest importance: the genus and the universal are secondary.

The concrete interpretation of knowing thereby enters the formal one.

But even the formal consideration is one we can take up only as “(formally) indicated.”

Perhaps the “something as something” is already not original; rather, we have here already a completely determinate interpretation (preconception).

Aristotle begins with the consideration of the “ὑποκείμενον,” i.e., that which lies at the basis of λέγειν; or that *about which* I make an assertion.

The genuine ὑποκείμενον is the ὕλη (materia, matter, stuff), insofar as knowing is determining, i.e., giving form. The ὕλη is therefore that which is in itself undetermined, the ἔσχατον ὑποκείμενον is the ὕλη in itself. Therefore, the ὕλη would need to be the genuine οὐσία. But is it that really?

Aristotle answers: that does not suffice (οὐ γὰρ ἰκανόν, ch. 3, sec. 7 [1029a9]. For the ὕλη is nothing that can stand on its own; it is grasped always already in relation to the form (μορφή). Cf. sec. 10 and 11.

B18

JUNE 14, 1921

Heidegger no longer holds onto Natorp's division of Book Z.²⁶ Chapter 10 cannot follow 6; 7-9 constitute precisely the kernel for the conceptual context of οὐσία.

The οὐσία is a τόδε τι, a χωριστόν, a πρῶτον, and a ἀπλῶς. (The ἀπλῶς determines the χωριστόν, it is the {ultimately} simple.)

With the formal concept of οὐσία, the formal concept of ὁρισμός is already given.

The four meanings {now taken from history}.

Right now: to what extent does the ὑποκείμενον fulfil the meaning of οὐσία; to what extent is it an οὐσία?

w9

τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is any and each "what" that is spoken of in relation to itself.

1030a7-8²⁷ – *Not every determination of what something is already a determination of meaning, but rather the determination of meaning is a special kind of determination of what something is, and this is the ὁρισμός.*

(οὐ γὰρ — — — τούτου ὁρισμὸν εἶναι ὃ ἂν λόγῳ τὸ αὐτὸ σημαίνει, ἀλλὰ τινὶ λόγῳ.)²⁸

The τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is an εἶδος with regard to becoming, a καθόλου [universal] with regard to what has become.

Only that determination of what something is in which the determining and the determined "what" are identical is also a determination of meaning.²⁹

In chapters 5 and 6, Plato is in view. The Marburg school charges Aristotle with misunderstanding Plato because [he did] not [understand him] in the manner of seventeenth-century natural science.³⁰ It finds wanting in Aristotle the essence of the Idea as a process of thinking, as a context of determining. In Aristotle the problem is in fact: how can the ἕκαστον be a τόδε τι and also at the same time a πρῶτον and ἀπλῶς. The Marburg school understands that as meaning that there is no distinction between the ultimate individual and the logical universal (Cassirer, *Substanzbegriff und Funktionsbegriff* [1910]; Natorp, *Kantstudien*, critique of Bauch's book on Kant).³¹

But is *the* individual really the same as what Aristotle has in mind? And is it the same individual that is in history? The human sciences have no place in the Marburg school.

[JUNE 14, 1921]

Two ways are to be avoided in the explanation of Aristotle:

- (1) Understanding Aristotle from the perspective of the philosophy determined through him (in the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas, etc.) This [later philosophy] is in a different spiritual-historical situation from his own.
- (2) Criticizing Aristotle from the standpoint of Kantian transcendental philosophy (Natorp among others). One must win Aristotle back by going back through history.

Natorp's opinion concerning the composition of Book VII (*Philosophische Monatshefte* 24 [1888],^m 561ff.) – namely, that two enquiries were entangled: (1) the form in a logical perspective: ch. 4-6 and 10-14 with end of ch. 16; (2) the form in a physical perspective, with regard to becoming: ch. 7-9, 15, 16; (3) transition from (1) to (2) and ch. 17 – is at first attractive but not to be retained. (Cf. Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre*,ⁿ 388-99.) Chapters 7-9 are no digression^o from logic into physics but rather an originary explication of the experience from which one first arrives at the judgment.

Οὐσία comes *before* “existence.” The “is-meaning” (copula) is more originary than existence. The formal meaning of λέγειν is an “is what,” “something” = τὸδε τι (see below).

B19

Aristotle's critique of Plato is misunderstood by the Marburg school (Natorp). Natorp^p charges Aristotle with misunderstanding Plato. For Aristotle naturally was not able to interpret Plato according to the natural sciences of the seventeenth century. Aristotle supposedly did not realize (so says Natorp) that Plato established a connection of the Ideas among themselves and indeed, a dynamic process, a κίνησις, a [Fiat?] of knowledge. The essence of the Ideas should be found in a connection of mutual determination. Thereby the Ideas can also comprehend the individual. (Cf. Natorp's own systematic reflections on the “Apeiomorphie” of the individual in his critique of *Bauch's* “Immanuel Kant” in *Kant-Studien* 22, no. 4.⁹) But precisely this is a problem for Aristotle. How can one make an assertion about essence in relation to an ἕκαστον (τὸδε τι), “this here”?

They come at the singular phenomenon with a theory, while Aristotle is more radical and asks: How do I experience the singular? That is his central question.

The problem of the *movement* of the Ideas interests him not at all. But Aristotle, too, did not solve the question of how to grasp the singular.

Chapter 6: 7, 8, 9 the problem of becoming

The origin of the Aristotelian formation of concepts is shown in chapters 7, 8, 9. Our account, up to now formal, receives here its concrete significance.

[Supplement from Bondi transcript:

To remain in the carrying-out of the process of determining what something is; the λόγος must be carried out in a determinate way such that I in asserting what something is remain with this “what.”

For Natorp all logical possibilities are contained in the cosmos, no [...] of the ultimate individual from the logical. But it is a question (1) if the individual thus intended (that which is endlessly determined logically) is what Aristotle had in mind with the *τόδε τι* or (2) if the historical individual is to be comprehended with that “logical” individual. Aristotle is so radical as to ask: How do I *experience* the singular? He attempts to comprehend the formed singular thing free of any theory. But it is then again a question if the historical individual can thereby be comprehended.

B20

On VII, ch. 1-4

Ch. 1 – *Οὐσία* is more originary than “existence.” The formal content-sense of *λέγειν* is a “this-here.” *τόδε τι*. This *τόδε τι* is a *χωριστόν*, i.e., it requires no support in the assertion, as [does?] that which is asserted of something else. It is in this sense *πρώτως* and *ἀπλῶς*. *Οὐσία* must therefore be:

- (1) *τόδε τι*, respectively *χωριστῶς*;
- (2) *πρώτως*;
- (3) *ἀπλῶς*.

Ch. 3 – The *ὄλη* is indeed *πρώτως* and in a certain sense even *ἀπλῶς*, but *not χωριστῶς*, i.e., *no τόδε τι*.

It is abstract, therefore no *τόδε τι* (ch. 3, sec. 14).

B21

Ch. 3 – “*Υλη, μορφή, σύνολον* all fulfill the formal requirement of the *ὑποκείμενον*. From the *μορφή*, Aristotle arrives at the *τί ἦν εἶναι* (the *σύνολον* is clearly secondary and the *ὄλη* was dismissed in the above).

Ch. 4 – Does the *τί ἦν εἶναι* satisfy the formal starting point of *οὐσία*?

What is the *τί ἦν εἶναι*? “*Τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι*” is every “what” that is said in relation to itself.

Ch. 4, sec. 5 [1029b13ff.] – “*ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι ἕκαστον ὃ λέγεται καθ’ αὐτό.*” Decisive is here the “*ἕκαστον.*”

The “*εἶναι*” should not be suppressed; it is had in a determinate *λέγειν*. Ch. 4, sec. 6: in the examples for *τί ἦν εἶναι*:

“*Τὸ σοι εἶναι τὸ μουσικῶ εἶναι*”⁸ [1029b14ff.]. What do the *datives* mean? They are an abbreviation of *καθ’ αὐτό*. They signify: “in relation to that there,” “directed toward that.” The *καθ’ αὐτό* lies in the carrying out of the assertion itself. “*τὸ σοι εἶναι*” means, however: “the being that pertains *to you.*”

B22

“*οὐ γὰρ ἔστι τὸ σοι εἶναι τὸ μουσικῶ εἶναι*” means: “the fundamental meaning that constitutes you yourself is not that which constitutes being cultured.” At issue is not a difference of content; the meaning of the assertion is another one.

The genuine “what” = meaning. Not every what-determination already determines a genuine “what” or a “meaning,” rather only the *ὀρισμός*. *ὀρισμός* is a *λόγος* of such a kind that the “what” is determined not from somewhere else but only through itself. In

To what extent do the different regions of objects enable me to arrive at their “what”? All of our conceptual determinations here are misdirected. For is the meaning of ἕκαστον always the same?

The fundamental character of things in γένεσις: that they have a *form*. When the form has come to be, it is universal. (καθόλου and γένος enter the scene first here.) The actual problem is the problem of philosophical knowing.]

^{w10} Chapter 4, 1030a3-17, decisive for our conception of the Aristotelian formation of concepts.

Chapter 7 – becoming = 3 types: φύσει, τέχνη, and chance ^{τύχη}.

The starting point is making, ποιήσις, that is always related to one who makes; thus subjective³² performance. In contrast, φύσει makes itself from itself, objective performance. The *kinds* of becoming are thus three.

the ὀρισμός, I persist in the carrying out of the what-determination and so hold firmly onto the “what” (how that is possible is something Aristotle does not discuss). (Cf. ch. 17.) The formal concept of οὐσία and of the τί ἦν εἶναι should not be applied to everything indifferently. Our conceptual determinations are upside down if we wished to determine the concept of the ἕκαστον in advance. For is the ἕκαστον the same in geometry, biology, and history?

Aristotle comprehends the ἕκαστον not as logical individual but as formed in some way (see the concept of γένεσις in chapters 6 and 7). Its fundamental characteristic is that it has an εἶδος.

B23

We thus have the following thought progression:

οὐσία → ὑποκείμενον → ὕλη → τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι: related to becoming (γένεσις). The ἕκαστον as what is becoming. The τί ἦν εἶναι = εἶδος.

Nevertheless, the ὀρισμός in Aristotle is then in the end directed toward the καθόλου; but only in a derivative sense, from out of γένεσις. For the εἶδος is developed from out of becoming (ch. 6). The opposition of μορφή and ὕλη stands within the problematic of οὐσία as related to γένεσις.

What is at issue in the ὀρισμός is not the “what” but the “how” of λέγειν. (The “how” of the carrying-out!) The ὀρισμός λόγος draws from the object something that belongs to it itself but not as property, rather as ... [τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι?]^s

This interpretation of the ὀρισμός is only possible when the essence of οὐσία is an εἶδος (a *formed* thing). This he sets out as the fundamental structure; also “genus and species” are in him tailored to this.

(Important: 1030a3-17.)

[Detailed interpretation of] Book VII, chapter 7-9

B24

These chapters exhibit the starting point of the Aristotelian concept formation. One sees the concrete significance of what was achieved abstractly in chapters 1-4. What stands at the beginning then appears as the logical comprehension of the concrete. Why οὐσία is the ἕκαστον also becomes clear.

The concept formation at the time, as it appears in Aristotle, remains in close proximity to immediate taking-cognizance, which does not at all occupy a high level of theorizing. One can understand it only when one sees that in relation to which the theoretical is naïve. One must just see it with an open mind!

Natorp takes chapter 7-9 to be an insertion, wrongly; he appears not to understand the context (cf. *Platos Ideenlehre*, 388-399).¹

Ch. 7 begins with the “types” of becoming (φύσει, τέχνῃ, ἀπ’αὐτομάτου) and their “moments” (ὑπό τινος, ἔκ τινος, τί).

Φύσις and ποιήσις are set against each other.

Ποίησις is a subjective⁹ performance, φύσις not.

Ch. 7, sec. 9 (1032a32ff.)

B25

ἀπὸ τέχνης δὲ γίνεταί ὅσων τὸ εἶδος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.¹⁰ The image of the formed thing is in the soul, according to which paradigm the formation is “made” (ποιεῖν).

sec. 9-20

Now 3 moments of becoming; what belongs to every becoming: *out of, through,* and *to* something.

Why is εἶδος an οὐσία? Cf. *De Anima*, Book 2.

JULY 5, 1921

In addition, further problems. How does {he} arrive {at} the psychical? To what extent can {one} grasp an object as such? Without presuppositions, but of what kind?

De Anima II 1 – inquiry into the “what” = inquiry into οὐσία. And indeed, according to a completely determinate concept of οὐσία. Εἶδος relates the οὐσία to a γένεσις, and this is a ποιήσις and κίνησις φύσις. The γένεσις in φύσις [becoming in nature] has in itself a determinate εἶδος. Thus he pushes already toward a determinate region of beings, namely, nature. – The εἶδος is *entelechy*. This to be understood in two ways: ἐπιστήμη θεωρεῖν. Analogous to sleeping and waking.³³

Genuine being is becoming and working. The concept is therefore related to the effected reality [*das Wirkliches*] as what is becoming.

^{W11} Being here stands alone, {not} in relation to the assertion. – Entelechy constitutes being itself; the soul itself is characterized as entelechy.

412b11 – τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι in parallel with οὐσία.³⁴

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He † οὐσία and thereby {looks toward} a determinate region: φυσικά and ἀρχαί.

In chapter 1 about *living beings*.

In chapter 2 in contrast about beings (ensouled and unensouled) distinguished through life.³⁵ Here the soul is determined as an ἀρχή.³⁶

Αἰτία = the {In-what-way}; to what extent is this question also a questioning of the “what”?

The example of becoming healthy:

Worth noting: (sec. 14) [1032b13]: ἡ γὰρ ἰατρικὴ [τέχνη] [...] τὸ εἶδος τῆς ὑγείας [...].¹¹

The art of healing consists in having before one's eyes the (right) image of health. From this image (the goal) the doctor works back in thought (νοεῖν, i.e., through a λέγειν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ) to the means of healing.

sec. 15-16: Λέγω δ' οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι [1032b14] – τῶν δὲ γενέσεων καὶ κινήσεων ἢ μὲν νόησις καλεῖται ἢ δὲ ποίησις, ἢ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τοῦ εἶδους νόησις, ἢ δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου τῆς νοήσεως ποίησις¹² (1032b15-17).

The τί ἦν εἶναι becomes clear when one considers that it is the ἀρχή of a γένεσις. (Chiefly, sec. 15 [1032b14]: Λέγω δ' οὐσίαν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.)

Cf. sec. 18 – Τὸ δὴ ποιοῦν καὶ ὅθεν ἀρχεται ἢ κίνησις τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν, ἐὰν μὲν ἀποτέχνης, τὸ εἶδος ἐστὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ¹³ (1032b21-23). Ch. 8. sec. 10 – Φανερόν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὡς εἶδος ἢ οὐσία λεγόμενον οὐ γίγνεται, ἢ δὲ σύνοδος ἢ κατὰ ταύτην λεγομένη γίγνεται, καὶ ὅτι ἐν παντὶ τῷ γενομένῳ ὕλη ἔνεστι, καὶ ἔστι τὸ μὲν τότε τὸ δὲ τότε¹⁴ [1033b16-19].

B26

On the meaning of γένος:

Ch. 8, sec. 15 – [...] ἄνθρωπος γὰρ ἄνθρωπον γεννα, ἐὰν μὴ τι παρὰ φύσιν γένηται, οἶον ἵππος ἡμίονον. καὶ ταῦτα δ' ὁμοίως. ὁ γὰρ ἂν κοινὸν εἶη ἐφ' ἵππου καὶ ὄνου, οὐκ ὠνόμασται τὸ ἐγγύτατα γένος, εἶη δ' ἂν ἄμφω ἴσως οἶον ἡμίονος¹⁵ (1033b32-1034a2).

[*Metaphysics* VII] 1-6, better 5 and 6

Metaphysics VII 17 – αἰτία not only {in relation to} things but {also an} αἰτία for *what* a thing is. The αἰτία = that-for-the-sake-of-which. *The εἶδος is held in view in production and therefore is an αἰτίον.*

[*De Anima* II 1 and 2. Inquiry into the κοινότητα λογος³⁷ (the most general saying) about what the soul is (τύπω εἴρηται³⁸ is always for him an anticipatory indication, a sign). In 1, formal general consideration of the οὐσία then we come to the σῶμα (body). But how? Cf. *Metaphysics Z* the σῶμα is ἀπλοῦς, {therefore} is it οὐσία.³⁹

In 2, he goes another way.

W12 Ἀσαφές (unclarified) is the starting point, it jumps out at one.⁴⁰ What jumps out at one is the distinction between living and nonliving nature. Plants grow *in different directions*⁴¹ (here the fundamental meaning of everything biological, even if completely primitively). These now appear to have the ἀρχή in themselves; we call what is in them ζώή.

Ways of living: νοῦς, *movement* κίνησις, *nutrition*, αἴσθησις; {all} the other three are also a κίνησις and γένεσις.⁴²

Cf. 415b13: Living is a way of being, and the ἀρχή of this way of being is the *soul*.⁴³

Cf. 413b12, 413b13ff.⁴⁴ – –

Now first of all: θρεπτικόν [the nutritive faculty]. It is a way of ζῆν [living]. Where there is life, there is nutrition; to this extent it is the most fundamental capability of the soul; without it life is nowhere to be found. (Bergson is the only one among the moderns⁴⁵ who recognized αἰσθάνεσθαι as **full living and remarked that the expression “perception” is completely inadequate.**) The plant has its genuine living in nourishing itself; what is *proper* in constituting an animal is αἴσθησις. 413b therefore πρώτως not = begins, but rather = *proper*.⁴⁶ What is at issue in chapter 2 is the soul as ἀρχή. Also, already a preview of the meaning that αἴσθησις itself has. Cf. chapter 3, where again the question concerns the λόγος ψυχῆς, the genuine “what” of the soul. Comparison with the figure. At issue here is λέγειν, not Plato’s problematic. A multiplicity of ἴδια to which also the general meaning {corresponds}, ἐφαρμόσει (harmonizes with).⁴⁷ We lack the term for that which {corresponds}; the κοινός λόγος derives its meaning from it. Aristotle does not begin with the genus. To what extent [does] εἶδος [correspond] to the concept of species?

W13 Result of this examination: one cannot speculate about the soul in a general way but rather in the case of each what is most its own is its *logos*, its οἰκείον.

In chapter 4 – if one wants to work out the οἰκείος λόγος, how must it proceed given that general talk makes no sense (one must relate this chapter back to the first one)?⁴⁸ It must be grasped *in the carrying out* [*im Vollziehen*]. (In the case of the αἰσθητικόν [faculty of perceiving] the αἰσθάνεσθαι [process of actually perceiving], etc). Prior to performances the δύναμις^{possibility} is the ἐνέργεια, the carrying out, putting to work, the actual performance. Even prior to that, however, is what lies against [the object] (ἀντικείμενα); that is in the case of αἴσθησις something different than in the case of τροφή, or rather the way of lying-against is in each case different.

The connection between the ἴδια and the κοινότητα.

Different ways of living.

Book III {at the basis here}. III 1, 2.

JULY 19, 1921

[*De Anima*] II 3 – Aristotle says it would be laughable to ask about the κοινότητα λόγος, thus the question from II 1; it would rather be laughable without II 2: the fundamental representation of self-moving must be held onto; it is everywhere in the phenomenon of life. In the concrete examination the particular *modes* of the soul must be understood as broadly as possible.

It has often been noted as a peculiar fact that the “I” of contemporary psychology does not appear in Aristotle. Upon closer inspection, however, it is everywhere there but only in the guise of δύναμις – the I-can and it-can, a form of objecthood, therefore, that has as a fundamental determination that it can. Thereby an indication of the objecthood of all modes of living. It is from this perspective that we must understand δύναμις ἐντελέχεια and working-suffering; everything from the perspective of the I-can of the νοῦς; how far the remaining concrete determinations of life (beyond human νοῦς) play a role here would need to be examined *individually* more closely.

W14 Does there then remain a general concept amidst the particular modes of life? 414b19⁴⁹ – How does the κοινότητα λόγος relate to the ἴδια? Duality and unity! Here is a problem that is not decided in philosophy up to the present day {!}. The general question is whether one should approach the problem in the way that Aristotle did from the perspective of Platonic philosophy.

Λόγος here *not* = concept but rather the assertion. Aristotle means that there is no asserting to be done about the soul *besides* the particular souls.

Λόγος *not* besides the ἴδια: they are in a determinate order and succession (τὰ ἐφεξῆς). The ἐφαρμόσε πάσιν [harmonizes with all] thereby receives its meaning. The determinate order is the following:

The αἰσθητικὸν is a *surplus* in relation to the τρεπτικὸν and cannot be without it. This mode of living does not carry itself out without the other. Thus a determinate mode of founding. The preceding is always the condition of possibility for the following (possibility = the possible working-itself-out).

The trilateral is also contained in the quadrilateral. This formal containment enables Aristotle to take the soul together with the figure. For our observation, a completely different relation in the case of figure than in the case of the soul. But these distinctions do not bother Aristotle; he is concerned only with the [relations of being] in-one-another and after-one-another. What he actually has in mind is the human being in which all capabilities are concretely present.

Γένεσις (thought of as objective *doing*) is what is most proper, what is most natural in nature. In γένεσις, the εἶδος is the οἶον [of what sort] ^{how constituted}; from it derives the concept of species [*Art*]; εἶδος is the meaning of οὐσία that is connected to γένεσις; and indeed in nature.

Cf. 425b17.⁵⁰

From here also an understanding of ἐντελέχεια.

[JULY 19, 1921]**[3. On] *De Anima*, Book II**

Δύναμις means: “it can.”

Aristotle comprehends the I as δύναμις: “I can” (where the “it” and the “I” are not fundamentally distinguished).

Λόγος τῆς ψυχῆς: question: whether this is *one* λόγος or several λόγοι; whether there is a general λόγος (414b20ff.).

Γένεσις as doing.

Φυσικώτατον, in which nature is most genuinely nature (415a26): that is that: τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἶον αὐτό¹⁶ [415a28] (power of reproduction).

οἶον εἶδος: origin of the concept of kind [*Art*].

Εἶδος is *the* meaning of οὐσία (is-meaning) that is related to γένεσις (φύσις).

W15 II 4 – different concepts

{Namely,} the αἰτίον, at the same time οὐσία (cf. *Met. Z 17* to what extent οὐσία is αἰτίον. Cf. 415b13: the genuine being lies in the οὐσία. εἶναι here = being constituted, being such, but not mere being-there [Dasein], existing. Much more a *being-there-in-such-a-way* [Sodasein]. Every mode of being-there has a “such,” and this “such” lies in “what it is.” In the “what” lies the mode of being. Accordingly, οὐσία is the αἰτίον τοῦ εἶναι.

ἔτι τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἢ ἐντελέχεια⁵¹ [“The *entelecheia* is the *logos* of what exists potentially”].

The λόγος is here ὀρισμός, is assertion [*Aussagen*] that directs itself toward the οὐσία. What is at issue here is life as a determinate mode of being and indeed living things. The genuine “what” (and mode of being) of things is the ἐντελέχεια. Life is life in the genuine sense as ἐντελέχεια. ἐνέργεια is being-in-action, but ἐντελέχεια being-in-action with a goal and already possessing this goal.

[*De Anima*] II 5 revolves around 3 different groups of concepts: (1) δυνάμει; (2) πάσχειν; (3) ἀλλοίωσις.

How in the context of αἴσθησις do we come upon πάσχειν? (Noteworthy is the end of chapter 5!)⁵² It arises always together with ποιεῖν. What does πάσχειν mean? It lies in something different encountering one. Insofar as the one has experienced something from the other, it is ὁμοιον.

πάσχειν = (1) φθορά † τις and (2) σωτηρία⁵³

Regarding (1): When one thing is worked upon by something different, it is *no longer* what it was.

(2) It is at the same time⁵⁴ something that has suffered and experienced; the ὁμοιον remains. The ἀλλοίωσις.

The ποιεῖν brings the ὁμοιον with it, and a δυνάμει ὄν.

W16 Δυνάμει ὄν in a double sense / learning knowledge {and indeed} γραμματική:

(1) belonging to the genus of knowers; (2) he has elementary items of knowledge, is already in a position to know. Already here we have the concrete individual.

Opposition sleeping – waking yet another dimension of δυνάμει and ἐνέργεια.

417b29⁵⁵

Important chapter 6 {and also} chapter 5, 12. III 1 and 2.

JULY 26, 1921

Problem of αἴσθησις; it is a determinate mode of ζῆν, this a determinate mode of being; each has its ἀρχή. (Therefore, the theory of knowledge, etc., is not at all what is at issue here.) It is determined as πάσχειν and κινεῖσθαι. Genuine determinations of αἴσθησις: (1) δυνάμει ὄν; (2) a δέχεσθαι characterized as a λόγος. (424a20ff, 30);⁵⁶ λόγος here = relation [*Verhältnis*]. How does that belong to δυνάμει.

λέγειν = saying one thing in relation to another. Therefore, λέγειν is the saying of a relation. These 3 determinations now to be grasped more sharply:

416b15ff. – και γενέσεως ποιητικόν, οὐ τοῦ τρεφόμενου, ἀλλοῖον τὸ τρεφόμενον. ἤδη γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ ἡ οὐσία, γεννα δ' οὐθὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, ἀλλὰ σώζει.¹⁷

Three meanings of αἴτιον (the “in what way”).

415b10ff. – ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις, οὗ ἕνεκα, ὡς ἡ οὐσία [that from which comes the movement, that for the sake of which, as the οὐσία].

415b12ff. – τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι πᾶσιν ἡ οὐσία. [For the cause of being for all things {is} the οὐσία.]

In the “what” lies the “how” of existing (of *Dasein*).

415b14ff. – τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἡ ἐντελέχεια.

The “how” of the existing [*Dasein*] of the δύναμις is the ἐντελέχεια.

Ἐντελέχεια: the being-in-action toward a determinate goal that has already arrived at the goal. (ἐνέργεια activity). The ἐντελέχεια is in its being with itself.

B28

JULY 26, 1921

De Anima, Book II, ch. 5 – “αἴσθησις”

B29

Αἴσθησις is a mode of ζῆν (w[ith] ἀρχή). Living (ζῆν) is a determinate mode of being, for every such way of being there is an ἀρχή. Αἴσθησις is genuinely an ἀρχή of living. It is furthermore a δυνάμει ὄν (something that can).

(All this has been lost in the modern concept of sense impression!)

Αἴσθησις is further a δέχεσθαι [cf. *De Anima* B12, 424a17ff., 424b24]. It is finally a λόγος (424a27-28):

The δυνάμει ὄν = it can: characterizes most specifically αἴσθησις. It points toward ἐνέργεια, the working out of the “it can,” thus a reference to κίνησις. In chapter 5, explication of the δυνάμει ὄν in the context of κίνησις. 417a14 πάσχειν – κινεῖσθαι hang together with κίνησις, this last itself a determinate ἐνέργεια.⁵⁷

πάσχειν = suffering = *happening with* [*Geschehen mit*].⁵⁸

κινήσις = *happening*.

ἐνεργεῖν = working/effecting [*wirken*] = *happening of* [*Geschehen von*].

^{W17} Aristotle first speaks generally of happening, then more specifically of πάσχειν. ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον, in relation to the two [processes]. They are indeed alike, {earlier} unlike in relation to working upon each other: the one is in motion, the other is unmoved; after the happening, the unmoved is also in motion. All this lies in πάσχειν. The happening *with* and the happening *of* are during the happening in an unlike “what” but afterward in the same “what.”

Furthermore, πάσχειν determined as φθορά and σωτηρία. These determinations do not, like the first, apply to every πάσχειν but rather identify two different modes of πάσχειν.⁵⁹ ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον must be present in both cases. σωτηρία: the happening-with must be a peculiar one, and that to which something happens must be in such a way that it first comes to itself. αἰσθήσις is a πάσχειν having to do with σωτηρία. Beginning of chapter 5: δοκεῖ γὰρ ἀλλοίωσις εἶναι,⁶⁰ this he otherwise characterizes in his doctrine of motion as a determinate mode of κίνησις and indeed one that concerns the *what*; it is a γένεσις. Thereby a μεταβολή = a transformation [*Umschlag*] into conditions of deprivation [*Beraubtsein*] and ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις (= having), thus a becoming-other in which that to which something happens comes to itself (417b15ff).⁶¹

Πάσχειν is no ἀλλοιώσις ({what thinks thinks}). Ἀλλοιώσις is no πάσχειν. (Someone who learns becomes different, but no πάσχειν.) Thus *aporia*. Therefore, different modes of ἀλλοιώσις to be distinguished.

^{W18} In the context of divisions of πάσχειν also divisions of δύναμις. One approaches a closer determination of δύναμις when one asks: in what sense is αἴσθησις δύναμις? Over against the δυνάμει ὄν stands the ποιητικὸν [what acts or produces]. Apparent {presentation of an addition}: αἰσθητὸν [object of perception] preserves the perception, thus a peculiar ποιητικόν, namely, what is perceived (the ἀντικείμενον).

Chapter 6 { He distinguishes between (1) αἰσθητὸν καθ'αὐτὸν and
(2) κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
In the case of (1), ἴδια and κοινὰ are to be distinguished.⁶²
417b20 outside; in the soul.⁶³

Yet more on αἴσθησις as πάσχειν. Chapter 12 [of *De Anima* II]: it is a λόγος, and indeed a relation in which what can can [*sic!*] receive [*aufnehmen*], better: take [*annehmen*], encounter something, λαμβάνειν. Πάσχειν as such is not yet perception ({compare} plants).

οὐδ' ἡ αἴσθησις μέγεθος ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκεῖνου.¹⁸

What does λόγος mean here? Λόγος here means speaking about something, asserting about something; in the sense of asserting something *about* something. (In mathematics, *Euclid* among others, λόγος also means “relation.”)

In δύναμις, the “it can,” lies a reference to ἐνέργεια.

ἀνόμοιον unlike “what” (417a19-20).

Before the happening, they are both unlike, *during* the happening one drags the other with it, *after* the happening they are both *alike*.

(E.g., ball A moves toward ball B that is at rest, strikes it, and now they are both moving.) 417a16ff. – κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελής μέντοι.¹⁹ A happening that has not yet arrived at the goal.

417b2-4:

	πᾶσχειν	
	/ \	
φθορά		σωτηρία
		(through the happening, it comes to itself – impetus to development)
		So also αἴσθησις and indeed an ἀλλοίωσις.

The αἰσθητόν [thing perceived] is a ποιητικόν [something that produces], an ἀντικείμενον [something that lies against].

Cf. (1) 417b20ff.

(2) 424a22ff.

On ch. 12 – δέχεσθαι here not *receiving* [*Aufnehmen*], rather instead *taking* [*Annehmen*] (λαμβάνειν), also in the sense of φθορά (no receiving in the above sense and retaining!).

End of [chapter] 5: as if they were genuine expressions.⁶⁴ Not every body is a παθητικόν, not every one is susceptible to be acted upon by sound, color, etc. For example, *air*: it smells in an objective sense. However, in the case of αἴσθησις differently, *not* absolutely, and it remains. The δέχεσθαι is not⁶⁵

Translated by Francisco J. Gonzalez

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EDITOR'S NOTES TO THE NOTES BY HELENE WEISS

EDITING RULES

The above edition of the Helene Weiss notes from Martin Heidegger's 1921 Summer Semester seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima* was prepared according to the following set of rules:

1. Dagger † is used to signify illegible words the editor was unable to decipher.
2. Curly brackets {} are used for uncertain readings.
3. Square brackets [] are used for insertions.
4. Parentheses () signify brackets present in the original Helene Weiss notes.
5. Italic script corresponds to an underlining in the Weiss notes. However, Greek words which are underlined in the Weiss notes are not in italic but spaced-out.
6. Bold script is used for the lines which were presumably added later as a correction, interjection, or explication. However, this does not apply to supplements from Bondi transcript, which are inserted in square brackets.
6. Words in light pencil are rendered in gray color. Words written above other words are rendered in superscript. Words which have been crossed out but appeared legible are retained.
7. Errors present in the spelling of the Greek words are corrected. So is the spelling and punctuation of the German text. The abbreviations present in the notes are interpreted and expanded.

EDITOR'S NOTES

1. The same name is credited with the same presentation in the notes for the May 24 class below. This could be the Heinz Lichtenstein mentioned in the correspondence between Heidegger and Arendt: first mentioned by Heidegger in a letter of March 21, 1925, as still being with Arendt (“*noch bei Dir*”), then mentioned many years later by Arendt in a letter of March 27, 1972, as having become a psychiatrist (*Hannah Arendt – Martin Heidegger: Briefe 1925-1975*, ed. Ursula Lutz [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1998], 16, 232). But there is one major problem with this identification: Arendt in the later letter describes Lichtenstein as having been a student in *Marburg* (even more specifically, as one of a group of students coming to Marburg from Königsberg) and as being in possession of a group of transcripts of Marburg courses; and the earlier reference is of course from the Marburg period. Could Arendt's and Heidegger's (see his own following letter, 233-34) recollection be mistaken? Could Heinz Lichtenstein have been a student of Heidegger already in Freiburg in 1921? Ángel Xolocotzi Yáñez provides the following list of participants that includes none of the names mentioned in this transcript, including that of Weiss herself: Karl Löwith, Max Horkheimer, Hans Jonas, Oskar Becker, Günther

EDITORS' AND TRANSLATOR'S NOTES TO THE NOTES BY OSKAR BECKER

EDITORS' NOTES

Based on the Edition by Günther Neumann, Alfred Denker, and Holger Zaborowski (see Heidegger und Aristoteles: Heidegger-Jarhbuch 3, 9-22)

Both seminars [i.e. the 1921 Summer Semester seminar and 1922/23 Winter Semester seminar, which were the subject of the abovementioned edition – JW] are included in the Index of Heidegger's Works published in *Heidegger-Jarhbuch*, Band 1 [...].

The notes by Oskar Becker are written in black ink, in old German script. The handwriting is generally legible and can be deciphered everywhere, except for a few passages. The notes are found in a copy of a student notebook [*in einer Kopie des Kollegheftes*], which contains all notes from both Aristotle seminars. The pagination established by Becker in the student notebook is enclosed in square brackets [moved to the margins in this edition and supplemented with „B” to distinguish from Helene Weiss's notes – JW]. The table of contents written down by Becker refers to this pagination. The passages that were underlined in black ink are printed in cursive. Rare underlinings in colored pencil are not rendered in print. The editors' insertions [...] are enclosed in square brackets. Doubtful readings are signaled by a question mark in square brackets. However, the insertions present in Greek quotes and enclosed in square brackets are not editors' but Becker's. All Greek quotes were checked by the editors. Insignificant departures or errors of transcription were corrected without indicating it in the published text. Becker's punctuation is preserved.

At this point we would like to express sincere gratitude to Dr. Ulrich von Bülow from Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach for his friendly assistance in the edition of both seminar notes. We would also like to sincerely thank Dr. Hermann Heidegger for his permission to publish these notes.

Günther Neumann, Alfred Denker, and Holger Zaborowski

- a. The notes by Oskar Becker are preserved in Martin Heidegger's Nachlass in Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach (DLA 75.7247).
- b. Heinrich Rickert, *Zur Lehre von der Definition* (Diss. phil. Universität Straßburg 1888), Freiburg i. Br. 1888; Tübingen 1915.
- c. Albert Schwegler, *Die Metaphysik des Aristoteles. Grundtext, Übersetzung und Commentar nebst erläuternden Abhandlungen*, Tübingen 1847/48 (Paragraphs correspond to the numbering 1-25 on the margins).

Stern, Walther Marseille, Hans Reiner, and Afra Geiger (*Una Crónica de Ser y Tiempo de Martin Heidegger* [Mexico: Benemérita Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, 2011], 74).

2. These dates are puzzling as the seminar will turn to *De Anima* only in July. Furthermore, there was no class held on June 21, though a class may have been planned for that day. If one consults a calendar for 1921, one will see that all the classes were held on Tuesday, but not every Tuesday: the time between classes ranges from just one week (between June 7 and June 14, for instance) to three weeks (between June 14 and July 5). Since June 21 fell on a Tuesday and during the large gap separating the classes of June 14 and July 5, it is possible that a class was originally scheduled for that day but had to be cancelled.

3. Since neither the Becker nor the Weiss transcript contains any detailed discussion of the account of motion in the *Physics*, we must assume that the seminar just never got to it. The name assigned to the presentation is indeed “Beck” and not “Becker”; unless this is a mistake, we have in “Beck” another student of the seminar about whom I have not been able to discover anything.

4. “For it is, as it were, the principle of living things.” Heidegger’s comments have in mind the lines that immediately precede this line and that this line is supposed to explain: “It seems that knowledge of it [the soul] will contribute greatly to all truth, especially in relation to nature” (402a4-6).

5. If the reference is to 402a23, then there we read, “First it is perhaps necessary to determine in which genus it belongs and what it is, I mean whether it is a ‘this’ [τοδὲ τι] and οὐσία or a quality or a quantity, or some other one of the categories that have been distinguished; further, whether it belongs among the things that are potentially or is some ἐντελέχεια” (402a23-27). The Greek words left untranslated here are usually translated as “substance” (οὐσία) and “actuality” (ἐντελέχεια), but we will see Heidegger’s reading challenge these usual translations.

6. The seminar is here continuing with *De Anima* I.1 since the mentioned distinction is made toward the end of chapter I. Here Aristotle argues that the physicist must examine both form and matter, whereas the mathematician deals in abstraction with functions and affections (ἔργα καὶ πάθη) that are not separable from bodies, and the first philosopher deals with those that are separable (403b9-16).

7. The reference must be to 403a29, as is confirmed by the supplement from the Bondi transcript.

8. Weiss’s notes contain one unnumbered page with the heading: “Supplements (from the transcript of Bondi) to De Anima Seminar S. S. 21.” This is presumably Elli Bondi, to whom other transcripts of Heidegger’s courses have been attributed. Weiss attributes to Bondi also an “Abschrift” for the 1922/23 Aristotle seminar (Box 3, Folder 6, p. 1). See also editor’s afterword to *Gesamtausgabe* 17, 323, and *Gesamtausgabe* 18, 410. Since Weiss

- d. In Schwegler (see note 3) and in Heidegger's personal copy (Aristotelis *Metaphysica*, recognovit W. Christ, Leipzig 1886) this passage reads: λανθάνει δὲ μάλιστα τὸ ζητούμενον (Schwegler: ζητέμενον) ἐν τοῖς μὴ καταλλήλως λεγομένοις.
- e. where that which is questioned is itself there and a determination is attributed to it only from itself. [*wo das, was gefragt wird, selbst da ist und ihm nur aus ihm selbst eine Bestimmung zugesprochen wird.*]
- f. ἦ in Codex E (Parisinus graecus 1853, saeculi X).
- g. analyze, articulate: b determines A. Without articulation one has no question. (Is A b?) One must free oneself from the simple καθ' αὐτό. [*zergliedern, artikulieren: b bestimmt A. Ohne Artikulation hat man keine Frage. (Ist A b?) Man muß vom einfachen καθ' αὐτό loskommen.*]
- h. Bonitz's conjecture (Aristoteles, *Metaphysica*, Bonn 1848/49).
- i. Paul Natorp, "Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik. II," *Philosophische Monatshefte* 24 (1888), 540-74.
- j. The notes read: "wie."
- k. See note 2.
- l. Paragraph numbering according to Schwegler.
- m. Natorp, "Thema und Disposition... ."
- n. Paul Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre. Eine Einführung in den Idealismus*, Leipzig 1903 [On the pages indicated (388-99), Natorp distinguishes between and explicates the two different enquiries – FJG].
- o. Here in the sense of "deviation" [*Abschweifung*].
- p. Paul Natorp, *Platos Ideenlehre*, ch. 11 ("Aristoteles und Plato") and 12 ("Die Aristotelische Kritik der Ideenlehre").
- q. Paul Natorp, "Bruno Bauchs 'Immanuel Kant' und die Fortbildung des Systems des Kritischen Idealismus," *Kant-Studien* 22 (1918): 426-59.
- r. Unreadable word.
- s. Omission in the notes. The bracketed "τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι" is a proposed conjecture.

herself indicates the pages of her own notes to which the supplements from the Bondi transcript correspond, I will insert these supplements in square brackets accordingly (with the exception that a supplement indicated for p. 5 will be inserted towards the end of p. 4 where it appears to fit more naturally).

9. Presumably the context for this comment is Aristotle's claim that the φυσικός will concern himself with all the ἔργα and πάθη "of this type of body and this type of matter" (403b).

10. The reference here must be, as the ensuing comments show, to the word τοιούτου at 403b14. Here Aristotle writes, "to the extent that they are not the παθή of such a kind of body [τοιούτου σώματος] and are from abstraction, the mathematician [is occupied with them]" (403b14-15). So what Heidegger is highlighting as important here is that the mathematician is not occupied with the παθή of a *particular kind* of body, which does not preclude his being occupied with the παθή of matter understood generically.

11. The reference here is to a passage in which Socrates claims that every human soul by nature has seen "the beings" as it otherwise would not have entered this form of life (249e4-250a1).

12. The reference here is to a passage in which Socrates describes the soul as rejoicing in the vision of being and being nourished by its contemplation of the truth. It is worth noting that in neither of the passages cited here do we find the word εἶδος. What the soul sees and has a natural relation with are simply referred to as "beings" (τὰ ὄντα) and "being" (τὸ ὄν).

13. Here Aristotle refers to Plato in the *Timaeus* as subscribing to the view that like is known by like because he there composes the soul out of the elements.

14. That is, chapters 1-3 of *Metaphysics Z*.

15. "This other treatment" must refer to the account of εἶδος in chapters 7-9. While Aristotle does begin chapter 17 claiming to make another beginning (1041a6-7), it might seem obvious that chapter 17 cannot precede, and thus be the beginning of, what is undertaken in chapters 7-9. What is being assumed here is Natorp's hypothesis explained in the following note.

16. This a reference to Paul Natorp, "Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen *Metaphysik*," *Philosophische Monatshefte* 24 (1887): 37-65, 540-74. The English reader can consult the summary of Natorp's proposal in David Ross, *Aristotle's Metaphysics*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1924), 181. Natorp saw Book Z as consisting of two treatises: (i) chapters 1-6, 10-14; (ii) chapters 17, 7-9, and 15-16. This is because Natorp sees chapter 17 as a transition from a discussion of the cause of being to a discussion of the cause of becoming. This is why chapters 7-9, with their focus on γένεσις, or becoming, are separated from 1-6 and assigned to a separate treatise.

t. See note 14.

Translated by Francisco J. Gonzalez and Jakub Wolak

TRANSLATOR'S NOTES

1. The words cited here are clearly meant to express key features of the investigation of the soul that will be taken up in what follows: in producing conviction it cannot remain on the level of the general or universal but must examine different capabilities or powers of the soul and can do so only by investigating the different actions to which these capabilities correspond; it can do this, in turn, only by investigating the different objects (“what lies against”) of these activities.

2. “For example, if what a human being is were sought through speaking simply and not determining it as this or that, but it is necessary to inquire through dividing and articulating.”

3. “Since it is necessary to have the being [τὸ εἶναι] and for it to obtain, it is clear that one investigates why the matter is what it is such as the house.”

4. This is clearly an error, whether in the handwritten transcript itself or in its decipherment: there is no discussion of this relation in *Books* 4 and 6 of the *Metaphysics*; instead, the relation is examined in *chapters* 4 and 6 of *Book* 7. So it is the Weiss transcript that is correct here.

5. Heidegger’s invention of a new term by dividing the components of the word for “something” (*Et-was*) is impossible to translate, but I have done my best to convey what he is trying to express.

6. The whole line and translation are as follows: “φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι ἐπὶ τῶν ἀπλῶν οὐκ ἔστι ζήτησις οὐδὲ διδασίς, ἀλλ’ ἕτερος τρόπος τῆς ζητήσεως τῶν τοιούτων” (1041b9-11); “It is evident that there can be no investigation or teaching in the case of things that are simple, but there is another way of investigating things of this sort.”

7. “So that οὐσία would be what is primarily and is not *something* but is *simply*.”

8. “The being for you [and] the being for musical [cultured].”

9. The published German transcript reads *selbstliche*; therefore, “subjective” as opposed to “objective,” only in the sense of “related to the self.”

10. “The things that come from τεχνή are those the εἶδος of which is in the soul.”

11. “For the medical art [...] the form of health [...].”

17. Often translated as “essence,” literally “the-what-it-was-to-be.”
18. This “No!” is written in the margin. The reason for this obviously later correction will become clear in what follows.
19. Heinrich Rickert, *Zur Lehre von der Definition* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Mohr, 1888; 2nd ed. Tübingen: Mohr, 1915; 3rd ed. Tübingen: Mohr, 1929).
20. *Metaphysics Z4*, 1029b13.
21. Though there is nothing in the Greek text that corresponds to this phrase, the reference is presumably to a passage in Z17 cited below in the Becker transcript: 1041b4-5. But see also 1041a15, again cited in the Becker transcript.
22. The reference here is to a passage from Z17 in which Aristotle states the following: “What is being investigated lies most hidden in things not said of each other, as when what a human being is is sought through speaking simply rather than through determining that this is that” (1041a32-1041b2).
23. The line in question is that cited in the Becker transcript.
24. The transcript appears to read “2” here rather than “3,” but this would then be an error of transcription since the four meanings are presented only in chapter 3.
25. On the notion of “formal indication,” see the course of the preceding semester, WS 1920-21, “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” in *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens, Gesamtausgabe* 60 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1995), 59-65; *The Phenomenology of Religious Life*, trans. M. Fritsch and J. A. Gosetti-Ferencei (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004), 40-45.
26. Thus the earlier “*Nein*” in the margin! The implication is that Heidegger changed his mind on this important point between May 25 and June 14. This is crucial for reasons already indicated above: what Heidegger rejects now is the separation of the chapters on γένεσις from the chapters on οὐσία. He goes to the opposite extreme of maintaining that the chapters on γένεσις constitute the kernel for the conceptual context of οὐσία. The connection presumably receives its explanation in the claim made below: “εἶδος bezieht die οὐσία auf eine γένεσις.” Note that the Becker transcript, in contrast, does not explicitly record a change of mind, though it does note that Natorp’s thesis is “at first attractive.”
27. The transcript appears to read 1029b7-8, but as the following quotation from 1030a7-8 shows, this is an error.
28. What the Greek has is the following: ὁρισμὸς δ’ ἐστὶν οὐκ ἂν ὄνομα λόγῳ ταὐτὸ σημαίνειν ... “A definition is not when a name signifies the same as the account” Aristotle

12. “For I call the οὐσία without matter the τὶ ἦν εἶναι. Of processes of generation and movements, one [cause?] is called understanding, the other producing; that which proceeds from the *principle* and the *form* is understanding, while that which proceeds from the conclusion of understanding is producing” (reproducing Becker’s italics here and in following citations).
13. “What produces and that from which *begins* the movement of becoming healthy is, if resulting from art, the form that is in the soul.”
14. “It is evident from what has been said that what is called the form or the οὐσία does not come to be, but what comes to be is the composite spoken of in reference to this, and that matter is present in everything that comes to be and is on the one hand this and on the other that.”
15. “For a human being generates a human being, unless something is generated contrary to nature, as in the case of a horse generating a mule. Even these in the same way, since what is common to horse and donkey, the nearest genus not having a name, would be both equally like the mule.”
16. “Producing another like itself.”
17. “And [it is] productive of generation, not of the nourished thing, but [of what is] like the nourished thing. For its οὐσία already exists, and nothing generates itself but preserves itself.”
18. “Nor is perception a magnitude but a certain λόγος and δύναμις of the thing.”
19. “Movement is some sort of ἐνέργεια but an incomplete one.”

proceeds to explain that “Iliad” would otherwise be a definition since the name signifies the same as the account, which in this case would be the entire poem. Heidegger must have this counterexample in mind in suggesting that we have a definition only when the name signifies the same *as a particular kind of account* (τινὶ λόγῳ).

29. The transcript here appears to read “*Dasbestimmen*” instead of “*Sinnbestimmen*,” but given the context, it must be the latter that is meant, and it is hard to see what the former could mean here.

30. This charge is particularly clear in the section of Natorp’s *Platos Ideenlehre* cited above: there Natorp cites the laws of Newton as examples of Platonic Ideas (390) and describes the seventeenth century as a turning point away from the Aristotelian focus on substances and their qualities toward a more Platonic way of thinking focused on intelligible laws (397).

31. Paul Natorp, “Bruno Bauchs ‘Immanuel Kant’ und die Fortbildung des Systems des kritischen Idealismus,” *Kant-Studien* 22 (1918): 426-59.

32. What appears written here is “*selbstliche*,” and this is the reading in the corresponding passage in the Becker transcript as printed in the *Jahrbuch* (p. 20). If the contrast in the Weiss transcript to nature as *objective* performance suggests the translation to be “subjective,” the latter should be understood in the sense of characteristic of or related to the self.

33. The reference here is to Aristotle’s distinction in *De Anima* II.1 between two kinds of ἐντελέχεια (412a9-10, 412a22-23): one like possessing knowledge (ἐπιστημὴ) and the other like exercising this knowledge (θεωρεῖν). Because we do not cease to live when we are sleeping and not exercising the powers that define our soul (not only the power of knowing but also those of perceiving and locomotion), Aristotle defines the soul as the first kind of ἐντελέχεια.

34. Καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή. Οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. Τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδὶ σώματι ... (412b10-11): “It has been said in general what the soul is; for it is οὐσία in the sense that corresponds to λόγος. This is the τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι of this kind of body...” Oddly, this passage contradicts the claim immediately above that being here is not understood in relation to assertion. But the point must be that the notion of ἐντελεχία as such, in contrast to that of οὐσία, is not understood in relation to the assertion. It is worth noting that the notion of ἐντελέχεια does not figure in the account of οὐσία in *Metaphysics Z*; Heidegger appears to recognize that this notion as it appears in the definition of the soul in *De Anima* introduces a significantly different ontological concept.

35. “Διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψυχοῦ τῷ ζῆν” (413a21-22).

36. “... ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ τούτοις ὄρισται, θρηπτικῶ, αἰσθητικῶ, διανοητικῶ, κινήσει” (413b11-12): “that the soul is the principle of the

[potencies] mentioned and is defined by them: the nutritive, the perceptive, the intellective, and the locomotive.”

37. 412a5.

38. A reference to 416b30 is inserted above the line and there we read, τύπω μὲν οὖν ἢ τροφή τι ἐστὶν εἴρηται. Lines 413a9-10 speak of his account of the soul in general as defining it only in outline: Τύπω μὲν οὖν ταύτη διωρίσθω καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς.

39. The reference appears to be to *Met. Z1*, 1028a31, where Aristotle writes that what is simply or absolutely would be οὐσία (... ὄν ἀπλοῦς ἢ οὐσία ἄν εἴη). At the beginning of the next chapter, Aristotle will say that οὐσία is found most manifestly in bodies.

40. The reference is to the first line of *De Anima* II.2, where Aristotle describes himself as starting from what is both unclear and most evident: ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφῶν μὲν φανερωτέρων δὲ (413a11).

41. As opposed to nonliving things that move in only one direction. Heidegger develops this point in the SS 1926 course, *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*: “Ein Körper bewegt sich immer nur in *einer* Richtung. Die Pflanze dagegen breitet sich im Wachsen nach *allen* Seiten gleichmäßig aus” (*Gesamtausgabe* 22 [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993], 309; this is from the Mörchen Nachschrift, but for the same point less clearly expressed in Heidegger’s own notes, see 185).

42. In other words, Heidegger is insisting that understanding, perception, and nutrition are all themselves forms of movement, even if distinct from the movement in place that is a different power of the soul. In the text itself, only nutrition, growth, and decay are referred to as also being κίνησις (413a24-25).

43. Τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναι ἐστὶν, αἴτιον δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτων ἢ ψυχὴ (415b13-14). This passage remains of central importance to Heidegger in insisting that the soul for Aristotle is not a being but a principle of being for certain kinds of beings and that therefore what *De Anima* aims at is an *ontology of life*. See the return to this point in the SS 1926 course *Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie* (GA22, 184).

44. This is a passage already cited in which the soul is described as the ἀρχὴ of all the powers that define it.

45. What follows is written in black ink over a penciled phrase that is crossed out.

46. The reference is to 413b2: τὸ δὲ ζῶον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρῶτως. Heidegger’s point is that this means not “The animal begins with perception” but rather “The animal is properly what it is through perception.”

47. The reference is to the following passage: “It is evident that there will be one λόγος of the soul in the same way there is of figure. For as in that case there are no figures beyond the triangle and the other figures that follow upon it, neither is there a soul beyond the [particular] ones mentioned. There could be a common λόγος concerning figures that will harmonize [ἐφαρμόσει] with all of them but will not be peculiar to any one of them. The same is the case concerning the souls that have been mentioned” (414b20-25).

48. Presumably the reference is to Aristotle’s claim at 414b25 that a κοινός λόγος here would be “ridiculous” (γελοῖον), though this is in chapter 3 and not 4.

49. Presumably a reference to the claim that there is one λόγος of the soul in the same way there is one λόγος of figure.

50. “It is clear that the soul is a cause also in the sense of that-for-the-sake-of-which. For as νοῦς produces for the sake of something, nature does in the same way, and this is its end. The soul is this kind of thing in animals and according to nature” (415b15-17).

51. “The ἐντελέχεια is the λόγος of what exists potentially,” 415b14.

52. What Aristotle says about πάσχειν toward the end of chapter 5 is that this term (along with ἀλλοιοῦσθαι) is one we apply to perception *only for want of a better, more accurate term* (418a1-3). This will prove significant in what follows.

53. 417b1-2.

54. This “at the same time” (*zugleich*) is arguably a misinterpretation that will be corrected in the next class. In the passage in question, Aristotle states that πάσχειν is not simple (ἀπλοῦν) and then uses a μέν/δέ construction (on the one hand/on the other hand) to distinguish between what are two different senses of πάσχειν: one that destroys and one that preserves. It is therefore not at all suggested that what “suffers” suffers *in both senses at once*, as Heidegger’s “*zugleich*” assumes.

55. “But about these matters we will have occasion to provide further clarification another time”: Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διασαφήσαι καιρὸς γένοιτ’ ἂν καὶ εἰσαυθις (417b29-30). What follows in the transcript are presumably attempts to identify these later occasions.

56. At 424a28, αἰσθήσις is characterized as a λόγος τις and as a λόγος at 424a30.

57. “πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ πάσχειν καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν λέγομεν. καὶ γὰρ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργεια τις, ἀτελής μέντοι, καθάπερ ἐν ἑτεροῖς εἴρηται” (417a14-17): “First we speak of suffering, being moved, and being active as being the same thing. For movement is a sort of ἐνέργεια, though an incomplete one, as has been said elsewhere.”

58. As when I say, “Something is happening *with me*.”

59. Note how this appears to be a correction of the reading provided in the previous class. See note 54.

60. 416b35.

61. The crucial passage being commented on here is the following: “In the case of something learning and acquiring knowledge from being potential [ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος] and under the action of what is actual [ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος] and teaching, either we should not speak of being affected [πάσχειν] at all, as has been said, or of two types of alteration [ἀλλοιώσις], transformation toward privative conditions, and transformation toward positive dispositions and nature” (τὴν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἔξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν, 417b12-16).

62. A bracket surrounding the above distinctions between kinds of αἰσθητικόν identifies the reference as being to chapter 6 of *De Anima* II. Aristotle distinguishes the following: (1) proper sensibles (καθ’ αὐτόν) are distinguished between those peculiar to each sense (ιδία), such as color and sound, and those common (κοινά) to different senses, such as motion; (2) in contrast we have “accidental” sensibles (συμβεβηκός) that are things like man and dog.

63. The reference here is to Aristotle’s claim that the causes of the activity of perception are “outside” (ἔξωθεν), whereas the objects of thought, being universals, are in the soul (417b20-24).

64. The reference is presumably to Aristotle’s claim that, lacking anything better, it is necessary to use the terms πάσχειν and ἀλλοιοῦσθαι in relation to perception ὡς κυρίως ὀνόμασιν (418a3).

65. And here the transcript ends. There is clearly one page or more missing. Yet judging from the rust marks on p. 18 from the paper clip that once held all the pages together, any further pages seem to have been lost some time ago. In any case, the point with which the Becker transcript ends parallels the point made in the last paragraph of the Weiss transcript: both indeed end with the characterization of δέχεσθαι as “*Annehmen*” rather than “*Aufnehmen*.” This suggests that July 26 was indeed the last session and that whatever we are missing from the Weiss transcript could not have amounted to much.

Alejandro G. Vigo

HEIDEGGER – *DE ANIMA* SS 1921: PRESENTATION

A simple look at the lectures published in the *Gesamtausgabe* (GA) shows that, from the very beginning of his teaching activity at the University of Freiburg in 1919,¹ Heidegger was particularly interested in the issues concerning the philosophical method and the very idea of philosophy, in contrast to both science and *Weltanschauung*. The attempt to develop a radicalized conception of phenomenology, conceived of as a “primordial science” (*Urwissenschaft*) of “factual life” (*faktisches Leben*) and a theory of philosophical formation of concepts (*philosophische Begriffsbildung*), along with the idea of “formal indication” (*formale Anzeige*), is dominant in the incisive systematic explorations presented in the lectures of 1919 and 1920 (see GA 56/57, 58, 59/60). The peculiarity of factual life is such, Heidegger thinks, that its phenomenological elucidation should lead to an entirely new categorial repertoire that would “blow up” (*sprengen*) the conceptual framework of traditional ontology.²

The incorporation of Aristotle as Heidegger’s main philosophical interlocutor, starting in 1921, is fully part of this framework of interests. The lectures on Aristotle from the winter semester of 1921/22 (GA 61) and the summer semester of 1922 (GA 62), as well as the so-called “Natorp Report” of the autumn of 1922 (see GA 62, “*Anhang III*”), show

¹ Although Heidegger appears to have given some seminars and lectures as early as 1915 and 1916, his teaching activity was interrupted between 1917 and 1918, when he was recruited to participate in the war, and was only resumed in the “war emergency semester” of 1919 (from February to mid-April). For details, see T. Kissiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s ‘Being and Time’* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 461-62, 551ff.

² In this regard, see Heidegger’s express statement in the 1920/21 winter semester lesson on the phenomenology of religion (see GA 60, sec. 10, 54).

that one of Heidegger's main objectives in his confrontation with Aristotle is to develop a theory of the categories of life: in opposition to the dominant interpretation in the metaphysical tradition, Heidegger seeks in Aristotle the starting points not for an ontology of substance but rather for an ontology of life and human praxis. Once in Marburg, the lesson on Aristotle of the summer semester of 1924 (GA 18) and the impressive lesson on Plato's *Sophist* of the winter semester of 1924/25 (GA 19) – whose extensive first part is devoted to a detailed interpretation of Aristotelian texts, in particular, Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* – bear witness to the continuation of this same project: Aristotle is not only, and not primarily, the philosopher of logic and the epistemologist who takes the “declarative statement” (λόγος ἀποφαντικός) as his starting point but also, as the *Rhetoric* shows, the philosopher of everyday speech and opinion (δόξα); his conception of the authenticity of existence in the *Nicomachean Ethics* is not exclusively reduced to the ideal of contemplative life according to theoretical wisdom (σοφία) but leaves room – as a possibility more appropriate, in Heidegger's view, to the *conditio humana* – for the ideal of active life according to practical wisdom (φρόνησις) as well.³

It is in this thematic and motivational context that the seminar on the *De Anima* of the summer semester of 1921 is inserted as the first in a series of seminars and exercises on Aristotle that Heidegger held in parallel with the lectures. Until now, although its existence was known thanks to university records, its content was not accessible. The transcription of Helene Weiss's handwritten notes by Prof. Francisco J. González, together with Oskar Becker's notes preserved in his *Nachlass*, allows us to get a fairly accurate, albeit fragmentary, idea of the development of the seminar for the first time. It will be the task of specialized research to subject the content of these valuable notes to a more detailed examination. However, some basic features of Heidegger's approach are easily recognizable already at a first reading.

A first aspect of central importance, from a methodological point of view, concerns Heidegger's intention to get access to Aristotle taking as a starting point the *De Anima*. Aristotle seeks the foundation of knowledge in the field of the biological. The soul is the principle of life and therefore also of knowledge. Hence the study of the soul has priority over any other since every science has the foundation of its possibility in the soul itself. For this reason, it raises also peculiar demands for rigor, from both a methodological and a thematic point of view. But in any case, reading Aristotle from *De Anima* helps to avoid logistic misconstructions of his conception of being, based as it is on the matter / form scheme.

On this basis, Heidegger devotes special attention to the treatment of form (εἶδος) in the discussion of the οὐσία in *Metaphysics* VII. Here he insists that Aristotle should not be seen as a philosopher of substance, in the sense of so-called “realism”: οὐσία refers to being and should not be translated as “substance.” It is true that, in his purely logical (λογικῶς) treatment of the matter in *Metaphysics* VII, Aristotle approaches οὐσία from the fundamental phenomenon of saying, in the sense of predicative articulation under the

³ For a reading of Aristotle's ethics that emphasizes the priority of praxis in a similar vein without, however, neglecting the role of contemplative activity in the good life, see Claudia Baracchi, *Aristotle's Ethics as First Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

form “S is P.” This also explains the importance that the problem of definition acquires in this context. But as *De Anima* shows, Aristotle’s most radical treatment of the problem of being rests on his basic conception of the unity of form and matter insofar as being itself is seen as “endowed with form” or “shapely” (*gestalthaft*). This basic conception is forged, Heidegger explains, from the paradigm of creating or producing (*Schaffen*).

With regard more specifically to the case of the soul as a form, Heidegger points out that life is a specific way of being and the soul is its principle. In determining how one should think of the being of the soul as a form, unlike what happens with the purely formal (logical) treatment of οὐσία, Aristotle resorts not to the structure of the statement but rather to the notion of ἐντελέχεια, which refers to the realm of (natural) “becoming” or “coming to be” (γένεσις) and, more precisely, to the realm of self-movement. There is no general characterization of the soul as the principle of life because, as a way of being, life itself has a multiplicity of forms or levels. In Aristotle’s view, it would be ridiculous, Heidegger explains, to seek to replace the phenomenological analysis of the different forms or levels of life through a very general characterization in the form of a common definition. Instead, it is a matter of sticking to the basic notion of self-movement as a guide for the phenomenological elucidation of the various forms or levels of life.

In addition to the thematic and methodological aspects linked to the interpretation of Aristotle, the seminar offers a series of observations referring to the themes and problems of contemporary thought with which Heidegger was concerned at that time. In particular, the considerations referring to the adequate characterization of the phenomenological attitude, its assumptions of an executive nature, and the peculiar type of discursive articulation that it requires are repeated. In this way, the seminar anticipates a good part of the motives that recur in the lessons given in the following semesters. This first attempt at approaching Aristotle thus allows us to recognize the path by which Heidegger will embark in the years to come upon a journey that will leave indelible traces recognizable, under different formulations, even in the conception of *Being and Time*.

COMMENTS ON HEIDEGGER'S 1921 *DE ANIMA* SEMINAR

Up until the completion of his 1915 *Habilitationsschrift* on Duns Scotus, Heidegger had been largely preoccupied with Scholastic theology and, increasingly, philosophy. His early analyses of the questions of late medieval philosophy were inflected by neo-Kantianism, but in his work on Scotus the phenomenology of Husserl had already attained a central place in Heidegger's concerns about philosophical method and questions of meaning. By the time he became Husserl's assistant at Freiburg in 1919, Heidegger was beginning to think through fundamental problems regarding the methods of phenomenology itself, problems lurking in the background of this 1921 seminar, which also represents his first classroom effort to reexamine the meaning of Aristotle's thought by freeing it of its mediation by and refraction through the Scholastic tradition. In short, this seminar occupies a distinct place in the development of several related currents of Heidegger's thinking: his movement away from Scholasticism, his questioning of the starting points of phenomenological method, and his profound engagement with the Greek sources of the tradition of metaphysics, especially Aristotle.

According to the notes of Helene Weiss on the introductory class meeting, Heidegger's plan was to discuss each of the three books of Aristotle's *De Anima* in alternation with selected books from his *Metaphysics*: *DA* 1, *Meta.* 7, *DA* 2, *Meta.* 5, *DA* 3, and *Meta.* 3 and 13. At some point Heidegger expected to include Aristotle's discussion of motion in his *Physics* as well. Based on the notes we have, it appears that Heidegger spent the end of the first class and half of the second discussing the first chapter of *De Anima* Book 1, then turned to *Metaphysics* Book 7 for two and a half classes, returning in the last three to cover *De Anima* Book 2. We will consider the seminar, accordingly, in three parts, one for each text discussed.

1. *DE ANIMAI* AND ΨΥΧΗ AS 'ΑΡΧΗ

In the scanty notes we have for the first class meeting, the foregrounded question is more or less whether Aristotle is best read in a Scholastic frame. In Becker's version, Heidegger raises the question whether Aristotle's psychology stands as an individual science, with its own characteristic methodology and grounded upon principles derived from metaphysics – this would be the Scholastic view – or whether a different understanding emerges “when one investigates the occupation with the psychical only with regard to its philosophical significance” (Becker, 1). Weiss, however, phrases the concern in a way that casts it in

a slightly different light. In her version, the question is how psychology arises out of philosophy for Aristotle and what place it occupies within Aristotle's philosophy. This places the emphasis less on whether a Scholastic ordering of the sciences adequately captures Aristotle's thought and more on a philosophical hermeneutics focused on bringing out the inner structure and motivations of that thought.

Weiss's attention, however, is immediately drawn to the question of method, and her next several notes provide us various iterations of the question whether the investigation of soul calls for a method peculiar to its subject matter. It is of course not at all surprising that an introductory philosophy course should begin with considerations of method, especially a course given by a student of Husserl, the philosopher preeminently devoted to working out a method that would establish "philosophy as a rigorous science." Indeed, Aristotle himself begins his inquiry of soul, in the passage this first class examines, with questions regarding the proper μέθοδος (402a14) by which to pursue it. Precisely the fact that such a beginning seems so obvious, however, appears to be the reason both students highlight it. Heidegger only ever subsequently reverts to the topic of method once, in the second class meeting, and it is noteworthy that both students record the occurrence and that both manage to connect it only loosely if at all to the surrounding content (Weiss, 3; Becker, 4). We get the impression that in this methodological emphasis of the notes the expectations of the students go awry from the intentions of the instructor and that something else, which they have failed to recognize and record, is at issue in this first presentation.

Their scanty remaining notes do, however, give us some valuable clues. First of all, it seems clear that Heidegger covered roughly the first half of chapter 1, from 402a1 to at least 402b15. Becker's only notes other than the one about science and philosophy all record Heidegger's observations (presumably in the course of going through the text) on key words Aristotle uses in this part of the text and how they should be understood. All of them pertain to Aristotle's characterization of what kind of inquiry he is engaged in or, in other words, the character of the science he is elaborating, if it is indeed a science. It is not surprising that the mathematician Becker would gravitate to such considerations or that he should want to be sure he is understanding the key terms of the science in question. But what do the highlighted words tell us about Heidegger's concerns?

First we see that Heidegger said something about ἰστορία, the first word Aristotle uses to describe the consideration of soul (402a4). Becker next notes that πίστιν (402a11) means "fundamental conviction." These two terms highlight the main character of the first two paragraphs of the text. Aristotle first explains why the investigation (ἰστορία) of soul is a study of the highest rank but then begins to elaborate upon the difficulties in attaining trustworthy conviction (πίστις) from such an inquiry about its subject matter. There is something unsettled and unsettling about this inquiry, something inherent to it that makes it difficult to assign it a place within a structure of sciences. Becker's next note touches on one of the reasons: "General assertions about the subject are dubious," Aristotle observes at 402b8. More specifically, Aristotle questions whether it is possible to provide a single account of soul as such:

Now, those who speak and inquire about soul seem to reflect only about the human soul. But one must take care not to fail to see whether, as the soul of

a living thing, it has a single *logos*; or whether, as the soul of a horse, a dog, a human, or a god, it is different for each, while a living thing as a universal is either nothing at all or something secondary.¹

Humans, as the inquirers into soul, are prone to see all soul through the lens of their own experience of soul – for example, the Pythagoreans, who teach the transmigration of souls, as if soul as such could fit with the determinate bodily existence of any and all kinds of living beings. Given Heidegger’s focus in *Being and Time* on the methodological necessity of approaching ontology starting from an analysis of the “entity” Dasein, or the human way of being, one may suspect that it is this unsettling dual status of human soul both as the one conducting the inquiry and as a thing to be inquired about (maybe or maybe not as a member of a class of entities that can be called soul) that attracts Heidegger’s interest.

Weiss’s last notes for this class meeting help to corroborate this suspicion:

One distinguishes between method of presentation and method of investigation.

It is the way in which knowledge is grounded.

402a6 ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχή τῶν ζῴων contains the grounding for both: treatment of the subject and strictness of method.

For since the soul is ἀρχή so that the other sciences appeal to it, it must also be especially strict in terms of method.

There is no entirely clear logical connection between any two of these sentences as they stand, suggesting that Weiss is struggling without much success to make sense (seemingly in a post-Cartesian mode) of what Heidegger is trying to say about how method grounds knowledge and how that applies specifically to Aristotelian psychology.

The following seems to me a likely reconstruction of the sense behind the utterances imperfectly reflected in these notes. Methods of presentation and of investigation both aim at producing the kind of trustworthy conviction (πίστις) that Aristotle observes at 402a10-11 is exceedingly and in every way difficult to attain regarding soul (a passage to which, as we know from Becker, Heidegger also refers). More specifically, it is our starting points that have to inspire such fundamental conviction, the conviction that they are well suited to ground knowledge. Soul is the starting point for knowledge of living things: ἔστι γὰρ οἷον ἀρχή τῶν ζῴων. It is therefore the thing about which we need to attain conviction, and this involves many difficulties.

Heidegger’s attention, however, is drawn to the twofold meaning of ἀρχή as both “source” and “governing principle,” a twofold meaning strongly suggested in the early part of the sentence concluded by the above quoted passage and explained by it: “Knowledge of it seems, indeed, to contribute enormously toward all uncovering of truth, but especially truth about nature – for soul is in some way a governing principle [or source, ἀρχή] of

¹ Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans. Mark Shiffman (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing, 2011), 26 (402b3-8).

living things.”² As that which conducts the uncovering of truth as such, soul is the principal source of all such uncovering, and in that sense all sciences “appeal to” it or “call upon” it (*berufen*), and our method or pathway (μέθοδος) of elucidating it must therefore be rigorous in order for our sciences to carry conviction. This necessity is the grounding for the rigor or “strictness of the method” insofar as the method must adequately elucidate this starting point of all knowing. At the same time, soul is a primary governing principle of all living things, and thus the investigation of soul as an entity provides fundamental ontic grounding for “treatment of the subject” of nature.

If this dual character of soul, as both source of all inquiring and principle of all living things, is indeed at issue, Weiss’s final lecture note makes much more sense than otherwise: “From 23 onward, the same question as immediately before but in a sharper formulation.” What exactly is presented with a keener edge (*in schärfer Zuspitzung*) from 402a23 onward? Let us review Aristotle’s text up to that point. After initially proclaiming the importance of the inquiry and identifying soul as ἀρχή, Aristotle remarks that what we are seeking is its φύσις and οὐσία, and then whatever else belongs to it (402a7-8). Then, having warned us of the exceeding difficulty of attaining πίστις about soul, Aristotle articulates the first difficulty, and it is here that he introduces the question of μέθοδος: there might seem to be one procedure for apprehending the οὐσία of anything, but then again, there might not, in which case we would have to get hold of a way of investigating proper to the thing in question (402a11-19).

In these lines, as on occasion elsewhere, Aristotle uses the word οὐσία in a somewhat loose sense, to denote the distinctness of a thing’s being, not specifically the category traditionally called “substance.” After 402a23, he uses the word more strictly, raising the question whether it is in this category or some other that we should rightly consider soul to belong. He then raises the question of whether the soul is something ἐν δυνάμει or an ἐντελέχεια. These are the first two of about a dozen aporias Aristotle lays out at the beginning of his inquiry, and from Book II onward Aristotle successively addresses exactly these aporias. If Heidegger’s primary topic were method, we should expect some remarks about Aristotle’s aporetic approach, at least as a “method of presentation,” and that these students, whose attention seems to have been drawn to the topic of method, would make note of such remarks.

What seems to have interested Heidegger instead is that Aristotle raises the question of how to proceed to elucidate this ἀρχή, the soul, and from what starting points and then reverts to a series of questions that he suggests are more pointed and fundamental, questions about the manner of soul’s being and manifesting itself, the first two of which are ontological questions. Heidegger’s subsequent lectures will focus intently on the ontological principles of οὐσία and ἐντελέχεια and on Aristotle’s determination of soul in terms of these principles. They will also take up the question of the distinctive place of human soul in Aristotle’s inquiry, the question reflected in Becker’s note on “general assertions.” Finally, they will also address the topic of Becker’s last note, in which Heidegger translates τὰ ἀντικείμενα as “that which lies against.” Clearly, Heidegger wants

² Ibid., 25 (402a4-7)

to stress in this observation that the usual translation of ἀντικείμενον as “object” would be misleading because (as he will later explain) Aristotle does not understand perception as the apprehension of an object by a subject.

All four of these aporetic topics are centrally relevant to Heidegger’s later analytic of Dasein in *Being and Time*. There he will insist that Dasein, the human way of being, cannot be encompassed by the categories that ontologically characterize entities within the world, including the category of *substantia* by which Descartes still characterizes the being for whom there is a world, the *ego cogitans*. He does, however, recognize that Dasein has its own “determinate modes of being” (which is how he describes Aristotle’s conception of ἐντελέχεια), modes that are existential rather than categorial. The analysis of Dasein’s modes of being, especially its being-in-the-world and relating to entities in the world, will be misconstrued and obfuscated if we begin by thinking of this relationship in terms of a subject and its objects. In this early Aristotle seminar, we see Heidegger beginning, at least by analogy, to work out the distinctive place of Dasein as the entity whose rigorous analysis must be the ground of the fundamental conviction his method provides.³

Before leaving this initial class meeting, let us suggest another foreshadowing offered by Becker’s very last note. After commenting on Aristotle’s term ἀντικείμενα, Heidegger apparently observes that the corresponding word in Plotinus for the grasp of the ἀντικείμενον is ἀντιλήψις. In their very last notes for the course, both Weiss and Becker indicate that Heidegger characterizes Aristotle’s understanding of perception in terms of λαμβάνειν, the verb for grasping or taking hold of something, which is formed from the same root as ἀντι-λήψις. There is some reason to recognize in these comments an early sign of Heidegger’s narrative according to which Western metaphysics bears within itself from the beginning its eventual unfolding into the metaphysics of will to power in Nietzsche.

This suggestion finds reinforcement in the concluding remarks on *De Anima* 1.1 that begin the second meeting. According to Becker’s notes on the *De Anima* material, Heidegger asserted that Aristotle’s physics, and even his metaphysics, must be understood from the perspective of biology, which is occupied with form or, better, the “formed,” and that for conceiving the relationship between material and form the craftsman (τεχνιτής) in turn occupies a “fundamental position.” The last note of the “Bondi supplement” inserted at the corresponding point by Weiss phrases the thought in a more recognizably Heideggerian way: “Radical treatment of the problem of being. His guiding representation of the unity of form and matter is taken from creating – seen in terms of forming.” Sixteen years later in a lecture course on Nietzsche, precisely when Heidegger is explaining what makes a treatment of the problem of Being radical, he will say the following:

³ In the Weiss notes for the beginning of Heidegger’s June 7 meeting, we read, “*Important in Aristotle*: that which is grasped and the thing itself that grasps are identical” (Weiss, 6). Compare *Being and Time*, 32 (H12): “Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it *is* ontological.” The foundational place of the analytic of Dasein in the questioning of the meaning of Being requires above all that Heidegger characterize its constitutive phenomena in a way that does not rest upon interpreting it already as an οὐσία, and thus his examination of Aristotle’s categorization of soul as οὐσία is a crucial preparatory background for that task. On this point, see also Francisco Gonzalez, “The Birth of *Being and Time*: Heidegger’s Pivotal 1921 Reading of Aristotle’s *On the Soul*,” *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 56, no. 2 (2018): 216-39 (esp. 233).

Whatever the particular case, each time the guiding question [“What is being?”] is posed *one* region of beings becomes *definitive* for our survey of being as a whole. In each case the guiding question unfolds in itself something that sets the standard. By this “setting the standard” we understand the preeminence of an exceptional region within being as a whole. The remaining beings are not actually derived from that exceptional region; yet that region provides the light that illumines them all.⁴

The examination of *Metaphysics* VII to which Heidegger now turns will flesh out this suggestion of the student notes, that the phenomenal region of craft formation guides Aristotle’s interpretation of living beings in a way that accords with this later formulation.

2. METAPHYSICS VII AND DETERMINATENESS

The guiding theme of Heidegger’s first session on *Metaphysics* VII is the “question” (Becker, 3) or “problem” (Weiss, 3) of “what definition accomplishes.” *De Anima* 2.1 will offer a “definition” of the soul as a kind of οὐσία, and *Metaphysics* VII provides the classic treatment of the meaning of οὐσία. This treatment gives central place to the Aristotelian formula τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι, which is what a definition tries to bespeak. Heidegger emphasizes that this question of what definition accomplishes is not a question of logic but rather one of *access* to the entity we are examining. Thus by the end of this meeting his treatment will find its way to glancing but radical reflections on the methods of phenomenology.

The core idea of this session is expressed slightly differently by the two students. Becker relays at the beginning of his page 5: “The determination of something through something in the assertion is the fundamental phenomenon from which Aristotle develops everything.” Weiss, near the end of her page 3, puts it thus: when Aristotle says he is treating “λογικῶς,” the problem of οὐσία and of the definition, this has “the special meaning of asserting, thus considers the phenomenon with an eye to the general context of asserting, of something through something, that is the fundamental context.”

We can see immediately that Heidegger is pointing the way toward a “fundamental” (*Grund*) source of Aristotle’s analysis of οὐσία and that the way to this ground is through examining the phenomenon of assertion (*Aussagen*). Heidegger will devote section 33 of *Being and Time* to assertion in the context of a discussion of interpretation and the fore-understanding (“context”) that guides it. There he highlights the importance of the topic for precisely the task of this seminar: “the analysis of assertion has a special position in the problematic of fundamental ontology, because in the decisive period when ancient ontology was beginning, the λόγος functioned as the only clue for obtaining access to that which authentically *is* [zum eigentlich Seienden] and for defining the Being of such entities.”⁵ “Defining” here translates Heidegger’s original *Bestimmung* (determining).

In both contexts, then, assertion is a key to understanding *logos*, both as “letting an entity be seen from itself” by pointing it out and as giving something determinateness

⁴ Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, trans. David Farrell Krell, vol. 2 (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 197.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 196 (H154).

by predication “of something through something.” In the seminar, both students indicate that Heidegger highlighted a connection between ὀρισμός (“definition,” from the verb ὀρίζειν, meaning to bound or delineate) and *Bestimmung* (“determination”).⁶ This theme of “making determinate” provides the main thread of these reflections on *Metaphysics* VII, leading from the initial question of what definition accomplishes, through an analysis of assertion, to the phenomenal context of formation by craft.

Textually, Heidegger’s main focus in this introduction to *Metaphysics* VII is chapter 17, and immediately before turning to that chapter he provides indications that this material will lead to an encounter with Husserl’s phenomenology. Weiss writes, early on page 4:

Λέγειν is the fundamental phenomenon from which Aristotle arrives at οὐσία.

From here Aristotle explains the meaning of οὐσία and of ὀρισμός. The asserting of one thing of another in a completely determinate sense.

That which is to be defined is intended in a determinate sense.

Becker’s corresponding note (5, end) reproduces the same characteristic phenomenological cluster of language: phenomenon, determination, and intention.

The rest of this lecture divides into two parts. In the first, Heidegger shows how grounding Aristotle’s τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι in the phenomenon of λέγειν (asserting) leads to considerations of the basic givenness of phenomena in experience. The second part accordingly turns explicitly to a discussion of this givenness as understood by phenomenology in terms of intuition. Heidegger will end by suggesting that stopping at this givenness leaves important questions unasked. The direction of those unasked questions already finds initial articulation early on in Becker, page 5: “Aristotle sees ... the surrounding world in a determinate way, in the structure of *forming*. This is for him the genuine fundamental experience in the case of knowing.” As we have seen, “forming” belongs to the context of craft production, and if we recognize the associations of the craft context with what Heidegger will later call the “equipmental totality” and note here the language of “the surrounding world,” we can see how Heidegger is already sketching an early version of his later correction of phenomenological method through the analysis of the phenomenon of Dasein’s Being-in-the-world and the hermeneutical priority of the ready-to-hand over the present-at-hand.

Weiss (4) notes, “Chapter 17 [is] especially important for the meaning of τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι.” Becker, at the same juncture (7), records the reiterated observation that this question of τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι is being treated “λογικῶς,” which, as we have seen, Heidegger takes as his clue in tracing Aristotle’s interpretation back to “asserting” as its “fundamental context.” The most relevant mode of assertion here is assertion “according to the function of answering in questioning” (Weiss, 4) – namely, the question of why something is as it is. As Heidegger emphasizes, Aristotle in chapter 17 develops a contrast between the kind of answer that determines something through something and the kind (such as one responding to the question “Why is this a human being?”) that requires a different kind of seeking, allowing something to be determined through itself alone.

⁶ Weiss, beginning of 4; Becker, end of 5.

Weiss records Heidegger describing the first kind of questioning as scientific. The other kind of questioning, and the experience it corresponds to of the givenness of the being asked about, is the prescientific starting point examined by phenomenology. Heidegger's paraphrase of Aristotle on this point is the remark that "the being must be had," a formula he introduces, according to Weiss, both at the beginning of the treatment of chapter 17 and again at the transition to discussing phenomenology explicitly. In short, Heidegger sees that Aristotle here, like Husserl, is taking scientific questioning back to its more radical grounding in the experience of given beings and is examining this givenness itself.

Becker (10-11) provides a helpful summary of the bearing of this contrast between two kinds of questioning:

Here we must distinguish between the question (1) in scientific and (2) in philosophical knowing. What does it mean to say: being must be had in the sense of phenomenology? Phenomenology shows: if it is to be possible to know something, so must that about which I speak be *given* – "intuitively" given. This is the fundamental knowledge of phenomenology, but it is only *one* step and conceals a danger [*Gefahr*] insofar as this principle does not itself become a question.

Weiss, at the corresponding place (5) also speaks of this starting/stopping point as a "great danger" (*große Gefahr*), one that applies to Aristotle as well. In other words, Heidegger is recognizing an analogy between Husserl and Aristotle not only in their grounding of scientific questioning on the experience of givenness but also in their leaving important questions unasked by resting there.

Becker's final notes for this meeting (11-12) sketch the character of what is thereby left unexamined:

The question grows out of the having of a world of experience (a "fundamental experience"). – The how of questioning is already determined through the meaning of having. This contrast between philosophy and science is only preliminary. The analogy of philosophy and science is problematic and a danger for philosophy. It could be the case that philosophy has a completely different meaning.

We can see here how Heidegger's critique of Husserlian phenomenology, to be developed in *Being and Time*, is gestating in his critical reflections on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. Phenomenology's foundation in the intuitive givenness of experienced phenomena must be surpassed by means of a hermeneutic of that experience of givenness, of "having the being" of things: "Not only the framework of questioning but also the way of questioning is determined through having" (Weiss, 5). The "fundamental experience" out of which such questioning grows is, indeed, "the having of a *world*." Hence the necessity for a hermeneutic of worldhood and the having of it, that is, of Being-in-the-World.

Also hinted at here is the consideration that makes Heidegger's masterpiece *Being and Time* his most uncharacteristic work. A decade before this seminar, Husserl had published his

essay “Philosophy as a Rigorous Science,” which succinctly characterizes his philosophical program. Heidegger in this seminar casts some doubts on that program as a dangerous misconception of the task of philosophy. In presenting his justification for those doubts in *Being and Time*, Heidegger proceeds (as he nowhere else does) by way of insisting on and exercising exactly the same methodological rigor. His deployment of that rigor, however, makes manifest the need for the hermeneutic of Dasein and worldhood and for the surpassing of scientific strictures in philosophy’s disclosure of the framework of experience itself.

With all these orienting considerations in place, Heidegger proceeds in the next session (June 7) to an intensely focused exposition of what it means to say that the ὀρισμός and τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι are grounded in λέγειν understood as “assertion.” Throughout this exposition, Heidegger is concerned to avoid interpreting Aristotle through the two distorting filters he will warn against at the beginning of the subsequent June 14 meeting: the logical systematizing of the mediating scholastic tradition and the conceptual analysis of the regnant neo-Kantianism represented by Natorp. The problem of understanding the role of definition (ὀρισμός) in Aristotle’s thought is neither a problem of logic nor a problem of the structure of concepts but rather a problem of how, in seeking to investigate and elucidate “the meaning of beings,” Aristotle arrives at a consideration of definition and what it points to. Prior to all conceptualizing and logical systematizing lies the encounter with beings elucidated by phenomenology.

Becker (15) conveys the central thesis of the lecture effectively:

At the basis lies the natural attitude of *taking-cognizance*. A λέγειν lies already and without further conditions in this taking-cognizance. There is in every taking-cognizance already a “what” that is taken cognizance of. (This was never again grasped as radically as with Aristotle.) Everything grasped is a “what.” But this original “what” is also a τὸδε τι.

Asserting something of something presupposes that we “have the being” of the original something about which we are asserting. Aristotle’s categories, the foundation of what might be considered his system of logic or of concepts, reflect the different ways in which we assert that something *is*. Heidegger observes (Becker, 13), “In modern logic the copula is mostly neglected. However, it is from the ‘is’ of the assertion that subject and predicate first actually receive their meaning.” The manner of asserting, as we have already seen, differs drastically between asserting something of something else and speaking of a thing wholly in terms of itself, out of its own determinateness, and these different roles of the copula in “the carrying out of the assertion” provide the basis for the distinctive place of οὐσία among the categories. This place Aristotle distinguishes as “ὑποκείμενον” – the underlying, or that upon which all asserting rests. As Weiss reports (7): “This ‘what’ in taking-cognizance is a πρῶτον, the first ... as foundational.”⁷

When Heidegger considers Aristotle’s description of the “what” as a τὸδε τι, he is careful to clear away the neo-Kantian conceptualization of this term: “This τὸδε τι is not a temporally-spatially or ‘historically’ determined individual; rather, it is simply a ‘this-here,’

⁷ Note that Becker, in the corresponding place (end of 15) has “The ‘what’ in *intending* is the first: πρῶτον” (emphasis mine).

a ‘something’ lying before me” (Becker, 15). Heidegger’s recovery of and insistence upon the literal meaning of Aristotle’s words reinforces the phenomenological concreteness of Aristotle’s thinking: he does not have the language of “intentionality” but indicates what is meant in that language through his lexical characterization of the encounter with the phenomena. Connecting some of the thoughts left unconnected in the notes, we could sketch Heidegger’s concrete reconstruction of the phenomenon of assertion as follows. In the foundational taking-cognizance of a “this-here,” there is already an intending of it as a “what” whose more distinct determinateness comes about through the asking of “What is it?” But this asking clearly anticipates and demands in response an assertion whose copula is already assigned its mode – namely, the mode in which the assertion will provide determinateness for the “what” only out of itself (*ἀπλῶς, καθ’ αὐτό*). This assertion, as an articulation of determinateness, is the *ὀρισμός*, the bounding determination or delineation. In describing what the *ὀρισμός* seeks to make manifest as *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι*, Aristotle is verbally encapsulating the context of assertion-as-response-to-question: the *τι ἦν* refers to the question that was asked (“τί ἐστι,”), and the *εἶναι* represents the copula of the responding assertion. Thus, one might clumsily describe Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle’s *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι* as “the *ἀπλῶς*-being determinately asserted in the *ὀρισμός* as belonging to the *τόδε τι* intended in the questioner’s asking about the ‘what.’”

This reconstruction appears to correspond to and fill out the meaning of Becker’s notes on page 14:

What is the meaning of the expression “τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι”? Note the verbal form “εἶναι.” Through this verbal form *οὐσία*, characterized as *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι*, is related to *λέγειν*, to the dynamic of the assertion. What appears as the genuine meaning of this *οὐσία*: “that which is grasped in the *ὀρισμός*.” The *ὀρισμός* is a determinate *λόγος*, a determinate type of *λέγειν*, of grasping, and what appears as the “what” of this determinate type of grasping is precisely the *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι*.

Having thus established the field of concrete intentionality and the phenomenon of asserting as the context for interpreting Aristotle’s thought regarding *ὀρισμός* and *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι*, Heidegger offers an overall reading of *Metaphysics 7* that carries out a twofold agenda. His exposition of the text seeks to explain how *οὐσία* as *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι* comes to be equated with *εἶδος*; and his argument against Natorp’s reading of the text reaffirms the necessity of a phenomenological and historical desedimentation to rescue the radical import of Aristotle’s thought from anachronistic distortion and obfuscation.

Heidegger’s starting point for both these trajectories is *Metaphysics 7.3*. Here Aristotle observes that four different concepts stand as candidates for understanding *οὐσία*. In Becker’s words (16-17):

- (1) *τὸ τι ἦν εἶναι* – the “is-meaning”
- (2) *τὸ καθόλου* – the universal
- (3) *τὸ γένος* – the genus
- (4) *τὸ ὑποκείμενον* – the subject (substrate)

From here we have the problem of the whole of Book VII: To what extent does the formal meaning of οὐσία, which arises from λέγειν, come to fulfillment in these four concepts?

Both students note that Heidegger dismisses γένος and καθόλου as “secondary,” Becker (17) noting that this “is of the greatest importance.” The importance, at least for the argument of the next meeting, is that these constitute the logical and conceptual level upon which the whole neo-Kantian interpretation of Aristotle (and of philosophical thought generally) ground themselves, and to correct this misreading one must “win Aristotle back by going back through history” (Becker, 18). One then finds that the “concept formation at the time, as it appears in Aristotle, remains in close proximity to immediate taking-cognizance, which does not at all occupy a high level of theorizing” (Becker, 24). As Weiss (20) summarizes it, the Marburg school thinkers “come at the singular phenomenon with a theory, while Aristotle is more radical and asks: How do I experience the singular?”

This question of the singular, or “the historical individual,” is precisely what Heidegger sees as Aristotle’s concern in VII.7-9, which is why he rejects Natorp’s reordering of the text: “Chapters 7-9 are no digression from logic into physics but rather an originary explication of the experience from which one arrives at the judgement” (Becker, 19). The neo-Kantians have mistaken the derivative for the foundational. What these chapters of the *Metaphysics* exhibit is “the starting point of the Aristotelian concept formation” (Becker, 24).

As previously noted, the ὑποκείμενον as “underlying” describes the place of the τόδε τι as πρότον, as the intentional ground of all assertion and therefore as defining the place of οὐσία relative to the other categories. When Aristotle turns to consider ὕλη as the obvious candidate for what counts as ὑποκείμενον or the most underlying (finding that in the context of assertion it cannot satisfy that role because it is indeterminate and so must be relative to form), he is resorting to a consideration of the relationship of ὕλη and μορφή in γένεσις not as a detour into physics but as the phenomenal milieu of the historical individual encountered and intended as τόδε τι. Only once this is grasped as εἶδος and articulated as ὀρισμός can one elaborate the system of concepts with which Natorp proposes to comprehend the individual and to propound logical judgements.

The historical individual Aristotle calls the ἕκαστον. Thus Becker (22) indicates both the critique of Natorp and the direction of Heidegger’s hermeneutical phenomenology when he notes, “Our conceptual determinations are upside down if we wished to determine the concept of the ἕκαστον in advance.... Aristotle comprehends the ἕκαστον not as logical individual but as formed in some way.” Both students emphasize that this grasping “from out of γένεσις” of the οὐσία as “a *formed* thing” is “the fundamental structure” (Becker, 23) – or as Weiss (10) puts it, “The starting-point is making, ποιήσις.” This may well represent the decisive hermeneutical moment for the determination of Heidegger’s entire subsequent narrative of Western metaphysics as culminating in will to power. The immediate application becomes manifest when he returns in the final meetings to *De Anima* and reads the text under the pressure of this hermeneutical starting point.

3. *DE ANIMA* II AND DETERMINATE MODES OF BEING

In his initial observations about *De Anima* II.1, Heidegger apparently suggests that ἐντελέχεια, in terms of which Aristotle characterizes the being of the soul, seems to provide being with a standing independent of the context of the assertion. He goes on to insinuate, in effect, that this is an illusion; one might even call it an episode in what he will later name “the forgetfulness of Being.” Indeed, the dual aspect of ψυχή as ἀρχή that seems to have attracted Heidegger’s attention in Book I – as both a being and that which interrogates beings – here goes underground, foreshadowing the way in which Dasein loses sight of itself by looking at entities in the world.

The starting point for Heidegger’s interpretation is Aristotle’s remark that “one cannot speculate about the soul in a general way” but that it “must be grasped in ... the carrying out, putting to work, the actual performance” of each distinct δύναμις (Weiss, 13). He reminds the students that *Metaphysics Z* considered οὐσία in the concretely encountered τὸδε τι as something “constituted” (*beschaffen*, Weiss, 15), remarking now that its being is a “being-there-in-such-a-way” and that this holds as well for ἐντελέχεια, which in the case of soul indicates “life as a determinate mode of being.” In fact, the ἐντελέχεια is a λόγος of that which is δυνάμει, and this “λόγος is here ὀρισμός, is assertion.” The concrete phenomenon of life is not encountered as a formed entity but as the “carrying out” and “actual performance” of one of several distinct kinds of δύναμις, in a “being-in-action with a goal and already possessing this goal.”

This understanding of being-in-action as possessed of its own determinative τέλος is apparently the trace of the surreptitious interpretive sway of τέχνη. Heidegger finds every occasion to draw attention, in the accounts of these different soul-powers, to aspects described in terms of ποιήσις. The θρεπτικόν in its reproductive aspect is the ποιητικόν of offspring (Becker, 27), and in the case of αἴσθησις the perceived ἀντικείμενον plays the role of ποιητικόν (Weiss, 18; Becker, 30). No doubt if he had reached Book III as planned, Heidegger would have had much to say about νοῦς ποιητικός as well. Perhaps these observations provide the “closer inspection” meant to bear out an extraordinary interpretive claim Heidegger makes: that “the ‘I’ of contemporary psychology” thought to be absent in Aristotle is in fact “everywhere there, but only in the guise [*Verkleidung*] of δύναμις – the I-can and it-can,” and that therefore, guided by this “fundamental determination” (*Grundbestimmung*), we must understand “everything from the perspective of the I-can of the νοῦς” (Weiss, 13).

What motivates or grounds this claim? In Weiss’s notes it comes at the beginning of the July 19 meeting without preparation or argument. I am inclined to suspect that Nietzsche has already begun to influence Heidegger’s reading of Aristotle and that the narrative Heidegger later develops of the destiny of metaphysics reaching its full self-disclosure in the will to power begins to take shape in this early study, perhaps by way of tacitly assuming the conclusion it will reach. Ten years later (but still five years before he began to lecture on Nietzsche), in his study of *Metaphysics Θ* 1-3, Heidegger will interpret δύναμις as force and will give it a Nietzschean inflection: “In the essence of force there is, as it were, the demand upon itself to surpass itself.”⁸

⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Aristotle’s Metaphysics Θ 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*, trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 85.

While Heidegger never mentions Nietzsche in the seminar, some of the ideas constellated around this implicit emphasis on self-assertion of the will are suggestive of Nietzschean themes. Perhaps even the very theme of the seminar, life as form, is suggested by Nietzschean concerns. The repeated emphasis that εἶδος is a determination of οὐσία that arises out of γένεσις might suggest the Nietzschean emphasis on becoming and the will-to-life as form-positing. While the Weiss notes for July 5 do not provide a very lucid sense of the development of Heidegger's exposition (and there are no Becker notes), they do show that prior to discussing the determinate forms of life-activity Heidegger repeatedly connects εἶδος and ποιήσις:

Εἶδος relates the οὐσία to a γένεσις, and this is a ποιήσις and φύσις....
 The αἰτία = that-for-the-sake-of-which. *The εἶδος is held in view in production and therefore is an αἰτίον.* (Weiss, 11; emphasis in original)

Furthermore, the insistence on understanding “everything from the perspective of the I-can of the νοῦς” is followed by this reflection: “how far the remaining concrete determinations [*Bestimmungen*] of life (beyond human νοῦς) play a role here would need to be examined more closely” (Weiss, 13). To my mind, this suggests further reflection on how far the resemblance between Aristotle's analyses of the different distinct life-potencies and Nietzsche's understanding of life as determinate form-positing can be carried.

The following cluster of ideas is similarly suggestive:

Γένεσις (thought of as objective *doing*) is what is most proper, what is most natural in nature.
 In γένεσις, the εἶδος is the οἶον ... ; from it derives the concept of kind [*Art*];
 εἶδος is the meaning of οὐσία that is connected to γένεσις....
 From here also an understanding of ἐντελέχεια.

The theme of “objective doing” evokes the long tradition, running from Hegel and Feuerbach through Schopenhauer to Nietzsche, of characterizing the will as objectifying itself in the fashioning of forms.⁹ Does Heidegger suggest that this provides “an understanding of ἐντελέχεια” in the sense that life-as-becoming is the positing of determinate form as τέλος?

As suggestive and worthy of reflection as Heidegger's observations about the recurring note of ποιήσις in the text of *De Anima* may be, in certain respects his pursuit

⁹ If this suspicion is correct, the place of Dasein as fallen and projective interpreter of World, which Hans Jonas sees as giving a gnostic character to Heidegger's thought, may be a residue of the Will/World duality retained by Nietzsche from Schopenhauer, in whom it certainly has a gnostic character. It is noteworthy that the 1921 seminar was the first attended by Jonas, whose major phenomenological project was later to be an ontology of life. It is hard not to hear Heidegger's remark that what Aristotle “actually has in mind is the human being in which all capacities are concretely present” as the forerunner of Jonas's insistence that the generally gnostic tendency of modern ontology must be surpassed by a phenomenology of embodied human life, or “propriobodily prime experience,” as a “psychophysical totality which represents the maximum of concrete ontological completeness known to us” (Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life* [Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001], 23). This would mean that Jonas took the path Gonzalez sees Heidegger abandoning when he drops the project of an ontology of life guiding the present seminar in favor of the ontology of Dasein (*ibid.*, 235-38).

of this interpretation sometimes has the look of an act of force that surpasses what the text will bear. In the very last notes from the course, as previously mentioned, Heidegger makes much of Aristotle's use of the verb λαμβάνειν at 412a18 (Weiss, 18; Becker, 31). Here Aristotle describes all αἴσθησις as receptive of the sensible forms without the material, and he compares this receptivity to wax being impressed with a seal. The wax is here said to receive (δέχεται) the seal but also to take (λαμβάνει) the gold or bronze seal, although not insofar as it is gold or bronze. Heidegger insists on giving the second verb control over the meaning of the first: "δέχεσθαι here not *receiving* [Aufnehmen], rather instead *taking* [Annehmen (λαμβάνειν)]" (Becker, 31). This accords with Heidegger's earlier emphasis on interpretive grasping in the ὀρισμός, such that Aristotle "makes that which is grasped dependent on the kind of grasping" (Becker, 12). There is, however, no obvious justification for this reinterpretation of receiving as grasping. The wax, after the seal is impressed upon it, hardens and sets, and in that sense "takes" the impression firmly.

Heidegger strains this same passage even further, in a way that calls attention to the question he appears to be prematurely deciding. Aristotle makes clear that the sense "is not a magnitude ... rather, it is some *logos* and potency [δύναμις] of the magnitude it belongs to."¹⁰ Here λόγος clearly bears the sense of ratio or relationship since Aristotle goes on to observe that sensory experiences that exceed the measure of the sense destroy its λόγος. Heidegger, however, insists that even here it means "asserting" (Weiss, 16; Becker, 29). The fact that λόγος can mean ratio highlights Aristotle's understanding that human λόγος is the response to a λόγος within things, ordering principles that speak to a mind that can receive them. If this is the ultimate ground of λόγος, then the craft analogy is arguably not a case of Aristotle's transferring the teleological form-giving character of τέχνη into φύσις but rather a pedagogical means for bringing his hearer from what is first with respect to us, the more familiar world of crafted items, to that which is first in itself, the inner order of nature that art imitates.

In 1940, Heidegger gave a seminar on the text he never managed to arrive at in this 1921 seminar, Aristotle's *Physics*.¹¹ There he strives to clarify what φύσις means for Aristotle and how it differs from τέχνη. There he also gives renewed consideration to the meaning of ἐντελέχεια, as well as ἐνέργεια, and has new thoughts on λόγος that emphasize gathering into unity of presence more than asserting as determining.¹² Whether these further considerations provide a departure from or a deepening of the thesis regarding the role of craft formation as providing the "exceptional region" that illuminates the rest of being is a question requiring judicious interpretation. It is clear, however, that the preoccupation with such questions is already giving shape to Heidegger's continuity-narrative of the destiny of metaphysics from the time of this earliest course on Aristotle.

¹⁰ Aristotle, *De Anima*, 72 (424a26-28).

¹¹ Martin Heidegger, "On the Being and Conception of ΦΥΣΙΣ in Aristotle's *Physics* B, 1," trans. Thomas J. Sheehan, *Man and World* 9, no.3 (1976): 219-70.

¹² It is noteworthy that, whereas in the 1921 seminar Heidegger distinguishes ἐντελέχεια from ἐνέργεια ("ἐνέργεια is being-in-action, but ἐντελέχεια [is] being-in-action with a goal and already possessing this goal" [Weiss, 15]), in the 1940 seminar (256) he collapses ἐνέργεια into ἐντελέχεια: "Instead of the word ἐντελέχεια, which he himself coined, Aristotle also uses the word ἐνέργεια. Here, in place of τέλος, there stands ἔργον, the work in the sense of what is to be produced and what has been produced. In Greek thought ἐνέργεια means 'standing in the work,' where 'work' means that which stands fully in the 'end.'"

HEIDEGGER'S 1921 SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA*: SOME PHILOLOGICAL REMARKS

In line with the detailed analyses of Werner Beierwaltes and Glenn W. Most,¹ Franco Volpi maintains that a philological approach to Heidegger's interpretation of ancient philosophers is not worthwhile. Indeed, such an approach would inevitably involve a radical criticism or at least a series of corrections and adjustments because of Heidegger's "violence" toward the Greek texts, which Heidegger himself refers to several times.² Instead, Volpi suggests a focus on the primarily philosophical questions that Heidegger both raised and rethought. In particular, he argues that a more rewarding avenue of research consists in looking at how Heidegger unbiasedly draws from Greek philosophy and, consequently, in investigating the actual meaning of his confrontation with the Greeks. Thus, modern interpreters should realize that Heidegger did not aim to achieve historical and philological accuracy; rather, he tried to do justice to the fundamental questions posed by the Greeks and to make them his own.³ This approach, which proposes an investigation of the reception and influence of ancient philosophers on Heidegger's thought, has proven to be highly effective.⁴ However, it often rests on the assumption, formulated by, for example, Werner Beierwaltes, that

¹ Werner Beierwaltes, *Fußnoten zu Platon* (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2011), 345-425; Glenn W. Most, "Heidegger's Greeks," *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics*, 3rd ser., 10, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 2002): 83-98.

² Franco Volpi, "Der Rückgang auf die Griechen in den 1920er Jahren. Eine hermeneutische Perspektive auf Aristoteles, Platon und die Vorsokratiker im Dienst der Seinsfrage," in *Heidegger Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, ed. Dieter Thomä, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 2013), 25.

³ Volpi, "Der Rückgang auf die Griechen," 25.

⁴ The bibliography on Heidegger's "dialogue" with ancient philosophy is meanwhile considerable. To mention but a few examples: Alain Boutot, *Heidegger et Platon. Le problème du nihilisme* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1987); Francisco J. Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2009); Hans-Christian Günther and Antonios Rengakos, eds., *Heidegger und die Antike* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2006); Michael Steinmann, ed., *Heidegger und die Griechen* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2007). Especially on Heidegger's "dialogue" with Aristotle, see Michael Bowler, *Heidegger and Aristotle. Philosophy as Praxis* (London and New York: Continuum, 2008); Walter A. Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle. The Twofoldness of Being* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2005); Antonello D'Angelo, *Heidegger e Aristotele: la potenza e l'atto* (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2000); Alfred Denker, Holger Zaborowski, Günter Figal, and Franco Volpi, eds., *Heidegger und Aristoteles (= Heidegger-Jahrbuch 3, Freiburg im Breisgau: Karl Alber, 2007)*; Ted Sadler, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being* (London: The Athlone Press, 1996); Franco Volpi, *Heidegger e Aristotele* (Padua: Daphne, 1984).

Heidegger's knowledge of the Greek language was at least improvable.⁵ In this short commentary on Heidegger's seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima*, which we can now partly reconstruct thanks to Francisco Gonzalez's edition and translation of the notes of Helene Weiss and Oskar Becker,⁶ I will take a slightly different point of view. While others have recently focused on the importance of this seminar for the development of Heidegger's philosophy of Dasein,⁷ in the following pages I will suggest, in line with more recent analyses,⁸ that, in his seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima*, Heidegger approaches the text from a more genuine philological standpoint and considers problems discussed in the scholarship of his time. However, it will also become clear that it is impossible to completely disjoin Heidegger's discussion of exegetical questions from his own philosophical interests.

In the following pages, I will first give an overview of the structure of the seminar and Heidegger's didactic method insofar as it is possible to reconstruct it. Second, I will focus on two aspects that, from my point of view, are particularly interesting for a better understanding of his "philological approach" to *De Anima*. Finally, I will offer a summary of my analysis.

HEIDEGGER'S SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA*: STRUCTURE AND DIDACTIC METHOD

It is extremely difficult to reconstruct and delineate the structure and didactic character of a seminar for which we do not possess Heidegger's actual manuscript. Indeed, we face several problems, the first of which is the likely incompleteness of the notes taken by Helene Weiss and Oskar Becker. As Francisco Gonzalez shows in his introduction to the translation, both manuscripts are important for a complete reconstruction of the seminar

⁵ See Beierwaltes, *Fußnoten zu Platon*, 354-62. Beierwaltes focuses particularly on Heidegger's "etymologizing approach to root words," on his "associative method," and on his propensity for trying to "hear the unsaid" in the texts he analyzes. For an assessment of Beierwaltes's criticism of Heidegger's approach, see Diego De Brasi and Marko J. Fuchs, "Introduction: Heidegger's Lectures on Plato's *Sophist* and Their Importance for Modern Plato Scholarship," in *Sophistes: Plato's Dialogue and Heidegger's Lectures in Marburg (1924-25)*, ed. Diego De Brasi and Marko J. Fuchs (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 7-10.

⁶ Becker's transcript has already been edited previously in Alfred Denker, Holger Zaborowski, Günter Figal, and Franco Volpi, eds., *Heidegger und Aristoteles (= Heidegger Jahrbuch 3 [Freiburg im Breisgau: Karl Alber, 2007])*, 9-22.

⁷ See, in particular, Francisco J. Gonzalez, "The Birth of *Being and Time*: Heidegger's Pivotal 1921 Reading of Aristotle's *De Anima*," *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 56, no. 2 (2018): 216-39; Thomas Schwarz Wentzer, "Speaking Being: Heidegger's Aristotle and the Problem of Anthropology," in *Phenomenological Interpretations of Ancient Philosophy*, ed. Kristian Larsen and Pål Rykkja Gilbert (Leiden: Brill 2021), 69-91. See also Dimitrios Yfantis, *Die Auseinandersetzung des frühen Heidegger mit Aristoteles: Ihre Entstehung und Entfaltung sowie ihre Bedeutung für die Entwicklung der frühen Philosophie Martin Heideggers (1919-1927)* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2009), 194n393; and John Michael Hayes, "Deconstructing Dasein: Heidegger's Earliest Interpretations of Aristotle's *De Anima*," *The Review of Metaphysics* 61, no. 2 (2007): 263-93. Both Yfantis and Hayes take the seminar into consideration in their attempts to reconstruct Aristotle's influence on the "first" Heidegger. However, their analyses are based only on one transcript (Becker's for Yfantis; Weiss's for Hayes).

⁸ Cf., e.g., Massimo Luigi Bianchi, "Platone in Heidegger," in *Due immagini di Platone in età contemporanea. Il neo-kantismo, Martin Heidegger*, ed. Massimo Luigi Bianchi and Francesco Fronterotta (Milan: Mimesis, 2017), 47-135; Francesco Fronterotta, "Être, présence et vérité: Platon chez Heidegger (et à rebours)," *Studia Phaenomenologica* 20 (2020): 167-89; Gonzalez, *Plato and Heidegger: A Question of Dialogue*, passim; Andrea Le Moli, *Heidegger e Platone. Essere, relazione e differenza* (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1998); see also Francisco Gonzalez's introduction to his edition and translation of the transcript in this volume (Francisco Gonzalez, "Introduction to Heidegger's 1921 Summer Semester Seminar on Aristotle's *De Anima* as Recorded in the Handwritten Notes of Helene Weiss and Oskar Becker," *Kronos Philosophical Journal* 10 [2021]: 34-36).

since they are complementary. While Becker's notes are extensive about Heidegger's comments on *Metaphysics* book Z but sparse on the last sessions on *De Anima*, Weiss's manuscript offers a detailed "report" of Heidegger's explanations on book 2 of *De Anima*. However, we also see that Weiss used supplementary notes from Elli Bondi's transcript where she thought to have missed something. At the same time, Becker must have missed at least one seminar session.⁹ Not only might these transcripts be incomplete, but also they cannot reproduce the complexity and fullness of Heidegger's remarks. Francisco Gonzalez aptly describes these notes as "fragmentary and even confused" and adds, "one can imagine the students struggling to keep up with Heidegger."¹⁰ Nevertheless, we can delineate some general characteristics of the seminar and recognize some aspects of Heidegger's teaching method.

A first important point is Heidegger's emphasis on a holistic perspective in dealing with *De Anima*, which is a very traditional approach: he advises his students to consult some texts that will help them understand the role and importance of *De Anima* in Aristotle's thought. According to Weiss's transcript, these texts are as follows: *Metaphysics*, books 3 (B), 5 (Δ), 7 (Z), and 13 (M); and *Physics*, books 5 (E), 6 (Z), and 8 (Θ). Besides, Heidegger recommends that the students "read all the doctrine of categories in the *Organon*." I consider three phenomena to be particularly interesting here. First, this list (and, indeed, the whole transcript of the first class, Weiss's transcript page 1 and Becker's transcript page 1) has the appearance of a syllabus. Not only does Weiss indicate the precise date on which every text would be examined, but it seems that Heidegger used the first class to delineate the trajectory of the whole seminar – that is, an analysis of the connection between psychology and philosophy. Second, it is apparent from the remainder of the transcripts that not all the texts were examined during the seminar. Francisco Gonzalez stresses (in note 3 to the notes by Helene Weiss) that the transcripts do not contain notes on *Physics* 5, 6, and 8 and concludes: "we must assume that the seminar just never got to it." To be more precise, we do not find an extensive analysis in the notes of *Metaphysics* B, Δ, and M either. Similarly, there are only sparse allusions to the *Categories*. Third, it seems that Heidegger opted for a somewhat interactive didactic form: Weiss's notes record that at least two seminar sessions, on *Metaphysics Z* and *Physics*, were apparently supplemented (or perhaps introduced) with a presentation by students (in the specific cases, by the lesser-known Mr. Lichtenstein on *Metaphysics* and Dr. Beck on *Physics*).¹¹ This interactive approach seems to be an essential aspect in Heidegger's seminars as suggested by, for instance, the "reports" of different students published in GA 83-87.¹²

⁹ See Gonzalez's introduction; his editor's notes 2 and 8 ("Editor's Notes to the Notes by Helene Weiss," *Kronos Philosophical Journal* 10 [2021]: 106 and 108), and p. 40, 42, 44, 46, 56 of his edition of Weiss's notes ("Nachschriften von Helene Weiss," *Kronos Philosophical Journal* 10 [2021]).

¹⁰ Gonzalez, "The Birth of *Being and Time*," 239.

¹¹ See editor's notes 1 and 3 (p. 104 and 106).

¹² GA 83 = Martin Heidegger, *Seminare: Platon – Aristoteles – Augustinus*, ed. Mark Michalski (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2012); GA 84 = Martin Heidegger, *Seminare: Kant – Leibniz – Schiller*, ed. Günther Neumann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2013); GA 85 = Martin Heidegger, *Seminar: Vom Wesen der Sprache*, ed. Ingrid Schüßler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999); GA 86 = Martin Heidegger, *Seminare: Hegel – Schelling*, ed. Peter Trawny (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2011); GA 87 =

What do these aspects tell us? First, they contextualize the fragmentary nature of the notes. Due to the partially interactive character of the seminar, it seems plausible that Weiss and Becker might have opted to take notes only of Heidegger's explanations, which might not be completely systematic.

Second, they already give us a hint at the problems that Heidegger considered essential for a philosophical examination of *De Anima*. Let us compare Heidegger's list with a few commentaries on Aristotle's *De Anima* that were written in the last years.¹³ Heidegger mainly focuses on those Aristotelian texts that can help explain some of the complex and vague concepts within Aristotle's "system." However, he does not use them philologically or, at least, not according to what is commonly thought of as being philological. For example, unlike Christopher Shields in his commentary,¹⁴ he does not use them to determine the late composition date of *De Anima*. Furthermore, he does not say a word about Aristotle's hylomorphism, which is a prerequisite for understanding *De Anima* and is presented in general terms in *Physics* and *Metaphysics*. It is a topic that appears to be almost mandatory in commentaries nowadays.¹⁵ Nevertheless, Heidegger's choice is based intrinsically on Aristotle's text and is, consequently, philologically sound. Indeed, as Andree Hahmann points out in his systematic commentary on *De Anima*, the opening sentence of the work puts it on the same wavelength as *Metaphysics* and *Physics*:¹⁶ the three writings all begin by stressing the centrality of knowledge.¹⁷ Thus, Heidegger's plan, although not completely in line with "usual" philological remarks, is based on literary intertextual phenomena, suggesting the juxtaposition of these three works. However, Heidegger's choice is even more interesting in light of the seminar's development. Like Klaus Corcilius,¹⁸ he could also have stressed the connections between *De Anima* and all other "biological treatises" (*On the Generation of Animals*, *History of Animals*, etc.) since *De Anima* represents the fundamental conceptual starting point of Aristotle's theory of life. Nevertheless, Heidegger's interpretative move highlights the ontological perspective according to which he reads *De Anima*. This is, of course, in line with philologically founded interpretations of *De Anima*, which consider this work as

Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche: Seminare 1937 und 1944*, ed. Peter von Ruckteschell (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004).

¹³ In this paragraph and in the following sections, I will mainly consider the following texts: Thomas Buchheim, *Aristoteles. De anima – Über die Seele*. Griechisch – Deutsch, übersetzt mit Einleitung und Kommentar (Darmstadt: WBG, 2016); Klaus Corcilius, *Aristoteles. Über die Seele / De anima*. Griechisch – Deutsch, übersetzt, mit einer Einleitung und Anmerkungen (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2017); Andree Hahmann, *Aristoteles' »Über die Seele«. Ein systematischer Kommentar* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 2016); Christopher Shields, *Aristotle, De Anima*, trans. with intro. and comm. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2016).

¹⁴ Shields, *Aristotle: De Anima*, xii–xiii.

¹⁵ Cf. again Shields, *Aristotle: De Anima*, xiv, and Corcilius, *Aristoteles. Über die Seele / De anima*, xxx–xxxiii.

¹⁶ Hahmann, *Aristoteles' "Über die Seele,"* 22.

¹⁷ Arist. *De an.* 1.1 402a1–4: τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίῳ τὴν εἶδησιν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, μᾶλλον δ' ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ κατ' ἀκρίβειαν ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι' ἀμφοτέρω ταῦτα τὴν περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθεῖμεν; Aristotle, *Metaph.* 1.1 980a21: πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει; Aristotle, *Ph.* 1.1. 184a10–16: ἐπειδὴ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι συμβαίνει περὶ πάσας τὰς μεθόδους, ὧν εἰσὶν ἀρχαὶ ἢ αἰτία ἢ στοιχεῖα, ἐκ τοῦ ταῦτα γνωρίζειν (τότε γὰρ οἰόμεθα γινώσκειν ἕκαστον, ὅταν τὰ αἰτιαγνωρίσωμεν τὰ πρῶτα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς τὰς πρῶτας καὶ μέχρι τῶν στοιχείων), δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῆς περὶ φύσεως ἐπιστήμης πειρατέον διορίσασθαι πρῶτον τὰ περὶ τὰς ἀρχάς.

¹⁸ Corcilius, *Aristoteles: Über die Seele / De anima*, xiii–xxviii.

the expression of Aristotle's metaphysics of living beings;¹⁹ however, it is also telling for Heidegger's philosophical agenda in the early 1920s.

Thomas Schwarz Wentzer has recently argued that Heidegger's examination of Aristotle's *De Anima* represents a central step toward a correct understanding of human beings and, consequently, toward the conception of a phenomenologically grounded ontology. Focusing specifically on the *Phenomenological Introduction to Aristotle*²⁰ and several lecture series held by Heidegger in the early 1920s, Schwarz Wentzer shows how specific passages from *De Anima* (in particular, 2.8 420b16-22)²¹ may have played a role in Heidegger's description of the interconnectedness of speech and sociality as characteristics of Dasein.²² Indeed, such an influence might well be explained "philologically" by referring to Heidegger's approach to *De Anima* in the summer semester seminar of 1921. By placing *De Anima* within the context of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and *Physics*, a context that is almost requested by the text itself, Heidegger can unfold his ontological interests and stress the ontological significance of this work in terms of phenomenological hermeneutics.

The overall structure of the seminar mirrors this interest. A superficial overview of its content shows that almost half of the seminar (or, more precisely, half of Weiss's notes and a predominant part of Becker's) is dedicated to an investigation of the concept of οὐσία and *Metaphysics Z*, while the other half develops an analysis of book 2 of *De Anima* based on the previous examination of *Metaphysics*. In the following section, I will turn my attention to these two points.

HEIDEGGER'S "PHILOLOGICAL" APPROACH TO *DE ANIMA*

Heidegger's actual starting point in his examination of *De Anima* is the discussion in chapter 1 regarding the adequate method for an inquiry into the "nature" of the soul. The transcripts suggest that he offered a highly simplified reconstruction of Aristotle's line of argument. Instead of stressing the exploratory character of Aristotle's reasoning in this opening chapter,²³ Heidegger focuses schematically on the three disciplines – φυσική, μαθηματική, and διαλεκτική – that potentially offer a viable scientific approach to the question of the τὸ τί ἐστὶ of the soul. Rightly, Heidegger underlines that the question about the method in *De Anima* is essentially tied to the question about the definition of the soul.²⁴

¹⁹ See Corcilius, *Aristoteles: Über die Seele / De anima*, xx.

²⁰ GA 62 = Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik. Anhang: Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation). Ausarbeitung für die Marburger und die Göttinger Philosophische Fakultät*, ed. Günther Neumann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2005).

²¹ "For nature at that point makes use of the inhaled air for two functions, just as it uses the tongue for both taste and articulation. Of these, taste is the necessary one (for which reason it also belongs to more animals), while the power of speech is for the sake of well-being (ἢ δ' ἐρμηνεία ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ). In the same way, nature uses breath both for internal heating, since, for a reason to be stated elsewhere, that is necessary, and also for the voice, so that one may attain well-being (καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνὴν ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ τὸ εὖ)" (trans. Christopher Shields).

²² Schwarz Wentzer, "Speaking Being," 82-87. For a detailed analysis of Heidegger's approach to the relationship between logos and being in the 1921 seminar, see also Gonzalez, "The Birth of *Being and Time*," 221-23.

²³ On Aristotle's exploratory style, see Philip van der Eijk, "Arrangement and Exploratory Discourse in the *Parva Naturalia*," in *Reading Aristotle*, ed. William Wians and Ronald Polansky (Leiden: Brill, 2017), 181-214.

²⁴ Cf. Aristotle, *De an.* 1.1 402a11-22: "The general form of inquiry being common to many other areas – I mean inquiry concerning essence and what something is – perhaps it might seem to someone that there is some one method for all of the objects of inquiry whose essence we wish to ascertain, just as there is a single method of

In particular, he goes back to the programmatic statement in *De Anima* that Aristotle's primary scientific aim is to "consider and ascertain its [i.e., the soul's] nature and *ousia*" (θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνῶναι τὴν τε φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, 402a7-8). In this context, Heidegger uses *Metaphysics Z* to offer a detailed and (in his eyes) precise definition of οὐσία. I will not delve here into the complexities and problems of this definition. Suffice it to say that Heidegger's interpretation of οὐσία is more reflective of his own existentialist/phenomenological/ontological method and interests than of an accurate historical and philological understanding of this concept. Indeed, by connecting οὐσία with λέγειν and focusing on its etymological meaning, Heidegger proceeds step by step to a definition of οὐσία that is, in the transcripts of the seminar, still somewhat "foggy," albeit not very far from the pregnant definition he gives in the lectures on Plato's *Sophist*.²⁵ On the contrary, he does not deal with typical philological questions such as the grammatical construction or the resulting interpretation of the syntagma τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι in *Metaphysics Z*.²⁶ Nevertheless, his point of departure is a philological one. His remark is correct that οὐσία should not be understood and translated as "substance," as it was (and sometimes still is) common in the scholarly literature on Aristotle. Indeed, many scholars of Aristotle have pointed out in recent years that the translation of οὐσία as "substance" is excessively

demonstration for all the properties co-incident to them, with the result that one would have to inquire what this method is. If, however, there is no single and common method for determining what something is, the task before us becomes more difficult still. For then it will be necessary to lay hold of the way for each area individually. And even if the method should be evident, whether it is demonstration or division or even some other method, the question of where one ought to begin our inquiry already involves many difficulties and quandaries, for different fields have different starting points, just as for example the fields of numbers and planes do" (trans. Christopher Shields).

²⁵ GA 19 = Martin Heidegger, *Platon: Sophistes*, ed. Ingeborg Schübler (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992). See especially, GA 19, 466-67 [323]: "The question of the meaning of *ousia* itself is not alive for the Greeks as an ontological theme; instead they always ask only: which beings genuinely satisfy the meaning of Being and which ontological characters result thereby? The meaning of Being itself remains unquestioned. This does not imply, however, that the Greeks had no concept of Being. For without one the question of what satisfies the meaning of Being would be groundless and without direction. It is precisely the fact that the Greeks did not ask about the meaning of Being which testifies that this meaning of Being was obvious to them. It was something obvious and not further interrogated. This meaning of Being does not naturally lie in the light of the day but instead can be understood explicitly only by means of a subsequent interpretation. The meaning of Being implicitly guiding this ontology is Being = presence. The Greeks did not get this meaning of Being from just anywhere, they did not just invent it, but rather it is the one borne by life itself, by factual *Dasein*, insofar as all human *Dasein* is interpretative, interprets itself as well as everything that is a being in whatever sense. In this interpretation there is operative an implicit sense of Being. And indeed the Greeks drew their implicit sense of Being out of the natural immediate interpretation of Being by factual *Dasein*, where Being means to be there already at the very outset as possession, household, property [*Anwesen*] – put more sharply: as presence [*Anwesenheit*]. We will make use of this meaning of Being (which we ourselves first make visible, although of course we cannot discuss it further in this context), namely Being = presence, because it includes the whole problem of time and consequently the problem of the ontology of *Dasein*."

²⁶ See Gonzalez's edition p. 42-59 (and his translation p. 74-91). On the possible interpretation of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, see, e.g., Hermann Weidemann, "Zum Begriff des *ti ên einai* und zum Verständnis von *Met. Z 4*, 1029b22-1030a6," in *Aristoteles: Metaphysik. Die Substanzbücher (Z, H, Θ)*, ed. Christof Rapp (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), 75-103. For the debate about the connection between οὐσία and τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (substance and essence) in Aristotle, see also David Charles, *Aristotle on Meaning and Essence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); Norman O. Dahl, *Substance in Aristotle's Metaphysics Z* (Cham: Palgrave MacMillan, 2019); Michael W. Wedin, *Aristotle's Theory of Substance: The Categories and Metaphysics Z* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Charlotte Witt, *Substance and Essence in Aristotle: An Interpretation of "Metaphysics" VII-IX* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2018).

influenced by Aristotle's examination of οὐσία in *Categories*. For example, Christof Rapp argues that

οὐσία is the expression for what is usually called “substance.” It is a word-formation that goes back to the participle of the verb εἶναι, “being,” for which we have no literal equivalent. The decisive disadvantage of the common translation “substance” is that a specific conception of οὐσία is associated with it – namely, that of *Categories*. According to this conception, the distinct single thing as the carrier of changing properties is the actual substance. This association must be refrained from for an unbiased interpretation of οὐσία in *Metaphysics*. ... Aristotle uses the expression οὐσία in two different ways: On the one hand, it is used as a concrete noun, which can typically also present a plural form (οὐσίαι ...), on the other hand, οὐσία serves as a so-called “double-digit” predicate and means the substance of a thing (οὐσία τινός).²⁷

As noted earlier, Heidegger's analysis of οὐσία in the seminar does not examine routine philological details. However, we can see here how he uses a “real” philological problem – namely, the question of the actual meaning and possible translation of a Greek term – to develop his interpretation of metaphysics. Nevertheless, his approach is not arbitrary as some scholars claim.²⁸ On the contrary, as Francisco Gonzalez has recently argued, Heidegger's procedure is “fully justified in claiming that ‘speaking [λέγειν] is the fundamental phenomenon from which Aristotle arrives at being [οὐσία].’”²⁹ Gonzalez rightly points out that Heidegger takes Aristotle's definition of the soul in *De Anima* 2.1 412b10-11 as a point of departure for his examination of οὐσία. Here, the Stagirite states, “it has been said in general what the soul is: the soul is a substance corresponding to the account” (καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή· οὐσία γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον; trans. Shields). Heidegger intentionally omits the definitional character of the passage, which is restricted to determining the nature of the soul. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that Aristotle's claim may have a generalized extension, enabling it to apply to every being, not only to the soul. This is precisely what Heidegger's interpretation suggests. There is yet another aspect that seems to imply that his interpretation of οὐσία goes back to an additional philological matter. Reporting on Heidegger's syllabus-like remarks, Weiss notes that he suggested that Aristotle's *Categories* may not be authentic. By doing this, Heidegger at least mentions an opinion that was common in the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth.³⁰ Unfortunately, he does not elaborate on this point in the

²⁷ Christof Rapp, “Einleitung: Die Substanzbücher der Metaphysik,” in *Aristoteles: Metaphysik. Die Substanzbücher (Z, H, Θ)*, ed. Christof Rapp (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1996), 8 (my translation). Similarly, Corcilius, *Aristoteles: Über die Seele / De anima*, lxxix; Dahl, *Substance in Aristotle*, 5-6; Shields translates οὐσία at the beginning of *De anima* with “essence.”

²⁸ See above, notes 1 and 5.

²⁹ Gonzalez, “The Birth of *Being and Time*,” 220. For a detailed analysis of Heidegger's analysis of οὐσία in this seminar, see *ibid.*, 219-26.

³⁰ Cf., e.g., Werner Jaeger, *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung 1923), 45. Their authenticity is nowadays generally accepted. See, e.g., Michael Frede, “Titel,

seminar, and *Categories* does not seem to play a major role in his approach to Aristotle in general. Significantly, it is on Aristotle's *Categories* that the narrow understanding of οὐσία as "substance" rests. Consequently, it may be possible, though not conclusively verifiable, that Heidegger's qualms with the translation of "substance" were motivated not only by his etymological observation of the term itself or by his philosophical interests but also by his (unproven) rejection of *Categories* as genuinely Aristotelian.

The second aspect on which I would like to focus is Heidegger's examination of *De Anima*, book 2. His analysis is deeply influenced by his explanation of οὐσία and its connection to λόγος and λέγειν. Moreover, he (again) focuses only on those aspects that seem to be relevant to his own philosophical system. For example, he claims that δύναμις in Aristotle represents the equivalent of the modern psychological concept of "I" (Weiss's transcript page 13; Becker's transcript page 27). By doing this – and by explicitly remarking that with δύναμις Aristotle gives an "objectified" representation of "all modes of being" – Heidegger paves the way for his analysis of the *Seinsfrage*, which he also brings up, though concisely, in his examination of *De Anima* 2.4.³¹

His discussion of a few philological aspects is nonetheless interesting as it shows how he dialogues (or rather disputes) with other German philologists. For instance, he remarks on 413b2-3 that "[t]he plant has its genuine living in nourishing itself; what is proper in constituting an animal is αἴσθησις. 413b therefore πρώτως not = begins, but rather = proper" (Weiss's transcript page 12). Gonzalez comments in his editor's note 46 that "[t]he reference is to 413b2: τὸ δὲ ζῶον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως. Heidegger's point is that this means not 'The animal begins with perception' but rather 'the animal is properly what it is through perception.'" Heidegger's observation that πρώτως in this context means "properly" rather than "first" might seem gratuitous today for anglophone scholars. After all, we can find a similar remark in Robert Drew Hicks's edition, with a translation and commentary of *De Anima*, which was published in 1907 in Cambridge. Hicks writes as follows: "πρώτως, 'primarily' or 'fundamentally'; the adverb used in the same sense as the adjective in the definition of the soul as ἐντελέχεια ἢ πρώτη σώματος."³² Further, most contemporary translations of the passage tend to uphold the blurriness of the Greek text, though they lean on an interpretation similar to that of Hicks.³³ However,

Einheit und Echtheit der aristotelischen Kategorienschrift," in *Zweifelhaftes im Corpus Aristotelicum. Studien zu einigen Dubia*, ed. Jürgen Wiesner (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1983), 1-29; Lambert Marie de Rijk, "The Authenticity of Aristotle's *Categories*," *Mnemosyne* 4, no. 2 (1951): 129-59.

³¹ Weiss's transcript page 15 (trans. Gonzalez): "εἶναι here = being constituted, being such, but not mere being-there [*Dasein*], existing. Much more a being-there-in-such-a-way [*Sodasein*]. Every mode of being-there has a 'such,' and this 'such' lies in 'what it is.' In the 'what' lies the mode of being. Accordingly, οὐσία is the αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι."; cf. Becker's transcript page 27, on 415b12ff. See extensively on this Gonzalez, "The Birth of *Being and Time*," 226-29.

³² Robert Drew Hicks, *Aristotle: De Anima*. With Translation, Introduction and Notes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907), 325 *ad loc.*

³³ Cf. the following translations: "das Lebewesen ist aber primär durch die Sinneswahrnehmung 'bestimmt'" (Aristoteles, *Über die Seele*. Griechisch-Deutsch. Mit Einleitung, Übersetzung [nach W. Theiler] und Kommentar herausgegeben von Horst Seidl [Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1995]); "für das Tier aber ist dies [*scil.* das Lebensprinzip bzw. die Seele] primär das Wahrnehmungsvermögen" (Aristoteles, *Über die Seele*. Griechisch/Deutsch, übersetzt und herausgegeben von Gernot Krappinger [Stuttgart: Reclam, 2011]); "but it is because of sense-perception first of all that they will be animal" (Aristotle's *De anima: Books II and III*, with certain passages from book I, translated with introduction and notes by David W. Hamlyn [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978]); "tandis que l'animal n'est

Heidegger is working in his seminar with a specific German translation – namely, that by Adolf Busse.³⁴ Busse, a classical scholar who studied in Berlin under Adolf Kirchhoff, Johannes Vahlen, and, above all, Eduard Zeller,³⁵ renders the sentence as follows in his 1911 translation of *De Anima*: “das Tier aber beginnt mit der Sinneswahrnehmung.” This translation is similar to that advanced by Edwin Wallace in 1882, who renders the passage, “At the same time the animal strictly so called only begins when we reach sensation.”³⁶ Busse’s translation, as grammatically and semantically correct as it is, is nevertheless surprising and misleading. It is surprising because Busse was involved in the monumental critical edition of the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, for which he prepared nine volumes.³⁷ Nonetheless, he apparently does not consider this tradition in his translation. It is true that none of the volumes he edited dealt with *De Anima*, and it is also true that two of the three extant commentaries on *De Anima* in this series did not delve into a thorough examination of 413b1-2.³⁸ However, John Philoponus’s commentary examines this passage at length and suggests an interpretation that does not imply any concept of “beginning”:

413b2-5 But animal [belongs] in the first instance because of sense. [For indeed things which are not changed and do not shift their place, but which

constitué primitivement que par la sensation” (Aristote, *De l'ame*. Texte établi par Antonio Jannone, Traduction et notes de Edmond Barbotin [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1966]).

³⁴ Adolf Busse, *Aristoteles: Über die Seele* (Leipzig: Meiner, 1911; 2. durchgesehene Auflage: Leipzig 1922). At least I assume he is working with this translation based on the list of editions and German translations of Aristotle’s oeuvre that he offers at the beginning of his lecture published as *Phenomenological Interpretations of Selected Works of Aristotle on Ontology and Logic* (GA 62, 1-3).

³⁵ Cf. “Letter from Hermann Diels to Hermann Usener dated September 30, 1887,” in Dietrich Ehlers, *Diels – Usener – Zeller: Briefwechsel*, vol. 1 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992), 364; “Letter from Hermann Diels to Eduard Zeller dated February 2, 1881,” in Dietrich Ehlers, *Diels – Usener – Zeller: Briefwechsel*, vol. 2 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992), 46.

³⁶ Both Wallace and Busse oppose older English or German translations that render the passage in a way similar to Heidegger’s interpretation or to modern translations. Cf., e.g., Charles Collier, *Aristotle on the Vital Principle* (Cambridge: Macmillan, 1855): “but an animal is characterized above all by sensibility”; Christian Hermann Weisse, *Aristoteles von der Seele und von der Welt*, übersetzt und mit Anmerkungen begleitet (Leipzig: Barth, 1829): “Das Thier aber ist dieses zuerst durch die Empfindung”; Julius Hermann von Kirchmann, *Aristoteles drei Bücher über die Seele* (Berlin: Heimann, 1871): “dagegen ist das Thier es zunächst durch das Wahrnehmen.”

³⁷ CAG 4,1 = *Porphirii isagoge et in Aristotelis categorias commentarium* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1887); CAG 4,2 = *Dexippi in Aristotelis categorias commentarium* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1888); CAG 4,3 = *Ammonius: In Porphyrii isagogen sive V voces* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1891); CAG 4,4 = *Ammonius: In Aristotelis categorias commentarius* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1895); CAG 4,5 = *Ammonius: In Aristotelis de interpretatione commentarius* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1897); CAG 12,1 = *Olympiodori prolegomena et in categorias commentarium* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1902); CAG 13,1 = *Ioannis Philoponi (olim Ammonii) in Aristotelis categorias commentarium* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1898); CAG 18,1 = *Eliae in Porphyrii Isagogen et Aristotelis Categorias commentaria* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1900); CAG 18,2 = *Davidis prolegomena et in Porphyrii Isagogen commentarium* (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1904).

³⁸ Cf. *Themistii in libros Aristotelis De anima paraphrasis*, ed. Richard Heinze (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1899 = CAG 5,3), 44,26-28: τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῶον διὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν πρῶτως. καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα κατὰ τόπον...; *Simplicii in libros Aristotelis De anima commentaria*, ed. Michael Hayduck (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1882 = CAG 11), 100,6-11: 413b1 Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσι. Οὐχ ἀπλῶς τὸ ὅπως οὖν ζῆν (ἦν γὰρ καὶ τὸ κατὰ νοῦν καὶ κατ’ αἴσθησιν ζῆν), ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀντιδιαρούμενον πρὸς τὸ ζῶον, τουτέστι τὸ ἀτελῶς καὶ ἡ ἐσχάτη ζωή. ἀντιδιαρεῖ γὰρ λέγων τὸ μὲν ζῆν διὰ ταύτην, τὸ δὲ ζῶον διὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν πρῶτως. (For the purpose of this paper, it is irrelevant whether the commentary is by Simplicius or spurious.)

have sense, are said by us to be animals and not just alive. Of sense, what belongs first to all is touch.]

Just as living things are characterized by the nutritive power, so also animals are by the perceiving, so that those which share only in this, even if they share in none of those that are superior, are called animals. And he says that those things first share in the senses that share in touch. That is why if something shares only in it, it is said not only to live but to be an animal, because animal is characterized by sense; the so-called zoophytes are like this, such as sponges, for these share in touch alone. And they are called “zoophytes” because they are animals through sharing in sense, but they have [the feature] of plants that they do not change from place to place. Or rather even in this respect they have something of animals, and not even this do they have altogether like plants. For they change their places in parts, contracting and stretching out. (Trans. W. Charlton)³⁹

Similarly, Alexander of Aphrodisias offers an even more radical reading of *De anima* 413b2 in his treatise *De Anima*.⁴⁰

Even more surprisingly, Busse does not take into consideration any other tradition, since an interpretation similar to that advanced by Philoponus is also found in Thomas Aquinas's *Sentencia libri De Anima*.⁴¹ If we take into account the late antique and medieval interpretations, we realize how misleading Busse's translation is. Indeed, the translation of *πρώτως* as “beginning” seems to imply a “chronological succession” of the stages of beings or a noncontinuous *scala naturae* that would contradict the Aristotelian principle that *natura non facit saltus*. Heidegger's interpretation and those translations that either retain the “vagueness” of the Greek original or interpret it as “fundamental” are, on the contrary, in line with an understanding of the Aristotelian *scala naturae* as an uninterrupted ladder insofar as they pinpoint that sense perception is the essential characteristic of animals, as opposed to plants whose essential characteristic is the nutritive faculty. Thus, Heidegger's remarks on the meaning of *πρώτως* underpin a more fitting and philologically

³⁹ *Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis De anima libros commentaria*, ed. Michael Hayduck (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1897 = CAG 15), 235,25-236,2: 413b2 Τὸ δὲ ζῶν διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως. Ὡσπερ τὰ ζῶντα κατὰ τὴν θρεπτικὴν δύναμιν χαρακτηρίζεται, οὕτω καὶ τὰ ζῶα κατὰ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν· ὥστε τὰ μόνης ταύτης μετέχοντα, κἂν μηδεμιᾶς ἄλλης τῶν ὑπερτέρων μετέχη, ζῶα λέγεται. πρώτως δὲ μετέχειν τῶν αἰσθήσεών φησι τὰ μετέχοντα τῆς ἀφῆς. διὸ κἂν αὐτῆς μόνης μετέχοι τι, οὐ μόνον ζῆν λέγεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῶον εἶναι, διότι τῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ ζῶον χαρακτηρίζεται, οἷά ἐστι τὰ ζῶοντα καλούμενα, οἷον οἱ σπόγγοι· μόνης γὰρ ἀφῆς οὗτοι μετέχουσιν· ἄπερ ζῶοντα ἐκλήθη, διότι ζῶα μὲν ἐστί παρὰ τὸ αἰσθήσεως μετέχειν, φυτῶν δὲ ἔχει τὸ μὴ ἀμείβειν τόπον ἐκ τόπου. μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ κατὰ αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἔχει τι τῶν ζῶων, καὶ οὐδὲ τοῦτο καθάπαξ τῶν φυτῶν ἔχει· ἀμείβει γὰρ κατὰ μόρια τοὺς τόπους συσσελλόμενα καὶ ἐκτενόμενα.

⁴⁰ Alex. Aphr. *De an.* 29,14-16 Bruns: ὅσα δὲ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ἔχει (ταῦτα δὲ ἐστί τὰ ζῶα· ταύτη γὰρ τῇ δυνάμει τὸ ζῶον ὀρίζεται), ταῦτα ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔχει καὶ τὴν θρεπτικὴν.

⁴¹ *Sancti Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII P.M. edita. Tomus XLV,1: Sentencia libri de anima, cura et studio fratrum preaedicatorum* (Rome: Commissio Leonina; Paris: J. Vrin, 1984), 80: *Deinde cum dicit: Animal autem propter sensum primum etc., manifestat quomodo anima est principium uiuendi in animalibus. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo dicit quod primum dicitur aliquid esse animal propter sensum, licet animalis quedam et senciant et moueantur. Ea enim dicimus esse animalia, et non solum uiuere, que, licet non mutent locum, tamen habent sensum.*

sound interpretation of the Aristotelian text compared to the then-contemporary German translation of *De Anima*.

Another point I would like to draw attention to is Heidegger's comments on Aristotle's analysis of αἴσθησις and πάσχειν in *De Anima* 2.5 – that is, the conclusion of the seminar.⁴² Heidegger's remarks on this chapter must be understood in light of his more general interpretation of αἴσθησις. In the (presumably) last class of the seminar, he argues that Aristotle's examination of αἴσθησις in *De Anima* is not concerned with a theory of knowledge. Such a claim is at least partially incorrect. Indeed, Aristotle also speaks in *De Anima* 2.5 of knowledge (ἐπιστήμη), addresses the difference between perception and contemplation (τὸ κατ' ἐνέργειαν αἰσθάνεσθαι; θεωρεῖν), and mentions explicitly the sciences that deal with perceived objects (ταῖς ἐπιστήμασι ταῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν, 417a21-417b29). But Heidegger suggests that the Stagirite considers αἴσθησις in this context as “a determinate mode of ζῆν” – that is, “a determinate mode of being” (Weiss's transcript page 16; Becker's transcript page 29). However, such an understanding enables Aristotle, or so Heidegger appears to imply, to introduce the concept of πάσχειν in αἴσθησις. Here, Heidegger focuses inter alia on the precise meaning of πάσχειν and stresses the importance of Aristotle's conclusion about αἴσθησις at the end of 2.5. Thus, he first highlights the intrinsic “ambiguity” of πάσχειν and, following Aristotle's explanations in *De Anima* 417b2-5, connects it with the concepts of ὁμοιον/ἀνόμοιον on the one hand and φθορά and σωτηρία on the other.⁴³ Heidegger's – or, more precisely, Weiss's schematic presentation of Heidegger's – reconstruction is intricate. Francisco Gonzalez recognizes a slight discrepancy between the explanations on φθορά and σωτηρία offered on July 19 and those presented on July 26.⁴⁴ Nonetheless, such a divergence is, in my opinion, nonexistent. Weiss's notes of July 19 report the following schema:

πάσχειν = (1) φθορά † τις and (2) σωτηρία

Regarding (1): When one thing is worked upon by something different, it is no longer what it was.

(2) It is at the same time something that has suffered and experienced; the ὁμοιον remains. (Weiss's transcript page 15, trans. Gonzalez)

Heidegger thus explains the difference between two forms of πάσχειν. In the following class, on July 26, he clarifies further:

Aristotle first speaks generally of happening, then more specifically of πάσχειν. ὁμοιον and ἀνόμοιον, in relation to the two [processes]. They are indeed alike, {earlier} unlike in relation to working upon each other: the one is in motion, the other is unmoved; after the happening, the unmoved

⁴² As Gonzalez in his editor's note 65 (p. 118) convincingly argues.

⁴³ “Nor is being affected unqualified. Rather, in one way it is a kind of destruction by a contrary, and in another way it is rather a preservation of what is in potentiality by what is in actuality, and of what is like something in the way potentiality is in relation to actuality” (οὐκ ἔστι δ' ἀπλοῦν οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου οὕτως ὡς δυνάμεις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν [trans. Christopher Shields]).

⁴⁴ Gonzalez, editor's note 54 (p. 116).

What makes Heidegger's explanations particularly intricate, apart from the fact that they are necessarily abridged through Weiss's notes, is that he does not seem to elaborate on Aristotle's distinction between potential and actual sensation, which is indispensable for a correct understanding of *De Anima* 2.5. If we apply this distinction, we can understand and explain Aristotle's observations. From the point of view of its potentiality, sense perception begins within the body as a "suffering" caused by the effect of the ἀνόμοιον (unlike), but in its actuality sense perception is a perception of the ὅμοιον (like) in the soul. Thus, the state of perception changes. Conversely, there is no sense perception if this process (bodily influence of the ἀνόμοιον, which initiates a change within the soul into the ὅμοιον) is not completed. Similarly, Aristotle distinguishes two forms of suffering. In the first case, suffering is the deterioration of the condition of something under the influence of an opposing factor (φθορά); in the second case, suffering is the preservation (or even the strengthening) of the condition of a thing through the influence of something that helps it achieve its specific performance or mode of action.⁴⁵ However, such an understanding of the Aristotelian passage is, I think, implicit in Heidegger's remarks when he claims, first, that "ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον must be present in both cases" and, second, that πάσχειν as σωτηρία is both suffering and experiencing at the same time. These comments suggest that Heidegger's comprehension of Aristotle's text reflects the distinction between potentiality and actuality, although, apart from the short remarks on δύναμις ὄν – or δύναμις – and ἐνεργεῖν, he does not discuss it explicitly. This is confirmed in Becker's sparse notes from this class, where he reports a clear explanation of how we should understand the "interaction" of ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον: "Before the happening, they are both unlike, during the happening one drags the other with it, after the happening they are both alike" (Becker's transcript page 29, trans. Gonzalez).

Francisco Gonzalez rightly notes that Heidegger's interest in this passage needs to be explained in terms of his ontological approach. It appears that, thanks to his analysis of *De Anima* 2.5, Heidegger reaches an understanding of being as becoming, which turns out to be pivotal for *Being and Time*.⁴⁶ This becomes evident when we read Heidegger's comments in the last class of the seminar (Weiss's transcript pages 16-18). Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that Heidegger's "creative handling" of this topic is partially based on (or at least coexists with) a philologically sound, though extremely abridged, exegesis.

CONCLUSION

In this brief commentary on Heidegger's 1921 seminar on *De Anima*, I have examined a few aspects of his approach to Aristotle's investigation of the soul. In particular, I have briefly elaborated on some characteristics of Heidegger's didactic method and underscored how difficult it is to reconstruct his analysis of this complex work on the basis of his pupils' notes. At the same time, I have suggested that his approach to the Aristotelian text must be seen inter alia within the context of German scholarship on (and especially translations

⁴⁵ Buchheim, *Aristoteles. De anima – Über die Seele*, 250-51. Cf. also Shields, *Aristotle, De Anima*, 212-21; Hahmann, *Aristoteles' "Über die Seele"*, 111-22.

⁴⁶ Gonzalez, "The Birth of *Being and Time*," 229-33.

of) Aristotle's *De Anima* during the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Furthermore, I have argued that Heidegger's remarks on specific topics – such as the meaning of οὐσία, the interpretation of the *scala naturae*, and the analysis of sense perception in terms of “suffering” – are, though intricate and difficult to reconstruct, based on solid philological premises and support interpretations that, taken separately, concur with more accurate analyses.

It was beyond my purpose in this paper to investigate the importance of Heidegger's examination of *De Anima* for the development of his philosophy. However, it was sometimes necessary to point out that his analyses and explanations were driven by his philosophical interests. In this regard, it might be useful to consider Heidegger's 1955 lecture *What Is Philosophy?* (GA 11, 3-10). Toward the end of his reflections, he provides an explanation of the extent to which a philosophizing answer to the question “what is philosophy” is possible. By doing so, he describes his approach to philosophy and its history as follows:

When do we philosophize? Obviously only when we enter into a discussion with philosophers. This implies that we talk through with them that about which they speak. This mutual talking through of what always anew peculiarly concerns philosophers as being the Same, that is talking, λέγειν, in the sense of διαλέγεσθαι [conversing], is talking as dialogue. If and when dialogue is necessarily dialectic, we leave open. It is one thing to describe and determine the opinion of philosophers. It is an entirely different thing to talk through with them what they are saying, and that means, that of which they speak. Thus, if we assume that the Being of being addresses itself to philosophers to the extent that they state what being is, in so far as it is, then our discussion with philosophers must also be addressed by the Being of being. We must then ourselves, through our thinking, go to meet philosophy on the path it is traveling. Our speaking must co-respond to that which addresses the philosophers.⁴⁷

From this point of view, the seminar on *De Anima* is a further piece of evidence of Heidegger's overall approach to philosophy in general and ancient philosophy in particular. Indeed, it displays perfectly how his “dialogue” with ancient texts develops and works.

⁴⁷ Martin Heidegger, *Was ist das – die Philosophie?* (Pfullingen: Günther Neske, 1956); *What Is Philosophy?*, trans. and intro. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), 66-69.

COMMENTARY ON HELENE WEISS'S NOTES ON HEIDEGGER'S 1921 SUMMER SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE

ON HELENE WEISS

The notes discussed in the following essay are the result of an accumulation of individual and collective efforts. Directly, they are the product of Helene Weiss's labors; and indirectly, those not only of the seminar leader, Martin Heidegger, but also of Weiss's classmates, with whom Weiss collaborated in order to cultivate a record of the seminar; of Weiss's nephew Ernst Tugendhat, to whom Weiss entrusted the notes after her death; of Thomas Sheehan, who ensured their preservation in a university archive; and now of Francisco Gonzalez, who has transcribed them and translated them into English for broader dissemination.

The details of Helene Weiss's life are somewhat difficult to establish. According to a public genealogical profile, she was born in 1898 and died in 1951. She was never married and never had any children. She appears to have begun her studies with Heidegger at Freiburg in 1920 or thereabouts, and it is possible she followed Heidegger to Marburg in 1923 and returned to Freiburg with him in 1928. Weiss began her doctoral studies in 1930 in Freiburg and completed her dissertation in 1934. Heidegger rejected it. Weiss instead received her doctorate in Basel.¹

Psychologist Miriam Lewin,² Weiss's niece, and philosopher Ernst Tugendhat,³ Weiss's nephew, have both separately offered the same explanation for the move to Basel:

¹ Her dissertation is published as Helene Weiss, *Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles* (Basel: Haus zum Falken, 1942).

² Miriam Lewin, letter to the editor, *New York Times Book Review*, February 11, 1990, <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/11/books/1-heidegger-for-fun-and-profit-830790.html>, which reads in full:

My aunt Helene Weiss was one of Heidegger's students whose whole life was affected by his anti-Jewish prejudice. Heidegger accepted her as his doctoral student, but when she completed her Ph.D. dissertation under him, he refused it and forced her to leave the university without any degree. He shamelessly admitted that only her Jewish birth caused him to reject her thesis.

She managed to escape from Germany before Hitler took power and to enter England. There she discovered that without credentials she could not be employed in her field. She was forced to make her living selling pots and pans door-to-door, and she died in England at a rather young age.

³ See Victor Fariás, preface to *Lógica: Lecciones de M. Heidegger*, trans. V. Fariás (Madrid: Anthropos, 1991), XVIIIn8, and in particular the reference to Ernst Tugendhat, interview on Radio Suisse-Romande, 9/29/1989, in which Tugendhat evidently claims Weiss was rejected "because she was Jewish" (*weil sie Jüdin war*).

Heidegger rejected Weiss's thesis because she was Jewish. In the *Der Spiegel* interview (fifteen years after Weiss's death), Heidegger praises Weiss as one of his "most gifted students" and in the way of explaining her relocation to Basel says only that "continued study at Freiburg became impossible" for her. (He does not say why.) He then cites Weiss's acknowledged debt to Heidegger and shows his interviewer a signed copy of her thesis as evidence of a friendship.⁴ Weiss's niece Lewin claims that, after being compelled to leave Freiburg and lacking teaching credentials, Weiss "was forced to make her living selling pots and pans door-to-door."⁵

After Basel, Weiss's arc is obscure. Articles published by her between 1938 and 1948⁶ have her associated with the University of Cambridge, and various sources report her having obtained a teaching position at the University of Glasgow at some point. Weiss's niece places her in England. Heidegger places her in Scotland (euphemistically claiming she had "emigrated" there) and adds that he "visited Dr. Weiss several times in Brussels [*sic*] before her death."⁷ Weiss died in Basel in 1951.

Weiss's dissertation was on causality and chance (τυχή) in Aristotle. At one point in her notes on Heidegger's lectures, Weiss writes (in pencil), above a note summarizing a reference to *Metaphysics* VII.7, 1032a13, the single word τυχή, "chance" (AW 10). It doesn't appear in that particular passage in Aristotle, and Becker records a reference to the expression ἄν'αυτομάτου, "spontaneously," which does occur there (AB 24). Weiss's note, of course, is not a "mistake." More likely, it is the product of a young scholar transfixed by a certain problem in Aristotle and who, like the proverbial hammer, everywhere sees a nail. In that way, it serves as a gentle reminder that the notes that come down to us are not simply impure traces of Heidegger's thinking, any more than they are of Aristotle's, but a record of Weiss's own interests and questions, of the early development of Weiss's own philosophical project.

Weiss was twenty-three in 1921, when the seminar occurred. The oldest of her classmates, Oskar Becker, was thirty-one, the same age as Heidegger. Hans Jonas, the youngest participant, was eighteen. It was summer, precisely one hundred years ago.

* * *

⁴ Martin Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us," trans. W.J. Richardson, in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. T. Sheehan (Chicago, IL: Precedent, 1981), 50: "One of my oldest and most gifted students, Helene Weiss, who later emigrated to Scotland, took her degree in Basel (after continued study at Freiburg became impossible) with a work on *Causality and Chance in the Philosophy of Aristotle* (Basel, 1942). At the end of the foreword, the author writes: 'The attempt at a phenomenological interpretation that we present here in Part I owes its possibility to M. Heidegger's unpublished interpretation of Greek philosophy.' You see here a copy with a dedication of the author. I visited Dr. Weiss several times in Brussels before her death."

⁵ Lewin, letter to the editor.

⁶ Weiss is the author of "Aristotle's Teleology and Uexküll's Theory of Living Nature," *Classical Quarterly* 42, no. 1-2 (1948): 44-58; "Notes on the Greek Ideas Referred to in van Helmont, *De Tempore*," *Osiris* 8 (1948): 418-49; "An Interpretive Note on a Passage in Plotinus' On Eternity and Time (III.7.6)," *Classical Philology* 36, no. 3 (1941): 230-39; "The Greek Conceptions of Time and Being in the Light of Heidegger's Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 2, no. 2 (1941): 173-87; and "Democritus' Theory of Cognition," *Classical Quarterly* 2, no. 1 (1938): 47-56.

⁷ Heidegger, "Only a God Can Save Us," 50.

I. INTRODUCTION

My goal here is to tease out what seem to me the main interpretive gestures of Heidegger's 1921 Aristotle seminar from an Aristotelian perspective. By "an Aristotelian perspective," I don't mean any particular set of philosophical or interpretive commitments but a perspective shaped most of all by the reading of Aristotle and susceptible to provocation where novel avenues for interpreting the Aristotelian texts present themselves. I highlight what seem to me the sorts of things noticeable to a reader of Aristotle eager to improve their understanding of Aristotle. In one instance, I follow out a line of interpretation based on an association that seems to me a compelling one. I make no attempt to connect this seminar to any other seminar of Heidegger's or to any of his published works. Nor do I attempt, in any sustained or focused way, to situate the interpretation of the seminar within the larger tapestry of historical schools of Aristotelian interpretation or within the more local network of contemporary scandals in Aristotelian interpretation.

II. THE PLAN FOR THE SEMINAR

The plan for the seminar, as recorded by Weiss,⁸ includes relatively little direct discussion of *De Anima*. Heidegger evidently envisions discussions, in sequence, of the following (AW 1):

1. *Metaphysics* VII (on οὐσία);
2. *Metaphysics* V (Aristotle's so-called "philosophical lexicon" and a natural place to go for making sense of certain key terminology);
3. *Metaphysics* III (a book outlining certain "problems" intended to be resolved in the remainder of *Metaphysics*);
4. *Metaphysics* XIII (a book on form and mathematics in Plato);
 1. *De Anima* II and III;
 2. *Physics* V-VI and VIII ("on motion," according to the notes).

The lecture goers are also immediately encouraged to "[r]ead all the doctrine of categories in the *Organon*," and to "[p]ay attention to the problem of method."⁹ The plan for the seminar is, in other words, expansive.

Of the texts slated for discussion, only *Metaphysics* VII and *De Anima* I-II are discussed at length. In short, the seminar consists of a discussion of οὐσία¹⁰ followed by a discussion of soul.

⁸ From here on out, I will adopt the natural convention of treating the views expressed in the notes as Heidegger's views, for both the obvious reason (the lectures are Heidegger's) and the reason that Weiss herself takes Heidegger's views as having provided the foundation for hers.

⁹ AW 1. If "pay[ing] attention to the problem of method" means doing so in *Categories*, the reference is at least a little strange, since "method" (μέθοδος) occurs nowhere in *Categories* and *Categories* has nothing like a discussion of method in it. Generally, a question of "method" in Aristotle relates to how something is to be inquired into: whether it is through division, demonstration, induction, or some other way. With the exception of *De interpretatione*, however, every other work in the *Organon* (*APr*, *APo*, *Top.*, *De soph.*) includes at least one sustained discussion of questions of "method." The other possibility is that "the problem of method" refers to the problem as it occurs in *De Anima*, and then the sense is obvious. If I belabor the point here, it is because the possible connection between Heidegger's discussion of "definition" in *Met.* VII and the various uses and discussions of "definition" in Aristotle's logical works is of prime interest.

¹⁰ Although I resist this tendency generally, in this essay I leave οὐσία untranslated. οὐσία is a noun formed from the feminine participle, οὔσα, of the verb εἶναι, "to be," and the abstract suffix -ία. Literally translated,

The planned-for arc is reasonable, however, justified as it is by a question Aristotle raises at the beginning of *De Anima* and never explicitly answers. Aristotle first points out that, although eminently valuable and important, knowledge of soul is extremely difficult to come by. He then notes:

Given that what is being sought out is [a subject] common to many other [fields] – namely, the being [οὐσία] [of something], or what it is [τὸ τί ἐστὶ] – it might seem there would be one method [μέθοδος] for seeking out the being [οὐσία] of everything we want to know, just as demonstration is the method for investigating the unique incidental features of something, so that we would only have to seek this method [μέθοδος] itself [and then employ that method when seeking out the οὐσία of this or that]. But if there is no such common method for seeking out what something is [τὸ τί ἐστὶ], the task we have taken up becomes yet more difficult; for then it is incumbent on us to grasp in each particular case what the way [τρόπος] is [to seek out its οὐσία]. Moreover, even if this [way] were clear, whether it be a demonstration, division, or some other method [μέθοδος], seeking out [the οὐσία of something] from these [methods] would be subject to many impasses and false leads; for starting places [ἀρχαί] are different for different things, such as for numbers and planes. (*DA* I.1, 402a11-22)

A student attempting to understand Aristotle's project as described here could do little better than work through Aristotle's inquiry into the nature of οὐσία from *Metaphysics* VII before returning to consider soul as an instance of this more general concept.¹¹ As the passage above suggests, and as Heidegger also recommends, she would want to be particularly attentive to questions of method, and, in one sense, of how this question becomes challenging if it turns out there is no one method for the discernment of any οὐσία whatsoever.¹² In another sense, however, she would do well to be wary if it turns out there is some single method, since then there will nevertheless follow “many impasses [ἀπορία] and false leads [πλάναι]” in applying it.

οὐσία is “being-ness.” It is morphologically identical to *essentia*. While for historical and scholarly reasons it is customary to translate οὐσία as “substance,” this would obscure the presently relevant relationship between οὐσία and *Sein*; for it is clear from the seminar notes that Heidegger takes οὐσία to mean “being” in a fundamental (or *the* fundamental) sense.

¹¹ Some particular points of contact in the plan deserve perhaps a brief aside. (1) *Met.* V is a natural place to go for making out Aristotle's considered view of precise terminology, such as, for example, his definition of οὐσία in *Met.* V.8. (2) Arguably, many of the questions of *Met.* VII are described in the series of ἀπορία explained in *Met.* III, and, in connection with the prolegomenon to *De Anima*, a question in *Met.* III.3 is particularly relevant: whether it is by distinguishing the various genera of something that we come to know what it is. (3) The allusion at the end of the *DA* I.1 passage cited above to the different principles of numbers and planes (and, later, Aristotle's discussion of the prospects for defining “life” in general) might be an invitation to consider Aristotle's own reasons for rejecting the sort of mathematical monism prevalent in Plato as described in *Met.* XIII.

¹² This, too, would be a reason for supplementing the οὐσία-study of *Met.* V.8 and VII with questions about whether (as Plato thought) there is a single way in which any sort of οὐσία can be grasped, for which *Met.* III's various ἀπορία and *Met.* XIII's discussion of mathematical principles are natural touchstones.

Leaving aside for a moment any further comment on the content of these texts or on the seminar proper, it is worth noting what the plan reveals about Heidegger's approach to reading Aristotle:

1. First, Heidegger treats Aristotle as in some way a systematic thinker. "Systematic" is a pregnant description, and to be simultaneously more precise and more general, we might simply say that Heidegger sees the various parts of the Aristotelian corpus as in some way connected. Whereas another scholar might, for example, blush at running together the various (logical, epistemic, metaphysical, rhetorical, etc.) Aristotelian uses of "definition" (ὀρισμός) – which constitutes one of the central foci of the first half of the seminar – Heidegger evidently has no qualms about reading *Metaphysics* and *De Anima* (and some part of the *Organon*) as if a concept of "definition" were separable from and consistently apparent in these texts. If Aristotle poses a question in *De Anima* about the οὐσία of soul, that is reason enough, evidently, to take up *Metaphysics* VII as a source of insight into the use of οὐσία there. If it is tempting to call these connections "systematic" in nature, that is owing to a perhaps lurking and certainly justifiable temptation to treat certain texts as "definitive" – to treat *Metaphysics* VII as "definitive" or "foundational" on the question of οὐσία, for example. This sort of hierarchical designation, while partially true, is not entirely fair to the spirit of the seminar's main idea.¹³

2. Second, Heidegger treats the Aristotelian texts as immanently meaningful and performative as immanently interpretable. By this I mean that Heidegger takes his clues for the meaning of and connection between the various texts to each other from Aristotle himself. The problems of interest to the investigation of soul as well as to the clarification of οὐσία are all taken from Aristotle. Perhaps most tellingly, there is no attempt to begin by situating Aristotle's discussion of soul in a broader historical trajectory or theoretical designation. In this seminar, very little distracts Heidegger from the task of interpreting Aristotle. For a revealing contrast, consider AW 9, where Heidegger compares his interpretation of Aristotle's criticism of Plato with that of the Marburg school: "The Marburg school charges Aristotle with misunderstanding Plato because [Aristotle did] not [understand Plato] in the manner of 17th[-]century natural science... . [But i]n Aristotle the problem is in fact: [H]ow can the ἕκαστον be a τόδε τι and also at the same time a πρῶτον and ἀπλόως." (Note how the use of Greek expressions rhetorically captures the intended contrast with a more anachronistic interpretation – suggesting Heidegger sees his own view as its contrary.)

III. THE GENERAL APPROACH OF THE SEMINAR

The central question of the seminar is: What is life? What is soul? How do these emerge as questions for philosophy? Heidegger will argue, *in fine*, that for Aristotle the central questions of philosophy have to do with being (οὐσία), so that life is inquired into as a being – that is, in terms of soul. He will argue, in particular, that for Aristotle being comes to light in the context of certain experiences and that the structure of these experiences is to be

¹³ In particular, as we shall see, although in many ways answers to questions about οὐσία are lifted from *Met.* VII and dropped into *De Anima*, Heidegger also sees the question of οὐσία as touching on certain fundamental questions of experience, the elucidation of which requires the "psychology" of *De Anima*.

understood in terms of form (εἶδος) and in two ways: first, as the ontological basis for the being of what is and, second, as the phenomenological basis for the appearance of what is.

While there is much in Heidegger's approach to Aristotle that is in some way "original," it is worth noting that this view is not particularly controversial. In essentials, it is the highly traditional, consensus view that, for Aristotle, things *are* and *are known* by virtue of form. (Or, in a formulation closer to the spirit of the seminar: Things *come to be* and *come to be known* by virtue of form.) Heidegger's foil would be someone having this same basic idea about Aristotle's ontology and psychology but who takes the "logical" accounts of form (such as the formula: definition = genus + differentia) to have no immediate bearing on the "physical" accounts of form (such as the view that sensation "receives" form from sensible objects). On this view, the "logical" and "physical" (not to mention "psychological") accounts perhaps happily meet in the middle, so to speak, but they are philosophical projects of entirely different scope and meaning.

Although this latter view is also fairly traditional, what is relatively original in Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation is his refusal to separate these questions. Form, in Heidegger's interpretation, is always at once a principle governing the being *and* the appearance of what is. Relatedly, inasmuch as it is through form that one gives an account (λόγος) of being (οὐσία), the question of being is always accompanied by and seen through the lens of the question of the saying of being (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) – that is, the question of definition (ὀρισμός).

Heidegger thus reads *Metaphysics* VII, on οὐσία, as not only an ontology of form, where form is the principle that determines the being of what is, but as a phenomenology of form, where form is the principle by means of which we come to assert the being of what is. The refusal to separate form as an ontological principle from form as a phenomenological principle (or form as a principle of judgment from form as a principle of experience) means that Heidegger reads *Metaphysics* VII as both an inquiry into οὐσία as what is and an inquiry into the sort of structure that gives rise to the experience of what is.

This double perspective becomes further complicated in the context of *De Anima*, for there the question is not only about life or soul as an οὐσία having a particular structure and coming into our awareness in a particular way. The question of *De Anima* is also about how the soul, as the "seat" of experience and judgment, affords the sort of experiences that furnish grounds for the apprehension of being and then, further, for the clarification of being through λέγειν, "asserting."

Looking at the question the other way, we find the further challenge that soul, in Aristotle's view, is not susceptible to the same sorts of definitory practices that apply to, say, elephants or quadrilaterals; for soul is not only a sort of being but a "principle of living things" (*DA* I.1, 402a6-7). As a principle, then, it cannot be clarified through definition in the same way as the objects of science or understanding (ἐπιστήμη). Heidegger takes this opening gesture as a "grounding" for the "treatment of the subject" and for the "strictness of the method" (*AW* 1). The notion that the soul is a principle means, Heidegger is emphasizing, that it requires a certain sort of investigation and a certain sort of presentation. In addition to every attendant difficulty of clarifying the relationship of λέγειν and οὐσία, there is the further difficulty of clarifying soul, as well as the experiences that give rise to the emergence of soul as a thing to be clarified.

The question here that seems to me the most compelling and challenging is: What are the experiences giving rise to the view that there is such a thing as “life” in general? How does life, for Aristotle, emerge as a question at all? Perhaps for reasons of time, this question is hardly developed in the 1921 seminar. Taking a clue from a Heideggerian aside, however, I will suggest an answer to this question later.

IV. THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE BIOLOGICAL

The view that questions about the *nature* of what is are inseparable from questions about the *experience* of what is, and about the clarification of what is through λέγειν, perhaps has a more general defense in Aristotle. From the perspective of the specific focus of the seminar, however, it is specifically merited by the attention Aristotle pays at the end of *De Anima* I.1 to how different forms of inquiry correspond with different forms of definition. (Tellingly, the notes from Heidegger’s seminar jump from the opening of *De Anima* I.1, discussed above, to precisely this passage.) Here Aristotle claims that a “physicist,” or student of nature, will define an “affection of soul” in a different way than will a “dialectician,” or student of logic; for the former will include the matter, whereas the latter will not.¹⁴ These ways of viewing “affections of soul” differ, moreover, not only from those of the “mathematician” but also from those of practitioners of the various crafts – for example, the carpenter and the doctor (*DA* I.1, 403b13-14).

Each of these ways of seeing, Heidegger rightly emphasizes, is not for Aristotle simply a different sort of perceptual attitude or orientation of equal justification and standing. Thus, when Aristotle describes the “dialectician” as giving definitions by recourse only to “a thing’s form,” he immediately adds, “But it is necessary that this [form] be in some particular sort of matter [ἐν ἄλλῃ τοιαύτῃ], if it is to be at all” (*DA* I.1, 403b3). If we bear in mind that definitions for Aristotle are intended to convey what something is and why it is what it is, this lack is a serious deficit. For the “dialectician’s” definition lacks the sort of causal accounting that is central to the task of definition. In turn, as Heidegger says of the mathematician, “The mathematician deals with the house in abstraction from the fact that it is a house” (*AW* 2). Only “[t]he first philosopher deals with beings as beings: ὄν ἢ ὄν” (*ibid.*). What this sort of “dealing” would seem to require in the case of soul is an accounting, not only of the οὐσία of soul as form, but of this form as related to a certain matter – that is to say, to a body of a certain sort.

¹⁴ *DA* I.1, 403a25-403b2. Naturally, inasmuch as Aristotle himself is a student both of nature and of logic, these designations are not to be understood in a “vocational” sense. For that reason, the seeming vocational designations should be taken rather to embody certain attitudinal or perspectival dispositions rather than, say, “personalities” or “ways of life.” It is worth noting that this basic Aristotelian tenet alone, which takes knowledge to be irreducibly dispositional, goes a long way toward establishing one of the background suppositions of Heidegger’s Aristotle readings – namely, that Aristotle approached philosophical problems in a phenomenological or quasi-phenomenological way. Given Aristotle’s decidedly normative views about what counts as knowledge of this or that, however, taking Aristotle as a proto-phenomenologist has the inverse benefit of cutting against the grain of a certain recent trend to treat “phenomenology” as equal to self-narrative or mere description of experience. Thus, for example, whereas Husserl defined phenomenology as a “science of the essence of consciousness” and called for an investigation into the “things [matters] themselves,” where this was intended as a clarification of certain fundamental logical and epistemological concepts (see, e.g., *Logical Investigations*, trans. J. N. Findlay [London: Routledge, 1970], 168), a contemporary philosopher such as Dennett supposes that describing the sound of a guitar is what counts as phenomenology (see *Consciousness Explained* [New York: Hachette, 1991], 49).

Behind these distinctions lie Aristotle's broader philosophical commitments – the sort of commitments described earlier in relation to form. Heidegger lays out his sense of these broader commitments in the early sections of the seminar. They include both the “consensus” notion (as I put it) that form is ontologically as well as phenomenologically basic, and the more specific notion that complicates the questions of Aristotelian psychology – namely, that soul is both a thing to be contemplated and the very thing that serves as the seat of contemplation. Important in this regard is that Aristotle places psychology within the domain of “physics” in general and “biology” in particular. Thus, Heidegger holds that:

1. Aristotle “sees everything in terms of form” (AW 2). That is, Aristotle qua first philosopher – for whom, in Heidegger's view, “[t]he problem of being is ... more radical than any time since” (ibid.) – takes form to be the ultimate determination of what something is.

2. Aristotle's “guiding representation of the unity of form and matter is taken from *creating* – seen in terms of forming” (ibid.; my emphasis). Becker's notes include the telling remark that Aristotle's view of the “[u]nity of form and content” is fundamentally that of the τεχνίτης, or craftsman.¹⁵ Thus, Aristotle interprets form specifically in terms of function.

3. Aristotle not only “sees everything in terms of form”; he sees everything in terms of form inasmuch as it entails a particular sort of matter.

4. Hence (as a clarification of 2 and 3), “The true φυσικός takes the material as a material basis for a determinate function” (AW 2). In other words, physics for Aristotle has a fundamentally biological orientation.

5. And, finally, as we read a little further on, “The biological is for him (Aristotle) the fundamental beginning of knowledge” (ibid.).

Thus “the biological,” in Heidegger's view, is fundamental to Aristotelian physics, and Aristotelian physics is fundamental to Aristotelian ontology. Moreover, this ontology is to be understood in terms of form – that is to say, of form from a fundamentally biological perspective.

This last point is, interpretively, the decisive one and serves as a sort of frame for the answer to the question that begins the seminar: “What connection is there such that psychology should arise in philosophy? How is psychology built into the philosophy of Aristotle?” (AW 1). One answer might be that the soul is an object of interest for the Aristotelian inasmuch as it is the principle of animal life, and animal life is an object of interest for the Aristotelian (qua biologist). But Heidegger's answer to the question, How does psychology “arise in philosophy”? assigns to psychology a more fundamental philosophical role: The object of interest here is the principle of animal life, and animal life is the fundamental expression of being. For being is form; and form is function; and functions are matter organized for the performance of some task; and these are exemplified most clearly and constitutively in the case of animal life. Thus, understanding the basic

¹⁵ AB 2. This remark has little local support (i.e., in *De Anima*), though it may be supported by consideration of Aristotle's reliance on employing medical knowledge as a structural metaphor for nature in *Phys.* II, for example, or, more relevantly, in *Met.* VII.7, which Heidegger discusses later. In any event, other signs also support the view that the remarks on the different ways of “seeing” here are intended to be general in nature rather than specifically confined to the literal context of *DA* I.1.

structure and principles of animal life will, in Heidegger's view, bring us to the precipice of an understanding of being.

V. METAPHYSICS VII: A PHILOLOGICAL ISSUE

Heidegger reads Aristotle, as I have claimed, in a fundamentally "systematic" way, and we now have a more specific picture of what that interpretation looks like in this context, especially as it culminates in Heidegger's view that, for Aristotle, the biological is fundamental. A "systematic" interpretation of Aristotle of this sort is likely to run headlong into a difficulty every student of Aristotle encounters at some time or other: what to do about the frequently chaotic and disorderly nature of the Aristotelian treatises.

Generally speaking, responses to this difficulty make a spectrum at the two extremes of which we find what might be called the "Platonic" and the "materialist" views. On the "Platonic" view, the treatises were originally a product of Aristotle's thinking but have become sullied over time; that the thing to make sense of is the thinking that has been occluded by time and circumstance; and that therefore it is incumbent on the interpreter, in short, to determine which parts of the text are authentic representations of Aristotle's thinking and which are not, or to otherwise cut and splice the text in order to get closer to Aristotle's thinking. On the materialist view, the treatises themselves are the *interpretandum*, not Aristotle's "mind" or "thinking," because the treatises are a product of their reception. "Aristotle" is simply a nametag of convenience to attach to this historically amorphous "author," and the task of the interpreter is simply to make sense of the text as it has come down to us. The question, in short, is the extent to which the text (as "matter," so to speak) "gets in the way" of interpretation or is itself the thing to be interpreted.

One of the most significant moments in the seminar is Heidegger's handling of a philological issue that touches on this broader hermeneutic issue. As we will see, the question opens onto an important philosophical question, and Heidegger's sense of the answer to it will serve as a basis for what is, in my view, the main interpretive gesture of the seminar. The philological question arises, first, by seeing the outline of *Metaphysics* VII like this:

1. *Metaphysics* VII.1-3: an introduction;
2. *Metaphysics* VII.4-6: a "logical" discussion of form;
3. *Metaphysics* VII.7-9: a "physical" discussion of form;
4. *Metaphysics* VII.10-14: more "logical" discussion;
5. *Metaphysics* VII.15-16: a discussion of ideas and forms, in a Platonic sense;
6. *Metaphysics* VII.17: a reset?

The natural question is: Why the seesawing between "logical" and "physical" discussions? Moreover, which of the various claims Aristotle makes about "form" (and perforce about οὐσία) are to be taken as definitive? When is Aristotle answering a "metaphysical" question, and when is he merely reminding his audience of certain "logical" and "physical" principles? Most pointedly: Does all of this belong in the same place?

Many Aristotelians of the last century or so have taken the “Platonic” view that right answers to questions of this sort require rearranging (or even dating the several parts of) the text. This sort of view attained its early apotheosis in the 1923 publication of Werner Jaeger’s book on Aristotle’s “development.”¹⁶ Around the time of the seminar, two rearrangements of *Metaphysics* VII were to become popular:¹⁷

1. that chapters 7-9 (on “physical” questions) form a separate treatise; or
2. that the “logical” chapters 1-6, 10-14 form one treatise; and the “physical” chapters 17, 7-9, 15-16 (in that order) form a second treatise (Natorp’s view).¹⁸

Aside from the evident seesawing, the main reason favoring rearrangement is that summaries in books VII and VIII don’t seem to mention chapters 7-9.¹⁹

Heidegger’s handling of this question is a revealing and significant moment in the seminar and perhaps (though this is not my interest) in his historical-philosophical thinking more generally. At some point during the seminar, Heidegger evidently accepts Natorp’s view.²⁰ However, he ultimately rejects it, holding instead that “[c]hapters 7-9 are no digression from logic into physics, but rather an originary explication of the experience from which one arrives at the judgment” (AB 18); and that “7-9 constitute precisely the kernel for the conceptual context of οὐσία” (AW 8).

This turn in Heidegger’s approach to *Metaphysics* VII is fascinating and potentially instructive. Finding a plausible justification for the order and arrangement of the text as it has come down to us, Heidegger rejects the rearrangement. There seems to be no better reason for his rejection of the rearrangement than that there is an interpretation that preserves the order. Perhaps, by implication, this gesture is evidence of accepting the naturally more plausible (and more, though not extremely, “materialist”) view that such rearrangements are only to be hazarded where interpretation is otherwise impossible; that the thing to be interpreted is precisely the text as it has come down to us; that rearrangements are not interpretations but failures to interpret. Admittedly, Heidegger himself draws no general lesson from the acceptance of the order of the book as it has come down to us. However, his rejection of the rearrangement and his fairly original way of joining chapters 7-9 to the rest of *Metaphysics* VII suggest an attitude toward the Aristotelian treatises, as a family of historical artifacts, that stands in stark contrast to the prevailing mood of the time.

¹⁶ See Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, trans. R. Robinson, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948), chaps. 7-8, esp. 196-204. Among other acts of hermeneutic sorcery, Jaeger reads all of *Met.* VII as its own work, which he calls “*On Substance*.”

¹⁷ For discussion, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, ed. W. D. Ross, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1924), 181, comm. ad 1032a12.

¹⁸ For the reference and summary, see Gonzalez’s note 16 in “Editor’s Notes to the Notes by Helene Weiss,” *Kronos Philosophical Journal* 10 (2021): 108.

¹⁹ See *Met.* VII.11, 1037a21f.; and VIII.1, 1042a4f.

²⁰ See AW 2-3: “15-16 must then follow 9 (Natorp’s proposal);” “Heidegger holds Natorp’s division to be doubtlessly correct” (followed by a big “*Nein!*” in the margin). Then AW 8: “Heidegger no longer holds onto Natorp’s division of Book [VII].”

VI. METAPHYSICS VII: THE SAYING OF WHAT IS

In Heidegger's view, the fundamental and first task of psychology is to come to an understanding of what soul is. Since definition (ὀρισμός) is an articulation of what something is (λέγειν τῆς οὐσίας), then, in order to get clear on what soul is, we must first get clear on what definitions are as they relate to οὐσία – which is the subject of *Metaphysics* VII. Heidegger thus interprets *Metaphysics* VII in light of the idea that “λέγειν [saying, articulating, asserting] is the fundamental phenomenon from which Aristotle arrives at οὐσία” (AW 4). As Heidegger later emphasizes, the perspective Aristotle assumes in, for example, *Metaphysics* VII.4 (the “logical” analysis of οὐσία) “has ... the special meaning of *asserting*[:] thus [Aristotle] considers the phenomenon with an eye to the general context of asserting, of something through something” (AW 3).

There is a lurking “methodological” problem, alluded to earlier, however, in that definitions furnish understanding and understanding is an activity of soul. Thus, “where does the definition come from?” (AW 3). Or, as the Becker manuscript has it, “Does the concept of definition derive its meaning genetically from out of the structure of knowing?” (AB 3). When we consider the definition of soul as an instance of saying something of something (τὶ κατὰ τινοῦς), we are confronted both with the soul as something that is to be defined and as the original site of meaning that gives rise to the possibility of assertion, hence definition.

Heidegger takes the activity of asserting (λέγειν) as an activity that gives meaning both to οὐσία or being (as the thing *of* which assertion is made) and to ὀρισμός or definition (as what is said of what is) (AW 4). With a nod to *Metaphysics* VII.17, Heidegger stresses, “I must have the being [*das Sein*] in order to be at all able to determine: ἔχον τὸ εἶναι δεῖ: [A] something must be there in order that something can be asked about” (ibid.). As Aristotle puts it in *Metaphysics* VII.17, to seek out “why something is itself is to seek out nothing; for *that* it is must already be clear” before going on to ask *what* it is (*Met.* VII.17, 1041a14-15). Hence, Heidegger notes, “[a] question corresponds always first to an experience” (AW 4). The question, What is soul? must therefore correspond to an experience in connection with which the possibility of definition, as an instance of the activity of articulation, is possible.

As outlined above, *Metaphysics* VII.7-9 are customarily read as giving a “physical” treatment of οὐσία, as a complement to the “logical” treatment of *Metaphysics* VII.4-6, 10-14. As we have seen, Heidegger rejects separating these two treatments in any fundamental way. Moreover, he interprets chapters 4-6 such that the question of being, or οὐσία, is inseparable from the question of assertion (λέγειν, λόγος) inasmuch as it is through definition (ὀρισμός), which is a kind of assertion, that being, or οὐσία, comes into our awareness. Heidegger then reads chapters 7-9 as answering a question about how it is we relate to something (for example, the soul) such that definitions are possible: “What lies at the basis of the whole problem of grasping is how a thing is naturally situated in relation to our taking cognizance of it” (AW 6).

This interpretation begins with a comment on the meaning of expressions Aristotle uses to refer to the putative objects of assertion – in particular, τὸδε τι, “this something,” and ἕκαστον, “[a] particular.” At the beginning of *Metaphysics* VII, for example, Aristotle notes that one way in which “being is said” (τὸ ὄν λέγεται) is as τὸδε τι, “this something”

(*Met.* VII.1, 1028a1), which would seem to suggest that the expression should be taken to refer, in some concrete way, to an actual thing. So, too, when Aristotle writes, at the beginning of *Metaphysics* VII.4, that “the τί ἦν εἶναι ἐκάστου [the what it was for each thing to be] is what [each thing] is said to be in itself” (*Met.* VII.4, 1029b13-14). This seems to suggest an “objective” interpretation of the expression ἐκάστου, that is, as referring to some object that stands opposite assertion. Heidegger, however, takes this sense of a “what” for assertion as “completely formal” – that is, as a sort of placeholder for whatever is the object of concern in the act of assertion (AW 6).

It is while in the midst of unpacking this idea (culminating with the June 14 session) that Heidegger departs from Natorp’s division of *Metaphysics* VII.²¹ He wonders, “[I]s the individual really the same as what Aristotle has in mind? And is it the same individual that is in history? ... Aristotle is more radical [than the Marburg school supposes] and asks: [H]ow do I experience the singular? That is his central question” (AW 9). By interpreting Aristotle’s various references to “things” as having a fundamentally phenomenological orientation, Heidegger then interprets chapters 7-9 as Aristotle’s attempt to clarify the grounds of the experience of “things.” To that end, in a supplement from the Bondi manuscript, we read:

To remain in the carrying-out of the process of determining what something is; the λόγος must be carried out in a determinate way such that I in asserting what something is remain with this “what.”

To what extent do the different regions of objects enable me to arrive at their “what”? All of our conceptual determinations here are misdirected. For is the meaning of ἐκάστου always the same?

The fundamental character of things in γένεσις; that they have a *form*. (Ibid.)

Thus, in Heidegger’s view, what Aristotle is doing with chapters 7-9 is offering a genetic account of the objects of awareness (on the understanding that we take such expressions as “object” to have merely formal sense). Or, rather, he is offering an account of the kind of coming-to-be (γένεσις) that is characteristic of objects of awareness. In fact, in Heidegger’s view, this is the perspective of the entirety of *Metaphysics* VII. So, for example, the question of *Metaphysics* VII.3, whether οὐσία is a “subject” (ὑποκείμενον) – which is by most commentators taken to mean a subject in the physical sense of an unchanging substratum of change – Heidegger reads as asking whether οὐσία is the grammatical subject of assertion (see AW 8).

VII. SAYING AS MAKING

In my view, the key to Heidegger’s reading of *Metaphysics* VII, and perhaps to the seminar as a whole – which is both its most interesting facet and its most challenging to defend – is his view that “λέγειν is actually a ποιησις” (AW 7). This principle provides a way, first, of

²¹ Even before this, Heidegger had claimed, “Natorp falsely understands this [ἐκάστου] as the individual[. I]t is much more ... [.] an any ‘each,’ a ‘some-it.’ Something determines something: i.e., the some-it is determined through something” (AW 4).

teasing out the particular structure of articulation, as discussed in *Metaphysics* VII.4-6, 10-14; and leads, second, to a way of joining the seemingly incongruous chapters 7-9 to the rest of the book. For, among other business, Aristotle in *Metaphysics* VII.7-9 discusses the nature of production, and by claiming articulation is a form of production, Heidegger takes this, in part, as an attempt to clarify the nature of articulation.

Thus, toward the beginning of *Metaphysics* VII.7, Aristotle claims that all of the ways in which things come to be are either “on account of nature” or “productions” (ποιήσεις) (*Met.* VII.7, 1032a25-27). The idea that articulation is a form of, or in any event closely related to, production is then suggested immediately in Aristotle’s example of medical treatment as a sort of ποίησις. On this view, a doctor produces health by the presence in the doctor of the form of health; the doctor then reasons that, since the form of health “looks” like this or that, and the patient is in this or that condition, then they must have this or that done to them in order for their condition to “resemble” the form of health – and the doctor then goes on to perform whatever is required in pursuit of that end (which is the part that counts as a “production”) (*Met.* VII.7, 1032b6-14). “Thinking” (νόησις) accomplishes the task of determining how the form in the doctor’s soul is to be actualized in the patient. The actual carrying out of this task is what Aristotle calls “production” (see *Met.* VII.7, 1032b15-17).

Whether articulation is literally an instance of production, in the technical sense of ποίησις, may be an open question for Aristotle, but it is certainly true that the expression “making a speech” (ποιεῖν τὸν λόγον) is amply attested in Aristotle, most notably in his *Rhetoric* (where, too, a speaker is said to “produce” [ποιεῖν] conviction in her hearers),²² and Aristotle will also use ποιεῖν in a kind of apposition with λέγειν as in: “It would seem that Heraclitus’s account [λόγος], by asserting [λέγων] that everything is and is not, makes [ποιεῖν] everything true” (*Met.* IV.7, 1012a24-26); or: “Someone saying [λέγων] that all things are true makes [ποιεῖν] the contrary account [λόγος] true, too.” If Aristotle does not say that λέγειν is a form of ποιεῖν or ποίησις, he nevertheless uses the expression in a way that implies this.

A good question would be: If λέγειν is a kind of making, what does it make? One answer would be that λέγειν makes λόγοι, but this is tautological and unhelpful. An answer suggested by Aristotle, however, is that λέγειν makes clarity (τὸ σαφές)²³ and, in particular, knowledge as furnishing clarity. Hence, Aristotle will speak of defining as a task engaged in for the purpose of clarification, and he will say that this clarity is what definitions “make.” Thus, for example, in *Posterior Analytics* II.7, Aristotle asks:

How indeed does someone defining something show its being [δείξει τὴν οὐσίαν] or what it is [τὸ τί ἐστὶ]? For it is not possible to make it clear [δηλον ποιήσει] in the way that it is for someone performing a demonstration, where, if certain things agreed upon are, something else must be also...; nor in the way that it is for someone performing an induction from particulars

²² See, e.g., *Rhet.* I.1, 1355a25-28; I.2, 1356a2-6; I.5, 1362a11-14; II.18, 1391b23-31; etc.

²³ Of course, we would want to add: Only a λέγειν that is *true* “makes clarity,” but delving into the details of this distinction would take us far afield of the scope and orientation of the seminar.

that are clear [δῆλον ὄντων], [will the person defining something show] that everything is thus and nothing otherwise. ... What other way remains? For indeed, [the person defining something] will not show it simply through sensation, or with their finger. (*APo* II.7, 92a34-b3)

The question of definition is thus a question of a certain form of making and, in particular, a making of clarity and knowledge. Fittingly, in the introductory chapters of *Metaphysics* VII, Aristotle writes:

It is agreed that some οὐσίαι are perceptible, so that these are to be investigated first. And since, in the beginning, we ran through in how many ways οὐσία is defined, and one of these seemed to be the what it was for it to be, we should study this.²⁴ For getting to what is more knowable is germane to our current task [πρὸ ἔργου], since learning comes about for everyone in this way: from what is less knowable by nature to what is more knowable [by nature]. And this is the task, just as in actions the task is to make [τὸ ποιῆσαι], from what is good for each thing, what is actually [ὄλως] good for each thing good, in this case [our task] is [to make], from what is more known to oneself, what is more knowable by nature known to oneself. (*Met.* VII.3, 1029a33-b8)

Aristotle himself therefore describes the task of *Metaphysics* VII as a task of making; he even tells us with what “stuff” he plans to make it and what he plans to have made. He intends to take what is more known and evident to oneself and make of it what is more knowable by nature. Even if one takes this as a “metaphorical” extension of the idea of “production” (which, nevertheless, we should understand as encompassing not only “arts” such as medicine and carpentry but also the “art” that is *poetry*),²⁵ the structure is identical in the more “literal” cases and in the case described here. This explains, of course, why he begins with the “more evident” substances that are sensible. It might also explain, Heidegger is claiming, the discussion of “production” as an outline of how making in general is possible and with a special focus on those principles (form and matter) that are involved in the being and therefore the knowledge of natural things.

In the seminar, then, Heidegger takes chapters 7-9 as Aristotle’s account of the “formation of concepts” (AW 9). This view is premised on the idea that, as the Becker manuscript puts it, “Aristotle comprehends the ἕκαστον [individual] not as logical individual but as formed in some way,” and adds: “[S]ee the concept of γένεσις in chapters

²⁴ This last sentence is an interesting case study in late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century Aristotelian philology. Although no medieval or renaissance manuscript has it anywhere but where it is, it has been common since Becker to put it about fifteen lines later. For general discussion, see Ross, *Metaphysics*, vol. 2, 166, comm. ad 1029b3-12. About the whole passage, Jaeger asserts, with remarkable certainty, “These words have got into the beginning of the discussion of essence, where they are quite meaningless. ... Clearly the first words of the insertion were written between the lines of the old manuscript, and hence occur in their proper place in our copies. The rest, for which there was no room, was written on a separate sheet” (Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 199n1).

²⁵ Thus, of course, “poetics” (ποιητική) concerns the art of “poetry” (ποίησις); see *Poet.* 1, 1447a8-11.

6 and 7. Its fundamental characteristic is that it has an εἶδος” (AB 22-23). Thus, the purpose for the discussion of coming to be in chapters 7-9 is to clarify both how things are the way that they are and what we know about them when we know them (or have achieved a “definition” of them). They come about as a result of form, and it is through form that they are known.

VIII. ON SOUL

In Heidegger’s order of presentation, the analysis of *Metaphysics* VII is preparatory to the analysis of the discussion of soul in *De Anima*. As we read in the continuation of the latter, *De Anima* I.1 is an “inquiry into the ‘what’ = οὐσία. And indeed to a completely determinate concept of οὐσία” – namely, being in terms of εἶδος, “form” (AW 10). As we have seen, Heidegger interprets this “determinate concept of οὐσία” to encompass two dimensions: a “subjective” dimension, in the sense that it is by way of form that we come into awareness of οὐσία; and an “objective” dimension, in the sense that it is owing to form that οὐσία by nature come into existence.²⁶ Thus, “εἶδος [form] relates the οὐσία [namely, the being that soul is] to a γένεσις [coming into being], and this is a ποιήσις [production] and φύσις [nature]” (AW 10). The meaning of this last clause would then seem to be that the “determinate concept” of οὐσία that Aristotle has in view has both a subjective and an objective dimension: It is through form that it is to be discerned, and it is owing to form that it comes about.

With this distinction in mind, Heidegger emphasizes that we should understand soul not merely as a dummy expression for an object standing opposite a particular form of judgment but as a thing whose being is independent of judgment: “The εἶδος [that is soul] is *entelechy* [actuality]. ... Genuine being is becoming and working. The concept [of the soul] is therefore related to the effected reality as what is becoming” (AW 10). In the transition to talk of actuality, Heidegger is alluding both to a further development of the argument in *Metaphysics* and to the view of soul that we find in *De Anima* II – namely, that οὐσία, in the strict and authoritative sense, is actuality. (The same point may be put differently by saying, as Aristotle does frequently, that form is actuality.)²⁷ In *De Anima* II.1, Aristotle thus defines soul as a kind of “actuality” (*DA* II.1, 412b5).

The rest of the discussion of *De Anima* II.1 in this session is fairly unsurprising fare, but what stands out here is the notion that “[t]he concept [of the soul]” relates to the “effected reality” (*das Wirkliches*) that is soul as what is becoming relates to what is. In terms of the parallel to or identification with ποιήσις, this would imply that learning (i.e., coming to have knowledge) about soul is similar to, for example, the building of a house, such that the material (similar to lumber) is given through our various, unclear first

²⁶ These are tricky expressions to use around Heidegger, but as justification I point to the distinction between the “subjective performance” that is the work of the one who “makes” (which includes, for Heidegger, one who “asserts” [λέγει]) and the “objective performance” that is the work of nature. In reading “subjective,” I’m following Gonzalez’s note (note 33 in “Editor’s Notes to the Notes by Helene Weiss,” *Kronos Philosophical Journal* 10 [2021]: 112) and, as Gonzalez indicates, the corresponding passage in the Becker manuscript (AB 24).

²⁷ For the “official” statement, see in particular *Met.* IX.8, 1050b2-3: “It is clear that οὐσία and form are actuality.”

attempts to make out soul as the “principle of living things,” and the ultimate “product” (similar to the built house) is an understanding of or clarity about this principle.²⁸

In *De Anima* II.2, Aristotle approaches the question of soul from a perspective much in line with Heidegger’s interpretation. He begins by noting that “what is clear [τὸ σαφές] and more known [γνωριμώτερον] in terms of assertion [λόγος] [comes about] from what is both unclear [ἄσαφῶν] and yet more evident [φανερωτέρων]” (*DA* II.2, 413a11-13). The “ἄσαφές (unclarified),” Heidegger notes, “is the starting-point, it jumps out at one”; and “[w]hat jumps out at one is the distinction between living and nonliving nature” (*AW* 11-12). As a further delimitation of this “unclear and yet more evident” starting point, Aristotle writes: “Now, living [ζῆν] is articulated in a number of ways, so that if even just one of these belongs to something, we say it is living – I mean νοῦς [mind, intellect], αἴσθησις [sensation], moving and stopping in place, as well as wasting away and growing” (*DA* II.2, 413a22-25). Heidegger reads this “starting-point” not as a definitive statement about what it is to be alive but as a summary of the several ways in which the phenomenon of life appears to us and gives rise to the question of what life is.

Among the particular – that is to say, actual – occasions in which this phenomenon is manifest, what we find, however, is that they amount to expressions of forms of life specific to specific sorts of living things. Heidegger refers to the way in which life expresses itself in this or that sort of living thing as a “way of life.” Thus “[t]he plant has its genuine living in nourishing itself” – that is to say, in that aspect or “faculty” of soul responsible for self-nourishment (*AW* 12). In turn, “what is *proper* in constituting an animal is αἴσθησις” (*ibid.*). By looking closely at the way in which Aristotle describes these phenomena as attaching to plants and animals, respectively, Heidegger concludes that “one cannot speculate about the soul in a general way, but rather in the case of each what is most its own is its λόγος; its οἰκεῖον [home]” (*AW* 13). Heidegger thus emphasizes that the provisional statement about life does not commit Aristotle to any single general account of soul.

As Aristotle similarly concludes, there might very well be a single λόγος of soul, just as there is a single λόγος of figure. However, although the single λόγος of figure “harmonizes with every” figure – triangle, square, pentagon, and so forth – “it is particular to [ἴδιος] none of them” (*DA* II.3, 414b19-24). Then, similarly, while there could be a single λόγος of soul, it would be “laughable to seek out a common λόγος as much for these

²⁸ Here is a challenge to this and, I believe, a solution. In *Met.* IX.8, Aristotle specifically distinguishes between cases such as house building, where the actuality of it takes place “in” the product (ἔργον) that is outside or “beyond” (παρά) the actor or agent, and cases such as “seeing” and “studying” (θεωρεῖν), “for which there is no other task beyond their actuality,” and the actuality lies in the actor or agent herself (see *Met.* IX.8, 1050a23-b2). This would seem to make the sort of understanding we are to have of soul fall under the latter rather than the former case and to question the entire equation of articulation with ποιήσις that is, as I have claimed, the linchpin of Heidegger’s interpretation. A simple distinction will see it through this impasse, however: For whereas study – that is to say, the actualization of knowledge or understanding – will require one already to be a knower (so that, when one “studies,” in the sense of θεωρεῖν, one is actualizing knowledge or understanding one already has), *learning*, on the other hand, will not require this precedent knowledge or understanding and will indeed imply a change in knowledge or understanding when completed. Here the theory of learning described in *APo* I.1 and its distinction between “precedent acquaintance” (προϋπάρχουσα γνώσις) and knowledge or understanding proper (ἐπιστήμη) would be useful to bear in mind; see *APo* I.1, 71a1-b8.

[i.e., living things] as for those [i.e., figures]; for it would be a particular account of nothing that is [οὐδενὸς ... τῶν ὄντων], nor have to do with an appropriate, indivisible form [κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄτομον]” (*DA* II.3, 414b24-27). Moreover, Aristotle notes, such a general account would in fact seem to “discharge” us of the need for the more particular accounts (*DA* II.3, 414b27-28). Hence “for each particular [living thing or form of life], the question must be asked, What is its particular soul?” (*DA* II.3, 414b32).

IX. FROM HEIDEGGER TO ARISTOTLE: AN UNEXPLORED PATH

We have seen that Heidegger interprets Aristotle’s view of soul in light of his interpretation of οὐσία in *Metaphysics* VII. That is, he sees soul as a particular instance of the broader commitment to the notion that what is ontologically basic is form and specifically in terms of form as it relates to becoming. “Soul,” then, in the strict sense, in Heidegger’s view, is the “actuality” of animal life, in the concrete sense of the particular form of an animal coming into being as that particular animal enjoying a certain way of life.

We also saw earlier that Heidegger had intended to use the interpretation of *Metaphysics* VII as a sort of entrée to the interpretation of soul. Heidegger’s view of *Metaphysics* VII was that form played the role not only of accounting for the being of what is but also for the appearance of that being in terms of experience. In the account of *De Anima*, what we find is much in the way of an accounting for the *being* of what has soul; much also in the way of a description of our use of a general concept of “life” (even if this concept is of dubious justification); but little in terms of a phenomenological basis for this judgment.

In that regard, one of the least satisfying cross-references in the text comes at the end of the July 5 meeting, where we read:

The connection between the ἴδια and the κοινότητα.
Different ways of living.
III Book {at the basis here}. III 1, 2. (AW 13)

The reason for the dissatisfaction is the following. In the text discussed during this session, Aristotle has argued that there is no general account of soul but instead as many specific accounts of soul as there are ways of living. In the following session (July 19), Heidegger will pick up this line of thinking and instead argue that there is a way in which the general account is not as “laughable” as Aristotle claims. He will also, at the end of the next session, impart to his students that *De Anima* III.1 and III.2 are “[i]mportant” (AW 15). There is, however, very little mention of either of these texts in any of the lectures and no explicit references.

Now, *De Anima* III.1 and III.2 discuss a number of issues relating to the number of the senses, and among them: (1) that there are no more than five senses; (2) that there is no unique sense responsible for the sensing of the “common sensibles”; and (3) that the self-referential capacity of sensation (the ability to sense that we are sensing) does not require a further sense. In other words, Aristotle is keen on keeping the number of senses at five. The final session of the seminar is preceded by the aforementioned recommendation that *De Anima* III.1 and III.2 are “[i]mportant,” along with *De Anima* II.6 and II.12. And,

although *De Anima* II.12 has nothing specifically in common with *De Anima* III.1 and III.2, *De Anima* II.6 certainly does, and it is explicitly referred to at the end of the final session (see AW 18). It is the question of “incidental sensation” (αἴσθησις κατὰ συμβεβηκός).

There is no precise way to guess at what Heidegger’s reasons were for suggesting *De Anima* III.1 and III.2 to his students, but (1) the mention of a “connection between the ἴδια and the κοινότατον”; (2) the discussion of (and here reference to) “[d]ifferent ways of living,” specifically in the context of the discussion of the different sorts of account of soul possible; (3) the more general claim that Aristotle is interested not only in what soul is but in how and through what sorts of experiences we arrive at judgments about soul; and, finally, (4) the fact that nearly the only issue from *De Anima* III.1 and III.2 that receives treatment in the seminar is the question of incidental perception – all of this suggests that the theory of incidental perception may be key to outlining a possible phenomenological basis from which the question of life arises. Or, to put this in a qualified and highly informal way: This is what “jumps out” for me, anyway, from the reference to *De Anima* III.1 and III.2 at the end of the July 5 meeting.

How, then, could the theory of incidental perception be taken as a phenomenological basis for the question of life “in general”? Aristotle, first of all, claims in *De Anima* II.4 that the appropriate way to undertake an inquiry into the soul’s various “potentialities” is to first account for their “correlative objects” (ἀντικείμενα) and only thereafter to give an account of what they consist in as such (*DA* II.4, 415a20-22). Thus, for example, before giving an account of self-nourishment, he intends to give an account of food; before giving an account of each of the senses, an account of their objects; and so on. In *De Anima* II.5, he immediately breaks with this regimen, offering first an account of the actuality and potentiality of sensation “as a whole” but then proceeding, in *De Anima* II.6, to give an account of sensation’s objects, that is, of “sensibles” (τὰ αἰσθητά) (*DA* II.6, 418a7).

This latter account distinguishes between three sorts of “sensible” (*DA* II.6, 418a8-11):

1. “Special” objects: what is sensible “in its own right” (καθ’ αὐτόν) and “proper” (ἴδιον) to a single sense (e.g., visible phenomena vis-à-vis the capacity of vision; for there is no other way of perceiving visible phenomena as such except with vision);

2. “Common” objects: what is sensible “in its own right” (καθ’ αὐτόν) and “common” (κοινόν) to two or more senses (e.g., movement vis-à-vis the capacity of vision; for there are other ways of perceiving movement – namely, with touch [see *DA* II.6, 418a19-20]);

3. “Incidental” objects: what is “incidentally” (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) sensible and “common” (κοινόν) to two or more senses.

This last sort of “sensible” is what interests us.

The description of it that Aristotle gives is this: “By an ‘incidental sensible’ I mean, for example, if a white thing were [sensed as] the son of Diareus; for he is sensed incidentally, because he is sensed as incidental to the white thing. Hence [the sensor] is not affected by the sensible thing as such” (*DA* II.6, 418a20-24). Later, in *De Anima* III.2, he describes “incidental sensation” as sensing “that the white thing [is Cleon’s son]” (*DA* III.2, 425a25-27). Incidental sensation is the sensation of something as the attribute (the “incident,” συμβεβηκός) of something else, typically where what is perceived as an

attribute is not directly sensed.²⁹ It is for this reason, perhaps, that Aristotle's examples are of "the son of ..."; for this makes evident that it is not (or not only) *the individual* as such that is being perceived as an attribute of "the pale thing" but rather that some previously digested bit of information (that is to say, a *memory* that so and so is the son of Diareos or of Cleon) as it attaches to an individual is what is being perceived in relation to the white thing.

What is important to keep in mind here is how an incidental sensible differs from an "essential" (καθ' αὐτόν) sensible. The contrast between "essential" and "incidental" – or, more precisely, between what belongs to something "inasmuch as it is itself" (καθ' αὐτόν) and what belongs to something because it (merely) "goes along with" (συμβαίνει) it – is drawn, among other places, in *Metaphysics* VII.4. There Aristotle claims that the τί ἦν εἶναι, or "what it was to be," of each thing is "what is said καθ' αὐτό of it" (*Met.* VII.4, 1029a13-14). Just what is said καθ' αὐτό of something is what is being looked into; Aristotle goes on to claim that it is form (εἶδος) that is said καθ' αὐτό of something (*Met.* VII.4, 1030a12). In the interim, he notes a number of attributes, among them being white and being musical, that are not said καθ' αὐτό of something since, as he puts it with respect to a person who is musical, "being you [τὸ σοὶ εἶναι] is not being musical [τὸ μουσικῶ εἶναι]; for it is not according to you yourself [κατὰ ταυτὸν] that you are musical" (*Met.* VII.4, 1029b14-15). Now, of course, for many this will ring false, but the idea is not that musicality is not an important or otherwise (using this expression nontechnically) "essential" feature of "who" someone might be but rather that *being you* and *being musical* are not the same thing since, for example, there are others who are musical. Thus, musicality is not essentially linked to any particular person; it is not the essential expression of any particular person; rather, where we find it in a person, we find it as "going along with" (συμβαίνειν) them.

Here is the punchline to the unsatisfying reference to Aristotle's theory of incidental sensation: that it is perhaps precisely in this sense of "going along with" that *life*, as an attribute shared by but irreducible to the many living things we experience, is first encountered; that a series of incidental perceptions – that so and so is alive, and that this other so and so is alive, too; or, perhaps, more fundamentally, that so and so is breathing, and the breathing thing *lives*, and that this other so and so is having sensations, and the thing having sensation *lives* – is what provides the grounds for the judgment that these various beings all are *living*, though *living* does not belong to any one of them as such. In this way, then, the theory of incidental sensation from *De Anima* II.6 and III.1 (scant though it is) perhaps outlines the basis of (to recall an earlier formulation) an "originary explication of the experience from which one arrives at the judgment" that these beings have *life* (AB 18). The broader concept of life is, Aristotle noted, not a particular (ἴδιον) attribute of any one living thing, and in that sense the account of life is not an account of anything that actually is; rather, it is common (κοινόν) to them all but realized in highly

²⁹ The question of incidental sensation is not without scholarly dispute. In my view, the most convincing of semirecent interpretations, which I more or less hew to here, is Stanford Cashdollar, "Aristotle's Account of Incidental Perception," *Phronesis* 18, no. 2 (1973): 156-75. For alternatives, to begin with, see *ibid.*, 156n1.

particular ways.³⁰ Perhaps it is out of the experience of *life* as something that “goes along with” these various functions and more basically out of the capacity to perceive attributes that “go along with” beings in this way, then, that the possibility of a more general account of life emerges.

Admittedly, Heidegger himself does not pursue this possible interpretation here. He does allude to the distinction between sensations *καθ' αὐτό* and sensations *κατὰ συμβεβηκός* but makes nothing further of it (AW 18). Nor does he make the connection between the discussion of *De Anima* II.6 and the question of different accounts of soul or life. After his discussion of Aristotle's view that pursuing a “common” or general account of soul would be “laughable,” Heidegger stresses that, although “there is no asserting [in the sense of *λέγειν*] to be done about the soul *besides* [assertions about] the particular souls,” nevertheless the different sorts of souls there are (plant, nonhuman animal, human) “are in a determinate order and succession,” which he describes as follows, using the example of the animal in comparison with the plant: “[T]he *αἰσθητικόν* is a *surplus* in relation to the *[θ]ρεπτικόν* and cannot be without it. This mode of living does not carry itself out without the other. Thus a determinate mode of founding. The preceding is always the condition of possibility for the following (possibility = the possible working-itself-out)” (AW 14).

He goes on to claim that “[w]hat [Aristotle] actually has in mind” in his description of the relation between the various ways in which life manifests itself “is the human being in which all capabilities are concretely present” (ibid.). In short, despite his suggestion, Heidegger's own view differs radically from the view sketched above.

X. SKETCH OF A THEORY OF SENSATION

The remainder of the seminar is devoted to consideration, above all, of Aristotle's theory of sensation, *αἴσθησις*, as one of the ways in which life is evident, specifically in the context of animal life. In light of the main themes and interpretive principles of the seminar, two particular features of Aristotle's theory stand out: that, for Aristotle, sensation, generally conceived, is (1) “the taking-on [*δέχεσθαι*] of sensible *forms*,” and this “in terms of *λόγος*”; and (2) that sensation itself is, Aristotle claims, a kind of *λόγος* (*DA* II.12, 424a17-28). On the supposition that *λέγειν* is *ποίησις*, the “affective” aspect of sensation (considering Aristotle's contrast between *ποίησις*, making, and *πάσχειν*, being made) is of particular interest.

The theory of sensation is an interesting instance of the relationship between *λέγειν* and *ποίησις*. At the beginning of his account of sensation, Heidegger notes that “*πάσχειν* ... arises always together with *ποιεῖν*” (AW 15). The “productive” principle involved in sensation, though perhaps equivocal, is generally a question, not of the sensitive faculty or organs, hence not of the *λόγος* that is sensation, but rather of the *objects* of sensation. Thus, for example, impact on certain things is what “*makes* [*ἐμποιῆσαι*] sound” (thus *DA* II.8, 419b4-9). More generally, as Aristotle notes in his account of touch, “all sensing is a sort of being affected [*πάσχειν*], so that what is actually a certain quality *makes* [*ποιεῖ*] something

³⁰ In terms of the tripartite division of *DA* II.6, note how this characterization clearly places life in the category of incidental sensibles.

else, which is that quality potentially, [actually that quality]" (DA II.11, 423b31-424a2). Thus, sensation is a sort of being-affected by something else; and this something else, not sensation, is what performs the task of "making." The "making" that is involved in sensation, then, is brought about by the object of sensation.

Sensation itself – that is to say, in its "subjective" aspect – is thus a sort of λόγος capable of affection of a certain sort. It is this feature of sensation that Heidegger is particularly interested in developing. He emphasizes that Aristotle's distinction between "affection" as "destruction" and "affection" as "preservation" does not constitute two moments of affection but two "modes" (DA II.5, 417b2f.; AW 17). In Heidegger's view, sensation is preservative; it is not a "change" (μεταβολή) to something else, hence not an "alteration" (ἀλλοίωσις) (ibid.). Relatedly, in *De Anima*, Aristotle notes that, when "excessively [sensible]" (ὑπερβολαί [sc. αἰσθηταί]) or "too strong" objects are encountered, there is no sensation, since the organs and the λόγος are destroyed (DA II.12, 424a27-31). Sensation is possible only where the sensitive faculty/organ is in a sort of "mean" (μεσότης) condition (DA II.12, 424b1-2).

This feature of sensation then generates a question: In what way is sensation a sort of "potentiality"? In this Heidegger sees a more fundamental question: "One approaches a closer determination of δύναμις when one asks: in what sense is αἴσθησις δύναμις[?]" (AW 18). For sensation is made possible, in Aristotle's view, owing to the sensible object's "making" the sensitive faculty and/or organ "experience" the sensible quality that inheres "in actuality" in the object. It does this by "making" the sensitive faculty/organ "like" itself, where the sensitive faculty/organ is claimed to have been "potentially" the sensible quality. But the "experiencing" or "undergoing" of sensation is preservative, so that there is no "change" in the sensitive faculty/organ when sensation occurs – that is, in the strict sense of a "transformation" from one quality to its contrary (AW 17). The sensitive faculty/organ becomes "actually" what it was "potentially" previously, but from potentiality to actuality there is no change involved. "Thus aporia," Weiss notes (ibid.). The structure of the potentiality and actuality of sensation, then, may perhaps be an important clue to understanding the nature of potentiality and actuality as such, especially as these principles reach beyond questions of motion.³¹

XI. CONCLUSION

Weiss's notes of Heidegger's seminar on Aristotle suggest an atmosphere of intense interest in and penetration of Aristotle's writing. To be sure, they represent in many ways the first inklings of the immense resources of phenomenology as a formal structure for the task of philosophical interpretation. Moreover, they attest to a certain freedom from both the "medievalized" Aristotle (one all too familiar, still, to contemporary readers) and indeed from many of the predominant "Aristotles" of the last century: the posthumous victim of poor editing; the analytic philosopher; the ordinary language philosopher; the secret Platonist; the anti-Platonist – even the "Heideggerian" Aristotle, who dwells on etymologies and serves as a first act in the long, gaudy opera of "Western History." What stands out

³¹ See *Met.* IX.1, 1046a1-2.

in the 1921 seminar, above all, is a sort of resilience and creativity: a willingness to take the Aristotelian treatises as they have come down to us, and a philosophical imagination capable of fulfilling that resolve. The success of the seminar is then measurable not by the persuasiveness of Heidegger's reading but by the undeniable temptation to see in the Aristotelian treatises something that "Aristotelianism" is all too frequently poor at conveying: that, after all, the Aristotelian treatises may be challenging, chaotic, shy on sense, dry, and wooden – but they can also manage to be *interesting*, too.

ARISTOTLE'S *EUDEMUS* AS THE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK OF HIS *DE ANIMA*

1. THE BIZARRE FATE OF ARISTOTLE'S *EUDEMUS* IN THE SCHOLARLY DEBATE

The history of Aristotle's dialogue *Eudemus* or *On the Soul* is a curious one. The work itself has been lost. It does not form part of the standard Aristotelian Corpus. But we do have intriguing pieces of information about it. These were first assembled by Valentin Rose in 1863. He denied their attribution to Aristotle.¹ In antiquity, Alexander of Aphrodisias had claimed around 200 CE that the *Eudemus* was correctly put to Aristotle's name but that it did not contain his own philosophy.² Its nature was purely dialectical. In 1923, Werner Jaeger reinstated at one stroke the *Eudemus* as an Aristotelian text but dismissed it as an "early" and "Platonist" work that was outshone by his scientific treatise *De Anima*.³ Jaeger was responsible for a revival of interest in the *Eudemus* fragments that lasted several decades. But the work sparks little debate in the twenty-first century.⁴

¹ V. Rose, *Aristoteles Pseudepigraphus* (Leipzig: Teubner, 1863; new ed. 1885); R. Walzer, *Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta in Usum Scholarum* (Florence: G. C. Sansoni, 1934); see, more recently, W. D. Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta, recognovit brevique adnotatione instruxit* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955; repr. 1969); O. Gigon, *Aristotelis Opera. Liber III. Librorum Deperditorum Fragmenta* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1987).

² Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta*, 6-7; Gigon, *Aristotelis Opera*, "Testimonia," no. 16. 5, 79. In-text references to Ross and Gigon will refer to these works.

³ W. Jaeger, *Aristoteles: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Entwicklung* (Berlin: Weidmann, 1923; repr. 1955); Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals of the History of His Development*, trans. R. Robinson, with the author's corrections and additions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934; 2nd ed. 1948; repr. 1962). Jaeger hypothesized three phases in Aristotle's philosophical development, and although no one else had ever proposed such a view, he was baffled by this very state of affairs: "It is one of those almost incomprehensible paradoxes in which the history of human knowledge abounds, that the principle of organic development has never yet been applied to its originator" (Jaeger, *Fundamentals*, 4, 34). An equally teasing question, from the perspective of the science of history, is how Jaeger's views could triumph so rapidly and so enduringly given their highly speculative nature. For a very early and pointed critique, see H. von Arnim, "Nochmals die aristotelischen Ethiken (Gegen W. Jaeger. Zur Abwehr)," *Sitzungsberichte der Akademie der Wissenschaften in Wien* 2 (1929): 56-57.

⁴ A. Valjejo Campos, *Aristóteles. Fragmentos* (Madrid: Gredos, 2005); L. P. Gerson, *Aristotle and Other Platonists* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005), 47-75: "The Exoteric Writings and the Early Aristotle"; J. García Alandete, "El alma en los diálogos *Eudemo* y el *Protréptico* y relación con el tratado *Acerca del alma*," *Folios* 38 (2013): 35-43; K. Jażdżewska, "Dio Chrysostom's *Charidemus* and Aristotle's *Eudemus*," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* 55 (2015): 679-87; W. M. Coombs, "Aristotle's Harmony with Plato on Separable and Immortal Soul," *South African Journal of Philosophy* 36, no. 4 (2017): 541-52. See also S. Van der Meeren, *Exhortation à la philosophie. Le dossier grec: Aristote* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2011); C. Megino Rodriguez,

No other text from antiquity has such a curious tradition of appraisal. This raises the following questions: What could trigger the circulation of so many reports on writings by Aristotle that were not authentically his? Why would Aristotle have written a work in which his own views were not presented? Why would he have been highly praised in antiquity for works that did not yet formulate his own, fully fledged philosophy? Is it likely that knowledge of his truly valuable philosophy, such as the *De Anima*, wasn't garnered from his lecture notes until three centuries after his death? Why, as early as 343 BCE, did the advisers to King Philip II of Macedonia recommend that he enlist Aristotle as a private tutor for Crown Prince Alexander?

In the argument that follows, I will show that these negative theories about the *Eudemus* result from misinterpretations of texts. A gap was already wrongly assumed between the *Eudemus* and what we call the school treatises in antiquity. A radically different position on them is possible and indeed necessary. I will argue that the *Eudemus* contained Aristotle's genuine and most comprehensive outlook on the meaning of "life," "being born," and "dying." His *De Anima* was in harmony with this view.

2. WHY HAS THE *EUEMUS* RECEIVED SUCH REMARKABLE APPRAISALS?

Why have the appraisals of the *Eudemus* been so diverse?

The main reason, of course, is that the work is no longer completely available. We do find the *Eudemus* mentioned in antique lists that enumerate Aristotle's writings,⁵ but it is impossible to pin down why, after the discovery and publication of the works from Aristotle's personal legacy – that is, after the first century BCE – the text was lost to posterity.⁶

Cicero⁷ tells us in detail the plot of the dialogue, which described the activity of Eudemus of Cyprus, his travels, his relations with the Macedonian court⁸ and with the politician Dion of Syracuse, and his death in Sicily in 354/353 BCE in the struggle against King Dionysius II.⁹ The author of Pseudo-Plutarch's *Consolatio ad Apollonium* offers a decent-sized literal quotation, which suggests that he still possessed a complete text of the work.¹⁰

Yet this doesn't explain why Alexander of Aphrodisias maintained that the *Eudemus* did not contain Aristotle's own philosophy. Alexander is generally held in high regard as an authority on and orthodox exegete of Aristotle. He must have sensed a conflict

"Topics of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in Augustine of Hippo, the Transmission of Cicero, and the Context of Their Use," *Traditio* 71 (2016): 1-31.

⁵ See P. Moraux, *Les listes anciennes des ouvrages d'Aristote* (Louvain: Éditions Universitaires, 1951); I. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* (Gothenburg: Gothenburg University, 1957), 13-163.

⁶ Cf. O. Gigon, "Prolegomena to an Edition of the *Eudemus*," in *Aristotle and Plato in the Mid-Fourth Century*, ed. I. Düring and G. E. L. Owen (Gothenburg: Almqvist and Wiksell, 1960), 19.

⁷ Cic. *Div. ad Brut.* 1. 25. 53 = Arist. *Eudem.* frag. 1 Ross; 56 Gigon. Cicero remarkably shows no knowledge of the lecture treatise *De Anima*, although he was familiar with two kinds of Aristotelian writings.

⁸ In "Ein Gespräch mit König Philipp: zum 'Eudemos' des Aristoteles," in *Aristoteles. Werk und Wirkung. Paul Moraux Gewidmet*, ed. J. Wiesner (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1985), 463, K. Gaiser has even suggested that King Philip II of Macedonia figured as Eudemus's discussion partner in the dialogue. But one wonders whether this detail would not have been brought up critically by opponents of Aristotle's in later times. See also, by the same author, "Die Elegie des Aristoteles an Eudemus," *Museum Helveticum* 23 (1966): 84-106.

⁹ He and Plato long maintained intensive contact, and Plato almost persuaded him to establish a "philosophers' state" in Syracuse, but in the end, Dionysius pulled out.

¹⁰ Plut. *Mor. (Consol. ad Apoll.)*, 115b-e; Arist., *Eudemus* (frag. 6 Ross; 65 Gigon). But Ps.-Plutarch may, of course, have taken this passage from another work.

between the *Eudemus* and the other texts passed down under Aristotle's name. Jaeger, too, despite no longer vouching for Alexander's position, perceived a wide gap between the view of the *Eudemus* and the treatises of the Aristotelian Corpus. The Dutch scholar F. J. C. J. Nuyens systematically developed Jaeger's standpoint in his dissertation, where he found evidence for three clearly distinct phases in Aristotle's work.¹¹ He, like Jaeger, assumed a large chronological and ideological distance between the *Eudemus* or *On the Soul* and the lecture treatise *On the Soul* (*De Anima*).

This is not the place to dwell on Jaeger's idea of an Aristotelian development in several phases.¹² I do see the problem that modern authors find contradictions in the Aristotelian Corpus that they suppose Aristotle for some reason failed to notice or thought too insignificant to correct. A particularly vexing matter is that in the *De Anima* he supposedly viewed the soul as the entelechy of the visible body and in his biological works, such as the *Generation of Animals*, presented a fine-corporeal body, *πνεῦμα*, as the vehicle of the soul-principle. But no one has managed to explain why Aristotle could nevertheless have defended both positions and would have replaced one by the other, nor which one was replaced by which.¹³ In my view, the greatest objection to the standard Aristotle studies is that they pay too little attention to the fragments of Aristotle's dialogues.

3. WHICH POINTS HAVE PLAYED A ROLE IN THE DISCUSSION?

(3A) THE DATE OF EUDEMUS'S DEATH

In the debate on Aristotle's lost works, one regularly hears the labels "juvenile work" and "Platonist." What is behind this?

I already mentioned above that Eudemus died in 354/353 BCE. Eudemus was Aristotle's "good friend" (*familiaris*, says Cicero, in the story about his life and death). In that year, Aristotle was a member of Plato's Academy in Athens. He had arrived there in 367, at the age of 17, when Plato was 60 years old (and was staying in Sicily). Aristotle remained in Athens till 347, when Plato died and his nephew Speusippus succeeded him as school leader. Aristotle was 31 years old in 353 and had been a member of the research community under Plato's tutelage for fourteen years.

¹¹ F. J. C. J. Nuyens, *Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de Zielkunde van Aristoteles. Een Historisch-Philosophische Studie* (Nijmegen and Utrecht: Dekker & van de Vegt, 1939); Nuyens, *L'évolution de la psychologie d'Aristote* (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1948). On his contribution, see C. Lefèvre, *Sur l'évolution d'Aristote en psychologie* (Louvain: Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1972); A. P. Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body: A Reinterpretation of Aristotle's Philosophy of Living Nature* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 17-20.

¹² On this, see *Werner Jaeger Reconsidered*, ed. W. M. Calder III (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1992); E. Schütrumpf, "Werner Jaeger Reconsidered," *Illinois Classical Studies*, suppl. 3 (1992): 309-25; *Aristotle's Philosophical Development: Problems and Prospects*, ed. W. Wians (Lanham, MD: Rowman, 1996). See also, more recently, *Werner Jaeger: Wissenschaft, Bildung, Politik*, ed. C. G. King and R. Lo Presto (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017); S. Menn, "Aristotle's Philosophical Development," *Apeiron* 31 (1998): 407-15; A. P. Bos, "'Development' in the Study of Aristotle" (Amsterdam: Free University, 2006).

¹³ For the agreement between *De Anima* and the *De Generatione Animalium*, see C. D. C. Reeve, *Aristotle: De Anima Translated with Introduction and Notes* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2017), xviii-xxiv; *Aristotle: Generation of Animals and History of Animals I, Part of Animals I*, trans. with intro. and notes C. D. C. Reeve (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 2019), lxii-lxiv. Cf. A. P. Bos, "Pneuma as Quintessence of Aristotle's Philosophy," *Hermes* 141, no. 4 (2013): 417-18.

Therefore, the dialogue *Eudemus or On the Soul* cannot have been written before 354/353. But there is no indication how much later it was written. It may be that Aristotle responded spontaneously and rapidly to his pain at losing his friend and at the failure of the attempt to drive the tyrant Dionysius II from Syracuse.¹⁴ But this is not very likely. From the motive of Eudemus's death, which was connected in the plotline with the themes of illness and dreams and the theme of "returning home" of Eudemus, the "exile" (frag. 1 Ross; 56 Gigon), Aristotle developed a variety of subjects: the contrast between earthly existence and a nonearthly, everlasting existence; the soul's bondage to a body; and the fact that the soul's bondage to an earthly body is the worst catastrophe that can befall the soul. But he also elaborated the theme of this bondage as a "punishment" (τιμωρία, supplicium) (*Eudem.* frag. 6 Ross; 65 Gigon; *Protr.* 10b Ross; 73 and 823 Gigon). All these themes taken together suggest rather a philosophical discussion about the theme "What is the Soul," as considered in Plato's *Phaedo*, from an alternative and comprehensive perspective. And there is no need to date the *Phaedo* shortly after 399 BCE just because it describes Socrates's death.¹⁵

(3B) PLATONISM IN THE *EUDEMUS*?

The term "Platonism" has been applied to the *Eudemus* because its plotline talks about the dream prediction that Eudemus "will return home after five years." During a serious illness, Eudemus had heard three predictions in a dream, the first two of which were immediately fulfilled. On the basis of this dream prediction, he and his family and friends expected him to return "home" to his native town in Cyprus. But then he died in Sicily.¹⁶ The inference made here is that Aristotle wanted to emphasize that in 354/353 Eudemus's

¹⁴ Thus Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 39: "In this dialogue Aristotle immortalized the memory of his beloved friend and sought comfort for his sorrow." He was so preoccupied with the idea of an early, "Platonist" *Eudemus* that he concluded, "Not a word need be wasted on the singular insensibility that cannot see in it anything but a frigid stylistic exercise in the manner of the *Phaedo*" (Jaeger, *Aristotle*, 40; in the German original, on page 38, this passage reads, "Der Eudemus war ein Trostbuch. Über die seltsame Anästhesie, die in ihm nichts als eine frostige Stilübung in der Manier des Phaidon zu erkennen vermochte, ist kein Wort zu verlieren"). See, however, Gigon, "Prolegomena," 29-30: "Aristotle's dialogue was strongly dependent on Plato's *Phaedo*. ... I presume that Aristotle's dialogue on the one hand was different from Plato's, on the other hand that it invited the comparison"; and, on page 33: "it is wrong to regard this dialogue as an aberration of a young Aristotle, ... it constituted for many generations the standard document on Aristotle's opinions and doctrines περί ψυχῆς."

¹⁵ Cf. Gigon, "Prolegomena," 22.

¹⁶ These details seem to provide hard historical evidence on Eudemus. Yet we should consider that Eudemus of Cyprus could be a fictitious dialogue figure situated in a setting of historical figures and events and that the choice of his name may have been partly determined by the fact that Aristotle had a pupil called Eudemus of Rhodes. Nor does the story about the fulfilment of three dream predictions show conclusively that Aristotle himself once attached weight to dream predictions. In his work *De Divinatione per Somnum* 2, 463b12-15, he leaves little room for a divine origin of dreams. See Ph. J. van der Eijk, "Aristoteles Über Träume, Über die Weissagung im Schlaf" (PhD thesis, Leiden University, 1991); *Aristoteles, Over het geheugen, de slaap en de droom*, trans., intro., and annotated by van der Eijk (Groningen: Historische Uitgeverij, 2003). Cf. also M.-C. Paumier, "La théorie des songes d'Aristote dans le *De divinatione* de Cicéron," in *Aristoteles Romanus: La réception de la science aristotélicienne dans l'Empire gréco-romain*, ed. Y. Lehmann (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 245-61. In section 4.d below, we shall see that the opposition "sleeping" – "waking" is also important for Aristotle in the treatise *De Anima*. Although an *Elegy to Eudemus*, mentioning an altar honoring the friendship with Plato, has also been passed down by Aristotle, this may have formed part of Aristotle's dialogue *Eudemus*. See K. Gaiser, "Ein Gespräch mit König Philipp," but see also the radically different opinion of R. Renehan, "Aristotle's Elegiacs to Eudemus," *Illinois Classical Studies* 16, no. 1-2 (1991): 255-67.

soul had left his mortal body and returned to its heavenly “home.” Plato held this view in the *Phaedo*, and in this sense Aristotle was still said to be a “Platonist.”

At first sight it seems crystal clear that the central motif in Aristotle’s story in the *Eudemus* was that a human being has a soul and that the soul leaves the visible body when this human being dies, as in the case of Eudemus in the battle around Syracuse. But this is no more than a Jaegerian hypothesis. It is by no means certain that this was Aristotle’s point. We should seriously consider that he may have merely played with a double meaning of “returning home” (initially misunderstood, later better conceived) but also with the terms “soul” and “home” (of the soul). If Aristotle wanted to write not only a consolation for family members of his deceased friend but also a critique of and alternative to Plato’s *Phaedo* in a serious philosophical reflection on the theme of life and death, then there is good reason to suppose that he creatively incorporated information from Plato to make it clear that more matters need to be taken into account than Plato had done. For as a physician’s son,¹⁷ Aristotle held a very different view of life from Plato.

Just as Eudemus first thought that his dream was about his return to Cyprus and not about the soul’s return to a divine abode of origin, so it may have become clear in the course of the argument that the human self is not the soul but the intellect and that it is not a “soul” that returns somewhere but something else – namely, the intellect – and also that it is not about astral reality as the abode of origin and destination but about the sphere of the divine Intellect, which transcends the cosmos. If this were in fact the purport of the story about Eudemus, this text would be much closer to the content of the lecture treatise *De Anima*.

(3C) ETRURIAN PIRATES

We need to mention one more aspect that has played a role in the discussion about Aristotle’s dialogues.

Two of the fragments from Aristotle’s lost works contain the striking statement that Aristotle compared the condition of the soul in the visible body to the horrific torture to which Etrurian pirates in bygone days subjected their living prisoners: they bound them tightly to corpses of dead people and then abandoned them to their fate.¹⁸ No doubt his meaning here was to compare the corpse to a human being’s visible body and the living body to “his soul.”

Many commentators have seen this information as suited to the context of the *Eudemus* and as further evidence of the emotions that had gripped Aristotle when he wrote his dialogue the *Eudemus* or *On the Soul*. For this image no longer presents the

¹⁷ Aristotle’s father served the Macedonian king Amyntas in Pella. He had already died before Aristotle went to Athens. See Diogenes Laërtius, V 1.

¹⁸ See A. P. Bos, “Aristotle on the Etruscan Robbers: A Core Text of ‘Aristotelian’ Dualism,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 41 (2003): 289-306. W. Jaeger discusses the text in his treatment of the *Protrepticus* (*Aristotle: Fundamentals*, 100). But there are modern authors, such as Gigon, “Prolegomena,” 28, and J. Brunschwig, “Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens (À propos des fragments 60 Rose du *Protrepticus*),” *Revue Philosophique de la France* 153 (1963): 186-89, who believe that this passage is better assigned to the *Eudemus*. Brunschwig thinks that Iamblichus quoted from several lost works by Aristotle in his *Protrepticus*. On this matter, see D. S. Hutchinson and M. R. Johnson, “Authenticating Aristotle’s *Protrepticus*,” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 29 (2005): 193-294.

visible body as a “grave” for the soul, as Plato had done, or even as a “sarcophagus,” as J. Piquemal has aptly remarked.¹⁹ Here we seem to find a dualism of body and soul that has been taken to extremes. A. H. Chroust finds this reason enough to dismiss the argument of the *Eudemus*. It was merely an occasional work.²⁰

Yet Chroust's view is unjustified. Aristotle also did not support a separation of the soul from its body in the *Eudemus*. There, as in *De Anima*, the soul itself was presented as linked to a living (and instrumental) body. In *De Anima* II 1, 412a27-28, Aristotle describes the soul as “the first entelechy of a natural instrumental body that potentially possesses life.” As I have argued at length elsewhere (*Aristotle on God's Life-Generating Power*), this natural, instrumental body is not the visible body but πνεῦμα, analogous to the astral element. Instead of suspecting a wave of emotions on Aristotle's part, we should assume that, in speaking about the torture by the Etrurian Pirates, he offered a highly specific alternative to Plato's psychology.²¹ Whereas Plato in the *Phaedo* or *On the Soul* presented dying as the soul's liberation from the prison of the visible body and perhaps also as the soul's “awakening” from the sleep induced by its connection with corporeality (the “cock for Asclepius” in *Phaedo* 103 might refer to this – see below), Aristotle added an extra level to this process of liberation. He sees vegetative and nutritive existence as a condition from which the soul, bound as it is to its pneumatic soul-body, must be liberated. It is then “awakened” to sensitive and rational activity, and its fine-corporeal instrumental body can then regain its former condition of ethereal body. As such, it regains its astral nature (emphasized by Plato in his *Phaedrus*). The last step of liberation is that the soul's intellect, darkened in its state of bondage to mortality, leaves behind its instrumental body and as intellect “separated from all corporeality” unites with the divine Intellect. This shows that we should not see the intellect of the human soul as a “part” of the soul but as its real, uncorrupted core.

This special theme of liberation and awakening cannot be left aside as just an expression of deep sorrow and mourning, a surmise strengthened by the link that the mention of “Etrurian Pirates” produces with *Homeric Hymn VII* to Dionysus. This hymn relates that the young god Dionysus was taken captive by Etrurian *mafiosi* (ληϊσταὶ τυρσηνοί), who tied him down, hoping for an attractive ransom. But Dionysus had no trouble breaking his bonds (not for nothing his nickname was “Lyseus” – “Breaker of Bonds”) and changing into the shape of a lion, so that the kidnappers jumped overboard in mortal fear and continued to follow the ship as dolphins.

This Dionysus also connects with the figure of the demon Silenus, who plays a large part in the literal citation of fragment 6 of the *Eudemus*. Silenus was traditionally presented as a demigod and satyr in the immediate retinue of Dionysus.

¹⁹ J. Piquemal, “Sur une métaphore de Clément d'Alexandrie: les dieux, la mort, la mort des dieux,” *Revue Philosophique de la France et de l'Étranger* 153 (1963): 191.

²⁰ Cf. A. H. Chroust, *Aristotle: New Light on His Life and on Some of His Lost Works*, vol. 2 (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), 53-54.

²¹ The theme drew a great deal of attention in antiquity. In Gnosticism it led to the motif of the cosmic “Robbers,” who are responsible for the perishable bodies of human mortals in place of their imperishable (ethereal) bodies. A link is made here with the parable of the Good Samaritan and the “Robbers” who feature in it. See G. J. M. Bartelink, “Les Démons comme Brigands,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 21 (1967): 12-24.

The theme of the soul's bondage as "punishment" (τιμωρία) for a transgression of higher origin establishes another link with Plato, who also used the motif of the Titans, whose name already predicted the "penance" (τίσις) that they would have to pay and who had been shut up in the "Underworld" by Zeus on account of their offence against Ouranos. It is the "Titanic meaning-perspective" that is characteristic of Plato's worldview but that Aristotle developed in a variant of his own.

Moreover, Tertullian in his *De Anima* 46.10 has a remark about a "dreaming god Kronos (Saturn)" he found in Aristotle. Kronos is likely to have been contrasted there with the ever-vigilant Zeus,²² producing another connection with an important theme from *De Anima* II 1, which we will encounter again in section 4d below. A dreaming god calls to mind the central theme of Eudemos's dream and the question of the veracity of dreams. A dreaming Saturn / Kronos may also have figured as Archon of the cosmos and then be linked to the deity responsible for the motion of the cosmos and its infallible order according to Aristotle's *De Philosophia* book 3, as Cicero reports.²³ There, too, the veracity of our knowledge of the visible cosmos is called into question.

Such connections of themes from the text of the *Eudemos* could suggest that Aristotle intended the work as a thorough and serious alternative to the psychological theories that he had heard from his teacher Plato. This would certainly have drawn the attention of his contemporaries.

Is there a philosophical explanation for Aristotle's astonishing comparison of the condition of the soul of earthly man to the situation of a living prisoner tied to a corpse? There is indeed.

Primarily and most importantly, Aristotle's well-known definition of "soul" in *De Anima* II 1, 412b4-6, presents the soul as "the first entelechy of a natural body." This could well be read (and better than has been done for centuries) in the sense that the soul as entelechy, in an indissoluble conjunction with a special fine-material soul-body, is the vitalizing principle of the entire living organism of the concrete human being.

This fits well with all the passages in the Aristotelian Corpus in which he considers the presence of πνεῦμα – the special body that Aristotle sees as an analog of the astral element, ether – as necessary for life and being born.²⁴

In turn, this can be usefully connected with Aristotle's recognition and acceptance of an aspect of life neglected (or not given a clear theoretical foundation) in Plato: the vegetative, nutritive, generative life that he attributes to plants and trees (and by implication to humans and animals as well).²⁵

²² Cf. Arist. *Protrepticus*, 20 Ross; 979 Gigon. See A. P. Bos, "The Dreaming Kronos as World Archon in Plutarch's *De Facie in Orbe Lunae*," in *The Statesman in Plutarch's work*, ed. L. de Blois et al., vol. 1, *Plutarch's Statesman and His Aftermath: Political, Philosophical, and Literary Aspects* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 175-87; Bos, "Plutarch on the Sleeping Soul and the Waking Intellect and Aristotle's Double Entelechy Concept," in *Plutarch in the Religious and Philosophical Discourse of Late Antiquity*, ed. L. Roig Lanzillotta and Israel Muñoz Gallarto (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 23-42.

²³ Cf. Cicero, *De Natura Deorum* I 13, 33 = Arist. *De Philosophia*, frag. 26 Ross; 25, 1 Gigon, including the words "modo alium quendam praeficit mundo eique eas partes tribuit ut replicatione quadam mundi motum regat atque tueatur."

²⁴ Arist. *Gener. anim.* II 3, 736b33-737a1.

²⁵ It seems that, influenced by this view, Philo of Alexandria spoke of the visible body as a "corpse" and "bag of bones" that always needs to be dragged along. In the Alexandrian medical school, this may have led to more scope

4. THE HEART OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PLATO AND ARISTOTLE

(4A) LIFE DOES NOT START AT BIRTH BUT IN THE MOMENT OF PROCREATION

This one point forms the basis of all the important differences between Aristotle and his teacher.²⁶ Aristotle understood that life does not start when the first breath of life is inhaled but at the moment of “fertilization.”²⁷ This means nine months before a human baby takes its first breath. For Aristotle, it is clear that lungs must first be formed in an embryo before there can be respiration. But this raises a question: What agency is responsible for developing the embryo in the phase when the baby is not yet completed? Aristotle’s answer: It is an entelechy that pilots its instrumental body, *πνεῦμα*, and by means of *πνεῦμα* produces a new specimen in the womb entirely according to the model of a “human being.” For this reason, Aristotle stresses the need for the presence of *πνεῦμα* in a man’s semen, in a woman’s menstrual fluid, and in the material from which spontaneous generation is brought about. He can also claim that the semen of animals and fruits of plants possess soul (*Anim.* II 1, 412b25-27; *Gener. anim.* II 1, 735a4-9). For Aristotle, the crucial question was not how an embryo gets breath, motion, and vitality; rather, he asked what agency is at work to produce the body of an embryo after a pregnancy or fetation (*κύημα*) has been realized. This led him to unfold an entirely different perspective on the process of begetting, feeding, metabolism, and so forth. The visible body is therefore wholly dependent on a soul as guiding principle in combinations with a special soul-body, which consequently must be of a different order and quality from the mortal body. On the one hand he seems to have been strongly inspired by Plato in identifying *πνεῦμα* as this agency in mortal living creatures, which he describes in *De Generatione Animalium* II 3, 736b37 as an analog of ether, the element of divine astral beings, but at the same time he seems to have moved miles away from Plato’s soul-body dualism because he distinguishes the intellect sharply from the soul that is inseparable from its instrumental body.

for postmortem examinations. Aristotle himself remarked in one of his lost works that he who possessed “the eyes of Lynceus” and used them to regard the beauty of Alcibiades’s body would see nothing but a bag of bones and intestines (Boethius, *Consolatio Philosophiae* 3. 8 = Arist. *Protr.*, frag. 10a Ross; 10a R. Walzer, *Aristotelis Dialogorum Fragmenta*).

²⁶ Ps.-Hippolytus stresses the agreement between Plato and Aristotle save on the one matter of “the soul” (*Refutatio Omnium Haeresium* I 20, 3-6, ed. M. Marcovich [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1986]). See also Arist. *De Philos.*, frag. 26 Ross, 25; 1 Gigon, where I read “*multa turbat a magistro [suo Platone] uno dissentiens.*” See also M. D. Litwa, *Refutation of All Heresies: Translated with an Introduction and Notes* (Atlanta, GA: SBL Press, 2015), 64-67.

²⁷ Aristotle’s study *On the Generation of Animals* is one of his seminal works. His insights into procreation in various senses and embryonic development also meant that, in the work *On the Cosmos* 6, 397b21 and 399a31, God is not presented as “Father and Maker,” as Plato had done, but as “Begetter” (*γενέτωρ*) of all that lives. This insight into the beginning of life is also a compelling reason for the presence of the soul at the moment of fertilization (and not later, with the possession of differentiated organs). Cf. A. P. Bos, “The Soul and Soul-‘Parts’ in Semen (*GA* II 1, 735a4-22),” *Mnemosyne* 62, no. 3, ser. 4 (2009): 378-400; I. De Ribera-Martin, “Seed (*Sperma*) and *Kuēma* in Aristotle’s *Generation of Animals*,” *Journal of the History of Biology* 52, no. 1 (2019): 87-124; De Ribera-Martin, “Movement (Kinēsis) as Efficient Cause in Aristotle’s *Generation of Animals*,” Hopos: *The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science* 9, no. 2 (2019): 296-326; Aristotle’s *Generation of Animals: A Critical Guide*, ed. A. Falcon and D. Lefebvre (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); S. M. Connell, *Aristotle on Female Animals: A Study of the Generation of Animals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Connell, “Nutritive and Sentient Soul in Aristotle’s *Generation of Animals* 2.5,” *Phronesis* 65, no. 3 (2020): 324-54; N. Carraro, “Aristotle’s Embryology and Ackrill’s Problem,” *Phronesis* 62, no. 3 (2017): 274-304; *Aristotle’s Generation of Animals: A Comprehensive Approach*, ed. S. Föllinger (publication pending).

It is this new outlook on the realm of “living nature” that shifted Aristotle’s attention from πνεῦμα as “vital breath” to πνεῦμα as “vital heat” or “vital spirit.” Though he continues to talk about πνεῦμα as vitally important to all that lives, he introduces a distinction between the “externally” inhaled πνεῦμα, which is not present until birth, and the “implanted πνεῦμα” (ἔμφυτον πνεῦμα), which functions from the moment of fertilization. Respiration is radically revalued by Aristotle as useful and necessary for a small group of creatures that possess vital πνεῦμα of such purity and quality as to require cooling of the heart.²⁸

This is a drastic change compared with Plato’s views. One might expect Aristotle to address this explicitly in one of his works. There is in fact a treatise *On Pneuma* (*De Spiritu*) to his name, as part of the *Parva Naturalia* collection. But none of the modern editions regards this treatise as authentic.²⁹ However, anyone who has recognized the central role played by the vital-heat-bearing πνεῦμα throughout Aristotle’s treatment of biotic nature may be willing to reconsider this rejection.³⁰

(4B) BEING BEGOTTEN AS THE GREATEST CATASTROPHE FOR A HUMAN BEING

This gives us the opportunity to take a look at Plutarch’s famous text on “The Revelation by Silenus.”³¹ It, too, has often been cited as evidence of Aristotle’s negative and pessimistic frame of mind while writing his *Eudemus*. He explains there that Silenus had once been taken captive by King Midas, the man who almost brought about his own destruction by wishing that everything he touched would turn into gold and who since then had the big ears of a donkey. When Midas tried to force³² his prisoner to reveal what was “best” for man, Silenus finally answered that nothing could be “best” for man because “best” for man would be not to be born (τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι). Most preferable after that would be to die as soon as possible. This has also been said to offer an even gloomier view of earthly existence than we find in Plato.

Yet we might sense that the introduction of vegetative, nutritive life as a facet of the existence of all plants, animals, and human beings was a significant factor in Aristotle’s comparison. For him, it was evident that for a long time a living being functions at

²⁸ Cf. Arist. *De Respiratione* 13, 477a11-23.

²⁹ Here, too, Jaeger played an important role with his article “Das *Pneuma* im Lykeion,” *Hermes* 48, no. 1 (1913): 29-74; repr. in Jaeger, *Scripta Minora* (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1960), 57-102.

³⁰ Cf. A. P. Bos and R. Ferwerda, “Aristotle’s *De Spiritu* as a Critique of the Doctrine of *Pneuma* in Plato and His Predecessors,” *Mnemosyne* 60, no. 4 (2007) 565-88; Bos and Ferwerda, *Aristotle, On the Life-Bearing Spirit (De Spiritu): A Discussion with Plato and His Predecessors on Pneuma as the Instrumental Body of the Soul* (Leiden: Brill, 2008). For the opposite view, see P. Gregoric and O. Lewis, “Pseudo-Aristotelian *De Spiritu*: A New Case against Authenticity,” *Classical Philology* 110, no. 2 (2015) 159-67; M. Federspiel, *Pseudo-Aristotele: Des Couleurs, Des Sons, Du Souffle* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 2017).

³¹ Arist. *Eudem.*, frag. 6 Ross; 65 Gigon. On Silenus, see H. J. Drossaart Lulofs, who observes the close connections with Plato’s *Symposium* 216d-e; 215b; 221e, where Alcibiades draws a comparison between Socrates and Silenus (*De Ogen van Lynceus* [Leiden: Brill, 1967], 16-17). See also A. P. Bos, “Silenus als Bemiddelaar van Gnostische Kennis in Aristoteles’ Dialoog *Eudemus*,” in *Waar Haalden de Gnostici hun Wijsheid vandaan? Over de Bronnen, de Doelgroep en de Tegenstanders van de Gnostische Beweging*, ed. A. P. Bos and G. P. Luttkhuizen (Budel: Damon, 2016), 65-83, 301-5.

³² As if Silenus couldn’t have broken his bonds too, just like Dionysus! See Drossaart Lulofs, *De Ogen van Lynceus*, 31n38. The theme was also made famous by Euripides’s *Bacchae*.

a purely vegetable and vegetative level³³ and that there is no trace of what is man's pride and status: his rationality and intellectuality. In Aristotle's estimation, the entire embryonic development is "natural" and "goal-oriented" but does not display the dignity of what it is to be human. Aristotle's clear distinction of the vegetative level in human life has widened the gap between the first phase of being human and the true phase of man's purpose in life.

Another striking feature in the formulations of the texts on the "Etrurian Pirates" is that "being bound" is paraphrased by the terms "coupled" (*copulatos*), "coupling" (σύνεσξις), and "united" (*coniunctos*), terms that immediately suggest the process of generation and growth. This may be readily associated with what Aristotle said about πνεῦμα (*Gener. anim.* III 11, 762b19-20), which is present in all sublunary elements and completely pervades living beings, though the soul as governing authority is always situated in a central place, the heart.

(4C) THE INTELLECT, NOT THE SOUL, AS THE TRUE PRINCIPLE OF LIFE

Moreover, Aristotle connects man's true life not with his soul but with his intellect – that is, with the intellect as separated and no longer combined with the instrumental body of the soul.³⁴ It is very likely that he already discussed this in the *Eudemus* in a debate on Plato's position. A text in Themistius's *Paraphrase of Aristotle's De Anima*³⁵ reports that all Plato's proofs for the immortality of the soul are actually proofs for the immortality of the intellect, whether this involves the arguments of the *Phaedo*, of the *Phaedrus*, the motif of uniformity with God in the *Theaetetus*, or the *Meno*. When Themistius explicitly mentions the *Eudemus* and says that Aristotle argues the same there, we can safely assume that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle systematically explained the need for distinguishing strictly between the intellect on the one hand and, on the other hand, the soul as vehicle of the nutritive and sensitive vital functions, which are evidently connected with visible reality. Perhaps he presented himself as the discussion leader in this dialogue.³⁶

This is another indication of the systematic character of Aristotle's *Eudemus* relating to the central, dominant difference of opinion between Plato and his pupil. It was certainly not a work full of passion but one full of fundamental philosophical debate. It is clear, too, that, in his sharp distinction between "intellect" and "soul," Aristotle cannot be called a "Platonist" but pointedly criticizes the ambiguity in Plato's philosophy, which regularly presented the intellect as the highest part or the helmsman of the soul.

Aristotle, in my view, made it clear that Eudemus's "soul" is not material but not immortal either. The soul is an immaterial, guiding principle that is inextricably connected with a fine-material (pneumatic) body that serves the soul as an instrument.³⁷

³³ There is good reason to consider that Aristotle presented Endymion, the man of everlasting sleep, as a symbol of this condition in the *Eudemus* (frag. 11 Ross) and referred to this in *Eth. Nic.* X 8, 1178b18-20. Cf. A. P. Bos, "Is the 'Greek King' in Aristotle's *Eudemus* Frag. 11 (Ross) Endymion of Elis?," *The Modern Schoolman* 65, no. 2 (1988): 79-96.

³⁴ Cf. *Anim.* I 4, 408b18-30; II 2, 413b24-27.

³⁵ Arist. *Eudem.*, frag. 2 Ross; 58 Gigon. Cf. Gerson, *Aristotle and Other Platonists*, 55-57.

³⁶ See Cicero, *Ad Atticum* 13, 19, 3-4 = Ross, *Aristotelis Fragmenta Selecta*, 3.

³⁷ This is also his position in the *De Anima* II 2, 414b20-21.

Actually, Aristotle may be understood as saying that the soul is an immaterial “intellect” but one that is denatured by its connection with a fine-material body. For Eudemus’s vital principle, truly “returning home” is not a departure from the coarse-material body but a uniting with God as pure Intellect, freed from the soul-body. The “liberation” that Plato had talked about in his *Phaedo* has become a two-stage process in Aristotle: first the casting off of the coarse-material, perishable body and then the obtaining of an ethereal, immortal body in its place; but the ultimate goal is the casting off of the pneumatic / ethereal soul-body.³⁸

(4D) WHAT IS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN AN INTELLECT AND A SOUL IN ARISTOTLE?

This leads us to the question: What is actually the difference between an intellect and a soul in Aristotle? We find no clear answer to this in Aristotle’s oeuvre. This may surprise us, but it does not mean that we cannot tentatively say something about it.

In *De Anima* II 1, 412b4-6, Aristotle makes it clear that the soul “is an entelechy of a natural body that serves this entelechy as an instrument.” An intellect, on the other hand, is always said to be “free from corporeality” (*Anim.* II 2, 413b24-27). But an intellect, too, is called an “entelechy” by Aristotle (as is implicit in his statement in *Anim.* II 1, 413a6-7).

He also briefly mentions a “first” entelechy but without explaining what a “second entelechy” might be.

In all the centuries in which scholars have thought about this core text from Aristotle’s philosophy, the problems surrounding *De Anima* II 1 have caused great perplexity.³⁹

In a 2018 study,⁴⁰ I proposed as Aristotle’s view that every mortal creature owes its vital functions to an entelechy as the guiding principle of a fine-material, pneumatic soul-body that is the vehicle of vital heat. This “first entelechy” leads the process of metabolism, embryonic growth, and the formation of all the various parts of the visible body. In this process, through the same instrumental, pneumatic body, it enables perceptive activity and motor activity as well.⁴¹ But Aristotle also mentions in *De Anima* II 1, 412a22-26, that

³⁸ That makes the difference between Platonic and Aristotelian dualism. For Aristotle, intellect is not just one of the three parts of the soul. Cf. A. P. Bos, “The Distinction between ‘Platonic’ and ‘Aristotelian’ Dualism, Illustrated from Plutarch’s Myth in *De Facie in Orbe Lunae*,” in *Estudios sobre Plutarco: Misticismo y religiones místicas en la Obra de Plutarco*, ed. A. Pérez Jiménez and F. Casadesús Bordoy (Madrid: Ediciones Clásicas, 2001), 57-70, and Bos, “‘Aristotelian’ and ‘Platonic’ Dualism in Hellenistic and Early Christian Philosophy and in Gnosticism,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 56, no. 3 (2002): 273-91.

³⁹ We need to consider here that this only became possible long after Aristotle’s death through the rediscovery of Aristotle’s lecture treatises, which he had bequeathed to Neleus and which were only made public in the first century BCE by Tyrannion and Andronicus of Rhodes. On this, see O. Primavesi, “Ein Blick in den Stollen von Skepsis: Vier Kapitel zur Frühen Überlieferung des Corpus Aristotelicum,” *Philologus* 151, no. 1 (2007): 51-77. See also J. Barnes, “Roman Aristotle,” in *Philosophia Togata*, ed. J. Barnes and M. Griffin, vol. 2, *Plato and Aristotle at Rome* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 1-69.

⁴⁰ A. P. Bos, *Aristotle on God’s Life-Generating Power and on Pneuma as Its Vehicle* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2018), 212-35. See also Bos, “Aristotle on Life-Bearing *Pneuma* and on God as Begetter of the Cosmos,” in *Aristotle – Contemporary Perspectives on His Thought: On the 2400th Anniversary of Aristotle’s Birth*, ed. D. Sfendoni-Mentzou (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 109-24.

⁴¹ In *De Anima* II 2, Aristotle proves that, although various parts (functions) of the soul may exist, they are not spatially separate.

“in the existence of soul it is necessary to distinguish between ‘sleeping’ and ‘waking.’”⁴² In my view, his meaning here has never been properly explained.

A major breakthrough could be achieved if we were to accept a new solution. I believe Aristotle’s meaning is that a transition is possible within the specific category of human beings from “entelechy in a sleeping state” to “awakened entelechy.” Aristotle would thus be referring to the decisive step that a human being can take by starting to lead and guide his own life by means of his rationality in dependence on his intellectuality. Then the spark of divine intellect is “awakened”⁴³ in a human being and his soul no longer controls his activities as “first entelechy” but as “higher,” “second” entelechy.

Against the background of this central text in *De Anima* II 1, we can then understand why the theme of sleeping, dreaming, and awaking is a crucial motif in Aristotle’s *Eudemus* and in what sense he may have talked about a “dreaming Saturn,” as Tertullian reports in his *De Anima*.

In that case it would make sense if the demon Silenus, in his revelation to King Midas, not only told how the human condition of an embryo and an irrational child cannot possibly be praised as a model of true humanity. We might also expect that he was asked to explain how this disastrous situation of a sleeping or even comatose intellect came about.

We might then suspect that Aristotle linked up to information that he could have derived from Plato himself. After all, Plato had repeatedly identified the intellect as the directive principle of the soul. And in *Phaedrus* 246d and following, he had described the intellect’s ascent to the purely transcendent and then talked about the collisions of the soul-chariots,⁴⁴ owing to which the intellects descended into the astral world and ended up in a coarse-material mortal being (248d). In *Timaeus* 35a, Plato had presented souls as the products of “mixture” in the great Mixing Bowl of the Demiurge.

In this way Aristotle must have explained that intellect-principles became “bound” to astral fine materiality in a “fall,” a “transgression” they committed by breaking the Primal Unity with the divine Intellect and thus becoming “bound” by a fine-material body. It may well be that in such a myth about a “fall” he brought up the ancient Titan Kronos

⁴² *Anim.* II 1, 412a22-26: Αὐτὴ δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ’ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. Φανερόν οὖν ὅτι ὡς ἐπιστήμη· ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τῆν ψυχὴν καὶ ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσις ἐστίν, ἀνάλογον δ’ ἡ μὲν ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ’ ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν· προτέρα δὲ τῆ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἡ ἐπιστήμη. Here the emphasized sentence should be read as “For in being soul there is sleep and waking.” The reading by S. Menn, “Aristotle’s Definition of Soul and the Programme of the *De Anima*,” *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 22 (2002): 105: “For within the soul’s being present there are both sleeping and waking”; and by Reeve, *Aristotle: De Anima*, 21: “For both sleep and waking depend on the presence of the soul,” must be rejected.

⁴³ This is in fact the heart of Aristotle’s philosophy. (We might reasonably connect this statement with the sentence in II 1, 413a7-9, about the entelechy as “boatman,” and with I 4, 407b26, about the soul as using its body as instrument.) An intriguing question is whether he connected this theme of the soul being awakened with Socrates’s last words as attributed to him by Plato in the *Phaedo*: “Crito, we owe Asclepius a cock. Do not neglect it!” On this, see G. W. Most, “A Cock for Asclepius,” *Classical Quarterly* 43, no. 1 (1993): 96-111, who links the words to the statement in the dialogue (59b) that Plato was not present at Socrates’s death because he was ill. In one of his lost works, Aristotle had presented earthly life itself as a form of serious illness. Cf. Proclus, *In Plat. Remp.* 2, 349, 13-26 = Arist. *Eudem.*, frag. 5 Ross; 923 Gigon.

⁴⁴ Plato had presented the intellect as the driver of the chariot and horses as the forces responsible for motion. He did not assign a special role to the chariot itself. Aristotle seems to have awarded to ether or πνεῦμα the role of the moving chariot (ὄχημα), steered by the “power” of the intellect. Hence, in *Motu anim.* 10 and *Anim.* III 10, 433b19-20, he attributed the cause of locomotion not to one of the parts of the soul but to its instrumental body.

and a cunning assault by the Titans on the young god Dionysus, whom they lured with toys and then mangled and devoured⁴⁵ (with the exception of his heart, from which the “rebirth” of Dionysus becomes possible).

Looking back from this point, we can put some more emphasis on the story about Eudemus’s origin in Cyprus. For Cyprus is traditionally connected with the goddess of love, Aphrodite. In his story about the seizure of power in the world of the gods, Hesiod had already told how at the request of Mother Gaia, who could no longer endure her endless pregnancies, Kronos cut off the genitals of the Celestial God, Ouranos, and then cast them behind him. These had ended up near Cyprus, and Aphrodite was born from the resulting foam (ἀφρός). In his treatise *De Generatione Animalium* II 2, 736a18-21, Aristotle emphatically linked up with this ancient story and with the πνεῦμα that must always be in sperm to make sperm fertile.

(4E) TALK IN THE *EUEDEMUS* ABOUT THE DESCENT OF THE SOUL AND ITS COVERINGS

The conjecture that Silenus not only stated that becoming human in the sublunary sphere was the greatest catastrophe that can befall a rational being but also said something about why this is the case seems to be supported by the Neoplatonist philosopher Proclus in his commentary on Plato’s *Timaeus* 338c.⁴⁶ He explains that in the *Timaeus* Plato talked about the connection of the soul with corporeality but omitted all details about how this actually works. Aristotle, says Proclus, did the same in his lecture treatise *De Anima*, where he discussed the subject from a “natural-philosophical” (φυσικῶς) point of view. He did not digress there on the soul’s descent and the soul’s coverings (λήξεις) resulting from it. But “in his dialogues” he talked separately about this (i.e., the soul’s descent and its “coverings”) and set out the “fundamental argumentation” (τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον), the comprehensive framework for this.

Proclus does not explicitly mention the *Eudemus* but rather refers to “the dialogues.” However, what we know about Silenus’s revelation and about the torture by the Etrurian Pirates gives us good reason to conclude that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle set out his all-encompassing perspective on “life” and on the difference in levels resulting from loss of quality of intellect-principles and the instrumental body in which this principle is clothed.⁴⁷

5. IS THERE A REAL CONFLICT BETWEEN THE *EUEDEMUS* AND THE TREATISE *DE ANIMA*?

But why then the tension in many commentators’ conceptions between the content of Aristotle’s *Eudemus* and his school treatises, particularly his *De Anima*? This has everything to do with Aristotle’s presentation of “the soul” in *De Anima* II 1, 412b4-6, as “the first entelechy of a natural body that is ὀργανικόν.”

⁴⁵ Cf. Brunschwig, “Aristote et les pirates tyrrhéniens,” 182: “l’âme s’étire tout au long de l’espace corporel, elle se spatialisait en même temps qu’elle s’incarne. Tel Dionysos démembré et déchiré, tel aussi le prisonnier des pirates tyrrhéniens, étalé membre à membre le long de son macabre partenaire.”

⁴⁶ Cf. Arist. *Eudem.*, frag. 4 Ross; 66 Gigon. See A. J. Festugière, *Proclus, Commentaire sur le “Timée.” Traduction et Notes*, 5 vols. (Paris: Vrin, 1966-68).

⁴⁷ Proclus thus indicated an important difference between Aristotle’s dialogues and his lecture treatises. He is certainly not saying that the dialogues did not seriously represent Aristotle’s views, as Alexander of Aphrodisias claimed. This is misunderstood by Schneeweiss, *Aristoteles’ Protreptikos*, 191, in his assessment of the role of “myth” in Aristotle’s exoteric writings.

In this most general description of the soul as announced by Aristotle, nobody knows what Aristotle meant by the term “entelechy,”⁴⁸ and starting with Alexander of Aphrodisias around 200 CE the term ὄργανικόν was wrongly translated and interpreted as “provided with organs.”⁴⁹ Of course a body “provided with organs” cannot be anything but a visible, changeable body. But the term never had this meaning in Aristotle’s time. Nor was this Aristotle’s intention. In 1987 it was argued for the first time that the term ὄργανικόν should be translated as “serving as an instrument,” “instrumental,”⁵⁰ and this view is now generally accepted.⁵¹

This means that we have to choose between (a) the visible body, which is instrumental for the soul, or (b) another, special body with special properties that is instrumental for the soul.

Option (a) was chosen on the basis of the misinterpretation of the term ὄργανικόν by Alexander of Aphrodisias around 200 CE and by countless scholars after him (who perhaps were misled by the lines 412b1-4)⁵² but ran up against the obvious problem that it leaves unclear how the body can move. For the soul itself is not a self-moved principle of movement, as Aristotle argued at length in *De Anima* I 2-3.

Aristotle must have defended option (b).⁵³ In doing so, he must have meant the heavenly ether as the instrumental body of the souls of the stars and planets and πνεῦμα as the instrumental body of the souls of mortal beings. And he chose the neutral term “instrumental body” because he emphatically distinguished instrumental bodies in two different conditions.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ Translations such as “actuality,” “activity,” and “actualization” are impossible in any case, since the soul then cannot use its body as an “instrument” (*Anim.* I 3, 407b26-27) or be its passenger (II 1, 413a8-9). The term ἐντελέχεια must mean something like “the goal-pointing principle.” See Bos, *Aristotle on God’s Life-Generating Power*, 212-17.

⁴⁹ See the standard commentaries by R. D. Hicks, *Aristotle: De Anima, with Translation, Introduction and Notes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1907), 51; and W. D. Ross, *Aristotle: De Anima. Edited, with Introduction and Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), 20. Coombs (“Aristotle’s Harmony with Plato,” 547) continues this tradition. We must keep in mind that a *kyèma* already possesses a soul but no organs.

⁵⁰ See L. A. Kosman, “Animals and Other Beings in Aristotle,” in *Philosophical Issues in Aristotle’s Biology*, ed. A. Gotthelf and J. G. Lennox (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 376.

⁵¹ Cf. S. Everson, *Aristotle on Perception* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), 64; A. P. Bos, “Why the Soul Needs an Instrumental Body according to Aristotle (*Anim.* I 3, 407b13-26),” *Hermes* 128, no. 1 (2000): 20-31; Bos, *The Soul and Its Instrumental Body: A Reinterpretation of Aristotle’s Philosophy of Living Nature* (Leiden: Brill, 2003), 85-94; Gerson, *Aristotle and Other Platonists*, 136; P. Thillet, *Aristote: De l’Âme. Traduit du Grec. Édition Établie, Présentée et Annotée* (Paris: Gallimard, 2005), 64n4. Gerson notes here, “But how could that which uses the body as an instrument also be a form or actualization of that body?” and 137, “if soul is the actuality of a body, the very instrumentality of the body ... is inexplicable.”

⁵² On these, see A. P. Bos, “Aristotle’s Definition of the Soul: Why Was It Misunderstood for Centuries? The Dubious Lines *Anim.* II 1, 412b1-4,” *Museum Helveticum* 69, no. 2 (2012): 140-55.

⁵³ Cf. Reeve, in *Aristotle, De Anima*, xviii-xxiv. He describes πνεῦμα as “soul-transmitting” (xxii). See also his *Action, Contemplation, and Happiness: An Essay on Aristotle* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012), 1-8.

⁵⁴ It remains totally unclear why Aristotle formulated his definition of “the soul” in *De Anima* II 1 as he did if he simply meant a dualism between visible body and soul. For a “natural body” can never be a body provided with organs, let alone “potentially possessing life,” because in that case it must already be ensouled. Aristotle’s definition of the soul also would apply to mortal living beings only.

This removes the supposed opposition between Aristotle's dialogues and his school treatises⁵⁵ but also that between his school treatises and the biological writings, which F. Nuyens had assigned to a middle phase on account of their "instrumentalism" – that is to say, their presentation of *πνεῦμα* as the instrument of the vital functions.

Aristotle had to come up with a special soul-body because he had postulated the Intellect as the principle of origin but kept the Intellect clearly separate from corporeality and all movement connected with it. The Intellect is characterized by a guiding activity for all dependent reality. This dependent reality is material reality, in various gradations. His *πνεῦμα* doctrine therefore was not introduced temporarily or abandoned at some time but was an essential part of his alternative to Plato's solution to the problem of the relation between the immaterial soul and the corporeal body.

6. RELATED QUESTIONS

(6A) IS A DEFINITION OF "THE SOUL" POSSIBLE IN ARISTOTLE'S VIEW?

In *De Anima* II 1, 412a5, Aristotle announces that he will give the most comprehensive (*κοινότατος λόγος*) account of "soul,"⁵⁶ and he goes on to make a clear attempt, although one requiring several preambles. Many readers will agree with the following formulation as a rendering of Aristotle's definition: "the soul is the first entelechy of a natural body that potentially possesses life and that is instrumental [*ὄργανικόν*]."

In *De Anima* II 2, 414a20-22, he further clarifies that the soul "is not a body, but something of a body." Although this "natural body that is an instrument" is essential for the soul's being soul, it is not itself the soul.

Authors in antiquity were already unclear about Aristotle's view of the soul. Cicero says repeatedly that according to Aristotle the soul consists of a *quinta essentia*, which makes up the stars and planets too.⁵⁷ Ps.-Hippolytus, who in his *Refutation of All Heresies* provides striking details on the materiality of the soul according to Aristotle, doesn't seem to have the faintest idea in his book I 20, 3-6, of the soul as an immaterial, guiding principle. But in book VII 24, 1-2, he turns out to know very precisely Aristotle's definition of the soul in *De Anima* II 1 and even to know that Aristotle meant *ὄργανικόν* in the sense of "instrumental."

A highly intriguing question is why the older reports on Aristotle's lost works, such as Cicero's, fail to mention the term "entelechy."⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Just as Jaeger (*Aristotle: Fundamentals*, 228-58) sees clear traces of Aristotle's *Protrepticus* in the *Ethica Eudemia*, so we must read his *De Anima* as a systematic and detailed elaboration of the lines set out in the dialogue *Eudemus*. Cf. Gigon, "Prolegomena," 28-29.

⁵⁶ It has always been remarkable that the standard explanation of this definition since Alexander of Aphrodisias cannot possibly apply to the souls of stars and planets, which do not possess "bodies provided with organs."

⁵⁷ Arist. *Philos.*, frag. 27a-e Ross; T 18, 1; frag. 994, 995, 996, 986 Gigon. These texts cannot be dismissed as based on a pure misunderstanding by Cicero, as P. Moraux would have us believe ("*Quinta Essentia*," *P.W.-R.E.* 47 Halbbd [Stuttgart: Anton Hiersemann, 1963]: 1209ff.).

⁵⁸ But see *Tusc.* 1. 10, 22 = Arist. *Philos.* 27 b Ross; 994 Gigon, where Cicero ascribes the concept of *ἐνδελέχεια* to Aristotle as an indication of the ether's continuous motion.

(6B) SHOULD THE RELATION OF THE *EUEMUS* TO THE *PROTREPTEICUS* AND *DE PHILOSOPHIA* BE RECONSIDERED?

We have seen the weak foundation of Jaeger's claim that the *Eudemus* was written shortly after 354/353, with an entirely Platonist, strongly religious and mythical, Orphic coloring. In this view, the *Protrepticus* was written later,⁵⁹ and in *De Philosophia* Aristotle then presented his own, non-Platonist outlook to the outside world for the first time. Such a distinction finds little support nowadays.

Rather, we should consider that the *Eudemus* displayed strongly protreptic features and that the *Protrepticus*, which was dedicated to King Themison of Cyprus, may well have made a connection between Themison and Eudemus of Cyprus.⁶⁰ And when Cicero reports that *De Philosophia* comprised at least three books, it is reasonable to suggest that Aristotle published a multivolume work, the various parts of which may have had a certain independence.

In any case, a common feature of these writings was that they offered a comprehensive perspective, unlike the school treatises of the Aristotelian Corpus.

(6C) WHAT DID ARISTOTLE MEAN BY THE TERM ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΙ ΛΟΓΟΙ?

This leads me to a last, concluding question about Aristotle's *Eudemus*, but also his other lost works. This question is: Are these the writings that Aristotle sometimes referred to as ἐξωτερικοί λόγοι? We encounter this term in Aristotle's own extant treatises, but we do not know what it refers to.⁶¹ An additional problem is the fact that the term also occurs in the *Ethica Eudemia*, which in the nineteenth century was still regarded as a work by Eudemus of Rhodes.⁶² This being the case, its reference to ἐξωτερικοί λόγοι could not be taken as referring to a work by Aristotle. Once this obstacle was removed, several options remained open for interpreting the expression: (a) writings for *outsiders*; (b) writings on subjects falling *outside* the current theme;⁶³ (c) writings on subjects raised by schools *outside* the Peripatos.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ See W. Jaeger, *Studien zur Entstehungsgeschichte der Metaphysik des Aristoteles* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1912), 131-48; I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: An Attempt at Reconstruction* (Gothenburg: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1961); G. Schneeweiss, *Aristoteles' Protreptikos: Hinführung zur Philosophie, rekonstruiert, übersetzt und kommentiert* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2005), 189-97; Schneeweiss, "Die Überlieferungen von Themison und Sardanapall. Zur Datierung des aristotelischen Protreptikos," *Gymnasium* 117, no. 6 (2010): 531-57. Schneeweiss dates the *Protrepticus* to 331 and therefore much later than Jaeger had done. He does so because fragment 16 (Ross) of the *Protrepticus* mentions a parody on a famous epitaph of the Assyrian king Assurbanipal. He believes that this epitaph only became known through Alexander the Great's campaign.

⁶⁰ Cf. A. P. Bos, "Aristotle's *Eudemus* and *Protrepticus*: Are They Really Two Different Works?," *Dionysius* 8 (1984): 19-51.

⁶¹ Cf. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition*, 426-43, for this term in the post-Aristotelian tradition. See also A. P. Bos, "Exōterikoi Logoi and Enkyklioi Logoi in the Corpus Aristotelicum and the Origin of the Idea of the *Enkyklios Paideia*," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 50, no. 2 (1989): 179-98, where all the relevant texts are mentioned; Gerson, *Aristotle and Other Platonists*, 49-51.

⁶² See J. Bernays, *Die Dialoge des Aristoteles in ihrem Verhältnisse zu seinen übrigen Werken* (Berlin: W. Hertz, 1863). For a critical analysis, see Jaeger, *Aristotle: Fundamentals*, 246-58.

⁶³ W. Wieland, "Aristoteles als Rhetoriker und die exoterischen Schifften," *Hermes* 86, no. 3 (1958): 337-38, who assumed a reference to the *Rhetorica*.

⁶⁴ H. Diels, "Über die exoterischen Reden des Aristoteles," *Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften* 19 (1883): 477-94, who connected the term with writings from outside the Peripatetic school.

We have seen that explanation (a) “intended for outsiders” was defended by Alexander of Aphrodisias. This must be connected with his opinion that the view argued in these writings was incompatible with what he read as Aristotle’s genuine, scientific view in his treatises. But we do not know whether Alexander of Aphrodisias was the first to support this position. The circulation of Aristotle’s personal texts, which Neleus had preserved in Scepsis, could have something to do with it. Did Andronicus of Rhodes try to “tout” his edition of these hitherto unknown or less known works by putting them on the market as the “genuine” Aristotle? This would explain why Cicero is the author in whom we find the expression for the first time outside of Aristotle’s texts.

Another broad tradition holds that Aristotle, in the years that he led the Peripatos, gave “exoteric” lectures in the morning and “esoteric” ones (and therefore not open to all) in the afternoon, for those who had achieved a certain level of competence.⁶⁵ This view must also be of later date. Solid evidence supporting it has never been provided. And Aristotle himself never uses the term “esoteric” in this sense.

Aristotle does use another term whose purport for him we do not know: ἐγκύκλιοι λόγοι.⁶⁶ This term, too, has often been taken to refer to Aristotle’s lost works. But how this term relates to the other one is again unclear. The meaning most often proposed is “in circulation,” “publicly accessible.” After the discovery of Aristotle’s private collection of writings, this meaning could, of course, be contrasted with Aristotle’s school treatises as being “secret,” “not public.” But there is no indication that Aristotle took them in this sense.

Therefore, I want to adduce arguments for a different meaning of the term ἐξωτερικοὶ λόγοι: (d) works treating themes that go *beyond* the ordinary, visible world. Explanation (d) can be underpinned in various ways.

First, we are then dealing with a use of λόγοι that says something about the content of such a work, which is the common usage: φυσικοὶ λόγοι, ἠθικοὶ λόγοι. Second, Aristotle must have set forth his comprehensive perspective somewhere. Third, he was the first to distinguish carefully all kinds of levels of knowledge: perception, memory, reasoning, knowledge of craft, the collection of the empirical sciences, and “first philosophy.”⁶⁷

In the *Eudemus*, as we saw, he in any case discussed the theme of “sleeping,” “dreaming,” and “waking.”⁶⁸ But G. Méautis has also noted that Aristotle’s dialogue clearly models Eudemus on Odysseus, the man of many wanderings, far from home, driven by the ultimate desire to “return home” (nost-algia).⁶⁹ For Odysseus, this also meant being

⁶⁵ Cf. Düring, *Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition* 426-43.

⁶⁶ *E.N.* I 3, 1096a3; *Cael.* I 9, 279a30.

⁶⁷ Cf. Arist. *Metaphysica* A 1, 980a20-982a3. *Metaph.* A 2, 982b29-30, also emphasizes that “human nature is in many respects unfree,” and *a* 1, 993b9-11, underlines that as the eyes of bats are to sunlight, so the intellect of the human soul is to the most knowable things in nature, in a passage that directly calls to mind the famous text in Homer, *Odyssey* 24, 1-14, featuring Hermes, the escort of souls, who, bearing his golden wand, “with which he wakes the sleeping and puts asleep the waking,” escorts the souls of the killed suitors, squeaking like bats, to the underworld.

⁶⁸ See Drossaert Lulofs, *De Ogen van Lynceus*, 32-33, 33n55.

⁶⁹ G. Méautis, “L’Orphisme dans l’*Eudème* d’Aristote,” *Revue des Études Anciennes* 57, no. 3-4 (1955): 254-67.

reunited with his beloved Penelope, who had persistently rejected the favors of her suitors so that they, for want of better, dallied with the handmaidens.⁷⁰

Eudemus may have been presented by Aristotle as “man” in search of his true destiny, which lies not in pleasure or power or prestige and knowledge but in self-knowledge and knowledge of God (Wisdom). A supporting argument is that one of his lost works probably depicted “the Isles of the Blessed” as an abode where the inhabitants rejoice in their comprehensive knowledge of the cosmos, without needing to concern themselves with practical affairs or politics or farming.⁷¹ This mythical place was always associated with Kronos, who was king there after being deposed by Zeus. The suggestion seems to be that there is a higher order of knowledge than that possessed by the inhabitants of the Isles of the Blessed – namely, “first philosophy.” Aristotle appears to have designated Kronos as the Archon of the cosmos, responsible for motion and order in the cosmos but not the ultimate source of Truth because as Archon of the visible cosmos Kronos is burdened with an “instrumental body,” ether. Perhaps that is why he was presented by Aristotle as “dreaming.” Plutarch used this motif in his work *De Facie in Orbe Lunae* to portray the world government of Kronos as a pale imitation of the perfect knowledge of Zeus.⁷²

If we may assume that in the *Eudemus* Aristotle already unfolded his entire system of human knowledge and the edifice of the sciences, culminating in “first philosophy,” and named them as the collection of empirical “encyclical” (!) sciences, in contrast with and subordinate to the one, absolutely “free” science of theoretical philosophy, which transcends cosmic philosophy to rise to the “exoteric” reality of the Transcendent⁷³ – if we may so assume, then it is perfectly clear that the *Eudemus* cannot have been an immature juvenile work but was an exposition of Aristotle’s comprehensive view of life and the world, wholly in line with the lectures he gave in the Peripatos during the final years of his life.

Aristotle realized that science works on the basis of established principles but also that no scientific decision on these principles is possible. Science is always led and determined by a paradigm or meaning-perspective.⁷⁴ In opting for the “Titanic meaning-perspective,”⁷⁵ Aristotle followed his teacher, but the changes he made to it had a profound influence on the philosophy of many centuries after him.⁷⁶

⁷⁰ Associations with this theme are called up in Arist. *Metaph.* A 2, 982b3 and 982b27, where the highest form of knowledge is called “the most authoritative” and “the most free.”

⁷¹ See Arist. *Protrepticus* 12 a-b Ross; 824 and 73 Gigon.

⁷² See Bos, “The Dreaming Kronos as World Archon,” 175-87; P. L. Donini, “Crono e Zeus nel Mito di Plutarco, *De Facie in Orbe Lunae*,” in *Dignum Laude Virum. Studi di Cultura Classica e Musica offerti à Franco Serpa*, ed. F. Bottari, L. Casarsa, L. Cristante, and M. Fernandelli (Trieste: Edizioni Università di Trieste, 2011), 105-18.

⁷³ See A. P. Bos, “Immanenz und Transzendenz,” in *Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum*, ed. E. Dassmann, vol. 17 (Stuttgart: A. Hierseman, 1995), 1041-92.

⁷⁴ Cf. Arist. *Physica* I 2, 185a17-20. Precisely this text is mentioned by Eudemus of Rhodes as an “*exōterikē aporia*.” Cf. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum Libros Commentaria*, ed. H. Diels, C.I.A.G., vol. 9 (Berlin, 1882), 83, 27; 85, 26; and 86, 1 = Eudemus of Rhodes, ed. F. Wehrli, 2nd ed. (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 1969), frag. 36.

⁷⁵ See above, sec. 3c. See also A. P. Bos, *In de Greep van de Titanen. Inleiding tot een Hoofdstroming van de Griekse Filosofie* (Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1991).

⁷⁶ This is the truth of L. P. Gerson in the final chapter of his *Aristotle and Other Platonists*, 275-90. See 290: “Even when Aristotle is criticizing Plato, as in, for example, *De Anima*, he is led ... to draw conclusions based on Platonic assumptions.”

HEGEL: TRANSLATOR AND READER OF ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA*

Aristotle's books on the soul with his treatments of its particular aspects and conditions are [...] still the prime or sole work of speculative interest about this subject matter.

[Hegel, *Encyclopedia*, §378]

This article deals with Hegel's translation of two passages from Book III of Aristotle's *De Anima*: the end of chapter 4, which handles the question of the passivity of νοῦς, that is, of thought or intellect; and the very brief chapter 5, which is about the distinction between passive and active intellect. The text is a manuscript in Hegel's hand that has hitherto been edited only twice in Germany. The first edition was done by Walter Kern in the first volume of the *Hegel-Studien*,¹ and the second by Klaus Grotzsch in Hegel's *Gesammelte Werke*.² The purpose of this article is to propose an explanation of and commentary on that text. First, I address the question of the date of the manuscript; second, I turn to Hegel's privileged relation to Aristotle's thought in general; and finally, I come back to the text of the manuscript and propose an analysis that shows how, in translating Aristotle's text, Hegel interprets and reappropriates the thought of the Stagirite on these essential points in his theory of the soul: the distinction and relation between the passivity and activity of thought.

DATE OF THE MANUSCRIPT

In his edition of Hegel's *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (an edition that is in fact limited to the introductory section of the *Lectures* and the presentation devoted to Oriental philosophy), Johannes Hoffmeister mentions a handwritten manuscript by the philosopher about a translation of and commentary on two passages of Aristotle's *De Anima*:³ the end

¹ "Eine Übersetzung Hegels zu De Anima III, 4-5. Mitgeteilt und erläutert von Walter Kern SJ (Pullach)," *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 1 (1961), 49-88. [Citations from Hegel's translation of *De Anima* 4-5 are from Allegra de Laurentiis's translation published in this issue. – Trans.]

² G. W. F. Hegel, *Gesammelte Werke*, in cooperation with the German Research Foundation, ed. Rheinisch-Westfälischen Akademie der Wissenschaften (Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1968-); hereafter GW followed by volume number; here, vol. 10, 2: *Nürnberger Gymnasialkurse und Gymnasialreden (1808-1816), Beilagen und Anhang*, ed. Klaus Grotzsch (2006), 517-21.

³ G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie. Einleitung: System und Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. Johannes Hoffmeister (Leipzig: F. Meiner, 1940), XIII.

of chapter 4 and the whole of chapter 5 of Book III. This manuscript, which Hoffmeister thus relates to the lectures on the history of philosophy that Hegel delivered throughout his whole academic career (first in Jena in 1805/6, twice in Heidelberg in 1816/17 and 1817/18, and six times in Berlin in 1819, 1820/21, 1823/24, 1825/26, 1827/28, and 1829/30), was edited, as already mentioned, for the first time by Walter Kern in the first volume of the *Hegel-Studien*. Kern locates the manuscript in the field of Hegelian history of philosophy and situates its writing “probably in the course of the year 1805”⁴ – that is, in the Jena period and close to Hegel’s first lecture on the history of philosophy. In addition to the analysis of the evolution of Hegel’s handwriting, he grounds the determination of this date on the testimony of a former student of Hegel’s, Georg Andreas Gabler, who reported in a later review of the *Encyclopedia* that Hegel had already at that time (around 1805) started working on thorough elucidations of Aristotle that would draw from the original texts.⁵ Rudolf Haym confirmed this in his book *Hegel und seine Zeit*, writing, “In the course of the last years [of the Jena period], he [Hegel] has begun with zeal to study the Stagirite’s writings.”⁶ Let us also note that this dating has been confirmed by Heinz Kimmerle, who is the main scholar behind the chronology of Hegel’s Jena writings.⁷

Yet despite this convergence being at first sight perfectly convincing, such dating has been put into question and even declared inaccurate by Klaus Grotzsch,⁸ editor of the Nuremberg texts for Hegel’s *Gesammelte Werke* (Hegel had been rector and professor of philosophy in the gymnasium of the city of Nuremberg from 1808 to 1816). On the basis of the type of paper of the manuscript, he attributes it to the Nuremberg period: these would be documents Hegel would have used in his classes. To be sure, he notes that Hegel did not teach the history of philosophy in Nuremberg, but we can suppose that in his classes on philosophical psychology or the encyclopedia of philosophy, he may have been led to make some digressions regarding Aristotle’s *De Anima* and thus have translated passages that he deemed especially enlightening. Now Grotzsch provides the following nuance: we cannot exclude the possibility that Hegel did this work with a view to the lectures on the history of philosophy that he would indeed give in Heidelberg in 1816/17, 1817/18, or even after that in Berlin in 1819. Thus, he proposes a rather loose dating of the manuscript: between 1810 and the first Berlin years, around 1820.⁹

It surely seems difficult to contest this dating since it is grounded on unquestionable material evidence. Still, the fact of Hegel’s encounter with Aristotle and his in-depth study of Aristotle’s texts in the second part of the Jena period, likely at the time of preparing his first course on the history of philosophy, which he gave in 1805/6, is just as unquestionable. Specifically, a short text from the Jena Notebook, which puts together notes on several topics and which was written by Hegel between 1803 and 1806,¹⁰ testifies to the fact that

⁴ “Eine Übersetzung Hegels zu *De Anima* III, 4-5,” *Hegel-Studien*, 60.

⁵ See H. Kimmerle, “Dokumente zu Hegels Jenaer Dozententätigkeit (1801-1807),” *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 4 (1967), 71n8.

⁶ R. Haym, *Hegel und seine Zeit* (Hildesheim: Olms, 1962), 225-26.

⁷ H. Kimmerle, “Zur Chronologie von Hegels Jenaer Schriften,” *Hegel-Studien*, vol. 4 (1967), 169.

⁸ GW 10, 2, 1002n807.

⁹ See *ibid.*, 1002.

¹⁰ See note 86 in GW 5, 504.

he already at that time had a thorough acquaintance with the *De Anima* and developed his conviction regarding the genuine orientation of Aristotelianism, an orientation he would then resolutely defend against the dominant interpretation and that, according to him, makes Aristotle's thought truly exceptional.¹¹ This short text is about *De Anima's* famous image of the *tabula rasa*, of the soul as being at first like a clean slate that would have to cover itself passively with determinations coming from outside, an image that, taken literally, has led to an empiricist interpretation of Aristotle, one that Hegel always vigorously rejected. For him, Aristotle is nothing like an empiricist in the usual sense of the word; rather, his thought is speculative. In this short text, Hegel claims that we must not confuse a helpful image of representation, that is, of common thought (namely, the image of the *tabula rasa*), with the real gist of his thought, which is not at the level of representation but at the level of the concept: "In philosophizing, there is nothing to be represented." Hegel concludes that this image "does not express what is essential about his [Aristotle's] concept of soul."¹² All this leads me to claim that if the manuscript is posterior to the Jena period and cannot belong to a time before the Nuremberg period, it is nonetheless an indication of an interest in and research about Aristotle that started as early as the Jena period and that will thereafter deeply determine all of Hegel's thought. Therefore, it seems essential to provide a brief explanation of the importance of Aristotle's thought in the conception and elaboration of Hegel's dialectic, which alone will allow us to understand the genuine meaning of the translation transmitted through this manuscript.

ARISTOTLE IN HEGEL'S ITINERARY

In his early writings from 1785 to 1800, Hegel rarely names Aristotle, and even when he does, it is without much significance. Even when he later embarks on the philosophical path with Schelling – with whom he closely collaborates in the first years in Jena, from early 1801 to early 1803 – Aristotle is far from being among his privileged references. To be sure, Hegel then shows great esteem for Ancient philosophers in general, but among them, he notoriously prefers Plato to Aristotle and emphasizes, as he puts it in his 1802 article on natural right, the "superior vitality" of the former over the latter.¹³ It also seems to me indisputable that his first attempts in conceiving his philosophical system in Jena are strongly impregnated with Platonism, as his first biographer Karl Rosenkranz notes, for instance, concerning the *System of Ethical Life*, written between 1802 and 1803.¹⁴ The situation changes radically when, in the last years of the Jena period, while preparing

¹¹ That we find in the *Jena Systems (Hegels Jenenser Systementwürfe)* an influence of Aristotle, and especially of his doctrine of the soul, has been shown by Kern's article published in the *Hegel-Studien* (see "Eine Übersetzung Hegels," 62-63) and my reading of Hegel's *Logic and Metaphysics* of 1804/5 concerning the section on the "metaphysics of objectivity" (see my *Critique et dialectique. L'itinéraire de Hegel à Jéna (1801-1805)* (Brussels: Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 1982), 411-12n268).

¹² Here is the text I am examining: "Im Philosophiren gibt es Nichts zum Vorstellen. Hier und da ein Bild. An das halten sich die Menschen. *Tabula rasa* von Aristoteles zufälligerweise, zur Nothdurft gebraucht. So weiss jeder von Aristoteles. Es drückt von seinem Begriff der Seele nicht das Wesentliche aus."

¹³ GW 4, 455.

¹⁴ See K. Rosenkranz, *Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegels Leben* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1977), 124ff. One could also show evidence of this Platonism in the first *Logic and Metaphysics* of 1801/2, of which some fragments survived (and were published in GW 5).

his first lectures on the history of philosophy in 1805/6, he takes on the task of studying Aristotle closely and thereby considers the corpus as a whole, from the metaphysics to the philosophy of mind through the philosophy of nature, following the ordering of subject matters as he organizes them in his *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*. From then on, Aristotle is praised as an incomparable scientific genius who has surprisingly anticipated in Antiquity the most modern philosophical insights, who deserves more than any other [Ancient philosopher] to be studied, and who even surpasses his master Plato in terms of speculative depth.¹⁵ It is true that these claims are to be found in what has been recovered from the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* that Hegel gave in Berlin, whereas the Jena Notebook (*Jenaisches Heft*), as well as the Heidelberg summary (*Heidelberger Abriss*) and a whole series of other manuscripts related to the history of philosophy, are lost.¹⁶ However, according to the testimony of Karl Ludwig Michelet, who was the first editor of these lectures for the edition of Hegel's works immediately following his death and who still had the Jena Notebook, Hegel never ceased using it until his death (except for its introductory section) and even used it increasingly in the last years of his teaching.¹⁷ Thus, describing his editorial work, he claims to have regularly used the Jena Notebook as a "basis," treating it as the "skeleton to which the substantive flesh and richness of later thought would have to be attached."¹⁸ Michelet's testimony is corroborated by Rosenkranz, who also had the Jena Notebook, about which he says, "Essentially, Hegel did not modify his lectures on the history of philosophy [from 1805/6] in his later presentations; he only developed them."¹⁹ As a result, we can get a fairly precise idea of the impact that the study of Aristotle's texts in Jena had on Hegel.

Let us then ask the question: When Hegel started to read Aristotle closely around 1805, what stunned and even amazed him? Briefly, it was the way in which Aristotle characterizes the idea – which is the principle of all things and which forms their prime substance – not as a thing or an object (belonging to the realm of thinghood [*choséité*]) but as an act, an "activity," which he calls ἐνέργεια and which Hegel translates as *Wirklichkeit* (in French, *effectivité*; in English, *actuality*). Hegel believes that in this Aristotle overcomes Plato with respect to speculative depth and gets closer to the most contemporary philosophical insights. In truth, Plato and Aristotle work for him in the same direction – namely, that of idealism, the only authentically philosophical direction.

¹⁵ See *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, G. W. F. Hegel, *Werke in zwanzig Bänden* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp [Theorie Werkausgabe], 1969-1971); hereafter cited as W followed by volume number; here vol. 19, 132ff. [Unless otherwise noted, citations from the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* are from the English translation of E. S. Haldane, F. H. Simson, and F. C. Beiser (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). – Trans.]

¹⁶ The editors of the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* in the *Vorlesungen* series published by Felix Meiner note, "Bei keiner der Hegelschen Vorlesungen – mit Ausnahme der Ästhetik – sind die Überlieferungsverluste so schwerwiegend wie bei der Geschichte der Philosophie" (G. W. F. Hegel, *Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte*, vol. 6: *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, ed. P. Garniron and W. Jaeschke, pt. 1 [Hamburg: F. Meiner, 1994], XXVI).

¹⁷ G. W. F. Hegel, *Sämtliche Werke (Jubiläumsausgabe)*, ed. H. Glockner (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1965); hereafter cited as SW followed by volume number; here vol. 17: *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, vol. 1, with foreword by Karl Ludwig Michelet, 3.

¹⁸ SW 17, 9.

¹⁹ Rosenkranz, *Hegels Leben*, 201.

Thus, I have previously noted how he rejects the traditional interpretation that attempts to turn Aristotle into an empiricist on this point, as opposed to Plato the idealist (even if Hegel recognizes that there is in Aristotle a “manner” of philosophizing that could be described as empiricist but that has nothing to do with common empiricism and that we may call speculative empiricism).²⁰ However, Hegel continues, whereas Plato conceives the Idea in an objective way – that is, as a strictly motionless and immutable universal that “lacks the principle of vitality, the principle of subjectivity”²¹ and that remains, therefore, an abstraction – Aristotle thinks of the idea as thoroughly active and moving, as what is in itself an actualization of itself. In other words, Plato stops at δύναμις, at the Idea as immobile potentiality, whereas Aristotle thinks of it as actual, or better, as the act of self-realization.²² Not that Aristotle falls back onto Heraclitus, on the pure change that blindly swallows everything in its unceasing flux: he departs from the Parmenidean tradition (of which Plato remains an heir) just as much as from the pure disquiet of becoming, to which Heracliteanism condemns being [*l'étant*] as a whole. In fact, what Hegel finds remarkable and astonishing in Aristotle is how he manages to unify both strains of thought by conceiving the Idea as what at the same time changes, becomes, and actively moves itself *and* remains identical to itself through this change. This is what he explains with the notions of potentiality and activity (δύναμις and ἐνέργεια), notions that “occur repeatedly in Aristotle [...] and which we must be familiar with, if we would understand him.”²³ Let us examine this more closely.

Hegel broadens the significance of Aristotle's δύναμις-ἐνέργεια pair further than it is justified by the letter of Aristotle's text by interpreting it in the light of the modern categories of subject and object. Δύναμις, as he classically begins,²⁴ is the material element of every being [*étant*], the element of possibility or power; it is as such the “abstract universal,” not yet unfolded, the “in itself” or “objective” – namely, the “essence” as the self-identity of what is, what remains and is permanent in being [*étant*]. By contrast, ἐνέργεια is the formal element. It is what gives being [*étant*] its form, what activates its form as the “end” to be realized (whence its designation as ἐντελέχεια) and that makes it actual. In short, it is the “formative principle” that actualizes this end within the realm of being and thereby makes being emerge. As Hegel puts it, ἐνέργεια is as such “the self-relating negativity” or “more concretely, subjectivity.” He then examines what happens with these twin concepts in the different kinds of substance distinguished by Aristotle. What is characteristic and surprising in his interpretation is that he finds δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in all types of substances, not just among finite perceptible substances produced by nature or craft but also *in the absolute substance*. Hegel is perfectly aware that this

²⁰ See W 19, 145-49.

²¹ W 19, 153. [As this is omitted in the English translation, this is my translation. – Trans.]

²² Recall the comparison of Plato and Aristotle in the *Addition* to §142 of the *Encyclopedia*: “Aristotle's polemic against Plato consists then, more precisely, in the fact that the Platonic idea is designated as mere *dunamis* and that Aristotle makes valid the notion, to the contrary, that the idea, recognized by both of them likewise as what is alone true, is to be considered essentially as *energeia*, i.e., as the inner [dimension] that is absolutely out there and thus as the unity of inner and outer or as the actuality in the emphatic sense of the word discussed here” (W 8, 281; trans. K. Brinkmann and D. O. Dahlstrom [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015]).

²³ W 19, 154.

²⁴ On what follows, see, W 19, 154-55.

substance is without matter. Yet that does not mean that it is deprived of δύναμις but rather that, as opposed to perceptible substances, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια or possibility and actuality are not separated in it (it is, therefore, not a composite substance) but absolutely one: in it, “δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, and ἐντελέχεια are united.”²⁵ We shall nonetheless ask why Hegel maintains δύναμις in absolute substance, that is, in what Aristotle calls in *Metaphysics* 12 (Book Λ) the divine. Why does he broaden the meaning of δύναμις beyond its strictly material character? Why not simply talk, as does Aristotle, of pure ἐνέργεια? In truth, this is what Hegel does but by putting it in the following way: the absolute substance is one whose essence – that is, according to what he has already argued, its possibility or δύναμις – lies entirely in its ἐνέργεια. For, he argues, the absolute substance has an essence, a nature that remains through it and constitutes its self-sameness, for without such essence it would dissolve in pure Heraclitean motion. Yet this essence is nothing other than its self-actualizing activity. In other words, the absolute substance is nothing other than self-actualization, but this is precisely what it is. Let us cite a passage where he expresses most clearly this interpretation of the Aristotelian absolute, an interpretation whose significance we ought to understand fully: “God is pure activity, is that which is in itself and for itself; it needs no matter [...]. Or differently put: it is the substance which has its actuality in its potentiality and whose essence (*potentia*) is activity itself and in which both are not separate; in it, the potentiality is not different from the form, it produces its own content, its determinations; it produces itself.”²⁶ We must properly understand these crucial claims. What Hegel means is that, in the case of the absolute, essence is nothing prior to its actualization – namely, prior to its activity and to the motion that this activity implies. It must not be conceived as something ready-made and that would only need to be actualized thereafter. Hegel recalls the Aristotelian doctrine of the priority of actuality over potentiality: δύναμις is not prior and superior; on the contrary, ἐνέργεια is prior insofar as it is the production of itself by itself, preceded by nothing and presupposing nothing. It follows from this that we must understand Aristotle’s pure activity, according to Hegel, essentially as a manifestation and objectivation of itself: it is an efficient cause for it gives being and actuality to everything, but it is so more deeply as final cause, for as the cause that produces the world and everything, it is fundamentally self-relating, that is, circular, self-reflection [*retour à soi*].

It is not possible to cover the entirety of Hegel’s rich and stimulating (despite being not literal and orthodox)²⁷ commentary on Aristotle’s absolute substance.²⁸ There is, however, one point that needs to be stressed for it is directly related to the question that our manuscript is about – namely, the distinction between passive and active νοῦς, which Hegel introduces in his characterization of the absolute substance. Pure activity, in the sense that was specified, is essentially thought or, as the word νοῦς is usually translated,

²⁵ W 19, 158.

²⁶ W 19, 158-59. [As the English translation omits bits of the text in W 19, this is my translation. – Trans.]

²⁷ Let us recall here that Hegel read Aristotle in the old Erasmus edition (the so-called Basel edition), which he himself called “illegible,” and that he had no Latin translation to help (see SW 17, 10-11). It is noteworthy that, for several passages of Aristotle’s text, this edition offers different teachings than those we find in our recent editions.

²⁸ See my “Hegel, lecteur de la métaphysique d’Aristote. La substance en tant que sujet,” *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, no. 2 (April-June 2012): esp. 212-20.

intellect or intelligence (Hegel also speaks in terms of spirit²⁹ and reason³⁰). Now just as he had introduced the distinction between potentiality and actuality (δύναμις and ἐνέργεια) in the absolute substance, Hegel introduces in it the distinction between passive and active νοῦς. How should we understand this? How can there be room for passive νοῦς in absolute thought? The principle of Hegel's answer is the same as in the case of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια: the passivity of absolute νοῦς must be understood on the basis of its essential activity. Let us examine this more closely.

Hegel starts from the “crucial moment [*Hauptmoment*] of Aristotelian philosophy”³¹ – namely, where in Book 12 of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle specifies the thinking nature of the absolute substance as “thinking of thinking,” a text that Hegel famously cites at the end of his encyclopedic system as if it were its crowning.³² How does he interpret it? What characterizes the absolute substance is surely the unity or identity of thought with itself. But what kind of identity is at play here? Surprisingly, Hegel first rejects the notion of unity or identity: “Unity is a defective expression; it is an abstraction, mere understanding [*bloßer Verstand*]. Philosophy is not a system of identity; that is unphilosophical,”³³ and surely this is not the case in Aristotle. Clearly, the target of Hegel's rejection here is the unity of understanding, an abstract unity, one-sided because reduced to itself, which he calls a “dry identity [*unité aride, trockene Identität*],” uniform and immobile. This cannot be the unity of absolute thought's pure act. In its fundamental actuality, this identity is “activity, motion, repulsion” – that is, a self-identity that is at the same time a self-difference and that is authentically one and identical to itself in this differing: “in being different, [it] is at the same time identical with itself [*im Unterscheiden zugleich identisch mit sich*].”³⁴ This internal difference in the unity of absolute thought is, Hegel continues, the difference of active and passive νοῦς, a difference that is inherent to thought as such, even though it is absolute (yet, to be sure it differs in absolute and finite thought, as we shall see). How is this to be understood? How should we understand this element of passivity (of δύναμις) that Hegel discovers in Aristotle's notion of the pure activity of the absolute substance absolutely thinking? On this point, Hegel's commentary, which follows the text of the *Metaphysics* closely and cites it extensively, is very difficult. I will only consider what is essential for the purpose of the present argument.

Given what we know of the fundamentally “energetic” character of the absolute substance, the self-identity that it is as the “thinking of thinking” must be in its turn understood as fundamentally active – that is, as a self-identity in which thought acts upon itself and thereby makes itself actual. Hegel notes on this point that – by positing the absolute substance as cause and more precisely as efficient cause qua final cause universally desired (“on which the heaven and nature depend,” as Hegel quotes),³⁵ that as such generates a motion in which it desires itself and is in tension with itself – Aristotle

²⁹ W 19, 159.

³⁰ W 19, 160.

³¹ W 19, 162.

³² GW 20, 572.

³³ W 19, 163.

³⁴ W 19, 164.

³⁵ See W 19, 162. [The translation of *Metaph.* A 7, 1072b13-14, is from C. D. C. Reeve. – Trans.]

expresses the following idea: the absolute substance is at once object and subject of this desire, a desire that comes from it and is directed toward it. It is thereby clear that there is a difference in absolute thought, a difference between what desires and what is desired and more deeply between what provokes and causes motion and what receives motion and leads it back (circularly) to its source. Yet both are in reality the same, the same absolute thought as self-actualization and self-production: as Hegel writes, “what is moved and moves is the same.”³⁶ The motion that grips thought is thus the motion of its necessary self-actualization. This is where Hegel explicitly introduces the active/passive νοῦς couple in absolute thought. This he explains as follows: thought or the absolute Idea taken in its essential identity is the “unmoved,” the “immobile and eternal” – namely, the object of the desire (i.e., of the motion), which it prompts and activates in all things (things of which it is, in Aristotle’s term, the “mover” and that it brings into being).³⁷ As such, the absolute Idea is surely actuality, pure activity, but only objectively, potentially, or “in itself,” as something that is thought, as a νοητόν that does not actually think itself. In that respect, it is only passive νοῦς, like “the Father,” as Hegel interprets it Trinitarianly,³⁸ who is everything potentially (that would be the point where Plato stops). But, Hegel adds, “the object shifts into activity, into energy.”³⁹ The verb he uses, *umschlagen*, expresses the immediacy of the conversion to activity, to the active νοῦς. For, as we have seen in the case of the absolute substance, there is no distance between potentiality and actuality (between what thinks and what is thought). They both are essentially one and identical, in contrast to the cases of finite substances: the essence of absolute substance is to activate itself (“energy is substance itself”).⁴⁰ Concretely, this means that, according to its energetic essence, absolute thought makes itself its own object, itself the subject of the desire that tends and moves itself toward itself, and not just the object of this desire. In short, it duplicates itself directly into the thinking of thinking, which, as Aristotle says, is pure *theōria* or, as Hegel translates, speculation.⁴¹ However, in our case, the case of finite substances, what is continuous and constitutive for the divine (and is in the divine “always thus”),⁴² that is, to live the “most pleasant and best life,” is only “allowed occasionally.” This is indeed the difference between absolute thought and human finite thought. It has to do with the relation between passive and active νοῦς: in our finite thinking, the essential identity between the two is rare; there is usually a dissociation of potentiality and actuality. And this is why there is something material with the δύναμις of finite thinking.

We see how Hegel’s reading of Aristotle differs from traditional interpretations. By conceiving the ἐνέργεια of absolute thought in terms of activity and actuality, he transposes into it the motion of which it is the end. Thereby, ἐνέργεια is not simply universally desired – for if it were, it would not be essentially active but rather a passive

³⁶ W 19, 161.

³⁷ W 19, 158.

³⁸ W 19, 164.

³⁹ W 19, 162. [Since the English translation does not capture the immediacy denoted by the verb *umschlagen*, this is my translation. – Trans.]

⁴⁰ W 19, 159.

⁴¹ Citing *Metaphysics* Λ 7, 1072b24, Hegel writes, “Speculation (ἡ θεωρία) is therefore what is the most pleasing (the most blessed [*Seligste*], ἡδιστον) and best (highest),” W 19, 163; trans. modified.

⁴² W 19, 162.

intellect – but also and simultaneously what desires itself and, as such, is fundamentally active. This is not to say that there is no δὺναμις in it, for it does have an essence that expresses its stable nature, but this essence is nothing else than its activity and is in this respect strictly without matter. To put it in terms of νοῦς or intellect, its passive intellect becomes directly an active intellect without any gap or transition between the two.

These brief remarks regarding Hegel's commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics* have put us in a position to understand the manuscript.

ANALYSIS OF THE MANUSCRIPT

I will not attempt to confront Hegel's translation with Aristotle's text as this text is established in recent editions. This necessary task has been taken up carefully by W. Kern in his article about the manuscript, which I have already cited several times.⁴³ Let us simply recall that Hegel read Aristotle in an ancient edition that he called "illegible" and whose teachings, which often differ from those of recent editions, are at the source of many of his interpretations of Aristotle's text.⁴⁴ We should also note Hegel's remarkable knowledge of the Greek language, knowledge that he developed at school and to which the philologist Friedrich Creuzer, a colleague in Heidelberg, bears witness. His care in following Aristotle's text very closely is also noteworthy and is evident in his translation notes.⁴⁵ Still, Hegel is certainly not an impartial reader (if such a reader exists!) and, despite his profound admiration, he approaches Aristotle through his own philosophical concepts, which he is glad to find anticipated in the work of the Stagirite. In this regard, we ought to ask what the most authentic faithfulness to the philosophical genius of Aristotle is. Is it a reading that simply aims at objectivity and exactness and pretends to read a philosopher rigorously on his own terms? Or is it an interpretation that, without foregoing the necessary philological attention, yet attempts to develop Aristotle's thought through its own philosophical depth and thereby to discover new pathways, perhaps hazardous and debatable pathways, but powerfully suggestive ones?

The passages of *De Anima* translated by Hegel are among the most obscure and difficult ones.⁴⁶ In these passages, Aristotle is so concise and the text so dense that the translator (or the interpreter) can be lead astray. Thus, in his translation notes, Hegel felt that it was necessary to stop and comment on several difficulties – especially at the end of chapter 4 – to shed light on the problems and how Aristotle discusses them. I think that his translation of these passages of *De Anima* in which Aristotle examines the problems of the passivity of νοῦς (end of chapter 4) and the distinction between passive and active νοῦς (chapter 5) can only be understood in light of his reading of Aristotle's metaphysics (discussed in the previous section).

The end of chapter 4 develops two problems that Hegel's translation fuses together because they deal with the same question – namely, the question of the possibility of

⁴³ See Kern, "Eine Übersetzung Hegels," 74-81.

⁴⁴ See note 27 above.

⁴⁵ On this, see Kern, "Eine Übersetzung Hegels," 79-80.

⁴⁶ Hegel himself claims that the inquiry on the nature of the soul in *De Anima* is "sehr schwer und spekulativ" (W 19, 198). This is particularly true of the passages he translates.

thought (“wie ist das Denken möglich”).⁴⁷ Hegel does not present these as two distinct problems but rather as two formulations of the same problem, where the second one makes explicit and strengthens the first one. The first one starts with the characteristics of *voũç* as defined by Anaxagoras, that is, of absolute *voũç* as that which rules the world and is itself “simple, not determined from without and having nothing in common with anything else,” for, as the text explains, “insofar as something is common to both (to two), it is on the one hand passive, on the other active.”⁴⁸ Here is the *aporia* in its first formulation: if *voũç* is as Anaxagoras claims (simple, not determined from without, etc.), then how is thought possible given that thought “is a becoming-affected (-determined)” – that is, given that thought includes passivity? Let us note that Hegel values very highly the thesis of Anaxagoras. As we are told in the introduction to the *Science of Logic*, this thesis expresses the true nature of thought insofar as it is the “principle and essence of the world” and posits the “basis of an intellectual vision of the universe,” which can only develop into an ontological logic like Hegel’s.⁴⁹ In a note, Hegel sums up this first formulation of the *aporia* in a much more affirmative way: “How does thinking determine itself, as it is simple, unaffected, not shared [with anything else] and yet includes in itself passivity (but passivity belongs to communality)?”⁵⁰ Now the second formulation of the *aporia* intervenes and intensifies the first one: “How is it [thinking] possible given that *voũç* is, moreover [Überdem], itself a thinkable object?”⁵¹ In fact, thinking is also what is susceptible to be thought, to be a *voũç*, *ein denkbare Objekt*, as Hegel translates. This encloses passivity since to be thought is necessarily to be thought by another and thus to contain this being-other: “Aristotle asks how the being-other, the passivity of *voũç*, is to be grasped.”⁵² It is clear that what constitutes the crux of the *aporia* for Hegel is the situation of *voũç* as a thinkable object or being-thought (*Gedachtes*), for it is in this situation that its problematic passivity appears most strikingly. Indeed, according to Hegel’s translation of the solution to the *aporia*, what must be understood is how *voũç* can be in itself something thinkable, a passive object of thought, while belonging to objectivity in virtue of its intelligibility. However, we must recall that the question is posed in this way with regard to absolute *voũç* as understood by Anaxagoras. In other words, the conflict opposing the essential simplicity of *voũç* and its passive being-object is a problem from a metaphysical viewpoint, one that expresses the true nature of *voũç*.

Hegel identifies three possible solutions to the *aporia* in Aristotle’s text and notes that the third is the “right one” (*das rechte*).⁵³ The first solution posits thought’s belonging to its other – that is, to objectivity in general. It can be understood in the following way: if *voũç* is itself a thinkable object, it “must also inhere in the other (in external objects)” unless it is thinkable “in another way,” in a specific way.⁵⁴ But such a specific way is

⁴⁷ GW 10, 2, 517 (repeated on 518, 3rd line).

⁴⁸ Ibid., 517-18.

⁴⁹ See GW 21, 34.

⁵⁰ GW 10, 2, 517n2.

⁵¹ Ibid., 518.

⁵² Ibid., 517n2.

⁵³ GW 10, 2, 518n5.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 518.

incompatible with the conceptual unity of everything that is thinkable, and therefore νοῦς must be brought back to objectivity. In this hypothesis, νοῦς is the “predicate of another [*Prädicat von anderem*],”⁵⁵ and this seems to run against Anaxagoras’s thesis. By contrast, the second solution posits that νοῦς does not inhere in what is other than itself and is rather a thinkable object insofar as it mixes itself with objectivity, that is, by containing “mixed [*vermischt*] in itself the determination through which it is a νοητός.”⁵⁶ Yet this does not satisfy Anaxagoras’s doctrine of the essential simplicity of νοῦς either. Finally, the third and “right” solution is formulated in an elliptical way, and it is not easy to see the precise meaning that Hegel’s translation gives to the text. As far as I can see, this solution justifies the presence of a passive element in νοῦς based on its common, universal character. To speak of the common/universal character of νοῦς is indeed to say that it extends to the realm of otherness, of objectivity, and thus that it is intelligible, itself a “thinkable object” and, as such, something passive. Yet, this solution specifies that it is not actually such a thinkable object, but only “according to possibility (power).”⁵⁷ In other words, νοῦς is objective and belongs to the realm of objectivity only δυνάμει, as potential intellect that does not yet actually think and thus is not yet really active νοῦς. Hence the image of the clean slate on which nothing is yet written but that has the possibility of being inscribed with letters and words. It is important to note that Hegel’s interpretation understands this possibility not in the sense of an “empty possibility,” inert and indifferent, but in the sense in which the “egg, sperm [is the] possibility of the animal,”⁵⁸ and thus a possibility filled with a determined content, one that cannot avoid making this content actual since it [the possibility] is itself the passage to its own actualization.⁵⁹

Let us pause here and ask what the direction of Hegel’s translation as I have exposed it is. How does it orient Aristotle’s text? As we have seen, the issue is to see to what extent there is passivity in νοῦς if νοῦς is as Anaxagoras thinks: simple, impassive, and unmixed. What is this passivity? Essentially, it amounts to the objectivity of νοῦς, to the fact that it is present in the object insofar as the object is intelligible. Hence νοῦς is not simply thinking but also what is thought, “moreover, it is itself also a thinkable object.”⁶⁰ But, as the text specifies, it is only so according to possibility, as νοῦς in potentiality, and not as actual νοῦς, actively thinking. On these grounds, the text then proceeds to distinguish between two situations.⁶¹ In the nonmaterial realm (*im Immateriellen*), that is, in the case of νοῦς “without matter [*ohne ὄλη*],” which is “νοῦς as such [*als solcher*],”⁶² or pure νοῦς, there is an identity of thinking and what is thought (“thinking and what is thought are the same”), just as in “theoretical science [*theoretische Wissenschaft*]” – namely, in θεωρία, about which Hegel says, in his commentary on Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, that it is the act

⁵⁵ GW 10, 2, 518n5.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ GW 10, 2, 519.

⁵⁸ Ibid., 518n7.

⁵⁹ And this is why, as already noted in the Jena Notebook (see notes 10 and 12 above), the tabula rasa must be understood only as a comparison for representation, which does not truly reflect Aristotle’s thought. The same observation is developed in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (see W 19, 214-16).

⁶⁰ GW 10, 2, 519.

⁶¹ See *ibid.*, 519, ll. 5-11.

⁶² GW 10, 2, 519n5.

of divine νοῦς, of the νοῦς as absolute substance. This is not to say that Hegel suppresses the potential or objective dimension of absolute substance or νοῦς as such but to assert that this dimension coincides fully and without matter with its activity or actuality. In brief, the essence of νοῦς is fully in the activity of thinking; it is nothing but this very activity. This implies, as we have seen, that Hegel's interpretation of Aristotle dissociates potentiality and matter. In the case of νοῦς as such, there is potentiality without matter because matter is what separates possibility and activity (or essence and actuality), which in turn explains why potentiality does not always necessarily and immediately lead to its actualization.⁶³ And this is precisely what happens in the material realm (*in dem Materiellen*), where νοῦς faces material objects – that is, in the realm of νοῦς as we ourselves as finite spirits experience it and for which what is intelligible in the object does not appear directly and purely because there is the stumbling block of matter. And this is why, as opposed to absolute νοῦς, we are not always thinking.

Based on this explanation, if we move on to Hegel's translation of chapter 5, we see that it is an immediate extension of the end of chapter 4. As announced, he introduces the distinction between passive intellect and active intellect as the transposition of the potentiality/activity difference within νοῦς, a difference that, Hegel claims, Aristotle applies to everything. Referring directly to the realm of "nature," this chapter starts with the way in which this difference applies to the material world: "But since in all of nature each something is [*etwas ist*] in part the matter of each kind (this matter being what it all is *potentia*) but in part the causal principle and agent (which in terms of its activity is everything), [...] these differences must also obtain in the soul."⁶⁴ Whence the thesis concerning the constitution of νοῦς as partly what "becomes everything" (such is passive νοῦς) and partly what "makes everything, like an active being" – namely, what produces the intelligible in the manner that "light in a certain way [*auf eine gewisse Weise*]" produces colors by actualizing them.⁶⁵ But, as the translation continues, "this is νοῦς [*diss ist der Nus*]," namely, the active or "abstract" νοῦς (according to Hegel's translation of Aristotle's χωριστός) – that is, separated from matter, unmixed, and not determined by something else – for the "substance" of νοῦς is to be "*actu*."⁶⁶ We are thereby brought back to Anaxagoras's thesis that νοῦς is simple, not determined from without, and so forth, but with the following stipulation: νοῦς is so only insofar as it is essentially active, active thought, "for the active is absolutely [*durchaus*] superior to the passive, and the principle [*superior*] to matter"⁶⁷ (following the doctrine of the priority of activity over potentiality

⁶³ Hegel makes the same comment about thought in Aristotle's *De Anima* in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*: "Thinking is also δόναμις [...]; the possibility itself is here not ὄλη, νοῦς has no matter, for potentiality pertains to its very οὐσία [...]. In the corporeal, therefore, matter, as potentiality, and external form, as reality, are opposed to one another; but the soul is, in contrast with this, universal potentiality itself, without matter, because its essence is activity [*Wirksamkeit*]" (W 19, 212-13; trans. modified).

⁶⁴ GW 10, 2, 520.

⁶⁵ Note how Hegel emphasizes Aristotle's "in a certain way" (τρόπον γάρ τινα, 430a16) in a note: "*In a certain sense*, [that is] it may apply here with the example; otherwise to be banished" (GW 10, 2, 520n5). In general, when it comes to νοῦς or thought in its pure essential activity, examples are in principle inadequate (being helpful only for representation). This is clearly the case of the example of the clean slate or *tabula rasa*.

⁶⁶ GW 10, 2, 520.

⁶⁷ Note that Hegel here translates the Greek ἀεὶ (1030a17) by *durchaus*, which means *absolutely* and writes the following remark: "ἀεὶ not just according to time" (GW 10, 2, 520n6). Indeed, Aristotle thinks there is not only

as developed in *Metaphysics* Θ). Thus, if there is passivity in νοῦς, a passivity stamped with materiality in the case of finite human νοῦς, this passivity is entirely determined by its fundamental activity, which is its principle and is essentially separated from matter, and this means, as the text adds, “immortal and eternal.”⁶⁸ This is why we cannot say of νοῦς, “considered absolutely [*absolut betrachtet*], that it thinks at one time and not at another.” As we have seen, this intermittence is due to our human, material condition, and it is precisely this materiality that prevents us from being conscious of the activity that underlies all of our thought and that makes us experience it as intrinsically passive and determinable, as if it must receive its content from without. But this determinable νοῦς does not correspond to what νοῦς truly is, to its immortality and eternity by virtue of which it is a continuously active thought and essentially identical to what is thought; on the contrary, it is “ephemeral and perishable” [*vergänglich*].

I will stop here in the analysis of the manuscript. Before concluding, however, we must make one last step: compare its translation with the translation we find in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* as edited by Michelet. In fact, these lectures include a translation of several passages from the end of chapter 4 and a full translation of chapter 5 of Book III of Aristotle’s *De Anima*.⁶⁹ According to W. Kern, this translation could very well come from the notes that Hegel brought regularly to his classes and in which he had written several points that he wished to explain. Be that as it may (for without these papers we cannot know for sure), Kern, who has compared these two translations, argues that there is an “astonishing difference” between them.⁷⁰ He further claims that this difference could make it possible to see an evolution in Hegel’s conception of the Aristotelian doctrine of νοῦς, drawing Aristotle closer and closer to his own dialectical conception of spirit. For my part, I think this claim is really exaggerated, for if there are indeed translation differences, they have, as far as I can see, no decisive consequence on how Hegel understands and interprets Aristotle’s thought. Kern may have here been the victim of his erroneous dating of the manuscript – he situates it around 1805, whereas it is clearly later, somewhere between 1810 and 1820, as has been established by the new edition of the *Gesammelte Werke*: this faulty dating, which gives the impression of an important temporal distance between the two translations, has certainly strengthened his conviction that there is an important difference between their respective teaching. I would like to take a closer look at this and focus on what is most significant.

Kern notes that, in the manuscript, Hegel renders χωριστός and χωρισθείς⁷¹ (attributes of active νοῦς, that is, of νοῦς as such) by “abstract,” whereas in the translation of the *Lectures* he translates them as “*an und für sich*” (in and for itself).⁷² According to him, this “seems to indicate a complete change in Hegel’s formulations concerning the

a temporal priority of activity over potentiality but also a logical and ontological one (see *Metaphysics* Θ 8 and 9). Let us add that, despite appearances, there is not even a priority of potentiality over activity according to time in νοῦς, since as such, νοῦς is essentially and directly active such that its potentiality cannot differ at all from its activity (see GW 10, 2, 521).

⁶⁸ GW 10, 2, 521.

⁶⁹ W 19, 214-16.

⁷⁰ Kern, “Eine Übersetzung Hegels,” 81.

⁷¹ At 430a17 and 430a22, respectively.

⁷² See W 19, 216

active intellect,” a change that allegedly witnesses the more and more explicit influence of dialectic on the Aristotelian concept of νοῦς.⁷³ However, this claim is based on a misunderstanding of Hegel’s use of the word “abstract” in the manuscript. Hegel’s point is not to appropriate the traditional conception inherited from scholasticism, of the active intellect as an abstracting intellect, but rather to signify, as I have emphasized above, its separated, pure, and unmixed character – that is, it highlights the fact that this intellect is without matter, deprived of any material δύναμις characteristic of representational thought and consists, rather, in the act of science, wherein what thinks and what is thought (subject and object) are completely identical. Thus understood, the word “abstract” is not opposed to the notion of “in and for itself” and instead designates the same perfection of pure thought. To be sure, Hegel has later preferred the “in and for itself” rendering of χωριστός and χωρισθείς to avoid any confusion with the pejorative meaning of “abstract” as what is undeveloped and opposed to “concrete.” But this is a terminological adjustment, not an interpretative change. As far as the understanding of the passive intellect is concerned, Kern considers as an innovation in the *Lectures* the conception of the passive intellect as what is thinkable or intelligible – that is, of νοῦς itself as an object, which extends νοῦς to nature and the world (let us note that Kern does not follow here Hegel’s translations but his commentary on Aristotle as we find it in the student transcripts of the Berlin lectures).⁷⁴ However, my analysis has shown that such a conception is already at play in the manuscript since the question raised at the end of chapter 4 of Book III of *De Anima* is precisely the question of the objectivity of νοῦς, of νοῦς as a thinkable and intelligible object. The passive νοῦς is explicitly understood as nature and world in the *Lectures*, but this is at least embryonic in the manuscript (which is limited to a translation of Aristotle’s text).

In conclusion, let us return briefly to the question of Hegel’s faithfulness to Aristotle in his translation. It is perfectly clear that what Hegel finds in Aristotle – especially regarding the soul and νοῦς – are perspectives that anticipate and, he thinks, correspond to his own thought. It is evident that this affects his translation. Does this mean, as many historians of philosophy have claimed, that Hegel is unfaithful to Aristotle? Clearly, Hegel is not a simple historian of philosophy; he is a philosopher who is interested in the history of philosophy for properly philosophical reasons and his own purposes.⁷⁵ In the name of scientific objectivity, one can say that he thereby imposes his own conceptions unto Aristotle. But more profoundly, one can also (1) recognize that this obvious yet necessary hermeneutic violence is by no means offhand and instead is based on a careful and informed reading of the texts and further (2) claim that it reveals possibilities in Aristotle’s texts that were hitherto unknown, possibilities that could not emerge without Hegel’s powerful reading grid. To be sure, one can object to and contest Hegel’s reading, but that should be done for properly philosophical motives and not simply in the name of alleged

⁷³ Kern, “Eine Übersetzung Hegels,” 82.

⁷⁴ See *ibid.*, 83. These transcripts are currently being published in 6 volumes in the *Gesammelte Werke* (GW 30.1-30.6).

⁷⁵ Thus Horst Seidl writes, “Hegels Übersetzung und Interpretation der Aristoteles- Textstellen ist stark von einer Deutung überlagert, mit der er weit über die Texte hinaus ihnen einen, seinem eigenen Denken entsprechenden Sinn abzugewinnen sucht” (“Bemerkungen zu G. W. F. Hegels Interpretation von Aristoteles De Anima III 4-5 und Metaphysica XII 7 u. 9,” *Perspektive der Philosophie* 12 (1986): 209-36).

scientific objectivity, which is often an alibi for preserving what has been consecrated by the tradition. We should at least recognize that there is a genuine dialogue there through which two thinkers have decisively enriched each other. In this respect, let us quote Heidegger, who wrote, in the second preface to *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, “In contrast to the methods of historical philology, which has its own agenda, a thoughtful dialogue is bound by other laws – laws which are more easily violated. In a dialogue, the possibility of going astray is more threatening, the shortcomings are more frequent.”⁷⁶ Acknowledging this indisputable observation, we should at once recognize that these deficiencies are often more nourishing and instructive for thought than any orthodoxy.

Translated by Antoine Pageau-St-Hilaire

⁷⁶ M. Heidegger, *Gesamtausgabe*, I. Abteilung: *Veröffentlichte Schriften 1910-1976*, vol. 3 (Frankfurt am Main: V. Klostermann, 1991), XVII; trans. R. Taft (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), xx.

HEIDEGGER AS TRANSLATOR

Was he actually a translator? Hardly, it seems, except in the sense that he dealt often with texts composed in languages other than his native German. As would almost any scholar, any philosopher. Almost of necessity. Not, however, for the sake of translation, not in order to produce a translation, but only for the sake of the work to which the foreign text would somehow contribute. In his case, translation, it seems, was entirely ancillary to thinking.

Indeed, on the one occasion when we met, it was I who was the translator, the one who, preparing a translation of a text, came to consult with the author himself about certain words in his text that had proved especially resistant to translation. The difficulty lay not simply in finding near equivalents of these words in English but equally in determining their precise sense up to a point where the search for an appropriate English word could legitimately commence. I knew in advance that our discussion would be entirely in German, that, lacking sufficient familiarity with English, he would refrain entirely from offering advice about translation from German into English. I knew that he would almost certainly advise me only by way of translations entirely within German. Indeed, he had observed in more than one text that we continually engage in such translation of our own language into its own words (“However, we fail to recognize that we are also already constantly translating our own language, our native language, into its proper word”).¹ He had insisted that such intralingual translation (in Jakobson’s term) is more difficult than translating from one language to another. In this more difficult translating, this originary translating, as he had called it, thinking – he had said – necessarily engages, even when one’s thinking remains quite apart from any involvement with languages other than one’s own. In this sense, then, if in no other, Heidegger had cast himself in the role of translator. Yet this identification of the originary translating that belongs to thinking as such was explicitly carried out in the 1942-43 lecture course *Parmenides*, first published in 1982 (“In every dialogue and in every soliloquy, an originary translation holds sway”).² I knew nothing of it when I visited him in 1975.

I arrived much too early at his home in Zähringen. During the long wait, I kept composing and recomposing the questions I wanted to pose to him, retranslating them into German, retranslating them into themselves, at least into a more apparent proximity

¹ GA 54 = Martin Heidegger, *Parmenides*, ed. Manfred S. Frings (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), 17: “Wir verkennen jedoch, dass wir ständig auch schon unsere eigene Sprache, die Muttersprache, in ihr eigenes Wort übersetzen.”

² *Ibid.*: “In jedem Gespräch und Selbstgespräch waltet ein ursprüngliches Übersetzen.”

to themselves. When finally I was led into his study, he was sitting near the window, reclining slightly on a couch. The liveliness of his face and the intensity of his penetrating gaze were so striking that I hardly noticed at first the weakness of his high-pitched voice. There was friendliness in his greeting, as he had heard something of me from the two Americans whom he knew best and most trusted, Glenn Gray and Joan Stambaugh; they had kindly arranged the meeting.

Our initial conversation was prompted by the book I had brought for him. We spoke of Plato, though only in very broad terms, and he voiced his dissatisfaction with *Platons Lehre von der Wahrheit*. There were no explicit references to Friedländer's critique or to Heidegger's response to the critique, though I knew very well, from texts already published at that time, about the debate with Friedländer concerning the change in the essence of truth that Heidegger had taken to occur in Plato; I knew that this exchange – and perhaps much more – lay behind his dissatisfaction with his book. It would not be amiss to say that both the critique and Heidegger's response to it came down to certain questions of translation – namely, of the translation of ἀλήθεια as *Unverborgenheit* and of the intralingual translation of ἀλήθεια as ὀρθότης.

The conversation turned to Schelling, as Heidegger's 1936 lecture course on Schelling had at that time just been published. An opening was thus provided for one of the questions I had hoped to be able to pose to him. It concerned his statement in the Schelling lectures that, though not every philosophy is a system, every philosophy is systematic. My question alluded to Heidegger's own thinking: What can *systematic* mean within the context of a thinking that is no longer metaphysical? His answer was brief: it is, he said, a matter of a systematicity that arises *aus der Sache selbst* rather than being imposed on the *Sache*. It seemed to me that this was precisely the requirement that had come into play already in German Idealism, in the demand for unity of form and content. Thus, it seemed that one would have to pursue the question further by differentiating between a thinking that would be capable of coinciding with its *Sache* and a thinking that, as Heidegger had once put it, would be drawn along in the withdrawal of its *Sache*. In the latter case, thinking would have to translate itself continually across the difference separating it from the *Sache*.

But we did not pursue this discussion any further, realizing – he more intensely no doubt than I – that it would lead into the most difficult questions, such questions as that of how to say the withdrawal as such, how to say it without thereby drawing it out of its withdrawal, without rendering present that which is turned away in its absence, without violating precisely that which would be said. Instead, Heidegger began speaking of Nietzsche, of the systematicity of Nietzsche's thinking. I recalled the lecture course in which Heidegger had said – scandalously, no doubt, at the time – that Nietzsche was no less systematic than Aristotle. I knew how in this connection Heidegger had privileged Nietzsche's *Nachlass*, and this was indeed the next topic to which he turned. He noted that Nietzsche was much more systematic in the *Nachlass* than in the published works, which, he said, were more literary and polemical. As the definitive, Colli/Montinari edition of Nietzsche's *Letters* had just been announced, I asked whether he thought this publication was likely to bring to light anything decisive for the interpretation of Nietzsche's thought. He hesitated for a moment and then said he thought it unlikely.

The conversation turned to more specific matters, to matters pertaining more directly to translation and to specific concerns that had arisen in translating his texts. He offered some clarification of the distinction, operative in *Sein und Zeit*, between *echt* and *eigentlich*: *echt*, he said, designates a character that can belong to one's relation to anything (one can have such a relation to anything), whereas *eigentlich* designates a certain character of self-relation. He refrained, as I had expected he would, from venturing any suggestion as to how this difference might be rendered in English. He stressed also the importance of the distinction between *existential* and *existentiell*, as well as the complexity of the sense of *Bewandtnis*. I was especially eager to ask him about *Entschlossenheit*. He insisted – more strongly than with any other point we had discussed – that it has nothing whatsoever to do with the will. I asked him what he would think of *Geoffnetsein* as a translation that might mediate between the word and an eventual English translation. He strongly approved this suggestion. On this note of translation, our conversation ended.

At the time of my visit, I was concerned primarily with translating a particular text. It was only later that I came to realize how often Heidegger's texts address the question of translation as such – that is, the question of the very sense of translation and of its relation to thinking. Even in as early a text as the Aristotle essay of 1922 (*Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*),³ he discusses the way in which the translation of a text is necessarily interwoven with the interpretation of it. If one recalls the analyses in *Sein und Zeit* that demonstrate how thoroughly interpretation enters into even the most concrete, pretheoretical modes of comportment, then it comes as no surprise that Heidegger repeatedly declares that no translation is free of interpretation (“every translation is already an interpretation”).⁴ What is more remarkable is his portrayal of the task of the translator as involving a kind of self-abandonment: in order to translate a text genuinely, it is required that, first of all, one be oneself translated back into the domain in which what the text says was originally said. What translation requires, first of all, as its very condition, is that the translator be translated. Or, more precisely, translation involves a certain interaction or reciprocity between translating and being oneself translated. Replacing, for instance, a Greek word with a German word becomes genuinely translation only if one has oneself already been translated back into the domain in which the Greek word was originally and originally said.

In this connection, *domain* does not merely designate the everyday surroundings in which the ancient thinker passed his days. The domain is determined, rather, as the holding sway of a certain unconcealment (*das Walten einer Unverborgenheit*), of a certain opening of truth (ἀλήθεια). As the domain of a thinker, it offers a certain clarity and yet sustains also a questionableness (*Fragwürdigkeit*). On the other hand, the domain thus determined does not stand over against the everyday world; it is simply the extraordinary that lies within the ordinary. It is to this proximity that reference is made in the story about Heraclitus that is handed down by Aristotle and retold more than once by Heidegger. The story tells of some strangers who once came to visit Heraclitus. Upon their arrival, they

³ GA 61 = Martin Heidegger, *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles*, ed. W. Bröcker and K. Bröcker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985).

⁴ GA 8 = Martin Heidegger, *Was heißt Denken?*, ed. Paola-Ludovica Coriando (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1954), 107: “Jede Übersetzung ist aber schon Auslegung.”

saw him warming himself at a stove. They were surprised, astounded, especially as he invited them to enter, saying, “For here, too, the gods are present.”⁵

Translation involves substitution, which, in order to issue in genuine translation, presupposes that one has oneself been translated back, displaced, into the domain in which and from which the original word speaks. Yet the converse also holds: *it* is preeminently the translation – the German word, for instance, that is to replace the Greek word – that serves to translate the translator back into the domain from which the Greek word says what *it* says.

If we merely replace the Greek word ἀλήθεια with the German word “unconcealedness,” we are not yet translating. That occurs only when the translated word “unconcealedness” transports us into the domain of experience and the mode of experience out of which the Greeks or, in the case at hand, the primordial thinker Parmenides say ἀλήθεια.⁶

Translation must hover, as it were, between the two poles, between substitution and displacement, between translating and being translated. Through such hovering, translation would bring these two moments into their intimacy (*Innigkeit*).

Because this intimacy can become effective, because translating is intertwined with *Wiederholung*, translation has a bearing on *Überlieferung*, on tradition in the sense of handing-down, on not just what is handed down but the handing down itself, that by which the “content” of tradition gets handed down from one epoch to another. Thus, Heidegger declares that translation belongs to the innermost movement of history. It is for this reason that translations such as that of the basic Greek philosophical words into Latin can prove to have been so momentous. It is for this reason that Heidegger can declare, almost outrageously, that the groundlessness of Western thought begins with this translation.

In these ways and others, Heidegger addressed the question of translation as such. In thus outlining the configuration within which translation operates, he made it a theme for thinking.

But was he actually a translator? Not just in the way prescribed by the belonging of intralingual translation to thinking but in the sense of producing translations? At least in certain texts, primarily those dealing with Greek thought, he does indeed present translations. And though these translations might seem merely to subserve the thinking ventured in the texts in which they occur, it is in fact almost the opposite that is the case. Nowhere is this more evident than in the brief essays on Heraclitus that he entitles by certain fundamental words of Greek thought. In particular, the essay “Logos” is devoted to the single sentence from Heraclitus (fragment 50) that bears most decisively on the

⁵ Εἶναι γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα θεοῦς (DK 22 A9 = Laks-Most Heraclitus P 15 = Aristotle, *De partibus animalium*, A 5, 645a15-23).

⁶ GA 54, 16: “Wenn wir das griechische ἀλήθεια lediglich durch das deutsche »Unverborgenheit« ersetzen, übersetzen wir noch nicht. Dazu kommt es erst dann, wenn das übersetzende Wort »Unverborgenheit« uns übersetzt in den Erfahrungsbereich und die Erfahrungsart, aus dem Griechentum und in jetzigen Fall der anfängliche Denker Parmenides das Wort ἀλήθεια sagt.”

fundamental word that is its title.⁷ Beginning with citations of the Greek text and the conventional translation, Heidegger proceeds in the course of the essay to discuss each of the Greek words or phrases belonging to the fragment, producing in each case a translation of the word or phrase. Attentive reading of Heidegger's text makes it clear that these translations are not mere byproducts of the interpretation but rather that the interpretations issue precisely in these translations, that they are gathered up in the rendition into German. Most remarkably, the essay concludes by gathering up the individual translations into an extended translation of the entire fragment and by then, finally, setting commentary explicitly in the background so as to present the translation issuing from that commentary.

In his 1939 essay on Aristotle's *Physics*, Heidegger not only carries out a translation of the same sort but also thematizes the translational character of the essay. He declares that the translation is already the interpretation proper, so that all else that is called for in the essay is an explanation of the translation. "Since this [translation] is already the *interpretation* proper, only an explanation of the 'translation' is needed."⁸ In other words, the essay is nothing but the translation and the appended explanations of the translation. In this essay, one could say, Heidegger is nothing but a translator. As such, his aim is not, he says, to carry the Greek words over into the proper force and weight of his own language; his translation is not intended to appropriate what is said in Greek to the saying power of the German language. Heidegger's translation is not one through which philosophy would be taught to speak German. Rather, his translation is meant only to effect a displacement into the Greek and, having done so, to become superfluous. "A 'translation' is certainly not a carrying-over of the Greek words into the *proper force and weight of our language*. It is not intended to *replace* the Greek word but only to displace us *into* the Greek and as a displacement to disappear in it."⁹

As a translator of Aristotle, Heidegger suspends his text between the two poles of substitution and displacement. His text hovers in the space of this difference in such a way as to bring the two moments into their intimacy but only then to let the substitution be effaced for the sake of a translation of Aristotle (and of his present-day readers) back into Greek.

⁷ GA 7 = Martin Heidegger, *Vorträge und Aufsätze*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2000), 211-34.

⁸ GA 9 = Martin Heidegger, *Wegmarken*, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), 245: "Da diese (Übersetzung) schon die eigentliche *Auslegung* ist, bedarf es nur einer Erläuterung der 'Übersetzung.'"

⁹ Ibid.: "Die 'Übersetzung' ist allerdings keine Übertragung des griechischen Wortes in die *eigene Tragkraft unserer Sprache*. Sie will nicht das griechische Wort *ersetzen*, sondern gerade nur *in* dieses versetzen und als Versetzung in ihm verschwinden."

IMAGES, OFFSPRING, AND HIDING PLACES: TRACES OF THE GOOD IN PLATO'S THOUGHT

1. INTRODUCTION

First, thank you very much. I'm totally delighted by this invitation, delighted that I could take part in this year's edition of the summer school,¹ although I'm chagrined especially in light of the description of the place where you are right now, very chagrined at the physical distance and the physical abstraction. This abstraction, among other things, aggravates an age-old posture – that is to say, the safe distancing of philosophical discourse from embodiment, from sensuousness, from involvement in the various hazards, strivings, and struggles of life. So, this is something that chagrins me, and yet a certain absence might not be an uninteresting starting point for today's remarks – remarks that are going to be on the theme that you have assigned to me: the Idea of the Good, that which is considered to be the foundation and ultimate end of the comprehensive trajectory of Platonic thought.

However, in the title of my presentation, I have already bypassed that phrasing, “the idea of the Good.” I've bypassed it not so much in order to transgress that which no doubt is a Platonic formula but rather to call attention to it, to recover this formula, “the idea of the Good,” from its formulaic inertia, so that we might begin to attempt to do justice to it, to sense its depths along with its perplexing and hence noteworthy character.

2. TRACES

So, in my title, the phrasing is “traces of the Good” – “Traces of the Good in Plato's Thought.” But why “traces”? The Good, what Plato calls the Good, appears to be always ahead of us, receding before the inquiring gaze, vanishing into the line of the horizon as we think we are drawing closer to it. As when Socrates signals in *Philebus* 64c, “we are standing before the door [προθύροις] of the dwelling [οἴκησις] of the Good.” But then, as he undertakes to move beyond the threshold of the dwelling of the Good, to move to the Good “itself,” at this very moment the image, which still preserves beauty (the beautiful appearance of the abode) and the good (the indwelling) in their distinctness, dissipates. As Socrates tries to get closer to the indwelling Good, the Good seems to revert into

¹ Lecture given on August 27, 2020, at the Platonic Summer Seminar in Lanckorona, Poland.

the beautiful. I'm quoting again: "Now the power of the Good [τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις]" (interesting phrasing too, isn't it?), this principle (which is also a δύναμις) "has fled for us into the nature of the beautiful; for measuredness [μετρίότης] and commensuration [συμμετρία] surely turn out to be everywhere beauty and virtue" (*Philebus* 64e). "Thus," he concludes (65a), "we are not able [we lack the δύναμις] to track down [θηρεῦσαι] the good with a single idea, but we seize, we capture [λαμβάνω] it by three things," not one. There is no simple eidetic capture, but we may grasp the Good by reference to "beauty, commensuration, and truth."

Again, note the language of potentiality, which is employed to designate the principle, the origin. This principle is creative – that is to say, it is literally a power to initiate, a power to give rise; it is a generative force. So we deploy the language of δύναμις here, the Good as a generative force. The power of the Good, however, the power that the Good is said to be, appears also to be overpowering. It exceeds our own power to track it down, to hunt, to chase it: θηράω (65a). So, the prey flees, καταφεύγω (64e), and takes refuge further away. And a single, simple definition, circumscribing the Good in its whatness, escapes us. The good is a fugitive, then, and altogether unapproachable. It is, thus, a matter of following the signs of its passage; it is a matter of following the traces (in the plural) it would leave behind in its wake.

3. GENERATIVITY

Now I would share with you a few remarks on the question of generativity and generation, the fecundity characterizing the Good. The elusiveness of the good, far from contingent or accidental, rigorously follows from its hyperbolic character. Far from amounting to failure, the impossibility of an eidetic capture seems to be the most appropriate acknowledgment of excess, of absolute primordially – a primordially that cannot simply be resolved into chronological antecedence (which, in and of itself, already would prove vastly irrecoverable, thus constituting an insurmountable problem as a result). But there is even more at stake because such a primordially should rather be understood in terms of utter discontinuity with respect to the order of becoming and, therefore, to the order of temporal and spatial unfolding. It should be understood as an anteriority so radical as to transcend the order of becoming and yet, at the same time, so as to foreclose even the suggestion that the Good might be located elsewhere, at some other time. Thus, becoming is transcended, but this, at once, also means that the primordially of the Good, discontinuous with respect to becoming, is not at some other place; it is nowhere else. And this already says a great deal about the complexity and the internal self-differing of the third kind, of the mixed – that is, the realm of becoming.

Yet precisely at this point, confronted with a fugitive taking refuge in the unspeakable, a fugitive infinitely withdrawing into disappearance, we are reminded that λόγος is not simply logic, not simply syllogistic procedure, the language of rationality, the language of scientific knowledge. These are the late offspring of λόγος, but λόγος remains irreducible to such articulations. Archaic resources of λόγος would be the word of poetry, illuminating and bringing forth, showing connections; invocation, evocation, prayer, exclamation, the cry of despair, the call for help; the power to let appear, to conjure up phantoms and images, to recount, to sing, and to unfold stories. So, included in this

one word, λόγος, we should also hear the power of words infused with silence, aware of their own limits – words capable of meeting and marking such limits.

This is a vast repertoire, indeed, a repertoire that Plato inherits from earlier and heterogenous traditions and magisterially deploys, understanding it as integrally belonging in the philosophical discourse. Properly philosophical discourse is not aloof from these other resources of λόγος. Properly philosophical discourse is not merely logic. Plato understands the younger philosophical discourse as belonging, albeit in its distinctive features, in a broader and more ancient context.

In this connection, let me take you to a very familiar place in the *Republic*. We are toward the end of Book VI, at pages 507a and following, where we find the well-known ἀναλογία of the sun and the Good. This is a proportion, an analogy that tells us that the Good cannot be addressed on its own terms; it can only be gestured toward by resorting to an image of its own offspring, its own son, which is the sun, and the analogy lays out the following structures, which are specular in both terms and hold both for the sun and for the Good. Just as the sun opens up the realm of visibility, broadly speaking of sensibility or phenomenality – in other words, the sun opens up the field where “seeing” and “being seen” take place and are yoked together, the act of seeing and the object seen. And this can take place by virtue of the fact that the sun radiates light. Analogously, repeating the very same pattern but with new terms, in the case of the Good we are told that the Good opens up the field of intelligibility. The field of intelligibility is the realm within which “intellecting,” seeing through intelligence, and “being intellected” are yoked together. And the disclosure of this field, the expanse of this field where intellecting and being intellected are yoked together can be disclosed by virtue of τὸ ὄν and ἀλήθεια – not by virtue of light, here, but rather of “being” (in the present participle) and ἀλήθεια. So being and ἀλήθεια are analogous to the light, lighting up the intelligible field and making intelligible things possibly intellected. Here, in this image (which is an image of fecundity, of procreation), we are told in the most striking way that the Good is absolutely transcendent with respect to all these other terms that we have encountered – transcendent in the way in which the origin is transcendent with respect to the originated, transcendent not only with respect to the sun and the entire visible field (the phenomenal field that the sun opens up), but transcendent even with respect to the intelligible field. For the intelligible field is precisely that which flows out of the Good, very much like the luminous field of sensibility flows out of the sun’s energy.

So, the Good is transcendent not only with regard to sensibility and phenomenality but even with regard to the domain of the eidetic, to the order of the εἶδη, which are precisely issuing from it as from a source. Here we are not specifically told about fatherhood, but more broadly we are told of the Good as the beginning out of which springs the intelligible (507e, 508b-c, and 508d).

This ἀναλογία casts light on the two segments that are then articulated in the so-called divided line. The segments of the sensible and the intelligible are then further subdivided. Transcendent, excessive with respect to the entire line, the Good generates it. By virtue of its fecundity and creative thrust, from the nearness of the highest region (the realm of the εἶδη), the Good reaches all the way to the lowest segment of the line. Thus, we need to understand the Good as the source of this entire system precisely because it

not only opens up, discloses the realm of intelligibility but, qua father of the sun, the Good is also the grandfather or remote ancestor, if you wish, of becoming and the phenomenal world we live in.

As a consequence, we must underline the continuity of the divided line. The line is called “divided” because it is subdivided in segments. And yet, we need to understand that we are not talking about different objects as we move up and down the line. We are not talking about different objects of perception. We are talking about the same object of perception that is perceived at different levels, with varying degrees of illumination, or, if you wish, with varying degrees of being and truth. In this way, the same subject matter, the same object, for instance the human hand, can be seen starting from the lowest level of imagination (for instance, seeing a shadow projected by it or its image reflected on a surface); then our perception can be further clarified and gain increasing precision by looking at the hand itself; subsequently, the hand may become the object of the mathematical, numerical operations of thought, of *διάνοια*, if we take into account the fact that there are numerous hands and hands are items that, however always singular, also bear similarities and can be counted; eventually, at the level of the *εἶδη*, we wonder about the whatness of the hand. So, at differing levels of truth and being, we are really investigating the very same objects. And, absolutely fundamental in my view, we need to be very clear about the fact that we are not talking about the intelligible objects and sensible objects as though they were separate classes of items, but rather we need to understand the progressive (processional, if you wish to turn to Neoplatonic language) increase or decrease in clarity, manifestness, unconcealment – that is, the increase or decrease of proximity to the source.

So, that which presents itself only in withdrawal, the Good, this rigorously unspeakable refugee, can be spoken of, somehow, outside the requirement of rigor. After all, rigor and the protocols of eidetic or conceptual determination will have been derivative with respect to the Good. See, we haven't even talked about *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας* yet, but we are already dealing with the same problem that is over and over again restated in Plato.

4. EXPERIENCING THE GOOD

At this point I want to open a little parenthesis and make a few remarks about what it means to experience the Good. For, if it is true that it cannot, strictly speaking, be eidetically determined, still, unless the Good is a word with no semantic suggestiveness or content at all, the Good must mean something to us, we must have a sense of it if not an eidetic determination of it.

Above we got a hint of the hiding/dwelling place of the Good (and its invisible domain). The Good hides in its offspring, in the phenomenal and the sensuous. This is its abode, its home, as Plato writes in the *Philebus*. It rests in the realm of multifarious phenomena disclosed by the light of the sun, and yet irreducible to them. It seems to be in them, nowhere else, and yet it abides nowhere to be found. At least nowhere to be found eidetically, in terms of eidetic determination. The issue, I think, is pointedly not about reticence. It's not a matter of reticence regarding the Good and first principles at large. The so-called unwritten doctrines are unwritten not because their letter is kept secret, not because they are withheld from the public and circulated only among a selected,

privileged few. I believe they are unwritten because they cannot possibly be written. Or spoken (properly, eidetically articulated), for that matter. For at the culmination of the line, the dialectic and ἐπιστήμη, which name intellectual perception at the highest level, are not complete and self-enclosed. So much so that, at the highest segment of the line, the perception of the εἶδη is named not only dialectic and ἐπιστήμη but also νόησις. For each segment of the divided line, concerning the level of perception of the soul, Plato initially utilizes only one term: starting from the lowest level, he calls the increasingly perspicuous perceptions εἰκασία, πίστις, διάνοια. Only at the fourth and last level the terminology proliferates, so that here the perception of the εἶδη is named dialectic, ἐπιστήμη, and νόησις, with all the problems that νόησις involves. For, indeed, νόησις is a matter of immediacy, is a matter not of dialectical articulation but of nondiscursive and immediate apprehension, so the addition of the noetic mode in the terminology pertaining to the highest segment certainly complicates the matter in the direction that I'm trying to suggest. So, let me also add that the dialectical knowledge of the εἶδη themselves (let alone the dialectical knowledge of the idea of ideas, i.e., the Good) cannot be carried out to a definitive end, does not come to a closure, does not come to completion.

Let me be precise and offer some examples. We can think here of the strategy of the *Republic*, in which the invisible εἶδος of justice in the soul is pursued by reference to the examination of the visible practices of justice (and injustice) in the πόλις. You will remember this agreement in Book II. Precisely because we are not δεινοῖ enough to be able to look into the soul and see the justice there, we are forced to look at the bigger picture, at the bigger, readable letters of communal life. Thus, it is by granting the analogy between πόλις and ψυχή that, through the examination of the πόλις, we will be able to grant some kind of knowledge of the ψυχή as well. But this is a wild stipulation, meaning above all that we achieve eidetic determination through the study of appearances. That is a fantastic paradox. We achieve a sense, a determination at the eidetic level through the εἶδωλον. We achieve εἶδος through its diminutive. In a most remarkable semantic reconfiguration, far from a matter of deception or derivativeness, far from the status of mere copy of an eidetic original, the order of appearance is treated as primordial, constitutive, and originary.

Or we can think of the *Symposium*. There are other examples, for instance from the *Timaeus* as well, but to limit myself to a most incisive moment in the *Symposium*, let us look at 211a, in which it is affirmed that of the idea (in this case, the idea of the beautiful) there is neither λόγος nor ἐπιστήμη, neither discursive articulateness nor epistemic constructions and determinations. But if dialectical knowledge is problematic at the level of the εἶδη in general, it proves profoundly problematic a fortiori when it comes to the idea of ideas – that is, the Good. So, I think that here lies the mystery, what has been called the esoteric, altogether other than a doctrine that would be speakable but willfully withheld. The difficulty of the esoteric lies in the fact that what we are indicating with the name “Good” can only be shared beyond discourse or can only be shared thanks to a discourse coming to an end, coming to cease after having carried us beyond, ceasing with a gesture. And here we are at the very heart of Letter VII, aren't we?

Let me read it again, this most incisive passage, 341c:

[T]here is not, nor will there ever be, any treatise of mine dealing therewith [the principles], for it does not at all admit of verbal speech [it is not ῥητὸν]. It does not admit of verbal expression like other studies but as a result of continued intimacy [συνουσίας] or company with the subject matter and living together [συζῆν], it is brought to birth in the soul all of a sudden as a light that is kindled from a leaping spark and thereafter nourishes itself.

So, discourse unfolds from doxastic assumptions, to further and further clarifications, all the way to noetic intuition, but the system at this point remains open, this path continues and fulfills itself in life – notably, through intimacy with the things themselves (this is what we just heard about), through living together (συζῆν), sharing life, sharing time. Dialogue and dialectic (which are exercises practiced together by human beings in given geo-historical contexts and thanks to certain material conditions, for indeed no one can afford the luxury of entertaining dialogue and practicing dialectic with others unless certain material conditions are granted), then, turn back to the beginning of the line, the stratum of corporeality, of sensibility, and of animality. For there is no dialogue and dialectic among disembodied minds.

That eidetic determination is no simple, uncontroversial affair, as we said, is evident with particular incisiveness concerning the idea of ideas, the idea of the Good. Dialectic would lead to the knowledge of the being of things (the τί ἐστὶ, the whatness of each thing); this would be the highest outcome of the path to knowledge, of the operations of a knower with respect to a known. However (and this is of the utmost importance), what does the Good say beyond this? Well, beyond this, beyond coming to know the τί ἐστὶ, the Good, at the origin of this whole unfolding, indicates a further attainment, which I think is the utmost μάθημα, according also to what Letter VII says. That is to say, the Good indicates the conjunction of subject and object, the realization of their nonseparation, because in the dialectic there still is the knower and the known, but in the beyond, marked by the language of the Good, lies the realization of their nonseparation, of the belonging together of knower and known. And this is good. And this is the Good. Or: this may be the Good if this predication were at all possible.

That subject and object may correspond, respond to each other, accompany each other, such may be the Good. Here is named the re-composition of discursive distinctions, of the separations that do not carry an ontological value but only a provisional heuristic function, merely limited to discursive analysis. Similarly, in discourse we make distinctions and distinguish a sensible level from an intelligible level and an object understood in its shadow character from an object understood eidetically. Yet, as Aristotle very often underlines as well, it is one thing to make distinctions in speech and another to distinguish in being.

The discursive distinctions that keep the knower and the known separate, of course, have a fundamental importance precisely because heuristically, in the course of discursive analysis, they allow for the ascent to further and further determinations, to increasing clarification. But these are distinctions in λόγος, not in being. These do

not carry an ontological value but are provisional; they belong to λόγος, and as such they should eventually be overcome. The Good, I believe, works as a reminder of the limit of these discursive distinctions, a reminder preventing a forgetfulness disastrous in its consequences (for instance, the forgetfulness allowing for the assumption that the epistemological control and determination of the object is the ultimate end). The Good tells us that it is not the ultimate end; the ultimate end is the beyond-reason that lies in the awareness that knower and known, albeit different, are not separate. They are not the same, yet they are not separate: different and nevertheless not a duality, let alone dichotomically opposed. Such a re-composition cannot be obtained, let alone determined, conceptually. But a transgression of discourses, particularly the written ones, in which theses, formulas, and doctrines get crystallized ... such a going beyond the task of determining beings in their whatness opens the way for a conjunction of researcher and researched, of knower and known. As such an excess and transgression, the Good opens the way for an overcoming of these distinctions that have exhausted their functions, their *raison d'être*, and therefore must be left behind. This is the beyond being, the ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας. The Good, fleeting and uncaptured, reveals that the line is in fact a circle. It reminds us that the two extremities are to be set in continuity, that their linear opposition is not to be indefinitely maintained and must, indeed, be overcome and ultimately dropped. So, it's not only a matter of going up but a matter of circling upwards from below and down again. And this circling is very much at the heart of the dynamism of the *Republic*.

Let me say it again: seeing the sun means relating to a being to be known, an object. However, beyond this, there is the awareness of the relation between the eye and what it sees. And it is good to be mindful of that. Such a mindfulness gives itself – and its being there, its giving itself, is good. And I would say it is the Good – not a concept, nor anything to be determined conceptually.

The unspeakable is in itself unspeakable, not simply a secret to be kept, a secret not to be divulged, which, among other things, would reduce the withdrawal from writing to the decision of a sovereign author controlling his or her strategies at will. The unspeakable in itself, if I may say so, this limit ineluctably undergone by the author, not decided by the author but suffered by him/her, is the ground and framework (strange as this may sound) of knowledge. Knowledge takes place within this abysmal scene. This would be the unfathomed ground without which knowledge becomes impoverished and gravely defective or even dangerous, if not impossible. It may not be by chance that the first lines of the *Nicomachean Ethics* emphasize that not only knowing and research but all human endeavor, all human activity (Aristotle says “they say,” but of course he takes up this widespread conviction), is oriented to the Good, is ultimately thrusting itself in that direction, is ultimately striving for the Good. And what is the possibility of human knowing, enacting, endeavoring without that orientation, without that horizon of finality, elusive as it in fact may be?

The unspeakable one that cannot be determined as an οὐσία is not unrelated to the discourse of knowledge, to the discourse culminating in dialectic, but rather it is the accomplishment and the completion of such a discourse, as we said, the most eminent μάθημα. For it is the πᾶγμα itself, again, that is not altogether speakable; it is the singularity of each being that cannot be eidetically determined. Not fully, never fully.

Being, then, reverts into the goodness of the fact that it is, into the good fact that it is, the goodness of it being.

And note in passing: in Aristotle, the experience of friendship may be seen, I think, as the concrete exposition of this reconnection of corporeality and sensibility on the one hand and dialectic on the other hand. These magnificent passages that we considered two years ago at the Collegium, in Book IX of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, show with insistence that friendship is mostly and above all a matter of sharing αἴσθησις, a matter of συναίσθησις, sensing together, in the con-senting and con-sensing brought about by simply being together, even without speaking. These passages finally bring together the sensing animal and dialectic as a shared practice. And this is a further figure of the Good, I believe. Friendship understood precisely in the intimacy of dialectic and animality.

5. DOUBLE ORIGIN

Very briefly, I had in mind a section called “double origin” that would call into question the story that we have been following so far of mono-parental progeny, of mono-parental procreation. On the one hand, non-conceptually and beyond the determination of essence, the good would be retraced in what it leaves behind: in the domain of intelligibility, wherein intelligence contemplates the intelligible; but also in the son, in the sunny offspring and all proceeds from it, in a procession disclosing the entire cosmos and its orderly as well as disorderly vicissitudes. The cosmos of sensibility would indeed proceed from out of the overflowing abundance and generosity of the father.

On the other hand, Plato consistently signals the limits and one-sidedness of this story of single parenthood. The causes become two, the origin is shown as twofold. In order to give itself out, to manifest its expansiveness, the good needs an open to flow into, a receptiveness within which manifestation can take place. Generation presupposes such a companionship. And these are moments of extreme difficulty in the Platonic corpus.

Always as an afterthought, but nevertheless very carefully, Plato juxtaposes another principle to that of the Good, a principle that is equi-primordial at least, if not even more primordial, and takes on various guises. Again, it's a principle disguised in images, in myths and figurations; at the limit, sinking into unspeakability.

What is eminently inapparent in the story of exuberant paternity is the implicit but altogether vital need for a *locus*, a wherein (ἐν ᾧ). In the *Timaeus*, this has several names and is variously accounted for yet remains elusive, impervious to any attempt at circumscription. This turn marks an abrupt change of pace and a new beginning (47e), in which a second, primordial cause is acknowledged. After having considered the work of the Demiurge and how the cosmos was brought into being through calculation and mathematical knowledge, Timaeus says: well, but of course, we forgot something here; in order to manifest itself in its overly abundant generosity, in its overflowing generativity, the Good must at least have a where into which it may flow. And so, the ἐν ᾧ, the “in which” in the *Timaeus* will take on several names, the first of which is “necessity.” But it is also called χώρα, the receptacle of becoming. I like to translate this untranslatable term as “the open.” Without the receptacle, without the open, without this opening, this spacing and receptive expanse, it would be impossible to think of the Good overflowing or procreating at all. Yet, at the same time, this is least perceivable. Receptivity is most easily overlooked

vis-à-vis the mesmerizing glow of what is received. That which is no thing recedes vis-à-vis the phenomenal advancing of things. We can speak at length about the creativity and fecundity of the Father, of the Demiurge, of the Good without wondering about the conditions necessary for the enactment of generation, about what must be granted in order for generation to take place at all. Plato seems to undergo such wonder and, by introducing a second cause, *χώρα*, responds to it: we need to speak of the origin as twofold, even in the radical incommensurability of these two *ἀρχαί*, of these two principles.

In the *Republic*, an analogous movement first announces itself in Book VII, in the mention (the prisoner is finally outside the cave) of “the sun in its *χώρα*” (the sun in the sky, which is the all-enveloping one wherein everything develops, the open of all becoming), and finds fulfillment in the closing myth of the Mediterranean mother. (Needless to say, a myth is hardly a closure and conclusion.) Here, in the midst of a highly ordered/structured cosmos, Ananke, Necessity, is imaged sitting impenetrably silent, surrounded by daughters not speaking but singing and themselves encircled by further interpreters. Both dialogues, centered around stories of the paternal/creative action of the Good, drift toward the acknowledgment of something missing, something that escaped first scrutiny so that the account must be started again, emended, supplemented.

The fact that the maternal enters the scene in both cases as an afterthought indicates that perhaps we’re dealing here with a withdrawal even more extreme, irrecoverable, archaic than that of the fugitive father. The strains undergone by *λόγος* – either turning into *μῦθος* or even precipitating into increasingly opaque attempts at predication, finally verging on silence – bear witness to this.

6. JUSTICE

However, not only does the *Republic* revolve around the central nucleus of the Good then drift toward Necessity, but furthermore this development is preceded by a similarly remarkable discussion – the discussion on justice. The theme of justice is taken up again in the books following Book VII and is linguistically addressed all the way to the end of the text.

Thus, I have prepared a few comments on Justice as another presentation of the Good. We started today by taking note of the Good fleeing ahead of us, leaving traces in the world of phenomena it engenders. In other words, we attempted to track down the Good by considering the consequences in its wake, the filiation. But perhaps we should likewise look for traces behind us, no less than ahead, for perhaps we trod along our path without noticing something that may not be irrelevant.

There is a persistent and precise parallelism between the language utilized in the treatment of the Good and of justice, starting from the characterization of the inquiry as a matter of hunting, of tracking down. They are equally fugitive and elusive. Moreover, justice is crucially concerned with commensuration, the welding together of difference, the harmonization of difference qua difference, and therefore the force of unifying while at the same time magnifying and even protecting the different qua different. There are all these examples that are brought up to further refine the image of justice: for instance, the example of harmony, of the chord, where different notes are brought together into one. And the chord would not be what it is were it not for the different notes, precisely qua

different. Again, this seems to me to be a preamble or a literal preparation of traits that will later be referred to the Good. And I would have concluded with a few remarks on the cave, on our situation in the cave, again going back to the question of what it means to experience the Good, if not to know it eidetically, and what it means to speak of justice and of the Good, in what ways the written text (philosophical inquiry in any guise) unfolds in the ψυχή and informs life.

The cave is not so much an image of the human condition, as is often said. Quite the contrary. Not all human beings are prisoners in the subterranean scene: there are also the puppeteers, those who keep up the spectacle in order to keep the prisoners entertained and unaware. Humans exploiting other humans. So, the cave is an image of the political and of political struggle, of what it may mean to open up some space and some possibility for bringing justice into the picture, into the ψυχή, into the πόλις. We might see the cave as an inceptive image where we may discern the dynamism, the possibility of evolution, of change and transformation, however remote. I think I should stop here...

[Q1: Michał Krzykawski] Thank you for this wonderful reading. I really enjoyed your presentation. Actually, I had a great pleasure to conduct a seminar two days ago. We had a discussion about your text *Measure, Excess and the All: To Agathon in Plato*.² We discussed the relationship between the Good and the question of χώρα. Of course, χώρα is this “receptacle” as you called it, but I also tried to push the interpretation of χώρα toward the Latin *localitas*. On the one hand, it is a receptacle, but on the other hand, it is the very place in which the Good can emerge. So would you agree with this interpretation? The Good, in order to be produced, has to take place, as simple as that.

And my second question is about your reading we have just listened to. You said that the εἶδος is available through εἶδωλον. The problem is that in our times the εἶδωλα, the simulacra, are produced and reproduced technologically, so perhaps it obliges us to redefine the question of τέχνη in Plato's philosophy, the question which is slightly repressed by Platonism. Do you have any thoughts about this?

In the text we discussed two days ago you also said that the human is the σύμβολον and the σύμβολον is very connected to the question of φιλία. The question of εἶδωλον is also connected to the question of σύμβολον, and it should also give us a better insight into the question of technology. My question is about the role of techniques or technology in relation to the εἶδωλον and the σύμβολον.

[CB] Please explain, what do you mean by this connection between the σύμβολον and the εἶδωλον?

[MK] If we assume that the human emerges within the σύμβολον, it means that we produce simulacra, we produce the εἶδωλα through symbols. Which can be a kind of support to the εἶδος or, on the contrary, can block the access to the Good. So, perhaps, it is about the question of evil in your interpretation of the Good.

² C. Baracchi, “Measure, Excess, and the All: To Agathon in Plato,” in *A Companion to Ancient Philosophy*, ed. S. Kirkland and E. Sanday (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2018), 109-22.

[CB] Well, these questions are very important and rather difficult. The first: absolutely in agreement on *localitas*, at times I use *locus*. In fact, I myself am used to the Latin *locus*. And it's disarmingly simple, fascinating: that place so easily disappears, is so easily forgotten, because of the fact that something takes place there, takes all our attention, absorbs all our attention. So our attention is focused on what's going on, what is taking place, what is there, and then, at most, we begin to wonder about the cause and what brought it about and so on, but the thereness is completely, radically inconspicuous, which is remarkable. And yet, in the spatial-temporal realm of becoming within which we are immersed, place is an experience bordering on ἀναίσθησις, bordering on imperceptibility. So this is completely fascinating and also dramatically simple. You're right, I completely agree with your specification and translation as *localitas*, although I think that χώρα says that in Greek, too – I mean, in archaic Greek. And even in modern Greek, as a matter of fact, the center of a town, the old town, is called χώρα. And that means the place, the place of a certain particularly intense, intensified gathering of something, a place where things are taking place. And so I think it is always important, especially when working with Plato, with his language, which is hardly technical, to keep in mind the common parlance and the everyday resonance of these terms. These are not technical terms but really simple ones that are used in common conversation. The second question is, of course, very complex because, when I said that we divine εἶδος from εἶδωλον, I was referring to a very frequent, not everywhere, but a very frequent strategy that Plato utilizes, and that is certainly the case with the *Republic*. So, we start with the city, and we've stipulated that ψυχή and πόλις are shaped and structured in the same way. So that, after having said something about the πόλις, then we *mutatis mutandis* can say something about ψυχή. But what you are pointing out is that image per se, the εἶδωλον per se, can really take us anywhere, it can be utilized in various ways. I think Plato is profoundly aware of that. Think about the fact that in the depths of the cave the puppeteers, the people who are in charge of the spectacle, are precisely carrying εἶδωλα in a row. These are also technological artifacts. They are not projecting the shadows of living beings, animals, plants; they are projecting the shadows of artifacts, right? So further removed, even from the shadow of a living being, an artifact that is furthermore (and this is a matter of τέχνη, too) brought in a procession, afforded a certain deliberate order, and so on and so forth. So there is really τέχνη here in the broadest sense of the term, not only as technology but also as art and also as this art to deceive, magical artistry, which makes you a sorcerer, in the way in which a Sophist is a sorcerer. So ultimately, I think that your question points to the fact, disarming in its simplicity – and there is no way out of this – that the tools, if we may use this word, used by Plato and those used by the Sophists, or by the puppeteers who keep the prisoners prisoners, who keep the prisoners captive by captivating them with this pleasant spectacle and entertainment – the tools they all use are the same. Plato makes up stories, as Socrates in this case, makes up constantly new stories and brings up constantly new imagery, and this is sorcery, this is seduction. This is a way of creating a kind of ambience of fascination that can free the soul or hold it captive. It can go both ways, exactly both ways. And there is no safe, in the sense of absolute and valuable, distinction between the two strategies. We can only say that in this sense we cannot really judge the difference between the philosopher and the Sophist, to limit ourselves to this duality: we cannot assess the distinction between the philosopher and the Sophist on the ground of the τέχνη they employ because they know

the same arts of λόγος. But the two figures differ ethically. The two figures differ in terms of the horizon of their finalities, because the horizon of finality of the Sophist is clearly not the orientation to truth. Not that the truth may simply and definitely be conquered. It may be pursued along possibly endless paths. But still, the pursuit may yield some insight and clarity. And it is not in vain. It actually can help us unfold a clearer understanding of certain issues, although maybe never once and for all. But still, that is not the end of the Sophist. So much so that Thrasymachus in Book I says: Well, you know, justice is what I say it is. Justice is what the strongest says it is, and the strongest says that justice is something to his own advantage. What this amounts to saying is that we are in a context of pure nominalism, the word justice is completely empty, whoever is in power will fill it with contents that are self-serving. So this amounts to denying that there is a truth or anything at all to be affirmed about justice. But of course, the ethos of the philosopher is precisely to keep pursuing this issue, what is justice, how can I say, how can I grasp or steal some sense of what we mean when we utter this word “justice.” Unless we want to say that it is just an empty word, that it is just sounds that we emit, you know, just in order to win elections and in order to win causes in tribunals, and in order to win power or things of this kind. So I think that as far as resorting to the τέχναι is concerned, which is your question, your question is severe and leaves no way out. I mean, we cannot say that the philosopher does not employ that. It all depends in what direction because that can lead to διαβολή just as well. As far as the human σύμβολον is concerned, the reference in my essay, which you have read, was not so much connected with εἶδωλον (with the question of puppeteers) but was rather inspired by the use of this word σύμβολον in the *Symposium*. It is in conjunction with the speech of Aristophanes where the σύμβολον is literally meaning a part and the evocation of the whole in the part. So the human being is the σύμβολον moving in the world, moving through existence, looking for the other part, the missing parts. So I meant σύμβολον in this sense, and I am not exactly sure how we would reconnect it with the εἶδωλον because the σύμβολον is, phenomenally speaking, a fragment. It is a part of the whole, endowed, to be sure (as parts are), with the power to recall the whole.

[MK] Yes. I am not sure if my understanding is correct, but, you know, if we agree that the σύμβολον is the very process of producing symbols, right, it would mean that the symbols that are produced ... we produce symbol in order to re-unify these two parts that were disunified, right? This is why we produce symbols.

[CB] Yes, but I should specify that I was not using “symbol” in this sense because the human is not anything that we produce unless we want to go into the question of human architecture, human formation and *Bildung*. Or we could say that the human is produced as a symbol by the action of Zeus that cuts it into two and from there on, here we have the symbol. But this is why I was a little bit cautious in bringing it straightforwardly into the question of technicity.

[Q2: Andrzej Serafin] I have something else to say. It is a simple question but one that I would really no longer want to ask after hearing your remark on the final unification of the knower and the known, or the researcher and researched. I think I could just cease

speaking, but then I would like to continue for a while and ask the question about the second principle that you have mentioned and its position in the divided line metaphor. So, as you have said, the Good is located at the end beyond the uppermost limit, but still it propagates itself or radiates through the entire scope of the line. Still, this other principle, $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$, if we could identify it of course with the place or that in which the Good takes place, or perhaps matter, according to some interpretations ...

[CB] Exactly.

[AS] ... so it would be possible, perhaps, to locate it at the other part of the line, just below or before the downmost limit. That is, well, it is not my claim but just a suggestion that we have discussed here today. So, the suggestion is, if not, then why not, but if yes, then how would you connect this possibility of locating $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$ at the other side of the line with your conclusion that the line becomes the circle after all and then those two ends would reconnect ultimately.

[CB] I think that you already answered or provided an answer to ...

[AS] That is why I didn't want to ask the question but ...

[CB] No, I think you utilized very revealing language. You said that the Good radiates throughout the line. I think that is correct. Exactly in the same way in which light radiates from the sun, the visible sun. I think that we need to understand this linearity, not in the abstract, spaceless, geometrical sense but really as this movement of expansion, this movement whereby the Good radiates, the Good expands itself, makes itself manifest in this overflowing, in this flowing beyond itself. I mean, parenting is always self-transcendence, right? It is always releasing something/someone that dramatically goes beyond oneself. And therefore, we need to understand this movement on the part of the Good. And this movement is precisely what, as we were saying earlier with Michael, it is precisely what always already albeit inconspicuously requires the in-which, $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \tilde{\omega}$. So the line and this very profusion that, for the late Platonists or Neoplatonists even, will be the movement of emanation, this movement could not take place but in the coupling with $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$, in the availability and receptivity of $\chi\acute{\omega}\rho\alpha$. Always already. So that this very movement of overflowing would coincide with the opening up of this availability, of this receptibility. So that the movement of expansion and the space accepting and receiving it would have to be understood as being at one: not the same, but at one. So not that, before, there is a space and there is a kind of fecundity and then you bring them together. No, it is the very movement of radiating that already bespeaks and silently betrays the fact that *there is* place there, radiating takes place, as Michael said earlier. And I think, then, it would also be fascinating to consider that the very same scheme, the very same dynamic is reported by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* (987b18), when he gives an account of so-called unwritten doctrines. And he says that all that is (starting from the $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\delta\eta$ and all the way to physical manifestation, $\varphi\acute{\upsilon}\sigma\iota\varsigma$ and its becoming and phenomenal character) originates from two principles, and the two principles are, he says, (1) in beingness, in $\omicron\upsilon\sigma\acute{\iota}\alpha$, the

One (which is also as well characterized as the Good, so coincidence of the One and the Good), and (2) in matter, the great and small, the dyad, which Plato also takes into consideration in the *Philebus*, not to mention the Pythagorean ascendancy, and so on, and it is again the same scheme. There is no sense of an emanation from being into the expanse of phenomenality, the expanse of the κόσμος as we know it, without this duplicity. I don't know if I addressed your concern, but what is suggested in what you said, also, is of course the reconnection of beginning and end, of the upper and lower levels. But this reconnection itself takes place in the expanse, I think, in the open that χώρα is, that χώρα names. And this reconnection is not a reconnection of the εἶδη and sensibility or materiality as cosmic principles, as principles of the All. But, more precisely, it is a reconnection of levels of human perception, of perception of the human ψυχή. This is why I would resist this idea of positing the Good at or beyond the summit and χώρα at the lower end or even beyond the lower end. But again, you know, it is interesting to see and to really take seriously the fact that all of this is said outside rigor.

IS THE IDEA OF THE GOOD BEYOND BEING?

1. INTRODUCTION: “ABSOLUTE” VERSUS “RELATIVE”

“The sun, I presume you will say, not only provides to visible things the power of visibility but also generation and growth and nurture though it is not itself generation.” “Of course not.” “And you will say that the things known not only receive from the presence of the good their being known, but their very existence and essence is derived to them from it, though the good itself is not essence but still transcends essence in dignity and surpassing power. Glaucon was quite amused and said: By Apollo, a miraculous superiority! It is your own fault, I said, you forced me to say what I thought about it” (*Republic* 6, 509b-c [my translation]: τὸν ἥλιον τοῖς ὀρωμένοις οὐ μόνον οἶμαι τὴν τοῦ ὀραῖσθαι δύναμιν παρέχειν φήσεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ αὔξην καὶ τροφήν, οὐ γένεσιν αὐτὸν ὄντα. πῶς γάρ; καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεισθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβεῖα καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος. καὶ ὁ Γλαῦκων μάλα γελοῖως, Ἄπολλον, ἔφη, δαιμονίας ὑπερβολῆς. σὺ γάρ, ἦν δ’ ἐγώ, αἴτιος, ἀναγκάζων τὰ ἔμοι δοκοῦντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν).

What is a reasonable interpretation of Socrates’s statement that the Good is “beyond being”? Does this mean that the Good has no being at all, as Rafael Ferber and Gregor Damschen maintain?¹ This would mean that the Idea of the Good is ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας in the sense of being beyond being altogether: ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. This is a position (when the Good is identified with the One) espoused by Plotinus, later Neoplatonists, and many others, including Schleiermacher, and more recently the Tübingen school. Hans Joachim Krämer, one of the major figures of the Tübingen school, for instance, emphasizes the testimonies of Aristotle, Iamblichus, and Proclus about the One of Speusippus, that it is

¹ Rafael Ferber and Gregor Damschen, “Is the Idea of the Good beyond Being? Plato’s ‘epekeina tes ousias’ Revisited,” in *Second Sailing: Alternative Perspectives on Plato*, ed. Debra Nails et al. (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 2015), 197ff.

“not even a being,” and sees this as an account of the beyond-beingness of the One in Plato’s thought.²

On the other hand, does ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας mean *not* that the Good is beyond being altogether – that is, ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος (since Plato does not say this) – but rather that the Idea of the Good should be understood in Middle Platonic terms as “something like the highest being, τὸ ὄν αὐτό, which bestows upon all other things their being,” as Matthias Baltes argues: “the Idea of the Good is a νοητόν, and as such it is an ὄν”³ Luc Brisson adopts a similar position. For him, the linguistic exaggeration embedded in Glaucon’s “miraculous superiority” (δαμιονίας ὑπερβολῆς) effectively undercuts the statement ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, showing that the superiority of the Good over being is only relative, “not an absolute superiority as will be the case with Plotinus.”⁴ “The transcendence of the Good is not absolute, but qualified: it surpasses the οὐσία of the other beings not in itself, but in dignity and power, just as a king surpasses his subjects in dignity and power, even if he remains a human being.”⁵

Here I will argue for a different interpretation, partly because I think that Baltes’s and Brisson’s formulations are inaccurate and partly because the dichotomy between the so-called absolute superiority of Plotinus’s position and the relative superiority of the Middle Platonic position overlooks some complexities of Plotinus’s own different formulations. While I do not deny that Plotinus holds that the Good is ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος, something that Plato never says, these complexities provide a different way of finding a more nuanced ground between the absolute and the relative positions as so formulated.

Why is this important? There is perhaps no more important question. If there is a Good, in the sense that Socrates indicates, is the Good both really accessible to us – and to everything – and yet not merely in our power – that is, not the projection of our own preferences? Above all, it seems to me, this is true to the spirit of Plato, that, by contrast to the contemporary world, we are not in control of everything, that everything should not be in our own image and likeness, and that, while the divine is open to everything, in reality it is beyond our capacity to co-opt it, which is to say, beyond the preferences of individuals, tribes, cities, peoples, or species.

2. MIDDLE PLATONIC INTERPRETATION

So, let me set out the case against the absolute position espoused, it is claimed, by figures such as Plotinus. First, Baltes rightly notes that Socrates repeatedly talks of the ἰδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ (505a2, 508e2f., 517b8f., 534b9f.) and calls it παράδειγμα (540a9). In addition, at 507b5, Socrates ranks it as an idea, alongside other ideas, such as the Beautiful – as he does in other dialogues. In this context, Baltes asks if an idea that transcends being is conceivable at all. Ferber and Damschen suggest that it is a logically impossible concept:

² Hans Joachim Krämer, “Epekeina tes ousias: On Plato, *Republic* 509B,” in *The Other Plato*, ed. D. Nikulin (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012), 41.

³ Matthias Baltes, “Is the Idea of the Good in Plato’s *Republic* Beyond Being,” in *Studies in Plato and the Platonic Tradition. Essays Presented to John Whittaker*, ed. M. Joyal (London: Routledge, 1997), 3-24.

⁴ My translation of Luc Brisson, “L’approche traditionnelle de Platon par H. F. Cherniss,” in *New Images of Plato: Dialogues on the Idea of the Good*, ed. Giovanni Reale and Samuel Scolnicov (Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2002), 88.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 90.

“like a square circle: not even an *ens fictum* or *imaginarium*, but a chimaera that is an *ens verbale*. An *ens verbale* is something one cannot imagine but only formulate.”⁶

Second, Socrates characterizes the Idea of the Good as “the brightest part of being” (518c9: τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον), “the most blessed of being” (526e3f.: ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος), “the best among beings” (532c5: ἦν τοῦ ἀρίστου ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θεῶν). So, the Idea of the Good “must still belong to the realm of being.”⁷

Third, the Idea of the Good is “apprehended by thought itself” (532a5f.); it is “last in the knowable/known” (517b8f.), which means that it “must still belong to the intelligibles, though as their summit (τέλος).”⁸ It is also a μάθημα – that is, an object of study, like other μέγιστα μαθήματα.

Fourth, just as the sun belongs to the realm of visibles, so the Good belongs to the realm of the intelligibles. So, at 526e1f. (ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος), the Idea of the Good “belongs to the intelligible things” – as is also implied by its “kingship” (509d1-2: “one reigning over the intelligible kind and place, the other the visible ...”). Kingship implies not a difference in being but rather a difference in order. I am not persuaded by this, since even if we admit that the Sun is a part of our world, we do not mean a part in the sense of an item like chairs, table, friends; the Sun is a god. This also applies to Brisson’s argument (“... just as a king surpasses his subjects in dignity and power, even if he remains a human being”).⁹

Fifth, the divided line does not envisage any transcending of the realm of ideas. The Good is simply the last in the realm of the known and can with difficulty be seen (517b-c, 518c10, 519c10ff., 526e4, 532c5f., 540a8f.). Likewise, in the simile of the cave, just as the sun belongs to this visible world, so the Good belongs to the upper world.

Sixth, in 534b3ff., the dialectician is distinguished by being able to give an account of the substance (λόγος τῆς οὐσίας) of all things. “Therefore, we are told, he must also be able to give a λόγος τῆς οὐσίας of the Idea of the Good ... [it] can be defined accurately by this λόγος (διορίσασθαι τῷ λόγῳ) by distinguishing and abstracting it from all other things (ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ἀφελών),” either by diarsis or synopsis, which is said to be characteristic of dialectic,¹⁰ just as being is said to be apart from or outside the greatest kinds in the Sophist 250b-d. In short, according to Baltes, “the Idea of the Good is in possession of an οὐσία, which can be defined by a λόγος (a definition or at least a circumscription).”

Hence, Baltes concludes: (1) the Good “surpasses all kind of being that is caused by it, yet nevertheless belongs to the realm of being,”¹¹ which is to say, “it is not οὐσία *in the same sense as the οὐσία caused by it.*”¹² (2) All this points to the fact that the Idea of the Good does not transcend being (τὸ ὄν). And this means that “the Idea of the Good is

⁶ Ferber and Damschen, 202-3.

⁷ Baltes, “Is the Idea of the Good,” 5.

⁸ Ibid., 5.

⁹ Brisson, “L’approche traditionnelle de Platon,” 90.

¹⁰ Baltes, “The Idea of the Good,” 8.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid., 11

α νοητόν, and as such it is an ὄν ... being in its purest and simplest form ... while all things depend on it (511b8), it does not depend on anything ... in this sense it is οὐκ οὐσία and ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας ('beyond any particular essence'), and in this sense it 'transcends' (this kind of) essence 'in dignity and power,' for it has the dignity ... of origin and cause, which preserves everything through its power (δύναμις, 509b8-10; cf. 516b9-c2).¹³ In addition, of course, as we have emphasized, Plato never says – as does Plotinus – that the Good is ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος.

Baltes, therefore, interprets the Good in *Republic* 6-7 following Middle Platonists ranging from Plutarch, Justin, and Celsus to Numenius, Alcinous, and Atticus. He tends then to see the Good as a kind of superior form of Intellect that may perhaps be identified with the *phytourgos* or craftsman of *Republic* 10, providing a kind of economy between the Craftsman of the *Republic* and that of the *Timaeus*. He also acknowledges a trend of thought before Plotinus, starting in fact with the Old Academy, which sought to raise the supreme principle beyond being – as in Speusippus, Brotinus, Ps. Archytas, Eudorus, and Moderatus of Gades (together with passages from the *Corpus Hermeticum*). But these testimonies he finds, as does Brisson, either unreliable or inconclusive, which is not good reason, in my view, to dismiss them altogether. We cannot, in addition, dismiss Aristotle's testimonies about the One and indefinite dyad (with Cherniss), about the Good (frag. 49, Rose), or about Plato's identification of the Good with the One (*Metaphysics* 1091b13-15; *EE* 1218a15-30; cf. *Sophist* 245a8-9).¹⁴

But Brisson has a good point: the later evidence about Moderatus, for instance, comes from Porphyry, and it is unclear how precisely it is related to the Good of the *Republic*. Brisson also dismisses these later testimonies because they are expressed in the terms of Porphyry, Proclus, and Simplicius: "How are we to explain that nobody before Plotinus ... drew all the consequences of such a fundamental innovation?"¹⁵ For Brisson, the originality of Plotinus lies partly in his "infidelity" to Plato. And indeed, nowhere in Plotinus's *Enneads* can we find any mention of the phrase "[transcending] in dignity and power" (πρεσβεία καὶ δύναμις ὑπερέχοντος, *Republic* 509b).

3. THE CASE AGAINST

Despite their strong case, I think that Baltes and Brisson are wrong. They insist that the Good must belong to the Intelligible world and that it must be "a being." But the latter claim is plainly incompatible with what Socrates actually says: the Good is not "a being," if a being (ὄν) is equivalent to οὐσία, which it surely must be. Equally, what would the Greek phrase be that would support the claim that the Good must *belong* to the intelligible world – namely, that it must be one among beings? Comparable phrases in Greek might be an appropriate verb with κατά + the accusative (to rank or order in accordance with) or εἶναι + genitive, "to be of," but such belonging would be inappropriate, since the Good is not to be ranked with anything else or among beings; and to say that it must "be of"

¹³ Ibid., 11-12.

¹⁴ On this, see J. Halfwassen, "Der Demiurg: seine Stellung in der Philosophie Platons und seine Deutung im antiken Platonismus," in *Le Timée de Platon. Contributions à l'histoire de sa réception. Platos Timaios. Beiträge zu seiner Rezeptionsgeschichte*, ed. Ada Neschke-Hentschke (Louvain: Peeters, 2000), 39-62.

¹⁵ Brisson, "L'approche traditionnelle de Platon," 90.

the Intelligible would make it in some way dependent upon its effects. Plainly, it must be itself before everything else.

This is not to claim that there is no ambiguity here. The ambiguity is real and striking.

Even though Socrates focuses on the progeny of the Good, he does allow for the possibility that he and Glaucon could on another occasion grasp “what the good itself is” (7, 532a: *αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἕκαστον*); and a little later at 7, 534b, he implies that “in the same way” (*ὡσαύτως*) as they would determine the being or *οὐσία* of the other Forms,¹⁶ they should mark off the Good from everything else, according to *οὐσία*, not opinion (534b-c). Indeed, too, early in Book 6, Socrates introduces the many beautiful and good things and distinguishes them from the Beautiful itself and the Good itself “according to one *ιδέα* as being one.”¹⁷ He then goes on to introduce the Idea of the Good. Proclus will distinguish the Good itself on the level of the Intelligible World from the primary Good itself. But it is not clear how one might defend such a distinction historically or philosophically.¹⁸ So, the Good is plainly connected to the Intelligible World even if it cannot be “a being” in that World or “belong to it” in any normal sense of belonging.

On the other hand, if the Good is the ultimate source of power (*δύναμις*) for everything that comes from it, and if the Intelligible World and everything else has intellect, being, and substantiality because of the Good, as Socrates makes clear, then it is clear that intellect and being cannot be *in* the Good, as identical with it. Here we might object that the Good’s being or intellect might be of a different order from the being and intellect it provides. Baltes puts this as follows: “it can be said that the Idea of the Good can only grant what it possesses itself.” Or again, “As the cause of being, intelligibility, and truth, it must itself *possess* all these; not in the way of the things caused by it, but in the way of cause.” But surely these formulations cannot be related to the Good, for how can one speak of the Good *possessing* or *having* anything determinate – even, for example, “being possessed of an *οὐσία*”?¹⁹ How would the Good possess an *οὐσία* “in the way of cause” if Socrates explicitly says it is *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*? Again, we could reply that it has substantiality *in its own way*, but Socrates does *not* say this. We might also claim that “in providing intellect and truth” either to our minds or to the Intelligible World as a whole, Socrates does not rule out the possibility that the Good might be a superior Mind, like the Royal Mind he mentions in the *Philebus*.²⁰ Again, however, Socrates does not say this.

¹⁶ Hans-Georg Gadamer emphasizes “in the same way” in *The Idea of the Good in Platonic-Aristotelian Philosophy* [Die Idee des Guten zwischen Platon und Aristoteles], trans., intro., and annotation P. Christopher Smith (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1986), 86ff.

¹⁷ *Republic* 6, 507b.

¹⁸ For the distinction, see Proclus, *Platonic Theology* II. 7. 46, 13-47, 10. Cf. K. Corrigan, *Love, Friendship, Beauty, and the Good: Plato, Aristotle, and the Later Tradition* (Eugene, OR: Cascade Books, 2018), 37-44.

¹⁹ On the other side of the argument, Krämer also overstates the case, perhaps unconsciously: “While the alternative solutions of certain critics require questionable speculative artificial twists, and remain often implicitly unhistorical and founded in the project of modernity, the explanation of the *ἄγραφα δόγματα* starting from *Republic* VI has the advantage of making all of the functions of the ‘good’ fully intelligible” (Krämer, “*Epekeina tes ousias*: On Plato,” 52-53). If this were true, why should it be beyond being and intellect?

²⁰ *Philebus* 30d.

We are left, then, with a difficult divide. On the one hand, the Good must be connected with intellect and the Intelligible world – evidently so, if thought is to be possible. On the other hand, the Good is beyond determinate being (if this is what is meant by οὐσία) and also different from the infinitival “to be” it gives to everything else. If it is beyond determinate being (whether οὐσία or ὄν) and different from the infinitival to be, then why should it not also be beyond the participial form of being altogether: ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος? The Good must therefore be beyond any determinate being and beyond determinate being as a whole, and yet it must also be intelligible. How can this be so?

In my view, the most plausible conclusions we might draw are the following: (1) the text is ambiguous, undetermined; (2) if so, the ambiguity should be retained and not resolved artificially; (3) both sides of the ambiguity have to be embraced in some way without accepting simply one or the other; so (i) the Good must be connected to the intelligible in such a way that it does not belong to it – that is, it cannot be “of it”: to be in the Intelligible as cause does not mean that it is “of” anything else; (ii) if the Good is not “of” the Intelligible in this way, then it must first be “of itself” in a way that marks it off (cf. 7, 534b-d) from all other things. Only by being itself first can it be related to all other things, intelligible or sensible. Dialectic in Book 7, for instance, has the well-founded conviction that the Good itself can be grasped or touched, but this is not the Good *in itself*; however intimate the grasp or touching might be (cf. of the Forms, 490b3), this must be the Good in relation to everything else – that is, *per aliud*, as the culmination of the special kind of παιδεία Socrates outlines. From this perspective, the Good is thinkable, knowable – even an intelligible object; and it makes perfect sense to see the Good as in some sense definable, though Socrates does not *directly* say that we can have a λόγος τῆς οὐσίας of it, only that it can be grasped by λόγος – *by removal from everything else, not circumscription*.

The fact, then, that εἶναι (“to be”) is not univocal but that it can be understood as relating to itself or as relating to others, as in the *Parmenides*, does not mean that the Good is intellect and intelligible but rather that the Good is the ground of all intelligibility and yet that in itself it goes beyond the intelligibility of intellect. Brisson’s interpretation of Glaukon’s hyperbole as negating ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας is, in my view, unpersuasive. The entire context suggests, on the contrary, that Socrates indicates something extraordinary – as Szlezák argues: the unique position of the Good is emphasized five times within twenty lines (508e6, 509a4-5, 509a7-9, 509b9, 509c1-2), surely with religious and ontological (or meontological) significance.²¹

4. THINKING PLOTINUS IN A DIFFERENT REGISTER

Let me turn now to the absolute non-being of the Good in the *Enneads* that Plotinus identifies with Plato’s One. Plotinus’s first Principle is beyond participial being (“that which is” – τὸ ὄν) but not necessarily beyond the highest form of the infinitival εἶναι. There is, of course, a strong apophatic element in Plotinus’s approach to the Good, as we find in Alcinous, Sethian Gnostic “nescience,” Proclus, Dionysius the Areopagite, and

²¹ Thomas Szlezák, “The Idea of the Good as *Arkhe* in Plato’s Republic,” in *The Other Plato*, ed. D. Nikulin (Albany: SUNY Press, 2012), 134-36, 141-42, 142n14, 142n15.

the subsequent tradition, but this is neither a monolithic absolutist position nor a logically impossible concept. Among many instances in the *Enneads*, I shall pick three passages to illustrate what I mean by this.

First, we find the paradoxical affirmation-negation of the One's intimate permeating presence to everything, while being itself distinct – an adaptation of the Platonic formula that the self-identical Form is present everywhere in everything without being separated from itself, a formula repeated in different ways by later thinkers including Meister Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa: “The One is all things and not a single one of them: it is the principle of all things, not all things, but all things are in the manner of that” (V 2 [11] 1, 1-2: Τὸ ἐν πάντα καὶ οὐδὲ ἓν· ἀρχὴ γὰρ πάντων, οὐ πάντα, ἀλλ’ ἐκείνως πάντα). In other words, Plotinus adopts a quasi-noetic formula early in his works to express something about the intimate relation between the One and all things and yet at the same time maintains its transcendence.

Second, in two early works, V 4 [7] and V 6 [24], the One appears to be called an intelligible object. This has often been understood to be a major difference from Plotinus's normal thinking, and it is true that he never says anything quite like it in later works. But, as I have argued – as has Beierwaltes²² – the One *is* an object of thought *for intellect*, but not in itself:

But how does this Intellect come from the Intelligible? The Intelligible remains by itself and is not deficient, like that which sees and thinks – I call that which thinks deficient as compared with the Intelligible, but it is not like something senseless; all things belong to it and are in it and with it. It is completely able to discern itself; it has life in itself and all things in itself, and its thinking of itself is itself, and exists by a kind of immediate self-consciousness, in everlasting rest and in a manner of thinking different from the thinking of Intellect. If, then, something comes into being while the Intelligible abides in itself, it comes into being from it when it is most of all what it is. When, therefore, the Intelligible abides “in its own proper way of life,” that which comes into being does come into being from it, but from it as it abides unchanged. (V 4, 2, 12-22, trans. A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, *Plotinus*, vol. 5: ἀλλὰ πῶς ἀπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ὁ νοῦς οὗτος; τὸ νοητὸν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ μένον καὶ οὐκ ὄν ἐνδεές, ὡσπερ τὸ ὄρων καὶ τὸ νοοῦν – ἐνδεές δὲ λέγω τὸ νοοῦν ὡς πρὸς ἐκεῖνο – οὐκ ἔστιν οἷον ἀναίσθητον, ἀλλ’ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ σὺν αὐτῷ, πάντη διακριτικὸν ἑαυτοῦ, ζωὴ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ πάντα ἐν αὐτῷ, καὶ ἡ κατανόησις αὐτοῦ αὐτὸ οἶνει συναισθήσει οὔσα ἐν στάσει ἀδίῳ καὶ νοήσει ἐτέρως ἢ κατὰ τὴν νοῦ νόησιν. εἴ τι οὖν μένοντος αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ γίνεται, ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦτο γίνεται, ὅταν ἐκεῖνο μάλιστα ἢ ὃ ἔστι. μένοντος οὖν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἰκείῳ ἦθει ἐξ αὐτοῦ μὲν τὸ γινόμενον γίνεται, μένοντος δὲ γίνεται.)

²² W. Beierwaltes, *Plotin über Ewigkeit und Zeit* (Enneade III.7) (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1967), 15n15; W. Beierwaltes, *Denken des Einen: Studien zur neoplatonischen Philosophie und ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1985); K. Corrigan, “Plotinus, ‘Enneads’ 5.4 [7], 2 and Related Passages: A New Interpretation of the Status of the Intelligible Object,” *Hermes* 114, no. 2 (1986): 198.

One can see the problem for Plotinus: out of the One as intelligible object *for Intellect*, Intellect has to come into full being as itself. Therefore, Intellect must be derived from the One that is *for Intellect* its own highest intelligible object. Here I am interested in only one feature of Plotinus's argument: while the One/Good is simply itself from a primary perspective, it is also an object of thought from a derivative perspective.

Seventeen treatises later in the chronological order, V 6, 2, 4-10, Plotinus puts this as follows in what looks almost like a scholastic formula: “[I]t is not necessary for everything which is an object of thought to have a thinking principle in itself and to think: for [then] it will be not only an object of thought but a thinker, and, since it is two, will not be the first” (νοητὸν δὲ ὄν οὐκ ἀνάγκη πᾶν καὶ νοοῦν ἐν αὐτῷ ἔχειν καὶ νοεῖν· ἔσται γὰρ οὐ μόνον νοητὸν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοοῦν, πρῶτόν τε οὐκ ἔσται δύο ὄν) (trans. A. H. Armstrong, Loeb Classical Library, *Plotinus*, vol. 5). Plotinus then states the coincident-noncoincident principle: “And the intellect which has the object of thought would not exist if there was not a reality *which is pure object of thought; it will be an object of thought to the intellect, but in itself it will be neither thinker nor object of thought in the proper, authentic sense; for the object of thought is for another*” (ὃ τε νοῦς ὁ τὸ νοητὸν ἔχων οὐκ ἂν συσταίη μὴ οὐσίας καθαρῶς νοητοῦ, ὃ πρὸς μὲν τὸν νοῦν νοητὸν ἔσται, καθ’ ἑαυτὸ δὲ οὔτε νοοῦν οὔτε νοητὸν κυρίως ἔσται· τό τε γὰρ νοητὸν ἐτέρῳ) (trans. Armstrong, slightly modified).

This is a remarkable statement: the One is *purely intelligible* – but “for another.” One might see this “intelligible object for another” formula as implicitly applicable to an interpretation of the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*. Is the Demiurge to be ranked with the World Soul, as Philo, Plutarch, and others thought,²³ or with Intellect, as Plotinus supposes, or is the Demiurge the Good itself? The weight of evidence, I suggest, favors the position of Plotinus. The Demiurge cannot be the Good of the *Republic*, since the Demiurge is Intellect and an Intellect that makes the World Soul. In addition, as the *Philebus* asserts, wisdom and intellect could never come to be without soul, whatever Socrates means by this.²⁴ The Demiurge must therefore be distinct from the Good. And since the Demiurge makes by looking to the Eternal Living Creature, then the Complete Living Creature must be *for the Demiurge* its highest intelligible object presided over implicitly by something that is not in itself an intelligible object. I conclude that the One-Good must be this ultimate beginning, something both coincidentally intelligible and yet beyond intellect. However, if it is in some way intelligible *for another*, then this is neither the absolute beyond being of Brisson's argument nor the chimeric principle of Ferber and Damchen. By being related to everything *absolutely*, the Good is supremely itself.

Is this view of the One-Good just a feature of Plotinus's early work, perhaps a reflection of some earlier Middle Platonic First Intellect formulations, a reflection, for instance, of Alcinoos or Numenius whom Plotinus was accused of plagiarizing? No, it seems to be an integral feature of Plotinus's overall thinking: the intimate presence of the Good in and for thought is radical even in Plotinus's mature work – for instance, in VI 7 [38]. It has not been observed that in Plotinus the first moment of *all thought* is a pure-self-dependence that only becomes *actual thought* because it is articulated by and in intellect.

²³ Cf. Halfwassen, “Der Demiurg,” 39-62.

²⁴ *Philebus* 30c.

This self-dependent activity or power is primary, coincident with the Good, *yet not fully coincident only because Intellect thinks it*:

All thinking comes from something and is of something. And one aspect of thinking, which keeps close to that from which it comes, has as its ground that of which it is the thought and itself becomes a kind of superstructure, being its ground's actuality and fulfilling that ground's potentiality without generating anything itself; for it is only a kind of completion of that of which it is. But the thinking which accompanies substance and *has brought substance into existence could not be in that from which it came to be*; for it would not have generated anything if it was in that. But since it was a power of generation by itself, it generated. ... And this is the first active actuality, which has generated an existent which came to be substance, and, being the image of another, is the image of one so great that substance came to be. *But if it was intrinsic to that and did not derive from it, it would be nothing else but intrinsic to that and would not be an existent on its own.*" (italics mine; VI 7, 40, 5-22: *πάσα ἐκ τινός ἐστι καὶ τινός. καὶ ἡ μὲν συνοῦσα τῷ ἐξ οὗ ἐστὶν ὑποκείμενον μὲν ἔχει τὸ οὗ ἐστὶ νόησις, οἷον δὲ ἐπικείμενον αὐτῇ γίνεται ἐνέργεια αὐτοῦ οὐσα καὶ πληροῦσα τὸ δυνάμει ἐκείνο οὐδὲν αὐτῇ γεννώσα· ἐκείνου γὰρ ἐστὶν, οὗ ἐστὶ, μόνον, οἷον τελείωσις. ἡ δὲ οὐσα νόησις μετ' οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστήσασα τὴν οὐσίαν οὐκ ἂν δύναται ἐν ἐκείνῳ εἶναι, ἀφ' οὗ ἐγένετο· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐγέννησέ τι ἐν ἐκείνῳ οὐσα. ἀλλ' οὐσα δύναμις τοῦ γεννᾶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ἐγέννα ... καὶ ἐστὶν αὐτῇ πρώτη ἐνέργεια ὑπόστασιν γεννήσασα εἰς οὐσίαν, καὶ ἴνδαλμα ὄν ἄλλου οὕτως ἐστὶ μέγαλον τινός, ὥστε ἐγένετο οὐσία. εἰ δ' ἦν ἐκείνου καὶ μὴ ἀπ' ἐκείνου, οὐδ' ἂν ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐκείνου ἦν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτῆς ὑπόστασις ἦν.) [Trans. Armstrong, slightly modified]*

Here, of course, Plotinus brings Plato's *δύναμις* together with Aristotle's *ἐνέργεια*: ultimate thought is not a "thinking of thinking," as Aristotle famously calls God's thought, but two aspects of a single activity. But my major point is that the primary self-dependent activity *for intellect* is the One-Good, an activity that would seem to be equivalent to what Plotinus elsewhere calls a sort of "intellect-in-unity that is *not* intellect because it is one" in VI 8 [39] 18, 21.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Given this framework in Plotinus's thought, I want to make the following suggestions about the interpretation of the Idea of the Good in *Republic* 6-7.

First, we have no need to assume an unbridgeable dichotomy between a meontological Plotinian and an ontological Middle Platonic interpretation. The dichotomy is false.


Second, any interpretation that assumes that the Good must be "a being" or a superior intellect that goes beyond "the being and intellect" that it is said to provide is not based upon what Socrates actually says. This eliminates, in my view, the so-called Middle Platonic interpretation.

Third, in order to take account of all the evidence, as I have suggested, the Good must be intelligible in one sense but not in another – that is, εἶναι or “to be” must be understood both in itself and in relation to the others, as it will be in the *Parmenides*. The fact that εἶναι in the primary sense goes beyond *any other instance in either the intelligible or the sensible worlds* is good evidence for taking Glaucon’s hyperbolic reaction seriously – that is, as having not merely metalinguistic but also ontological or meontological significance.

Fourth, the attempts of Schleiermacher and others in the nineteenth century to recover an Ur-Plato uncontaminated by the subsequent Platonic tradition, especially from the religious superstitions and exegetic extravaganzas of Plotinus and the later Neoplatonists, should not obscure the fact that earlier views were part of a living tradition that often interpreted Plato as correctly as it is possible to interpret him. In fact, as I hope to have shown here, Plotinus’s interpretation of the Good is, in some respects, profoundly faithful to Plato. However, Plotinus’s identification of the Good with the One has frequently been understood as an ideological and religious rather than as a plausible historical-philosophical move. Nonetheless, Plotinus is surely correct. The first hypothesis of the second part of the *Parmenides*, that is, the one that turns out not to be, *is said not to be* on the basis that it cannot participate in οὐσία – “if we must trust such an argument” (141e12-142a1). Plainly, the one in itself cannot *have* whatever “being” it *is* by participating in οὐσία. The one does not *have*: it *is* what it is before any having or participating. Evidently, then, neither the Good of the *Republic* nor the One of the first hypothesis of the *Parmenides* can be interpreted *only* in relation to the others. However, if they must be interpreted primarily in relation to themselves, then plainly the Good must be the One.

Magdalena Mateja-Furmanik

RETURN OF NATURE: RETURN OF PLATO



[John Sallis, *The Return of Nature: Coming As If from Nowhere*.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016.]

In the face of the ecological catastrophe, voices calling us to “return to nature” become more and more audible. According to the psychoanalytic fatality endorsed by John Sallis, if we don’t return to nature, nature will return to us but in the form akin to the traumatic return of the suppressed.

The return that is provoked at this extreme is not one in which nature would come back to itself or in which, as itself, it would again open up to human sensibility. Rather, it returns as if from the grave, often in deadly form, like a ghost of what it once was. It returns in the form of pollutants that poison the air and water, in the ever more frequent occurrences of tornadoes, hurricanes, and other gigantic disturbances destructive of life on a vast scale, and in the form of climate change, the melting of glaciers and polar icecaps, and the chain of consequences thereof.¹

Paradoxically perhaps, finally thanks to the catastrophe, we as a civilization will be forced to learn to abide with nature instead of to suppress and dominate it. We must

¹ J. Sallis, *The Return of Nature: Coming As If from Nowhere* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016), 7.

first diagnose our situation to understand how it was possible for us to reach our present situation. What was neglected and unthought properly so far in the very notion of nature? Later we should have another look (Latin *re-spect*) at the neglected and give it space. But what if the neglected is space itself or even what makes space possible? What if it isn't anything that may even be present? Such an enterprise requires not only simple readiness for acquiring some new information but transformation of one's own cognitive capacities.

Sallis takes us through all those stations while maintaining an outstanding clarity of the dilatation's structure. Within this thin, tightly packed book, even a reader who is unacquainted with the history of metaphysics but attentive receives all the conceptual tools necessary to grasp the very subtle philosophical problems brought forth by the author. He starts with the dichotomy of nature and spirit based on the works of Ralph Emerson and German idealists. As "nature" is understood as all that is "not me," its role is to embody "the other" so that spirit, whose role is to animate passive matter, may reach self-recognition by differentiating itself with an act of negation. On the other hand, this very act makes space for the manifestation of spirit and his own affirmation in the next step. According to Emerson, "There seems to be a necessity in spirit to manifest itself in material forms; and day and night, river and storm, beast and bird, acid and alkali, preexist in necessary Ideas in the mind of God, and are what they are by virtue of preceding affections, in the world of spirit."² Devoid of autonomy, nature is simply made to serve affirmation. It offers space but is absolutely passive and inert. For this, it lacks value in itself, which is the only domain of the spirit.

At least two rifts in such thinking make this metaphysical foundation shake: first, there exists a mutual dependency between spirit and nature that was acknowledged even by Emerson; it is not only that nature is subordinated to spirit but that spirit is subordinated to nature, too, for its essential drive to manifestation requires concrete content. Second, even if by manifestation itself spirit assimilates nature, it cannot do so entirely without suicidally ceasing its own being. The otherness of nature must remain, otherwise spirit would not be able to differentiate and recognize itself. So does this mean that nature simply coquets spirit – it, or she – simply lets him show off his dominance, but finally she makes boundaries, and the source of activity is at her side?

No matter who is the true ringleader in this play of domination, it shows us an elemental, ontological gap in the system. Neither nature nor spirit is fundamental. The next step was advanced by Hegel, who pointed out that the main task of philosophy should be the suspension of dichotomy itself, but this cannot be done by simply nullifying one of the opposites because the problem concerns the structure, not the elements of the structure. Instead, it is necessary that both terms – spirit and nature or subject and object – be sublated or suspended (*aufheben*) as subject and object.

Thus, to say that nature is sublated (*aufgehoben*) is not to say that it is nullified, as it would be if assimilated to spirit, but rather that it is preserved, not as independent and immediate, but in unity with spirit – that is, as

² R. W. Emerson, "Nature," in *Selected Writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson* (New York: Random House, 1940), 19, quoted in Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 14.

an objective subject-object. It is preserved in its difference from the very opposite with which it enters into unity.³

In the words of Schelling in *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, “nature shall be visible spirit and spirit, invisible nature.”⁴

However, it is not that a happy marriage of spirit and nature was established with the works of Hegel. As the author of *Philosophy of Spirit* maintains, spirit “is the truth and the final goal of nature and the true actuality of the idea.”⁵ As Sallis notes, there remains a tension between sublating and nullifying nature. For if nature is thought of as the site of the manifestation of the idea and thus spirit, the question is whether in this process nature is fully assimilated or maintains a certain difference. Sallis provides quotations from Hegel that prove both options, about which he comments modestly, “it can be said that the text is ambivalent as regards the question of the return of nature.”⁶

To understand the specificity of nature, Sallis turns to its etymology: “nature” stems from Latin *natura*, which derives from *nascor*, meaning “to be born.” *Natura* is the translation of the Greek φύσις, which derives from φύω – “to bring forth, to beget.” Such a recognition leads to the apparently simple conclusion that “nature is the place of birth, the mother of all things (in a sense that is not merely metaphorical).”⁷ This conclusion seems less obvious after Sallis compares it with the paradigm of production. Production (ποίησις) is twofold. As we learn from the *Timaeus*, in making something, an artisan looks to a model and forms his product, whereas the paradigm of birth is threefold as explained in the second discourse of the *Timaeus*, quoted by Sallis:

At present it is necessary to think of three kinds: that which comes to be, that in which it comes to be, and that from which that which comes to be is copied and begotten [φύεται]. And furthermore, it is fitting to liken the receiver to a mother, the *from which*, to a father, and the nature [φύσις] between these to an offspring.⁸

According to Sallis, the dominance of the paradigm of production had been decisive for Western philosophy and in consequence resulted in the ubiquitous presence of a dualistic distinction between form and matter. This state of affairs was changed by Schelling, who reinstalled the paradigm of birth at the heart of his philosophical thought. Having done so, he brought a charge against modern European philosophy, for which, in his opinion, nature does not exist, and for this reason it lacks a living ground.⁹ As a result of his disenchantment with dead, Western philosophy, he invented a new ontology in

³ Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 21-22.

⁴ F. W. J. Schelling, *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1967), 380, quoted in Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 22.

⁵ G. W. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie*, 251, addendum, quoted in Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 23.

⁶ Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 25.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 30.

⁸ Plato, *Timaeus* 50c-d, quoted in Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 30-31.

⁹ F. Schelling, *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*, 300, quoted in Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 31.

which he proposed a withdrawal of nature from spirit and invented a system of grounding. Throughout history, the ground of all beings was God, so that the sentence “All is God” may be translated “God is ground.” The task of Schelling was to display the structure by which the totality of things is grounded on this ground. By “ground,” Schelling means “condition for existence,” which in turn means that ground itself is beyond existence. This step will be decisive for the rest of Sallis’s book. Schelling admits that this idea is nothing new. In the case of God, ground was placed within his existence, which was understood by the term *causa sui*, but according to the author of *Ideas for a Philosophy of Nature*, to that point it was understood as a mere concept, whereas ground is something real and actual. He insisted that there must be a distinction between God as absolute and the ground of his existence, and those two terms cannot collapse to a virtual identity. It is important to underline that the distinction is not between ground and existence but between ground and that-which-exists. Schelling calls the ground of God the nature of God. Identification of ground with nature breaks off with the conception of the latter as “visible spirit.” A distinction between the existence of God and his ground marks a turning point from the paradigm of production to the paradigm of birth. Nature is no longer the creation of God. Nor are particular things because they are infinitely different from God. So things are not created by God but are born from the same ground. Sallis, after Schelling, extends the notion of ground to longing (*Sehnsucht*): “[Ground is] the longing felt by the eternal one to give birth to itself. [...] The longing is not the one itself but is equally eternal with it. It wills to give birth to God, i.e., to unfathomable unity, but to this extent the unity is still not in itself.”¹⁰ The ground is devoid of existence but simultaneously is described as possessing “will” – the will to give birth to God as existing. This means that nature is nothing passive; it is not something inert as was repeated throughout the history of metaphysics – on the contrary, it is pure activity, activity that is prior to being. This idea will sound more than a hundred years later in the famous text of Jaques Derrida:

Now if *différance* is (and I also cross out the “is”) what makes possible the presentation of the being-present, it is never presented as such. It is never offered to the present. Or to anyone. Reserving itself, not exposing itself, in regular fashion it exceeds the order of truth at a certain precise point, but without dissimulating itself as something, as a mysterious being, in the occult of a nonknowledge or in a hole with indeterminable borders (for example, in a topology of castration). In every exposition it would be exposed to disappearing as disappearance. It would risk appearing: disappearing. [...] What is written as difference, then, will be the playing movement that “produces” – by means of something that is not simply an activity – these differences, these effects of difference. This does not mean that the difference that produces differences is somehow before them, in a simple and unmodified – in-different present. Difference is the non-full,

¹⁰ Schelling, *Über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit*, 300, quoted in Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 39.

non-simple, structured and differentiating origin of differences. Thus, the name “origin” no longer suits it.¹¹

Like ground, *la différance* is not something present but is pure possibility of conceptuality as such. It is (but only metaphorically, for it is neither “it” nor “is”) movement opening space for any structure. For this reason, Derrida was counted by Sallis among modern philosophers who undertake thinking beyond being.

But according to Sallis, thinking beyond being was present in philosophy from the very beginning, only under a different name. He refers to Plato and mentions the *Republic*, the *Timaeus*, and the *Sophist*. In the first text, the very being of ideas is dependent upon the good:

Therefore, say that not only being known is present in the things known as a consequence of the good but also the “to be” and being [τὸ εἶναι τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν] are in them besides as a result of it, although the good is not being but is still beyond being [ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας], exceeding it in dignity and power.¹²

Precedence of the good over νοητά was compared in Plato’s famous simile to the anteriority of the sun and visible things. It is not only that the sun is anterior in a temporal sense, but first and foremost it is the condition of being. As such, it exists beyond being but again is not inert. From the *Sophist* we know that real existence is bestowed only on things possessing power [δύναμις] or being affected by power.¹³ If the good exceeds νοητά in dignity and power it is “the power of all powers, the very inception of power as such, of the power to set forth or to be set forth into presence.”¹⁴

The *Timaeus* has a special place in Sallis’s work. Throughout the whole book, the reader encounters references to χώρα, the explanation, justification, and even preparation of the reader for grasping of which seems to be the main topic. Χώρα is designated as a third kind next to νοητά and visible things, which instantaneously raises a problem because any kind (γένος) is a type of νοητά. This led Plato to name discourse on χώρα “a bastard discourse” as a trial to somehow include it in typology and simultaneously underline its beyondness: “Neither the χώρα nor the chronology can be *integrated* into the typology of kinds that structures the ontic-ontological sphere. Their abysmal difference sets them apart, *disintegrates* them.”¹⁵ Nevertheless, χώρα is nature before nature that grants beings its status as beings and simultaneously emancipates them from νοητά because they no longer possess the power to fully determine.

According to Sallis, in Plato there is a third passage devoted to thinking beyond being that has gone entirely unnoticed. He is referring to the *Sophist* and the Stranger’s discourse on the other. In the dialogue, we encounter the question of how it is possible for

¹¹ J. Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982), 6, 11.

¹² Plato, *Republic* 509b, quoted in Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 115.

¹³ Plato, *Sophist* 247e.

¹⁴ Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 115.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 116.

non-being to be. As we know, in the *Sophist* Plato was forced to commit patricide because he demonstrated that being cannot be constrained to being one. This conclusion prepares the ground for a discussion on five kinds – each of them is selfsame by participating in the same. However, this selfsameness does not exclude otherness and difference. On the contrary, each kind is other than the others by virtue of its participation in the other.¹⁶ In such a way, non-being is posed in the center of being. Sallis quotes after Plato, “So it is, after all, of necessity, in the case of motion and throughout all the kinds, that non-being be, for in each and every case the nature of the other, in producing each to be other than being, makes it non-being.”¹⁷ Plato reaches the point where non-being is integrated with being; but is there within being an exceeding of being similar to the good and *χώρα*? As Sallis’s reasoning goes, the other is a kind so it should be concentrated in a sameness with itself by participating in the same. But the Stranger says twice that the other is “chopped into bits”: “The nature of the other both *is* and is chopped into bits and distributed through all beings in their relation to one another.”¹⁸ Each kind, while selfsame, is other than every other kind, so each of them participates in the other. Sallis calls it a “proliferation of difference”:

It is as if it participated in itself so as to be other than itself, that is, dispersed, dismembered, disintegrated. But then, precisely in being the kind it is, it would be devoid of selfsameness and so would not be a kind. There would be a disintegration of difference at the very heart of being.¹⁹

What is specific about Sallis’s book is that it is an amalgam of thinking beyond being and special concern for concrete content. As we may deduce from the first chapter, he is concerned with the ecological catastrophe. How can all these issues concerning what is beyond being be of any help? A reader receives the answer in the chapter titled “The Elemental Turn.” According to Sallis, such natural elementals as the sky, wind, or earth do not accord with the ontological paradigm of thinghood. They are not simply things having properties, so they cannot be accounted for by means of the categories forged by Aristotle.²⁰ They are not discrete, so they cannot be simply individualized. Where is the beginning and the end of a mountain? Or the sky? It is impossible to establish their clear borders. Sallis concludes that in the case of the sky it is because its nature is more akin to the condition of visible things than simply things:

The sky under which all things come to pass is of unlimited extent; its vastness has no measure in common with the things over which it is arched. Yet it does not belong to an order other than the sensible; though distinguished from sensible things, it is nonetheless *of* the sensible. Indeed, its visibility is in a certain respect exemplary. Not only is the sky visible, but also, as the primary region from which light arrives to illuminate things as

¹⁶ Ibid., 118.

¹⁷ Plato, *Sophist* 256d-e, quoted in Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 118.

¹⁸ Plato, *Sophist* 258d-e, quoted in Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 119.

¹⁹ Sallis, *The Return of Nature*, 119.

²⁰ Ibid., 79-80.

they come and go, it holds the very source of visibility, bestows that which makes visibility possible and thus, more remotely, is itself a condition of visibility.²¹


The role of the elementals is to delimit the enchorial space in which things come to pass: they shelter and sustain life. Their lack of clear ontological determination leads Sallis to the conclusion that they are situated directly within *χώρα*. Having been released from the yoke of *νοητά*, of the one, natural elements may be acknowledged in their free plurality. Paradoxically, because they are no longer determined by what is *beyond them* in the sense of Platonic ideas but are placed within undeterminable *χώρα*, all determination comes from them. For this reason, Sallis devoted a whole chapter to Nietzsche; nature should not be understood as an opposite of the intelligible nor through recourse to subjectivity but from itself by the means of the shining (*Schein*) of things.

The subtitle of the book, *Coming As If from Nowhere*, refers to imagination, which is the proper, methodological tool tailored for grasping *χώρα* and neglected throughout the history of metaphysics. Sallis seems to agree with Fichte, who declares that imagination is the ground of the possibility of the subject because subject can only exist in relation to object, and the bringing-forth of objects is done by imagination, so imagination is not a power of the subject because it is presupposed by the very constitution of the subject.²² Imagination suspends itself between two opposite moments rather than settling on one or another – it provides context for manifestation. Its job is to bond two moments in opposition. It is not imagination that comes from subjectivity but subjectivity that comes from imagination – that is why it comes from nowhere.

Reading *The Return of Nature* leaves the impression that the author has taken you by the hand, led you step by step, and prefigured which moments could be problematic. In such places, he prepares the reader in a truly Socratic manner by showing images, as in the chapter “The Cosmological Turn.” The book not only provides a good dose of information from the history of metaphysics but points toward soul-stretching *μετάνοια*, understood literally as that which is beyond mind. Sallis leaves more questions than answers – indeed, the last paragraph of his book is comprised solely of questions. Maybe it is partly because only within the openness of a question is there space for glimpse of *χώρα*?

²¹ Ibid., 78.

²² Ibid., 101.



EXISTENCE AND APPEARANCE: TWO ASPECTS OF BEING¹

[Emanuele Severino, “Returning to Parmenides.” In Emanuele Severino, *The Essence of Nihilism*, translated by Giacomo Donis, edited by Ines Testoni and Alessandro Carrera. London: Verso, 2016, 54-93.]

1. There is something inadequate in the fact that Emanuele Severino (1929-2020), one of the most important Italian thinkers of the past century, is much less popular in countries that are not his own than many philosophers, even non-English-language ones. His ontological works, classified as “anti-Nietzschean and anti-Heideggerian”² “Neoparmenidism,”³ are not only unusual and – let us accept this statement – in a favorable sense insane, but they also give the reader inspiring food for thought. Among the most essential is his essay titled “Returning to Parmenides” in the volume *The Essence of Nihilism*, first published as an article in the Italian journal *Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica* in 1964. Karl Popper’s reflections about the pre-Socratics,⁴ for example, are cited more often, and even if their author is much better known, certainly he was not a specialist in ancient philosophy, especially in Eleatics. That is why one should ask to what extent is “Returning to Parmenides” really referring to Parmenides and how much is it a pretext for the Milanese philosopher’s own reflections. This by no means puts the Italian in a worse light but rather makes us look at his text differently.

It is also possible to see a certain paradox. In the preface to the Polish edition,⁵ Italian thinker Danilo Facca accurately notes that Severino was actually a kind of postmodernist, even if he was different from those who are usually accorded this name. (Postmodernism means here a departure from the modern triumph of technology and the

¹ This article, in its Polish-language version, only a bit different because of the essay’s translation, edition, and a slight change in my thoughts, was published before Severino’s death in *Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia* 13, no. 1 (2018).

² Alessandro Carrera, “Severino’s Magical Castle,” in Emanuele Severino, *The Essence of Nihilism*, trans. Giacomo Donis, ed. Ines Testoni and Alessandro Carrera (London: Verso, 2016), 11.

³ Ibid.

⁴ K. Popper, *The World of Parmenides: Essays on the Presocratic Enlightenment* (London: Routledge, 1998).

⁵ Danilo Facca, “Wstęp: Sprawa Severino” [Introduction: The Case of Severino], in Emanuele Severino, *Powrót do Parmenidesa*, trans. Mikołaj Sokółowski (Warsaw: IFiS PAN, 2005), 34.

conviction of knowing the whole truth.) If so, the distance between the Italian and the Eleatic seems even greater. If one were to allow oneself to interpret ancient philosophy as radically as possible from this angle – and the author of “Returning to Parmenides” is inclined to go to extremes – of all the most distinguished of the ancients, Parmenides would be the furthest removed from the equivalents of postmodernism of his time; perhaps he would even be one of the last to be affected by such a direction. For it seems – if we are to remain with anachronistic terms – that the “grand narrative” is even more lacking in Plato’s dialogues than in the surviving remnants of *Περὶ φύσεως*; after all, Parmenides’s work displays a carefully cultivated *naïveté* in his view of reality. The poem is devoid of irony and also devoid of criticism in its most original sense: *κρίνειν*, separation.

2. In the meantime – and this may come as a surprise if one looks at how a philosophical work is usually structured today – the name of the eponymous thinker from Elea does not appear here before the second page, preceded by comments on Heidegger’s interpretations of ancient metaphysics. According to Severino, the famous German, trying to refute the erroneous understanding of being present in all of Western philosophy after Parmenides, also made a mistake, although it was a mistake of a different kind. The dependence of being on presence and absence proclaimed by Heidegger or, to put it differently than the author of “Returning to Parmenides,” on *ἀλήθεια* and *λήθη* is considered here as one of the consequences of a faulty conception first present in Aristotle’s *Hermeneutics*: proving that what is is when it is and what is not is not when it is not is a purely logical statement that says nothing about the meaning of being and thus remains virtually empty.

Severino tries to solve these problems with the thesis that being has two dimensions: one deeper, the other shallower. The first, in the footsteps of Parmenides, is eternal and immutable; for example, a tree exists even when it cannot be physically experienced by being seen, touched, felt. The second, shallow dimension is that of becoming or susceptibility to change or to being observed. Things are not to be understood as arising and perishing but as occasionally “revealing” themselves, admittedly only materially accessible at their appropriate moment, yet still constant on a deeper dimension. Furthermore, Severino proposes the term “ontological difference”: the same thing is both becoming and unchanging and thus persists as “differentiating” itself. It is worth mentioning the conclusions that can be drawn from this while reflecting on the existence of what is apparently past: according to the Milanese philosopher, what was previously revealed exists eternally and unchangeably, and therefore, it may be added, the past is eternal and unchangeable. Eternity and immutability also apply to the undisclosed, although there is no opportunity to describe it.

3. In Severino’s opinion, however, the lack of understanding of Being, which he calls a betrayal, began even before Aristotle and *Hermeneutics*, although after Parmenides, because it began from a pupil of the Eleatic, Melissus of Samos. Melissus, despite the fact that the Stagirite would most probably disagree with such a classification, especially if he could have met the later ones, is combined here with a surprisingly diverse group of others: the already mentioned Aristotle, as well as Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger – that is, those according to whom Being, the “object of contemplation” if its understanding is based on

Περὶ φύσεως, is actually the object of “infinite practice.” To a certain but lesser extent, even Plato remained close to such an error, although his “parricide” is in Severino’s view little more than a legitimate deepening of Parmenidean thought. That is why the “gnoseological-Socratic distraction” led the first of the famous idealists to move unjustifiably away from the observation that Being, constant integrity, is based on difference to the false assertion that this integrity-difference has both primary and secondary elements, that it has aspects that arise from earlier ones.

Here, however, we must return to Melissus. According to Severino, the greatest problem is the proof of necessity itself already established in Western philosophy and coming from the student of Samos; considering it is like assuming that something can be a Being and also a non-Being – in other words, that it is “perfectly natural that things do not exist,” they come into Being, and they perish. “To be” – this thought follows from Περὶ φύσεως, according to the Italian – means (something that was forgotten after Parmenides) “to be being,” and “to be being” means “to be a necessary being.” Thus, reflections of Being that does not exist but also of Being that is not affected by necessity are themselves examples of “the twilight of the meaning of Being” – they are absurd. At the same time, he points out, the core of this ontological-historical argument appears in fact to be an apology for philosophy, the philosophy that is close to its old meaning, which Pierre Hadot, antiquarian and a follower of ἄσκησις, called spiritual exercise. “[T]rue *science, episteme*” – real philosophizing – gives the possibility of Severino’s conclusions to exist, because it is, or at least is supposed to be, a transgression of science, faith, and common sense: the “imposition” of Being above nonphilosophical thinking.

4. The main defect of post-Parmenidean classical metaphysics, according to the Italian writer, is its departure from the complete opposition between the positive and the negative – and this is in favor of an incomplete opposition. Since positivity as such remains “indifferen[t] (to Being and not-Being),” becoming susceptible to it only when it concerns something outside itself, then Being as such is also indifferent – thus it can be nothing. An example repeatedly quoted by Severino is the principle of noncontradiction because it is precisely this principle that the author considers contradictory: since it is said that one cannot be and not be at the same time, the possibility of existence is also granted to non-Being – it is enough that one does not impose Being on it.

It should be noted here that a complete opposition must concern recognized issues, concretes. (The philosopher from Milan relies here on Aristotle’s idea of ἔλεγχος; given that he valued Plato more than the Stagirite, it is not clear why he did not mention Socrates regarding this method.) Someone for whom colors are a mystery would not break the law of opposition if he stated that green is red; but he would deny this law by recognizing that red and green are different. Similar properties must be attributed to negations provided in “Returning to Parmenides” with semantic and logical argumentation. Negation, since it must refer to something, is necessarily a concretization; the negation of the “determinate” remains determinate since it is not – in contrast to what it negates – “indefinite” but a statement that “Being is non-Being.” It thus refers to a different plane. It is worth adding here that logic and noncontradiction, however Severino tries to refine them, are not, in his opinion – in contrary to the views of numerous contemporary philosophers – needed for true thinking

to occur; the author himself stresses the crucial importance of the sentence in his text that “self-contradicting is not a thinking nothing, but is a thinking the Nothing.” Thus, he tries to expand the understanding of both being and reasoning as much as possible.


Complex arguments are combined in the book with mental shortcuts, perhaps even with the omission of something that seems necessary – after all, this is a short text. Nevertheless, there is sometimes room here for provoking the reader. The author both confirms his conviction in the ascetic sense of his investigations and causes doubts as to whether he is overstepping the limits of philosophy, for example, when he says that this discipline “does not recognize the world but demands its transformation.” However, “Returning to Parmenides,” regardless of agreement or disagreement, remains an essential work. For it seems that the practice of philosophy, which in its original sense consists above all in self-improvement, needs to expand the space of what is imaginable. Emanuele Severino’s thought is that his so-called neo-Parmenidism can be of not inconsequential help here, although it seeks to transform the structure of the imaginary rather than to expand its scope.

5. However, it is difficult not to notice a certain problem. And this unresolved issue probably comes from Severino himself, not from the translator, even though translations always, by their nature, are only imperfect reflections of the original. “Returning to Parmenides” is a work that goes into great detail, focusing on individual lines from *Περὶ φύσεως* and more than once on possible shades of meaning of ancient Greek words. The first example is the word *ἔλεγχος*, left in a form in which only the alphabet was changed: *elenchos*, in italics. The second can be the meaning of the origin of *ἐπιστήμη*, a noun, from the verb *ἐπίσταμαι*. It is all the more regrettable that the Milanese philosopher made no attempt to explain how he understands the difference between “non-Being” (singular) and the “non-Beings” (plural, *μὴ ἔόντα*) appearing in Parmenides’s work at the beginning of the B7 passage. This, made visible here only in untranslated ancient Greek, has been virtually ignored. As if in the heat of the battle – as much displaying an emotional approach to philosophy as giving food for thought on several occasions – Severino had disregarded some important aspects of the poem.

6. So if we accept, following Gaston Bachelard, that “[p]oetry is a metaphysics of the moment”⁶ and agree to end this review in a completely unscientific style, then, as I believe, what describes Severino in an appropriate way is a quotation from Bolesław Leśmian, a great Polish poet and ontologist who often referred to beings and non-beings. The philosopher from Milan seems to be just like the hero of Leśmian’s poem “Silvroom” [Srebroń]. He was an “earnest Exister.”⁷

⁶ Gaston Bachelard, “The Poetic Moment and the Metaphysical Moment,” in Gaston Bachelard, *The Right to Dream*, trans. J. A. Underwood (Dallas, TX: The Dallas Institute Publications, 1988), 173.

⁷ Bolesław Leśmian, *Silvroom*, trans. Marian Polak-Chlabicz, quoted from Aleksandra Wiczorkiewicz, “Obce wcielenia Dusiołka. Leśmianowskie ‘cudotwory słowotwórcze’ w przekładach anglojęzycznych” (Foreign Embodiments of Dusiołek: Bolesław Leśmian’s Poetic Neologisms Translated into English), in *Przekładaniec*, no. 32 (2016): 245.



ERNST BLOCH'S RETRIEVAL OF ARISTOTELIANISM FROM ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

[Ernst Bloch, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Left*. Translated by Loren Goldman and Peter Thompson. New York: Columbia University Press, 2018.]

Ernst Bloch is known as a philosopher of hope, emphasizing the human need for utopia and focus on the future. Although his concepts were associated with social solidarism on the one hand and materialism on the other, he was not a follower of Marx. Bloch professed speculative materialism; his beliefs about matter and mind were derived from reflections on interpretations of Aristotle's works.

Although Bloch wrote many books, it would not be a mistake, in order to understand his message, to look at one of his early publications in which he uses the sources of his own concepts to search for their roots in the views of medieval Arab philosophers, in particular Avicenna and Averroes, although he references also the works of Avicbron and Giordano Bruno. This book, originally titled *Avicenna und die Aristotelische Linke*, was published in 1952. However, Loren Goldman and Peter Thompson made an extensive, analytical, and introductory translation into English in 2018 showing the topicality of its thoughts with respect to the latest research in the field of vital materialism or object-oriented ontology or even contemporary physics.¹

Referring to Aristotle's writings, Bloch postulates the division of his commentators into (1) conservatively oriented ones, for whom the form is the essential element that is impressed upon matter and nature is relegated to a passive and subordinate element in the world – representatives of the "Aristotelian right," who were subordinated to institutional religiosity with Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas; or (2) the "Aristotelian left" who consider matter to be an active collaborator, without which form has no traction, and

¹ Nobel Prize-winning physicist Ilya Prigogine and philosopher Isabelle Stengers claim that the "natural contains essential elements of randomness and irreversibility. This leads to a new view of matter in which matter is no longer the passive substance described in the mechanistic world view but is associated with spontaneous activity" (Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, *Order Out of Chaos: Man's New Dialogue with Nature* [New York: Bantam Books, 1984]), 9.

who reject determination, focusing on the community of naturalists – with Avicenna and Averroes, who lived a hundred years later.² The thoughts of the former are subjected by Bloch to a particularly careful study. From Aristotle’s teachings, extremely important in shaping Bloch’s thoughts seem to be their interpretation of the fragment in chapter 5 of *De Anima* III in which Aristotle distinguishes between two intellects: the intellect that becomes all things, and the intellect that produces all things. Avicenna claims that all intelligible forms preexist nonmaterially in pure intellects (*Geister*); in the cosmic order, the so-called active intelligence (*intellectus agens*) is the lowest. He claims that only that active intelligence imparts natural things their forms, as these intelligible forms flow into the human soul or, more precisely, into the material intellect (*intellectus materialis*) specific to any particular human being. That “material intellect” can recognize the general only if it looks upon the particular representations in the imagination and receives the intelligible forms emanating from the active intelligence.³ In turn, Averroes distinguishes between the “passible” intellect (sensory power – *intellectus passibilis*) as the faculty of sensory thought, and the active intellect, influencing the images in response to a combination of *intellectus passibilis* with imagination and memory. He also claims that the material intellect receives intelligible forms not from a single man but from all people, and the active intellect allows us to know the pure intellect and to achieve the highest bliss of man; this is the way he understands the union with the active intellect. It is worth emphasizing that, according to him, “everything that is peculiar to an individual man perishes with the death of his body, as it came about with the generation of the body.” He distinguishes *natura naturans* as “something eternally in flux and alive [...], in no need of God-nous from above or beyond,”⁴ as being opposite to *natura naturata*.

The studies of the works of Aristotle and his Arab commentators lead the author to distinguish three main conclusions, which he describes as the “main points in which Aristotle is developed naturalistically”⁵ and which he himself used as the basis for developing his own concepts.

First, Bloch considers the relationship between body and soul, noting that the “Aristotelian left” subjects the human soul to reflection, the individuality of which, unlike the collective animal soul, is determined by consciousness. Avicenna argues in his works that the human soul begins with the body but will survive after its death, unlike Averroes, who negates the survival after death not only of the body but also of the soul. Starting from the premise that the body is what feels, since feeling belongs to the animal soul, and that the body, in contrast to the soul, does not live after human death, he concludes that after death a man understood as a soul does not feel and therefore does not feel suffering. This conclusion contrasts with religious beliefs about punishment or reward in the afterlife and states that threats of punishment cannot be fulfilled since the soul does not feel the

² Thomas Copleston, *A History of Philosophy*, vol. 2, *Medieval Philosophy* (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1962).

³ Franz Brentano, *The Psychology of Aristotle: In Particular His Doctrine of the Active Intellect* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 7.

⁴ Ernst Bloch, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Left*, trans. Loren Goldman and Peter Thompson (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), 15.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 16.

punishment (or reward) after death for lack of a body. Thus, “those who are conscious of this truth [were] liberated [...] from fear of eternal torture.”⁶

Another inference concerning individual consciousness and general reason is made by Bloch based on the interpretations of both Avicenna and Averroes, noting that both opted for general reason. Bloch notes that Aristotle saw νοῦς as capable of understanding and as that which furnishes understanding, but he did not perceive the relation between this active reason and any human unity of reason. Meanwhile, for both Avicenna and Averroes, nonindividualized active reason is the location of the unity of human intellect. The author emphasizes that Avicenna links the appearance of active reason directly in human consciousness with the cosmic order of the monads that preceded it, bringing to mind the Neoplatonic theory of emanation – a concept that is far from naturalism. However, thanks to both him and Averroes, who has a materialistic viewpoint, “the unity of human beings [...] sprouts out from it, as does the tolerance taught through the doctrine of the *unitas intellectus*: there is only one single Reason among humans, and this Reason is the same in all people.”⁷ As Goldman notes in the introduction to the translation, the concept of *unitas intellectus* formulated by Averroes becomes for Bloch a premise in drawing conclusions about the unity of the possibility of knowing the participants of the active intellect. By participating in it, all people can have equal access to the Truth. Awareness of this participation nevertheless requires certain abilities, the so-called intellectual (dianoetic) virtues, as Aristotle called them in book 6 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, that distinguish the philosopher:

[W]hen his training and willpower reach a certain point, glimmerings of the light of Truth will flicker before him, thrilling him like lightning, flashing and going out. If he is diligent in his ascetic practice, these spells grow more and more frequent, until they come unasked, entrancing him without the use of exercises. No matter what he looks at, he will turn from it to the Sacred Presence, reminded of some aspect of the Divine, and again he will be overwhelmed. Thus he begins to see the Truth in everything. Finally his efforts bring him to a stage where his moment of recognition turns to tranquil contemplation; his stolen glimpses, familiarity; his spark, a limpid flame. He has gained an understanding as unshakable as that of an old friendship, [...] his inmost being becomes a polished mirror facing toward the truth. Sublime delight pours over him, and he rejoices in his soul at all the marks it bears of Truth. He still hesitates between them; but then, becoming oblivious to self, he is aware only of the Sacred Presence – or if he is at all aware of himself, it is only as one who gazes on the Truth. At this point, communion is achieved.⁸

⁶ Ibid.


⁷ Ibid., 18.

⁸ Avicenna, *Mantiq al-Mashriqiyyin* [Philosophia Orientalis], quoted in Bloch, *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Left*, 12.

Finally, Bloch focuses on the problem of the relation of form and matter, or rather potency and power, which is most crucial to his thoughts, looking for form in matter. Bloch distinguishes the primal form of matter as containing passive potential (what can become possible) from the active form (what is possible); he notes that Aristotle distinguished the status of what can become possible in matter (δυνάμει ὄν) only, while the active form creates an immaterial act with its sublimation in the form of an immovable mover, God. He claims, “Aristotle, with a polytheistic accent, sees the stars as gods; in Avicenna, the godhead, with an accent of monist tension, suffuses the whole of nature; in this way, his extasy unites the abstracted soul and the starry heavens as the same abstracted nature [...] matter raised nature to the heavens.”⁹

Bloch was a practical philosopher, his teleology built on happiness as the ultimate goal. He also sought to build a theoretical basis for a perfect πόλις. These elements of his concepts seem to be common to those of the ancient philosophers, both Aristotle and Plato. He associated the realization of the ideals of antiquity with a materialistic or rather naturalistic concept of the world, departing from the authoritarian personal God of monotheistic religions who remains in the center of attention and determines man, making it difficult for him to achieve happiness. His materialism could be considered pantheism. Mystical experiences constituted an important element in the community; according to Bloch, they were related not to a personal God but to the world and nature.

⁹ Ibid, 13.



THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGES

[Aaron Tugendhaft, *The Idols of Isis: From Assyria to the Internet*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2020.]

On February 26, 2015, Islamic State terrorists went into the museum of antiquities in Mosul and destroyed ancient Mesopotamian art. Not content with the mere act of demolition, they also made and distributed a video of their action. For Aaron Tugendhaft, seeing a still image from the video immediately brought to mind a strikingly similar image created in the very same area but thousands of years earlier. The still image looked like a scene of iconoclastic destruction sculpted in a relief for Sargon II's palace in the city of Khorsabad, from the eighth century BCE. For Tugendhaft, the uncanny juxtaposition of images across millennia suggested something like an eternal question about the role of images in the political world in the Middle East and in political life simply speaking. Is a world without images a possible basis for a politics of the enlightened, as iconoclastic religious leaders sometimes suggested? Or, if not, if images were instead a necessary part of political life, how could we avoid forcing society to live under the permanent shadow of one dominant group's untrue, fantastic dogma? The book is an extremely original attempt to address such fundamental questions about the role of art and images in politics, while at the same time engaging other, more ephemeral but quite pressing contemporary problems related to global politics and technology.

Tugendhaft begins to address these questions with a reflection on political diversity. He makes a familiar, anciently rooted argument that at the center of politics is a kind of pluralism. Political community is defined as the locus in which groups with different perspectives can manage to live with each other. This idea has sometimes been taken to extremes, where the champions of individualist versions of liberalism (especially in the United States) have preached a kind of isolation of all from all. In such a view, the state left you to yourself, so you were free to think as you liked. On the positive side, this left the philosopher to him- or herself. However, as Tugendhaft points out, the current situation of politics, where many of us live in our separate echo chambers, has shown some limits to this view. Social media divide rather than pluralize. Political community instead must

always be a balance between unity and liberty. The balance of unity and liberty was the classic formula for much nineteenth-century European liberalism and, more than the model of isolated individuals, is still valid today.

A number of theorists, in part guided by Leo Strauss, have recently revived Al-Farabi's political thought in order to address the new questions connected to technology and religion, as well as a new global politics. Tugendhaft also takes up Al-Farabi to address contemporary questions but in a different way, one that focuses on questions about art. He turns to Al-Farabi to reflect on his question of images in political life. Al-Farabi suggests that images, indeed, are not the truth. All images are necessarily false. The truth can be understood only by the wise, who rely on demonstration, not images. But the attempt to rule by theoretical knowledge will always fail because the multitude does not follow demonstrative arguments. The multitude requires persuasion of other sorts in order to live well together. In fact, it is essential that a society have images that can make the sphere of law effective without recourse to violence. Hence, without images that speak to the multitude, political life would not be possible. The prophet, according to al-Farabi, uses images for just this reason. Even if the law declares certain images forbidden, as religious law in Islam does, it must use other images to forbid them effectively. Al-Farabi in effect implies that iconoclasm is itself merely an image.

This implication makes the attempt of the destroyers of images such as those at Khorsabad or Mosul much more problematic. They are attempting to suggest a politics without images, while themselves creating the images they pretend to do without. The Islamic State's use of images for iconoclasm is not only self-contradictory or shallow; it also suggests a very dangerous invitation to a never-ending game. Tugendhaft notes that the call to violence and terrorism in videos such as the one at Mosul is presented by the Islamic State as an invitation to a videogame lived in the real world. Some of their propaganda, astoundingly, uses the format of the videogame *Call of Duty* clearly and intentionally. The life of a member of the Islamic State is indeed just like a video game, not only in similarly appealing to adolescent simplifications and to the "call" of hormonal, adrenaline-fueled violence. Also, as in a videogame, there is no reflection on ends in the life of a member of the Islamic State. Just as in a game, where you never consider ends but only the means to winning, so it is also in the situation of endless submission of the will to God. The endless deferral of reflection makes it impossible for rational thought to take root and guide a "player" in the Islamic State's game. It is in many ways the same as what happens in the aesthetic invitations and in the endless obedience that have often been required in the past by radical forms of nationalism, be it of the left or of the right.

Iconoclasm has always come to be an image, be it in ancient Mesopotamia, in early Islamic culture, or in modern Iraq. Tugendhaft attempts to sift through the different stances that have been taken toward the images of ancient Mesopotamia, while always reflecting on how they suggest larger political issues. His survey looks at fascinating ancient Islamic stories of Ibrahim and Nimrud, as well as more recent uses of ancient images by Saddam Hussein. He critiques these as well as the Islamic State ideology around archeology, while at the same time maintaining a healthy skepticism about Western liberal views. Often

the West prides itself on placing archeological objects in museums, as if it were more than part of our particular culture. The West presents museums as civilization itself in a struggle with the barbarism of the cultures whose art it exhibits. While one might like to trust museums in this pretense when faced with the Islamic State, Tugendhaft points out how museums of Mesopotamian art have often been the stalking horse for colonial injustice and misrepresentation. He outlines how museums were used by the French, the English, Americans, and even the Iraqis in attempts to underline the contemporary Western culture's superiority to the primitive Middle Easterners, while displaying instead Western arrogance and an inability to appreciate difference and the past. While of course still appreciating the Western museum's superiority to Isis, Tugendhaft calls into question dishonest narratives sometimes woven by figures in the history of places he at the same time very much seems to love, such as the British Museum and the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Museums are indeed a mark of superiority of the Western liberal use of images over that of the Islamic State. While museums may signal the death of art by trading its cult value for exhibition value, this exchange allows for museums, potentially, to embody the pluralist sphere that Tugendhaft identifies with the political. But as is the case with Middle Eastern antiquity, as he rightly emphasizes, the high goal is a custom more honored in the breach than in the observance.

The West now has its own newly vinted problems with images. The prophet to which al-Farabi looked for a model has been replaced by Facebook and its divisive algorithms determining which images we, the multitude, will see. They give us a sense of being ever more free while making us ever more enchained. Tugendhaft suggests that we, too, unknowingly fall into a kind of endless submission to the will of God just as did the Islamic State. Only now, God and the lawgiver have been replaced by the programmers. The solution, Tugendhaft suggests, is learning to live with imperfect images and, above all, learning to critique them. By endlessly questioning the images and demonstrating how they are not the truth, we can learn how to live together.

BOOK EXCERPT

When I began working on *The Idols of ISIS: From Assyria to the Internet*, I used research funds to buy myself a PlayStation gaming console and a copy of *Call of Duty*. It was already being widely reported that Islamic State (IS) had a fondness for the first-person shooter video game and I wanted to experience the appeal firsthand. I didn't get far. Lacking the skill to progress beyond the first campaign, I ultimately gave up and instead asked one of my students known for his skill at such games to identify moments that corresponded to scenes in Islamic State videos and record his play for me. I got the research I needed and he got paid for playing.

Since my book focuses on Islamic State's destruction of antiquities, I was particularly excited when my student showed me a scene from *Call of Duty: Black Ops 2*. Set in the 1980s, the game's protagonist, US Special Forces operative Alex Mason, travels to Afghanistan where he must blow up part of a structure in order to block a Soviet advance. The building resembles the twelfth-century madrasa complex Gumbad-i Chisht-e Sharif. (The campaign opens with Mason looking up as his partner rappels down the Bamiyan

Buddhas – famed, by the time of the game’s release in 2012, for their destruction by the Taliban more than a decade earlier.) My student also identified parallel depictions of aerial bombardment, drive-by shootings (à la *Grand Theft Auto*), and an elaborate interrogation scene.

Many of these images originate not in the imagination of American video game programmers but in media coverage of American wars. Anyone who came of age watching news coverage of the 1990-1991 Persian Gulf War, as I did, can’t fail to associate aerial bombardment with the new vision of warfare offered by camera-equipped “smart bombs.” Similarly, the prisoner’s orange jumpsuit in the interrogation scene pulls directly from images of prisoners at Guantanamo Bay following the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.

In reproducing such images in its videos, Islamic State intentionally mirrors images of American imperialism. In other words, IS videos imitate video games that are themselves imitations of the real world. This does not mean that one somehow returns through them to the real world itself. The play element of the video game is preserved in the world IS imagines—albeit with serious consequences.

In June 2012, IS began to release a series of videos on the internet called *Saleel al-Sawarim* (Clanging of the Swords). The first instalments were rather wooden compilations of polemical speeches and combat footage. But the fourth, released in May 2014, displays greater rhetorical sophistication. Stylistically mimicking sequences from combat video games, the hour-long video opens with a computer-generated satellite image of the Middle East that zooms into drone-shot aerial footage of Fallujah. A dizzying spin immerses the viewer in street-to-street fighting at the very heart of Islamic State’s world. By imitating the first-person shooter perspective, subsequent scenes reiterate the video-game quality of life in the Caliphate. The final sequence shows a man walking across a peaceful field, carrying a large IS flag fluttering gloriously in the wind. As in a video game’s metastory, *Saleel al-Sawarim 4* closes with an image of justice triumphant.

Videos like *Saleel al-Sawarim 4* provide a glimpse of the kind of world IS offers its adherents—a world already familiar to those who have grown up on video games and have sometimes been recruited through online gaming networks. One IS fighter even told a BBC journalist that his new life in the Caliphate was “better than that game *Call of Duty*.” The Islamic State’s recourse to a video-game idiom has consequently been interpreted as a recruitment technique.

Though true as far as it goes, this interpretation seems too simple. Why would someone wish permanently to inhabit a video game? The gaming aspect must be significant: first-person shooter video games offer a very particular form of play.

In *Homo Ludens* (1938), a classic treatise on play, the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga defines play as “a voluntary activity or occupation executed within certain fixed limits of time and place, according to rules freely accepted but absolutely binding, having its aim in itself and accompanied by a feeling of tension, joy, and consciousness that it is different from ordinary life.” First-person shooter video games exhibit these characteristics. The gaming console, which can be turned on or off at will, both provides a place for play and circumscribes play within a finite time. One is free not to play, but once playing one must accept the game’s rules.

Play, Huizinga writes, brings a “temporary, limited perfection” into an imperfect world. It creates an order in which political action is neither needed nor possible. That temporary escape from politics becomes permanent in the world Islamic State videos imagine. Instead of “standing quite consciously outside ‘ordinary’ life,” Islamic State’s play-space is coextensive with ordinary life—to the degree such a life can still be called ordinary. Yet we lose an essential part of ourselves when we cannot stop playing. Huizinga recognized the horrors that accompany unending play. Writing on the eve of World War II, he saw no redemption in “the spectacle of a society rapidly goose-stepping into helotry.” (British propaganda filmmaker Charles A. Ridley responded more playfully by re-editing footage taken from Leni Riefenstahl’s *Triumph of the Will*.)

IS videos, like fascist pageants, draw us into a world with no exit from play. They promise viewers a transformation like the one undergone by the protagonist of the dystopian online series *My Life as a Video Game*, an incessant gamer who finds himself pulled into the world of the games he plays.

Games like *Call of Duty* give players explicit, unambiguous tasks. In *Black Ops 2*, for instance, Alex Mason is tasked with gathering intel on the Menendez cartel. Toward this end, he must investigate Raul Menendez’s connection with the Soviets, defend a mujahideen base, retake a weapons cache, and interrogate a Russian prisoner. All of these actions are embedded within the game’s metastory: the need to bring Menendez to justice for his anti-American activities. Players choose the steps to take to accomplish each task. Head right or left? Use the AK-47 assault rifle or a Makarov pistol? But they never consider whether the tasks are worth pursuing in the first place. To live within such a video game would be to forego the prerequisite for political life: evaluating what constitutes the good for a group of people living together. One must simply obey the programmer’s all-encompassing law. Hacking is akin to miracles, not politics.

Some gamers, it should be noted, aren’t satisfied with a life of obedience. “Griefers” are players who deliberately irritate and harass other players, using aspects of the game in unintended ways. They seek freedom in a world of necessity. In refusing to adhere to the game’s intended form of play, griefers challenge assumptions like the primacy of the win and the value of teamwork. Such transgressive play parodies standard modes and disrupts or shifts the game’s end goal. Operating entirely within the game’s mechanical parameters, grieving exposes the laws of the video game world to questioning. Griefers are the gadflies of the game-world. Not surprisingly, conventional players have developed methods to police their transgressive behaviour.

Play can be an important form of experimentation. In his recent book, *Experimental Games: Critique, Play, and Design in the Age of Gamification*, Patrick Jagoda argues that video games provide opportunities for staging, processing, and testing experience. They allow us to try out alternative worlds, which makes us more adept at making judgments within this one. Video games, Jagoda shows, can be a valuable tool for cultivating our political selves. But this requires always maintaining the distinction between our world and the game world. Playing games isn’t the same as inhabiting one.

In fact, life inside a game-world makes playing impossible. Media theorist Alexander Galloway helpfully distinguishes between “diegetic” and “non-diegetic”

video-game actions. Diegetic actions involve characters and events that are presumed to exist within the game's narrative world; nondiegetic actions are external to the pretend world of character and story but still part of the game. For example, nobody within the game-world presses Pause, but pressing Pause is as much part of a first-person shooter game as firing a weapon. Nondiegetic actions occur at the border between the narrative world of the game and the world we inhabit in everyday life. That is where actual gameplay occurs. Within the diegetic realm, one isn't so much playing as being played.

IS videos only appear to offer a world of play. They appeal, rather, to a deeply-rooted desire to obey. In the Caliphate, one can never press Pause.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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Allegra de Laurentiis

AN EARLY TRANSLATION OF ARISTOTLE'S DE ANIMA BY G. W. F. HEGEL

Hegel's partial translations of *De Anima*, contained in the *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* from Heidelberg and Berlin (held between 1816 and 1831), have been available to Anglophone scholars since the earliest translation (by E. S. Haldane and F. H. Simson, 1892-96), and then in the improved edition by Robert F. Brown, J. M. Stewart and H. S. Harris (2009). The text offered here is instead the first English translation of an earlier German translation of *De Anima*, which Hegel prepared, in all probability, for use in his gymnasium classes at Nürnberg between 1808 and 1816. It encompasses only *De Anima's* III.4 (starting midway) and the entirety of III.5. The text can be found in *Hegel. Gesammelte Werke*, vol. 10, tome 2. It is far less polished than the later translations contained in the *Lectures* (and transcribed by his students), but of no less significance to scholars interested in Hegel's indebtedness to ancient Greek philosophy, particularly to Aristotle's conception of a "developmental" continuity from life to $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ – mirrored in Hegel's systematic philosophy as a continuity from the *Idee des Lebens* to the concept of *Geist*.

Francisco J. Gonzalez

INTRODUCTION TO HEIDEGGER'S 1921 SUMMER SEMESTER SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE'S DE ANIMA AS RECORDED IN THE HANDWRITTEN NOTES OF HELENE WEISS AND OSKAR BECKER

In 1921 Heidegger offered the first of many seminars he would give during the 1920s dedicated to the texts and thought of Aristotle. The seminar is of great importance not only because it is the first, but most of all because, in focusing on Aristotle's *De Anima*, it starts developing an ontology of life that both anticipates and also promises more than the analysis of Dasein Heidegger would undertake several years later in *Being and Time*. Indeed, during the intervening years, *De Anima* is abandoned as a focus of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle and with it the attempt to develop an account of the being of life as *such*. Despite its great importance, this seminar does not figure in the publishing plan of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, and it is here reconstructed for the first time through the publication, translation, and collation of two student transcripts, those of Helene Weiss and Oskar Becker, supplemented at points by a third by Elli Bondi (preserved with the notes of Weiss).

Alejandro G. Vigo

HEIDEGGER – DE ANIMA SS 1921: PRESENTATION

The seminar on the *De Anima* in the summer semester of 1921 begins Heidegger's attempt at phenomenological appropriation of Aristotle in the context of a more ambitious program: the elaboration of a phenomenologically adequate ontology of human life and praxis, that is, an ontology that is freed from the constraints of the uncritical generalization of the traditional ontology of substance. The strategy of reading Aristotle starting from the *De Anima* aims to situate his conception, from the beginning, in the biological field and, with this, to block the usual misconstructions of his ontological conception in logicist terms.

Mark Shiffman

COMMENTS ON HEIDEGGER'S 1921 DE ANIMA SEMINAR

In the first seminar he taught on Aristotle, Heidegger elaborates the problem of soul in *De Anima* I both as source of inquiry (ontological) and as entity characterized in (ontic) terms of οὐσία and ἐντελέχεια in a way that foreshadows his analytic of Dasein in *Being and Time*. He also attempts to free the reading of Aristotle from the interpretive framework of the neo-Kantians

by showing how Aristotle, like Husserl, recognizes that prior to all conceptualizing and logical systematizing lies the encounter with beings elucidated by phenomenology. Analyzing *Metaphysics Z*'s treatment of definition in terms of the logos of assertion, Heidegger emphasizes that the question of what definition accomplishes is not a question of logic but rather one of access to the entity we are examining, the τὸδε τι. Thus Aristotle, like Husserl, takes scientific questioning back to its more radical grounding in the experience of given beings; but both, while examining this givenness itself, leave important questions unasked by resting there. Accordingly, Heidegger further traces this "starting-point of the Aristotelian concept-formation" (in the making-determinate through assertion) back to the phenomenal region of craft-formation (ποίησις) and argues that this guides Aristotle's interpretation of living beings (particularly in *De Anima* II) as manifesting δύναμις in their various determinate modes of being (ἐντελέχεια). This reading foreshadows not only the hermeneutical priority of the ready-to-hand over the present-at-hand in *Being and Time* but also Heidegger's later narrative of Western metaphysics as harboring within itself from the beginning the understanding of being as Nietzschean will-to-power.

Diego De Brasi

HEIDEGGER'S 1921 SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA*: A CLASSICIST'S POINT OF VIEW

In this paper, I examine some "philological" aspects of Heidegger's approach to Aristotle's *De Anima*. In particular, I analyze, first, his didactic method in order to highlight how difficult a reconstruction of his analysis on the basis of his pupils' notes is. Further, I suggest that his examination of *De Anima* must be read within the context of German scholarship on Aristotle in the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Finally, I focus on a few specific topics and argue that Heidegger's interpretation, though intricate and difficult to reconstruct, is based on solid philological premises.

Erick Raphael Jiménez

COMMENTARY ON HELENE WEISS'S NOTES ON HEIDEGGER'S 1921 SUMMER SEMINAR ON ARISTOTLE

This essay offers a thematic reconstruction of Heidegger's 1921 seminar on Aristotle, with special attention to the various novel avenues of Aristotelian interpretation explored in it. Although Heidegger presents Aristotle as, in many ways, a systematic thinker, in the traditional sense, his acute, literal attention to the Aristotelian texts discloses an Aristotle that challenges the Aristotelian orthodoxy of Heidegger's time and offers up fresh insight into the seminar's guiding question: What is life? I show, in particular, how certain details of the seminar reveal an emergent, fresh orientation toward the Aristotelian texts, and I develop a few of Heidegger's interpretive views beyond their suggestive mention in the seminar.

Abraham P. Bos

ARISTOTLE'S *EUDEMUS* AS THE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK OF HIS *DE ANIMA*

In antiquity, Aristotle's dialogue *Eudemus* or *On the Soul* was dismissed as irrelevant by Alexander of Aphrodisias; in the modern debate, as an impassioned occasional text and as an early Platonist work. No sound alternative has ever been proposed. These views are refuted in this contribution, which argues instead that the work belongs to the "exoteric writings" and formulated the philosophy of Aristotle that established his reputation in antiquity. Its analysis may also contribute to a revision of the age-old misinterpretation of Aristotle's text, *De Anima* II 1, with its famous definition of the soul. For Aristotle, the soul of mortal creatures is "the first entelechy of the pneuma that serves the soul as an instrument" in order to produce and capacitate the visible body until the soul is "awakened" to mental activity and intellect. In the *Eudemus*, Aristotle gave a more comprehensive insight into "life" and "real life" than in his lecture treatise *De Anima*.

Gilbert Gérard

HEGEL: TRANSLATOR AND READER OF ARISTOTLE'S *DE ANIMA*

The subject of this article is Hegel's annotated translation of two key passages from Aristotle's *De Anima*, in which the Stagirite articulates the distinction between passive and active νοῦς from Chapters 4 and 5 of Book III. The article aims at dating this translation, placing it in the context of the relation of Hegel to Aristotle, and, finally, providing it with a commentary as accurate as possible. This threefold approach makes it possible to draw two major conclusions, one (1) pertaining to the decisive importance of Aristotle to Hegel and particularly to Hegel's metaphysics and philosophy of spirit, the other (2) to the very specific manner in which Hegel interprets the distinction between passive and active νοῦς, beginning with the distinction between δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, which can be traced virtually "everywhere" in Aristotle, and arriving at the divine thought that is distinguished from the finite human thought according to its specific modalities.

John Sallis

HEIDEGGER AS TRANSLATOR

The essay interweaves the discussion of Heidegger's views on translation with an account of the author's conversation with Heidegger himself. Heidegger points out that intralingual translation is more difficult than a translation from one language into another. He focuses on the translation of ἀλήθεια as ὀρθότης and ἀλήθεια as *Unverborgenheit*, which he proposed in *Plato's Doctrine of Truth*. The conversation turns to the problem of systematicity of philosophy and ends with a discussion of various concepts found in *Being and Time*, such as *echt*, *eigentlich*, *existential*, *existentiell*, *Bewandtnis*, *Entschlossenheit*, and *Geoffnetsein*. The concluding part of the essay presents a reconstruction of Heidegger's views on translation and considers the question of the domain, the importance of *Wiederholung* and *Überlieferung* in the process of translation, and the relation of translation to interpretation.

Claudia Baracchi

IMAGES, OFFSPRING, AND HIDING PLACES: TRACES OF THE GOOD IN PLATO'S THOUGHT

The Platonic Socrates addresses the question of the good in the central books of the *Republic*. Not knowing the truth concerning the good, he will reluctantly offer an account of the "offspring" and "interest" of the good – an outline of its semblance and phenomenal suggestiveness. Thus, the discourse of the *Republic* develops a tension between the philosopher kings (who are supposed to know) and Socrates. Far from simply revealing a constitutive inadequacy, Socrates's posture, which points beyond the order of eidetic knowledge, may end up embodying the utmost philosophical accomplishment. The good appears as a generative principle. In its superabundance, it gives rise to the whole range of manifestation, visible and invisible. On one hand, it opens up the region of intellect and the intellect. On the other hand, as the father of the sun and distant progenitor of becoming, it underlies all manners of sensibility. The regions of sensibility and of intelligibility emerge in their originary continuity, as the continuum of increasing or decreasing manifestness. One can discern here prodromes of the emanative movement variously elaborated in the Neoplatonic lineages and assimilated into the Judeo-Persian-Arabic traditions. Passages from the *Symposium*, *Philebus*, and *Timaeus* are also considered.

Kevin Corrigan

IS THE IDEA OF GOOD BEYOND BEING?

What is a reasonable interpretation of Socrates's statement that the Good is "beyond being"? Does this mean that the Good has no being at all, as Rafael Ferber and Gregor Damschen maintain? This would mean that the Idea of the Good is ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας in the sense of being beyond being altogether: ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος. This is a position (when the Good is identified with the One) espoused by Plotinus, later Neoplatonists, and many others, including Schleiermacher, and more recently the Tübingen school. On the other hand, does ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας mean not that the Good is beyond being altogether – that is, ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος (since Plato does not say this) – but rather that the Idea of the Good should be understood in Middle Platonic terms as "something like the highest being, τὸ ὄν αὐτό, which bestows upon all other things their being," as Matthias Baltes argues: "the Idea of the Good is a νοητόν, and as such it is an ὄν"? Luc Brisson adopts a similar position. For him, the linguistic exaggeration embedded in Glaucon's "miraculous superiority" (δαίμονιας ὑπερβολῆς) effectively undercuts the statement ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, showing that the superiority of the Good over being is only relative, "not an absolute superiority as will be the case with Plotinus." Here I will argue for a different interpretation, partly because I think that Baltes's and Brisson's formulations are inaccurate and partly because the dichotomy between the so-called absolute superiority of Plotinus's position and the relative superiority of the Middle Platonic position overlooks some complexities of Plotinus's own different formulations. While I do not deny that Plotinus holds that the Good is ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος, something that Plato never says, these complexities provide a different way of finding a more nuanced ground between the absolute and the relative positions as so formulated.

Magdalena Mateja-Furmanik

RETURN TO NATURE: RETURN TO PLATO

John Sallis undertakes a task of reintroducing the concept of nature that would be neither sentimental nor based on dualistic assumptions where the counterpart of nature is "I" or spirit. This work attempts to provide a foundation for thought that would work as a counterforce for the thought that has led to the ecological crisis. First, Sallis explains to us the dichotomy of nature and spirit through the works of Ralph Emerson and German idealists. In general "nature" is understood as all that is "not me," and its role is to embody "the other" so that spirit animating passive matter may reach self-recognition by differentiating itself with an act of negation. As Sallis demonstrates, within such ontology neither spirit nor nature is fundamental even though eventually spirit has dominated nature. Sallis searches for a philosophy that not simply favors one term or another within dualistic ontology but disrupts dualism itself. For this ascending toward space beyond being turns out to be essential. The author investigates the works of Friedrich Schelling and exposes his idea of grounding, then turns to Plato and points toward the idea of the good from the *Republic*, the role

of difference in the *Sophist*, and χώρα in the *Timaeus*. Of those three, χώρα seems to have a special place because it is present throughout the whole book. *The Return of Nature* is an amalgam of thinking beyond being and special concern for concrete content. According to Sallis, such natural elementals as the sky, wind, or earth do not accord with the ontological paradigm of thinghood. As he demonstrates, their lack of clear, ontological determination means that they are situated directly within χώρα.

Mieszko Wandowicz

EXISTENCE AND APPEARANCE: TWO ASPECTS OF BEING

In this review article of Emanuele Severino's essay *Returning to Parmenides*, I argue that Severino was a very important thinker, even if in fact his text was not about the philosopher of Elea himself but just inspired by his poem. Severino claimed that Parmenides was the last one who really understood the problem of Being. The Italian philosopher wrote about the so-called betrayal of ontology (by such different thinkers as Melissus of Samos, Aristotle, Marx, Hegel, and Heidegger), caused by "gnoseological-Socratic distraction." The main defect of post-Parmenidean classical metaphysics, according to the Italian writer, is its departure from the complete opposition between the positive and the negative – and this is in favor of an incomplete opposition. An example repeatedly quoted by Severino is the principle of noncontradiction because it is precisely this principle that the author considers contradictory: since it is said that one cannot be and not be at the same time, the possibility of existence is also granted to non-Being – it is enough that one does not impose Being on it. I also argue that there are some deficiencies in Severino's work, but this does not change the fact that the essay is an important part of the philosophy of the twentieth century.

Justyna Horbowska

ERNST BLOCH'S RETRIEVAL OF ARISTOTELIANISM FROM ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

Ernst Bloch, the philosopher of hope and speculative materialism, located the sources of his naturalistic views in the philosophy of Aristotle, and especially in its interpretations by the philosophers of the Orient. In his book titled *Avicenna and the Aristotelian Left*, he proposed three main theses formulated on the basis of Aristotle's *Treatise on the Soul*: the doctrine of the soul and body, the argument of active understanding or universal human intelligence, and finally the most important, the relationship between matter and form, between potentiality and potency in the world.

Gabriel Pihas

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY OF IMAGES

The review of Aaron Tugendhaft's *Idols of Isis* discusses the author's treatment of contemporary parallels with ancient iconoclasm. Tugendhaft discusses Al-Farabi's implicit critique of iconoclasm. He shows that Al-Farabi's awareness of the necessity of images in politics suggests a lack of self-understanding in ancient and modern iconoclasm. Tugendhaft shows that this reflection on images has much to teach us about our current conundrums about images in everything from Facebook to video games.

The philosophical quarterly *Kronos* was established in 2007 by scholars connected with the University of Warsaw and the University of Białystok. Metaphysics, the philosophy of politics, the philosophy of literature and religion, history of psychoanalysis comprise the thematic scope of the journal. The editors of the quarterly strive to familiarize the Polish reader with new translations and commentaries of classic works (Plato, Joachim of Fiore, Nicholas of Cusa, Shakespeare, Schelling, the Schlegel brothers, Heidegger, and many others), as well as the work of contemporary philosophers.

The annual *Kronos Philosophical Journal* (in English) was established in 2012 as a companion edition to the quarterly, to supplement it, yet without repeating the content of the Polish edition. The papers presented in the annual might be of interest to the readers from outside Poland, allowing them to familiarize themselves with the dynamic thought of contemporary Polish authors, as well as entirely new topics, rarely discussed by English-speaking authors. One of the issues published so far contained passages from previously unknown lectures by Leo Strauss on Aristotle; another issue was dedicated to the Russian phenomenologist Gustav Shpet.

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